



# Purplesale

smart contracts final audit report

April 2024





# **Contents**

1. Disclaimer	3
2. Overview	4
3. Project centralization risks	7
4. Found issues	8
5. Contracts	11
6. Conclusion	19
Appendix A. Issues' severity classification	20
Appendix B. Issue status description	21
Appendix C. List of examined issue types	22
Appendix D. Centralization risks classification	23

### 1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below - please make sure to read it in full.

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### 2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the PurpleSale team to perform an audit of their smart contracts. The audit was conducted between 08/04/2024 and 10/04/2024.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code was provided directly in .sol files.

SHA-1 hashes of the audited files are:

ldatabase.sol dab50cc1bec0466d0fb69ce19731a22b1b15b770

IPancakeRouter.sol 70431d3132d17524fb198a9f72adb6de4f534194

IPancakePair.sol c6c84bb5f6acd9380fe4e6f5ea4680201d46553c

IPancakeFactory.sol ab14c38a99b110a33f4f088b9b3791d892da3423

FairLaunch/ICO.sol 44185f81a37ff5ff03313f4e804b163cbdda2590

FairLaunch/BasicStructs.sol 353edc062ba36b33b76ee0e1cabd20f4d4a9b1d5

FairLaunch/Launch.sol a0830de8adc54eddd06b59fb993f93118f1a41fb

Presale/ICO.sol 7fccaaa44c2b2d4d37b3c76ec086819ae2d21796

Presale/BasicStructs.sol b512798c052e9605138092c68e8d864545551e59

Presale/Launch.sol 0cd71fea912bcf155f5b34db82bfe59aa03a62b0

**Update.** The PurpleSale team has responded to this report. SHA-1 hashes of the updated files are:

FairLaunch/ICO.sol fc7a8460fb8fcb0a41b4c61f871455add857a7d3

FairLaunch/Launch.sol a5a9189e7270ed5f6fdfa5cd5f84ddf33cf2932e

Presale/ICO.sol dc35a9b67de9ff5473352d1e1ee58252f7c17371

Presale/Launch.sol 7e12524a88bc01320fee3d345c3c61598499d62d

Please note that no code verification for deployed contracts was made. Deployed code may not be the same as what was audited. To ensure that the deployed contracts are the same as those audited, users must independently verify the SHA-1 hashes of the verified contract code.

# 2.1 Summary

Project name	Purplesale
URL	https://purplesale.finance
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
Language	Solidity
Centralization level	<ul><li>High</li></ul>
Centralization risk	<ul><li>High</li></ul>

# 2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
FairLaunch ICO	
Presale ICO	
LaunchFairLaunch	
Presale Launch	
Multiple contracts	

# 3. Project centralization risks

The project is highly centralized and all sales may become malfunctioned even after successful deployment.

# 4. Found issues



# Cd2. FairLaunch ICO

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Cd2l54	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Wrong calculations in the buyTokens() function	
Cd2I61	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Arbitrary router address	
Cd2I56	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	No checks in the setVesting() function	
Cd2I58	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Wrong totalWhitelisted calculation	
Cd2I53	<ul><li>Info</li></ul>	Wrong function name	Partially fixed
Cd2I55	<ul><li>Info</li></ul>	Front-run threat	
Cd2I57	<ul><li>Info</li></ul>	Whitelist functionality isn't working	

# Cd3. Presale ICO

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Cd3I5b	<ul><li>Critical</li></ul>	No checks in the setVesting() function	⊗ Resolved
Cd3I62	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Arbitrary router address	⊗ Resolved
Cd3I64	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Simultaneous cancelling and finalization	⊗ Resolved
Cd3I5c	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Wrong totalWhitelisted calculation	⊗ Resolved
Cd3l59	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Function adminCancelPresale() isn't working	Ø Resolved
Cd3I67	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	Minimal amount limit	Ø Acknowledged
Cd3I5a	<ul><li>Info</li></ul>	Front-run threat	Ø Acknowledged

# Cd4. LaunchFairLaunch

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Cd4l65	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Lack of input validation	Partially fixed

# Cd5. Presale Launch

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Cd5l66	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Lack of input validation	Partially fixed

# Cd6. Multiple contracts

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Cd6169	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	Lack of tests and documentation	Acknowledged

#### 5. Contracts

#### Cd2. FairLaunch ICO

#### Overview

The contract allows users to purchase tokens using a native token for a user. The price for the token on a sale is determined dynamically at the end of the sale.

Any user can withdraw his position in the native token before the end of the sale (except in the case when the sale is canceled). The contract will transfer some percent of his position (in native tokens) to the admin wallet address.

A presale can be canceled by the owner of the presale or by the protocol admin. If this happens users will be able to refund their funds.

Only the owner of a presale can finalize it.

The contract doesn't have tests at all and cannot be considered completely verified and completely working. This contract may contain critical vulnerabilities since tests are necessary for complete confirmation that the contract is fully functioning.

Also, the contract doesn't have any checks on inputs coming from the owner of a presale. Any user who wants to use this contract should fully trust the owner of the presale because if the owner sets bad values for the contract, the contract may break and the user can lose his funds.

#### Issues

### Cd2I54 Wrong calculations in the buyTokens() function





For example, there are 10 tokens for sale and the token has 18 decimals. Also, users sent 100 BNB to the contract to buy tokens. In this case, the global variable ratePerBNB will be equal to (10 \* 10\*\*18 \* 10\*\*18) / (10\*\*18 \* 100 \* 10\*\*18) = 10 / 100 = 0. Because of that the

sale will be broken.

#### Recommendation

There is no need for calculation of the ratePerBNB variable in the buyTokens() function. In the Claim(), \_normalClaim(), getUsersPurchase(), and remainingTokens() functions amount of tokens can be calculated using this formula: icoInfo.data.presaleSupply \* bnbAmount / raisedBNB.

#### Update

The issue remains for the remainingTokens() function, which is the only function using the ratePerBNB variable.

#### Cd2l61 Arbitrary router address



Any user can set any router address he wants. The owner of a presale can set a malicious router address and using that router steal all funds that will come to it.

#### Recommendation

Add in the factory contract a whitelist of routers that can be used in presales.

#### Cd2I56 No checks in the setVesting() function



In the function **setVesting()** there are no checks that this function is called only once and also there is no check that the **vesting.firstPercent** variable is less than 100%.

The owner of a presale can withdraw all tokens from the contract by setting very large vesting.firstPercent variable.

#### Recommendation

These checks can be added to fix this issue:

```
require(maxPercent == 0);
require(vesting.firstPercent <= 10000);</pre>
```

#### Cd2I58 Wrong totalWhitelisted calculation

Medium

Resolved

In the addToWhiteList() and removeWhiteList() there are no checks that addresses are unique. If they are not unique then the variable totalWhitelisted will have a wrong value.

#### Cd2I53 Wrong function name

Info



Function **getLiquiditySupply()** doesn't return liquidity supply. It returns a different value.

#### Cd2l55 Front-run threat

Info

Acknowledged

A call to the endSale() function can be front-run because there are no slippage cheks.

#### Cd2I57 Whitelist functionality isn't working

Info

Resolved

In the contract there is a whitelist functionality that isn't used anywhere in the contract.

#### Cd3. Presale ICO

#### Overview

The contract allows whitelisted users to purchase tokens using a native token. The price for the token on a sale is static and determined at the deployment.

Any user can withdraw his position in the native token before the end of the sale (except in the case when the sale is canceled). The contract will transfer some percent of his position (in native tokens) to the admin wallet address.

A presale can be canceled by the owner of the presale or by the protocol admin. If this happens users will be able to refund their funds.

Only the owner of a presale can finalize it.

The contract doesn't have tests at all and cannot be considered completely verified and completely working. This contract may contain critical vulnerabilities since tests are necessary for complete confirmation that the contract is fully functioning.

Also, the contract doesn't have any checks on inputs coming from the owner of a presale. Any user who wants to use this contract should fully trust the owner of the presale because if the owner sets bad values for the contract, the contract may break and the user can lose his funds.

#### Issues

### Cd3I5b No checks in the setVesting() function





In the function **setVesting()** there are no checks that this function is called only once and also there is no check that the **vesting.firstPercent** variable is less than 100%.

The owner of a presale can withdraw all tokens from the contract by setting very large **vesting.firstPercent** variable.

#### Recommendation


These checks can be added to fix this issue:

```
require(maxPercent == 0);
require(vesting.firstPercent <= 10000);</pre>
```

#### Update

The issue remains as vesting schedule still can be updated multiple times to exceed 100% in total. Moreover, introduced checks allow any user to abuse schedule re-setting.

#### Cd3I62 Arbitrary router address



#### Recommendation

Add in the factory contract a whitelist of routers that can be used in presales.

### Cd3I64 Simultaneous cancelling and finalization

The sale owner can cancel the sale, returning all ERC20 tokens, and then call the endSale() function to obtain part of collected BNB. In this scenario, users of the sale will have nothing in return.

#### Recommendation

Deny sale finalization if it has been cancelled.

#### Cd3I5c Wrong totalWhitelisted calculation

In the addToWhiteList() and removeWhiteList() there are no checks that addresses are unique. If they are not unique then the variable totalWhitelisted will have a wrong value.

Resolved

Resolved

Resolved

High

High

Medium

### Cd3I59 Function adminCancelPresale() isn't working

Medium

Resolved

The function adminCancelPresale() isn't working because a transaction will revert due to underflow in the remainingTokens() function during the calculation of the bal variable.

All tokens are transferred from the contract in the \_cancelPresale() function that is called before the remainingTokens() function. Because of that, this underflow will happen (balance is zero, soldToken is not zero).

#### Cd3I67 Minimal amount limit

Medium

Acknowledged

Only the first purchase is checked against the <code>icoInfo.data.minAmount</code>, after that any other purchases can have zero value, and the corresponding users will be included into the contributors' address list.

#### Recommendation

Fix the logic or remove requirements.

#### Cd3I5a Front-run threat

Info

Acknowledged

A call to the endSale() function can be front-run because there are no slippage cheks.

#### Cd4. LaunchFairLaunch

#### Overview

Using this contract a user can deploy his presale with any parameters he wants. He will need to transfer fees to a staking pool address and to an admin wallet address.

#### Issues

#### Cd4l65 Lack of input validation

High

Partially fixed

The user-input data is not validated in any kind, allowing creation of malicious or vulnerable sales.

#### Recommendation

Include safety checks for the input data.

#### Cd5. Presale Launch


#### Overview

Using this contract a user can deploy his presale with any parameters he wants. He will need to transfer fees to a staking pool address and to an admin wallet address.

#### Issues

#### Cd5l66 Lack of input validation





The user-input data is not validated in any kind, allowing creation of malicious or vulnerable sales.

#### Recommendation

Include safety checks for the input data.

# Cd6. Multiple contracts

### Issues

#### Cd6l69 Lack of tests and documentation

The project doesn't contain any tests and documentation. We urgently recommend increasing test coverage. We also suggest providing the documentation section.

## 6. Conclusion

1 critical, 8 high, 4 medium severity issues were found during the audit. 1 critical, 5 high, 3 medium issues were resolved in the update. The reviewed contracts are highly dependent on the owner's account. See the centralization risks chapter.

This audit includes recommendations on code improvement and the prevention of potential attacks.

Please note that no code verification for deployed contracts was made. Deployed code may not be the same as what was audited. To ensure that the deployed contracts are the same as those audited, users must independently verify the SHA-1 hashes of the verified contract code.

# Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
   May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

# **Appendix B. Issue status description**

- ❷ Resolved. The issue has been completely fixed.
- **Partially fixed.** Parts of the issue have been fixed but the issue is not completely resolved.
- Acknowledged. The team has been notified of the issue, no action has been taken.
- **Open.** The issue remains unresolved.

# Appendix C. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

# Appendix D. Centralization risks classification

## Centralization level

- **High.** The project owners can manipulate user's funds, lock user's funds on their will (reversible or irreversible), or maliciously update contracts parameters or bytecode.
- **Medium.** The project owners can modify contract's parameters to break some functions of the project contract or contracts, but user's funds remain withdrawable.
- Low. The contract is trustless or its governance functions are safe against a malicious owner.

### Centralization risk

- **High.** Lost ownership over the project contract or contracts may result in user's losses. Contract's ownership belongs to EOA or EOAs, and their security model is unknown or out of scope.
- **Medium.** Contract's ownership is transferred to a contract with not industry-accepted parameters, or to a contract without an audit. Also includes EOA with a documented security model, which is out of scope.
- **Low.** Contract's ownership is transferred to a well-known or audited contract with industry-accepted parameters.

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