


ApeDAO

smart contracts preliminary audit report for internal use only

September 2023





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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the ApeDAOFinance team to perform an audit of their smart contract. The audit was conducted between 17/09/2023 and 20/09/2023.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code is available at @iotapes/liquid-apes Github repository after the fa2142f commit.

Update: the ApeDAOFinance team has responded to this report. The updated code is located in the @iotapes/liquid-apes GitHub repository after the <u>30fb681</u> commit.

Some of the contracts are designed to be deployed behind a <u>proxy</u>, meaning their implementations can be updated. Users must pay attention and do own research before using such contracts.


2.1 Summary

Project name	ApeDAO	
URL	https://apedao.finance	
Platform	Shimmer Network	
Language	Solidity	

2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
LilApeNFT	0x3F5ae5270b404fF94BB4d2f15A4f3b 46f16470D1
OGApeNFT	0xf640ed4ADFD525a3DEae9FA76a8408 98d61009C1
PausableUpgradeable	
ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable	
ApeDAOMarket	0x6127C40AA99E5764Ebc730F8c3f760 2E27EF07A3

3. Found issues



C1e. ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C1el84	Medium	Fees limit	
C1el83	Medium	Insecure random	
C1el85	Info	Incorrect description	

C1f. ApeDAOMarket

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C1fl87	High	BASE_FEE coefficient	
C1fl86	Info	Lack of documentation	

4. Contracts

C1b. LilApeNFT

Overview

An implementation of the ERC-721 NFT token <u>standard</u> built with OpenZeppelin templates. LilApeNFT token has a fixed total supply, and supports enumeration and royalties.

C1c. OGApeNFT

Overview

An implementation of the ERC-721 NFT token <u>standard</u> built with OpenZeppelin templates. OGApeNFT token has a fixed total supply, and supports enumeration and royalties.

C1d. Pausable Upgradeable

Overview

A custom contract that inherits the Ownable authorization model from the OpenZeppelin library and allows setting a mapping of boolean flags for different types of pause statuses.

C1e. ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable

Overview

An implementation of the ERC-20 token <u>standard</u> built with OpenZeppelin templates. ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable can be minted in exchange for supported NFT tokens (LilApeNFT and OGApeNFT) with an updatable exchange rate. The contract is designed to be deployed behind a <u>proxy</u>, meaning its implementation can be updated. Users must pay attention and do their own research before using this contract.

Issues

C1el84 Fees limit

Medium

Resolved

The setFees() function is managed by the contract owner and allows to set new fee amounts. In the current implementation this function doesn't have any safety limits for input values. Thus, if the owner sets a commission of 100, then the user will not receive anything for the provided NFTs.

Recommendation

Consider adding limit for each type of the fee.

C1el83 Insecure random

Medium



A random number for redeeming NFT can be computed with high probability in the <code>getRandomTokenIdFromVault()</code> function. There's no reputable way of obtaining the randomness on-chain, so the industry standard is using VRF oracles or gaining the seed from the project owners if users trust them.

Recommendation

Use oracles such as Chainlink VRF to get secure random results as soon as they are available on the network you are using.

Update

The updated code of <code>getRandomTokenIdFromVault()</code> function solves the problem of obtaining a random number by calling <code>iscSandbox.getEntropy()</code>. At the same time, such a contract can be attacked by another smart contract. The attacking contract may regularly try to buy a certain NFT at a discount as a random one and revert if it fails to get the desired NFT. To mitigate this risk, a check could be added to <code>getRandomTokenIdFromVault()</code> that <code>tx.origin == msg.sender</code>. And since the <code>redeem()</code> and <code>redeemTo()</code> functions are open for everyone, the whitelist functionality must be added too. Pseudo-code example:

```
function reeem() {
  if(!isAddressWhitelisted(msg.sender)) {
    require(tx.origin == msg.sender);
  }
  ...
}
```

Note that whitelisted contracts should then use the same tx.origin == msg.sender check.

But this approach may reduce the potential market of users. Before making any changes, we recommend a comprehensive assessment of the risks of reducing market coverage.

C1el85 Incorrect description



The mint(), mintTo() function allows to mint new ApeDAOVault (ERC20) tokens in exchange for the provided NFT.

But the description for these functions states that NFTs are minted.

We recommend correcting the description of these functions.

C1f. ApeDAOMarket

Overview

This contract allows users to buy and redeem ApeDAO NFTs using SMR tokens.

Issues

C1fl87 BASE_FEE coefficient





The buyAndRedeemSMR() function allows to buy NFTs for SMR tokens. To purchase NFTs, SMR tokens must first be exchanged for the DAOVault tokens.

To calculate the required amount of DAOVault tokens, a similar formula is used as in the redeemTo() function of the ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable contract.

But the **buyAndRedeemSMR()** function also applies an additional **BASE_FEE** coefficient. This significantly increases the number of DAOVault tokens that has to be bought. This also indirectly affects the value of **maxSMRIn**.

```
_buyVaultToken(auxAmount + (totalFee * BASE_FEE), maxSMRIn, path);
```

In this case, the user can satisfy the increased number of SMR tokens. But then only a part of the DAOVault tokens will be spent to buy NFTs in the ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable contract. The other part will be blocked in the ApeDAOMarket contract.

Recommendation

We recommend checking your fee calculations and testing this issue.

C1fl86 Lack of documentation

Info



Consider adding documetation for the SMR, apeDAOVault, uniswapRouter state variables.

5. Conclusion

1 high, 2 medium severity issues were found during the audit. 1 high, 2 medium issues were resolved in the update.

The ApeDAOVaultUpgradeable contract is highly dependent on the owner's account. Users using the project have to trust the owner and that the owner's account is properly secured.

This audit includes recommendations on code improvement and the prevention of potential attacks.

Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
 May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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