Foundations of Software Engineering

Taint Analysis Miguel Velez



Learning goals

- Define taint analysis.
- Compare the dynamic and static approaches, as well as their benefits and limitations.
- Apply the analysis to several examples
- Understand how dynamic and static analyses can be combined to overcome the limitations of each other.



DYNAMIC ANALYSIS



Dynamic Analysis

- Learn about program's properties by executing it.
- Examine program state throughout/ after execution by gathering additional information.



Performance Analysis

How would you learn about method execution time?



```
1. void main(a) {
2.  if(a > 0) {
3.    sleep_ms(a);
4.  else {
5.    sleep_ms(1000);
6.  }
7. }
```

```
1. void main(a) {
2. start("main");
3. if(a > 0) {
4. sleep_ms(a);
5. else {
6. sleep_ms(1000);
7. }
8. end("main");
9. }
```

Benefits



Benefits

- Analyzes the state of the program in a runtime environment.
- If the property we are looking for is found, we can be sure that it exists.
- Validate static analysis findings.



Limitations



Limitations

- Input dependent
- Cannot explore all paths
- Cost of tracking information
- Heisenbuggy behavior



STATIC ANALYSIS



Static Analysis


- Learn about program's properties without executing it.
- Systematic examination of an abstraction of a program





Zero Analysis

How would you learn if you divide by 0?































Benefits



Benefits

- Analyzes all possible executions of the program.
- Pinpoint in code where issues occur.
- Detects issues in the early stages of development.



Limitations



Limitations

- Rice's Theorem: Every static analysis is necessarily incomplete or unsound or undecidable (or multiple of these).
- Difficult to track runtime properties.
- Can analyze parts of the program that are never executed.



TAINT ANALYSIS



Taint Analysis

- Information flow analysis.
- Used in the security domain.
- Tracking how private information flows through the program and if it is leaked to public observers.



```
1. input = get_input();
2. tmp = "select ..." + input;
3. query(tmp);
4. log(tmp);
```

```
1. input = get_input();
2. tmp = "select ..." + input;
3. query(tmp);
4. log(tmp);
Warning!
```

Terminology

- Sources
 - Private data of interest

- Sinks
 - Locations of interest
 - Check taints of incoming information
 - Determines if there is a leak in the program.



```
1. input = get_input();
2. tmp = "select ..." + input;
3. query(tmp);
4. log(tmp);
```

```
1. input = Source();
2. tmp = "select ..." + input;
3. Sink(tmp);
4. log(tmp);
```

DYNAMIC TAINT ANALYSIS



Dynamic Taint Analysis

 Track what are the taints that are influencing the values of the program.



```
    x = get_input();
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    print(w);
```

```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```

```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```




```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```


$$x \longrightarrow 0 \rightarrow T$$

$$y \longrightarrow 1 \rightarrow NT$$


```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```




```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```



```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```



```
    x = Source(0);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```



Leak in the program!



Is there a leak? Why? Why not?

```
1. x = Source(0);
2. \quad y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
4. z = 2
5. }
6. else {
7. z = 1
8.
9. Sink(z);
```

- Tainted data affects the value of another variable indirectly.
- Needed for sound analysis.




```
x = Source(0);
  y = x; Explicit information flow
  if(y == 0) {
3.
4.
       z = 2
                     Implicit information flow
5.
    else {
7.
8.
   Sink(z);
```


```
1. x = Source(0);
  y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
  z = 2
4.
5.
  else {
     z = 1
7.
8.
  Sink(z);
```



```
x = Source(0);
  y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
4.
    z = 2
5.
  else {
7.
      z = 1
8.
  Sink(z);
```



```
x = Source(0);
  y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
    z = 2
4.
5.
  else {
7.
      z = 1
8.
    Sink(z);
```



Leak in the program!




Try it yourself

```
x = Source(1);
2.
  y = 0;
3. while(x > 0) {
4.
       y = y + 1;
      x = x - 1;
5.
6.
7.
  z = y;
  Sink(y);
8.
  Sink(z);
9.
```

Try it yourself

```
x = Source(1);
2.
   y = 0;
  while(x > 0) {
3.
4.
        y = y + 1;
       x = x - 1;
5.
6.
7.
    z = y;
    Sink(y);
8.
    Sink(z);
9.
```



Leaks in the program!



Limits of Dynamic Analysis

- Results are input dependent.
- Implicit flows needed for sound analysis, but difficult to track*.

*Stayed tuned for the end of lecture.



STATIC TAINT ANALYSIS



Static Taint Analysis

 Track, at each instruction, what are the taints that are influencing the variables of the program.



```
    x = Source(i);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
```

```
    x = Source(i);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    x→T, z→T
    x→T, z→T, w→T
    Sink(w);
```


```
    x = Source(i);
    y = 1;
    z = x;
    w = y + z;
    Sink(w);
    x→T, z→T, w→T
    x→T, z→T, w→T
```

Leak in the program!





```
1. x = Source(i);
2. \quad y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
4. z = 0
5. }
6. else {
7. z = 1
8.
9. Sink(z);
```

```
x = Source(i, "A");
1.
2.
    y = x;
3.
    if(y == 0) {
4.
      z = 0
5.
6.
     else {
7.
      z = 1
8.
9.
    Sink(z);
```



```
1.
    x = Source(i);
2.
    y = x;
3.
    if(y == 0) {
4.
       z = 0
5.
6.
     else {
7.
       z = 1
8.
9.
    Sink(z);
```









Kildall's Worklist Algorithm


```
for Instruction i in program
    input[i] = \bot
input[firstInstruction] = initialDataflowInformation
worklist = { firstInstruction }
while worklist is not empty
    take an instruction i off the worklist
    output = flow(i, input[i])
    for Instruction j in succs(i)
        if output \pm input[j]
            input[j] = input[j] \( \to \) output
            add j to worklist
```



Input					
Stmt	X	У	Z		
1					
2					
3					
4					
7					
9					








Input					
Stmt	X	У	Z		
1	NT	NT	NT		
2	T	NT	NT		
3	Т	Т	NT		
4	Т	Т	NT		
7	Т	Т	NT		
9	Τ	Т	Т		

Stmt	Worklist	X	У	Z
1	2	Τ	NT	NT
2	3	厂	T	NT
3	4,7	Τ	Т	NT
4	7,9		Т	Т
7	9	Т	Т	Τ
9		Τ	Т	Т






(exit)

Input				
Stmt	X	У	Z	
1	NT	NT	NT	
2	Т	NT	NT	
3	Т	Т	NT	
4	Т	Т	NT	
7	Т	Т	NT	
9	Τ	Т	Т	

Stmt	Worklist	X	У	Z
1	2	Т	NT	NT
2	3	Τ	T	NT
3	4,7	Τ	Τ	NT
4	7,9	Т	Т	Т
7	9	Т	Т	T
9		Τ	Т	Т

Leak in the program!





Input						
Stmt	Stmt x y z					
1	MT	MT	MT			
2	Τ	MT	MT			
3	Τ	Т	MT			
4	Τ	Т	MT			
7	Τ	Т	MT			
9	Τ	T	T			


Stmt	Worklist	X	У	Z
1	2	T	MT	MT
2	3	Τ	T	MT
3	4,7	Τ	T	MT
4	7,9	Τ	T	Т
7	9	Τ	T	Т
9		T	Т	T

Leak in the program!



Try it yourself

```
1. x = Source(i);
2. \quad y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
  z = 0
6. else {
   z = 1
8.
  Sink(z);
```



Input				
Stmt	x	у	Z	
1	NT	NT	NT	
2	Т	NT	NT	
3	Т	MT	NT	
4	Т	MT	NT	
5	Т	MT	NT	
7	Т	MT	NT	
8	Т	MT	MT	
9	Τ	MT	MT	

Stmt	Worklist	x	У	Z
1	2	T	NT	NT
2	3	Т	NT	NT
3	4,7	Т	NT	NT
4	5,7	Т	Т	NT
5	3,7	Т	Т	NT
3	4,7	Т	MT	NT
4	5,7	Т	MT	NT
5	7	Т	MT	NT
7	8	Т	MT	MT
8	9	T	MT	MT
9		T	MT	MT

Possible leak in the program!



Limits of Static Analysis

- Do not know what values might cause the leak.
- Overtainting



```
    x = Source(args[0]);
    Object o = foo();
    v = o.equals(x);
```

```
    x = Source(args[0]);
    Object o = foo();
    v = o.equals(x);
```

All implementation of equals analyzed!

```
1. x = Source(args[0]);
2. if(Math.max(1, x) == 0) {
3.   Sink(x);
4. }
```

Overtainting anti-patterns

```
    i = foo();
    j = i + 1;
    a[i] = Source();
    a[j] = 0;
    Sink(a);
    Sink(a[i]);
    Sink(a[j]);
```

Overtainting anti-patterns


```
    i = foo();
    j = i + 1;
    a[i] = Source(); ← Taints the whole array
    a[j] = 0;
    Sink(a); a→T
    Sink(a[i]); a[i]→T
    Sink(a[j]); a[j]→T
```

COMBINING DYNAMIC AND STATIC ANALYSIS



Implicit Flows in Dynamic Analysis

```
x = Source(0);
  y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
  z = 2
  else {
7.
     z = 1
8.
   Sink(z);
```




Leak in the program!



Implicit Flows in Dynamic Analysis

```
x = Source(3);
  y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
  z = 2
  else {
7.
     z = 1
8.
   Sink(z);
```



Leak in the program!



Is there a leak? Why? Why not?



Is there a leak? Why? Why not?

```
    x = Source(3);
    y = x;
    z → 1→NT
    if(y == 0) {
    z = 2
    }
    Sink(z);
```

No leak in the program!



Different result for Semantically the same Program?

```
1. x = Source(3);
2. \quad y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
  z = 3
4.
5. }
6. else {
7.
    z = 1
8. }
    Sink(z);
9.
     Leak!
```

No Leak!



Fundamental Issue

- In dynamic taint analysis, some implicit flows are hard to track
- If the code is not executed, we do not track its information.



How would you solve this issue?


```
1. x = Source(3);
2. \quad y = x;
3. if(y == 0) {
  z = 2
5. }
6. else {
7.
    z = 1
8. }
    Sink(z);
9.
    Leak!
```


No Leak!



```
    x = Source(i);
    y = x;
    z = 1;
    if(y == 0) {
    z = 2
    }
    Sink(z);
```








```
1.          x = Source(3);
2.          y = x;
3.          z = 1;

5.          if(y == 0) {
6.          z = 2
7.        }
8.          Sink(z);
```



Leak in the program!



Is there a leak? Why? Why not?

```
1. x = Source(3);
2. \quad y = x;
3. z = 1;
4. \quad w = 1;
5. if(y == 0) {
6. z = 2
7. if(x == 0) {
8. W = 0;
9.
10. }
11. Sink(w);
```



Limits of Branch-not-taken Analysis

```
1. x = Source(3);
2. \quad y = x;
3. z = 1;
4. W = 1;
6. if(y == 0) {
7. z = 2
  if(x == 0) {
10. W = 0;
11.
12. }
13. Sink(w);
```



INTERPROCEDURAL ANALYSIS



Interprocedural Analysis

```
1. main() {
2.     x = Source(1);
3.     y = 1;
4.     z = foo(x);
5.     Sink(z);
6.     z = foo(y);
7.     Sink(z);
8. }
1. foo(x) {
2.     y = x * 2;
3.     return x;
4. }
5.     Sink(z);
6.     z = foo(y);
7. Sink(z);
```

Interprocedural Analysis

```
main() {
                               foo(x) {
      x = Source(1);
                                y = x * 2;
                                 return x;
3.
      y = 1;
  z = foo(x);
4.
      Sink(z);
5.
      z = foo(y);
6.
      Sink(z);
7.
                          Information with
8. }
                            context T
```

Interprocedural Analysis

```
main() {
                                    foo(x) {
       x = Source(1);
                                       y = x * 2;
                                       return x;
3.
       y = 1;
       z = foo(x);
4.
       Sink(z);
       z = foo(y);
6.
       Sink(z);
7.
                              Information with
8. }
                                context T
                              Information with
                                context NT
```

Summary

- Taint analysis is an information flow analysis to detect if private data is leaked in the program.
- Compare benefits and limitations of dynamic and static approaches.
- Can be combined to overcome the limitations of the other.

