

Elk Finance

smart contracts audit report

Prepared for:
elk.finance

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July 2021

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Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

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Introduction

HashEx was commissioned by the Elk Finance team to perform an audit of their smart contracts. The audit was conducted between July 24 and July 26, 2021.

The audited smart contracts share the same code and are deployed to multiple blockchains.

Contracts addresses in Avalanche C-Chain:

Factory [0x091d35d7F63487909C863001ddCA481c6De47091](#),

Router [0x9E4AAbd2B3E60Ee1322E94307d0776F2c8e6CFbb](#).

Contracts addresses in Polygon(MATIC):

Factory [0xE3BD06c7ac7E1CeB17BdD2E5BA83E40D1515AF2a](#),

Router [0xf38a7A7Ac2D745E2204c13F824c00139DF831FFf](#).

Contracts addresses in Fantom:

Factory [0x7Ba73c99e6f01a37f3e33854c8F544BbbadD3420](#),

Router [0x4D2cf285a519261F30b4d9c2c344Baf260d65Fa2](#).

Team website contains the [whitepaper](#) and [documentation](#).

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts.
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used to understand the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

We found out that the code is a fork of UniSwapV2. An audit for Uniswap is available [\[1\]](#). For this reason we focused on the unaudited parts of code, as well as modifications made by Elk Finance.

Contracts overview

ElkERC20

Implementation of ERC20 token standard with additional permission functionality.
Allows the unlimited token allowance if set to `uint(-1)`. The same as UniswapV2ERC20.

ElkFactory

The same as UniswapV2Factory.

ElkPair

The same as UniswapV2Pair.

ElkRouter

Same as UniswapV2Router02.

Libraries & Interfaces

The same as UniswapV2. ElkLibrary was forked from the uniswap-lib repository after the [7b00ef2](#) commit.

Found issues

ID	Title	Severity	Response
01	ElkERC20: ERC20 implementation	Low	Acknowledged
02	General recommendations	Low	Acknowledged

#01	ElkERC20: ERC20 implementation	Low
ElkERC20 contract lacks <code>increaseApproval()</code> and <code>decreaseApproval()</code> functions. These functions mitigate frontrun attacks on the <code>approve()</code> function if a user wants to alter previously approved amounts in one transaction (see [2]).		

#02	General recommendations	Low
Renaming all the functions of Router contracts that contain native currency in name (ETH/BNB/AVAX etc) is excessive and could be reduced to a single synonym for all blockchains.		

Conclusion

Audited contracts are copies of the UniswapV2. No high or medium severity issues were found.

Contracts addresses in Avalanche C-Chain:

Factory [0x091d35d7F63487909C863001ddCA481c6De47091](#),

Router [0x9E4AAbd2B3E60Ee1322E94307d0776F2c8e6CFbb](#).

Contracts addresses in Polygon(MATIC):

Factory [0xE3BD06c7ac7E1CeB17BdD2E5BA83E40D1515AF2a](#),

Router [0xf38a7A7Ac2D745E2204c13F824c00139DF831FFf](#).

Contracts addresses in Fantom:

Factory [0x7Ba73c99e6f01a37f3e33854c8F544BbbadD3420](#),

Router [0x4D2cf285a519261F30b4d9c2c344Baf260d65Fa2](#).

References

1. [Uniswap audit](#)
2. [Attack vector on approve method](#)

Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

We consider an issue critical, if it may cause unlimited losses or breaks the workflow of the contract and could be easily triggered.

High severity issues may lead to limited losses or break interaction with users or other contracts under very specific conditions.

Medium severity issues do not cause the full loss of functionality but break the contract logic.

Low severity issues are typically nonoptimal code, unused variables, errors in messages. Usually, these issues do not need immediate reactions.

Appendix B. List of examined issue types

Business logic overview

Functionality checks

Following best practices

Access control and authorization

Reentrancy attacks

Front-run attacks

DoS with (unexpected) revert

DoS with block gas limit

Transaction-ordering dependence

ERC/BEP and other standards violation

Unchecked math

Implicit visibility levels

Excessive gas usage

Timestamp dependence

Forcibly sending ether to a contract

Weak sources of randomness

Shadowing state variables

Usage of deprecated code