


Holygrails

smart contracts final audit report

December 2022





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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the **Holygrails** team to perform an audit of their smart contract. The audit was conducted between **2022-12-02** and **2022-12-14**.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code is available in the <u>HolyGrails-Official</u> repository. The audit was performed for commit 8c28798.

2.1 Summary

Project name	Holygrails
URL	https://www.holygrails.io/
Platform	Solana
Language	Rust

2.2 Contracts

Name	Address	
airdrop		


HashEx

sol_airdrop

staking

All programs

3. Found issues



C1. airdrop

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C1-01	Low	Lack of PDA checks	

C2. sol_airdrop

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C2-01	Low	Wrong size calculation	
C2-02	Low	Lack of PDA checks	

C3. staking

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C3-01	Low	Not full initialization	
C3-02	Low	PDA check	

C3-03	Low	Unused field	
C3-04	Info	The source of rewards	
C3-05	Info	Misleading code documentation	

C4. All programs

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C4-01	Low	Lack of custom error descriptions	

4. Contracts

C1. airdrop

Overview

The airdrop program is meant for creating and performing airdrops of SPL tokens.

A user can make an airdrop. Said user will become an admin of the airdrop, while other users can participate in this airdrop and create a data account. For tokens to be claimed, first the admin has to deposit them into the vault of the airdrop, and then a user has to ask the admin to sign his transaction for the claim.

Two signatures are needed to perform the claim: the user's and the admin's. Users can't claim tokens without the admin's signature. The amount of claimed tokens is determined by the airdrop's admin.

Issues

C1-01 Lack of PDA checks

LowResolved

In all functions except **create_airdrop()**, the account **airdrop** isn't checked for being a PDA. All PDAs that are coming from a user should be checked. Checking ownership only isn't enough.

Recommendation

The structure CreateReceiver should be changed. For example, like this:

```
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct CreateReceiver<'info> {
    // Airdrop account
    #[account(
        mut,
```

```
seeds = [
    b"AIRDROP".as_ref(),
    airdrop.creator.as_ref(),
    airdrop.token_mint.as_ref(),
],
bump = airdrop.bump,
)]
pub airdrop: Account<'info, Airdrop>,
...
```

Add similar checks for vault, receiver, airdrop accounts in other functions.

C2. sol_airdrop

Overview

The sol airdrop program is meant for creating and performing airdrops of native tokens.

A user can make an airdrop. Said user will become an admin of the airdrop, while other users can participate in this airdrop and create a data account. For tokens to be claimed, first the admin has to deposit them into the vault of the airdrop, and then a user has to ask the admin to sign his transaction for the claim.

Two signatures are needed to perform the claim: the user's and the admin's. Users can't claim tokens without the admin's signature. The amount of claimed tokens is determined by the airdrop's admin.

Issues

C2-01 Wrong size calculation

LowResolved

The variable Airdrop::SIZE is larger than the actual size of the Airdrop struct by 32.

Recommendation

Lines 301-303 should be changed to this:

```
impl Airdrop {
   pub const SIZE: usize = 32 + 1 + (32 * 3) + (8 * 2);
}
```

C2-02 Lack of PDA checks

In all functions except **create_airdrop()**, the account **airdrop** isn't checked for being a PDA. All PDAs that are coming from a user should be checked. Checking ownership only isn't enough.

Recommendation

The structure CreateReceiver should be changed. For example, like this:

```
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct CreateReceiver<'info> {
    // Airdrop account
    #[account(
        mut,
        seeds = [
            b"SOL_AIRDROP".as_ref(),
            airdrop.creator.as_ref(),
        ],
        bump = airdrop.bump,
    )]
    pub airdrop: Account<'info, Airdrop>,
    ...
```

Also, add similar checks for receiver, airdrop accounts in other functions.

Resolved

Low

C3. staking

Overview

The staking program is used for creating pools and staking in them.

Issues

C3-01 Not full initialization

In the function initialize_pool(), there is no initialization of the pending_admin field in the structure Pool.

Recommendation

In the function initialize_pool(), add the following line:

```
pool.pending_admin = Pubkey::default();
```

C3-02 PDA check

LowResolved

All PDAs that are coming from a user should be checked. Checking ownership only isn't enough.

Recommendation

The structure **CreateUser** should be changed. For example, like this:

```
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct CreateUser<'info> {
    // Stake instance.
    #[account(
        mut,
        constraint = !pool.paused @ ErrorCode::PoolPaused,
        seeds = [
```

```
b"POOL",
    pool.creator.as_ref(),
],
bump = pool.bump,
)]
pub pool: Box<Account<'info, Pool>>,
...
```

Also, add similar checks for **stake_token_vault**, **reward_token_vault**, **user** accounts in other functions.

C3-03 Unused field

In the structure **StakeEntry** the field **stake period** isn't used anywhere.

Recommendation

Reward calculation should be reconsidered or this field should be deleted.

Update

The team responded to the issue and added a comment in the code that this variable is used in UI to show the staker's inital intention for staking.

C3-04 The source of rewards

Info

Low

Resolved

Resolved

The funds for the staking rewards are added externally. In order to function the program properly there thould be enough funds deposited.

Recommendation

Clarify the source of rewards in the project's documentation and make sure there are enough funds for the rewards.

Update

The team responded to the issue and added comment in the code that the project's admin or a third party are supposed to deposit enough funds for the stakers' rewards.

C3-05 Misleading code documentation

Info



In the structure **StakeEntry**, there are incorrect comments.

```
#[derive(AnchorSerialize, AnchorDeserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone)]
pub struct StakeEntry {
    /// Pool the this user belongs to.
    pub staked_amount: u64,
    /// The owner of this account.
    pub stake_period: u64,
    /// The staked amount by the user.
    pub staked_at: u64,
    /// The claimed amount by the user.
    pub withdrawn_at: u64,
    /// The number of stakes that the user have.
    pub claimed_amount: u64,
    /// The stake entries.
    pub active: bool,
}
```

Recommendation

Update the comments to conform with the code.

C4. All programs

Overview

Issues related to all programs in the scope of audit.

Issues

C4-01 Lack of custom error descriptions

Low

Resolved

Custom error descriptions are added to the structs but not for all checks made in the structs.

For example:

```
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(amount: u64)]
pub struct Withdraw<'info> {
    /// The airdrop account.
    #[account(
         mut,
         has_one = admin @ ErrorCode::UnauthorizedAdmin,
         has_one = vault,
         has_one = token_mint
    )]
    pub airdrop: Account<'info, Airdrop>,
    ...
}
```

Recommendation

We recommend adding custom errors for every check to simplify debugging in case of errors.

Update

In the contract airdrop on lines 333,

5. Conclusion

No serious issues were found during the audit. The code is well-written and has unit tests for each program.

Appendix A. Issues severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
 May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Info.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, info severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. Issue status description

- ❷ Resolved. The issue has been completely fixed.
- **Partially fixed.** Parts of the issue have been fixed but the issue is not completely resolved.
- Acknowledged. The team has been notified of the issue, no action has been taken.
- **Open.** The issue remains unresolved.

Appendix C. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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