


Trinity DAO

smart contracts final audit report

November 2023





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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the Trinity DAO team to perform an audit of their smart contracts. The audit was conducted between 25/10/2023 and 31/10/2023.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code was provided directly in .sol file with very limited tests and documentation. The SHA-1 hashes of audited contracts:

GTToken.sol 5365440375af18917e3fc154eaf5058459bd2216

Distributor.sol 7ced4ce7ae73ba790aeaaca3e1fbbd37c97bc950

LocalMatrix.sol bf87b2f95c393254aa2e6dfae5022709a2250e7d

LocalMatrixLib.sol b82c6940db593f1a6d9b65ab6649d266c47e9922

Core.sol 015e4750f599b590609ed38c1ebae347bd206442

ILevelsContract.sol 032bd45a38a060aab1765a114918876c0127d5ea

IDistributor.sol 282fe9cc02e7a13236b007d47d2ada8db8a4ed99

IERC20.sol 90ebd78dd3051ecb612f01f57888986142102b3e

IGTToken.sol 20fcaada386542113fba227b0d1b44a02d482a45

IMatrix.sol b08f637ba4434d7f4fd147d2f86471a1a35b7fc0

Update: the Trinity DAO team has responded to this report. The updated contracts have

SHA-1:

GTToken.sol eb7ae753591c5a274bffca05c92425521e699f73

Distributor.sol ff31f34c2dedc4537ea07adf2d736a04dfdd9a64

LocalMatrix.sol f223599ba3d6f746ac8799e54eca9615f970d6dc

LocalMatrixLib.sol b82c6940db593f1a6d9b65ab6649d266c47e9922

Core.sol 015e4750f599b590609ed38c1ebae347bd206442

lLevelsContract.sol 032bd45a38a060aab1765a114918876c0127d5ea

IDistributor.sol 6d1e6baea8165f638483ad6013b74b3ff309845c

IERC20.sol 90ebd78dd3051ecb612f01f57888986142102b3e

IGTToken.sol 20fcaada386542113fba227b0d1b44a02d482a45

IMatrix.sol cd9eb252eabcc7271ea5d78b345e45914084c1ff

2.1 Summary

Project name	Trinity DAO
URL	https://trinity-dao.com
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
Language	Solidity
Centralization level	High
Centralization risk	High


2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
GTToken	
TrinityDAO	
LocalMatrix	
AccountsLocalMatrixes	
Core	
Interface and imports	

3. Project centralization risks

The project owner has indirect ability to withdraw user's funds without explicit permission.

4. Found issues



C41. GTToken

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C41lc9	High	ERC20 standard violation	
C41lca	Low	Default visibility of state variables	
C41lcb	• Low	Inconsistent behavior between transfer() and transferFrom() functions	Ø Acknowledged
C41lcd	• Low	Gas optimizations	Ø Acknowledged
C41lcc	Info	Possible transfer blocking by donating tokens to next level	Ø Acknowledged

C42. TrinityDAO

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C42Id0	Low	Low entropy randomization in selecting random referrer	Ø Acknowledged

C42Id3	Low	Gas optimizations	Ø Acknowledged
C42Ice	Low	Default visibility of state variables	
C42ld2	Info	Trinary bonus can exceed balance of the Matrix contract	

C43. LocalMatrix

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C43Id8	High	Refund amount can exceed input amount	Ø Acknowledged
C43ld5	High	The getTrinaryBonus() function is callable with zero amount, leading to bonus being lost	A Partially fixed
C43Id6	High	Refund success flag is not updated	
C43Id9	• Low	Gas optimizations	Partially fixed
C43Id4	• Low	Default visibility of state variables	
C43le2	Info	Typographical error	⑦ Open

C44. AccountsLocalMatrixes

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C44Idb	Medium	Possible math problem	Acknowledged
C44ldc	Info	Possible surrogate handling logic problem	

C45. Core

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C45lbf	Medium	No mechanism to transfer contract ownership	Ø Acknowledged

5. Contracts

C41. GTToken

Overview

An ERC20 standard token with minting functionality for a selected address - TrinityDAO contract.

Issues

C411c9 ERC20 standard violation



The contract's **transfer** function exhibits behavior that is not compliant with the ERC20 standard:

- 1. The function returns **false** upon a successful transfer, which is contrary to the standard that expects a **true** value.
- 2. Transfers of a zero amount are prohibited. The ERC20 standard does not enforce such a restriction, and zero transfers should be treated as valid (often used to trigger side effects).

Non-compliance with established standards can lead to incompatibilities with third-party tools, services, and dApps that expect standard behavior. It also can introduce unexpected behaviors for users and developers familiar with ERC20 standard.

```
function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual override returns (bool) {
   if (amount == 0) { return false; }
   super.transfer(to, amount);
   emit TokenTransfer(to, _msgSender(), amount, 0, 0);
}
```

C41Ica Default visibility of state variables



Resolved

The tokenLimit, tokenAmount, and distributor state variables in the contract have been declared without an explicit visibility specifier. In Solidity, if no visibility is specified, the default is internal. This means that while these variables are not directly accessible from external calls, they can be accessed and potentially modified by derived contracts. Not specifying visibility explicitly can lead to confusion about the intended accessibility of these variables and may inadvertently expose them to unintended modifications in future contract iterations.

C41Icb Inconsistent behavior between transfer() and • Low O Acknowledged transferFrom() functions

The **transfer** and **transferFrom** functions in the provided ERC20 implementation exhibit different behaviors:

- 1. The **transfer** function restricts transfers of a zero amount, whereas **transferFrom** (as per the provided information) does not enforce such a restriction.
- 2. The transfer function emits a custom TokenTransfer event, while transferFrom does not.

This inconsistency can lead to confusion for developers and users, potential issues in dApps or services built on top of this token, and makes the token's behavior deviate from standard ERC20 expectations.

```
function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual override returns (bool) {
   if (amount == 0) { return false; }
   super.transfer(to, amount);
   emit TokenTransfer(to, _msgSender(), amount, 0, 0);
}
```

C41Icd Gas optimizations

Low

Acknowledged

1. The accountStatuses data should be moved to immutable state.

2. Unnecessary read of user's balance in call of getAccountStatusLevel() inside the _beforeTokenTransfer() function.

3. Multiple reads from storage in the getStatusLevelViaBalance() function: accountStatuses .length and accountStatuses[i].lowBorder variables.

C41Icc Possible transfer blocking by donating • Info Ø Acknowledged tokens to next level

The contract's mechanism, which assigns status levels based on token balances and prohibits transfers that would decrease a user's status level, introduces a potential risk. A malicious actor or even an uninformed user could send tokens to an account, pushing it to a higher status level. Once this happens, the recipient becomes effectively "locked" from transferring any tokens out, as any transfer would lead to a level decrease and is thereby prohibited. This could lead to scenarios where token balances are inadvertently frozen, disrupting user activities and potentially leading to a loss of trust in the contract's functionality.

```
function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)
internal
override
{
    if (contractOwner != msg.sender && from != address(0)) {
        uint balanceOf = balanceOf(from);
        uint8 currentAccountStatusLevel = getAccountStatusLevel(from);
        uint8 newAccountStatusLevel;
        if (currentAccountStatusLevel != 0) {
            newAccountStatusLevel = getStatusLevelViaBalance(balanceOf - amount);
        }
        require(newAccountStatusLevel == currentAccountStatusLevel, "GTE: 1");
    }
    super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);
}
```

C42. TrinityDAO

Overview

Main contract of the project - an MLM staking for a fixed ERC20 token. The referral multilayer scheme is configured via instances of LocalMatrix contracts. Has access to minting GT tokens as an additional reward for staking.

Issues

C42Id0 Low entropy randomization in selecting random referrer

Low

Acknowledged


The **getRandomReferer** function attempts to generate a pseudo-random number by hashing a combination of **block.timestamp**, **block.difficulty**, and **msg.sender**. While this method does provide some level of randomness, it lacks sufficient entropy and is potentially vulnerable to manipulation.

- 1. **block.timestamp**: Miners can slightly manipulate timestamps, which could influence the result.
- 2. **block.difficulty**: Predictable and can't be used as a major source of randomness. For EVM versions after the Paris, it behaves as an alias for **block.prevrandao**.
- 3. msg.sender: Publicly known information.

Given the above inputs, a well-informed and well-resourced attacker could predict or influence the outcome of the **getRandomReferer** function.

C42Id3 Gas optimizations





- 1. The GTToken, IERC20Token, gtTokenDecimal, gtTokenSize variables can be declared immutable or constant.
- 2. Multiple reads from storage in the isSubMatrix() function: matrixCount.

3. The isSubMatrix() function should break the loop upon the first found condition.

C42Ice Default visibility of state variables

Low

Resolved

The contract contains several variables (players, accountsByAddress, IERC20Token, GTToken, gtTokenDecimal, gtTokenSize, and levelInfos) that use the default visibility. By not explicitly specifying a visibility (like public, internal, or private), it can lead to confusion about the intended accessibility of these variables, possibly exposing them to unintended access patterns or making it harder to discern the contract's intended behavior.

C42Id2 Trinary bonus can exceed balance of the Matrix ● Info ⊘ Resolved contract

The TrinityDAO.getTrinaryBonus() function calls for LocalMatrix.getTrinaryBonus() and transfers up to account.balance[1] + account.balance[2] + account.balance[3] amount to the user. In general, the Matrix contract's balance can be insufficient to perform such transfer due to possibility of adding a user without incoming payment via onlyOwner buyProgram() function.

C43. LocalMatrix

Overview

A referral model contract that stores staked user's funds. Some functions of LocalMatrix rely on the AccountsLocalMatrixes library. It can be called only via the Distributor contract.

Issues

C43Id8 Refund amount can exceed input amount

High

Acknowledged

The general nature of the TrinityDAO as a Ponzi scheme may cause an insufficient balance to complete a withdrawal. In particular, the TrinityDAO.refundRequest() can't be completed for a single user in overall due to refund amount being doubled against the input amount for the buyProgram() function.

```
function buyProgram(
      address accountAddress,
      address referer,
      uint8 level
  ) external isLevelTreeInitialized(level) nonReentrant {
      uint levelPrice = localMatrixes[level].getLevelPrice();
      _sendInLocalMatrix(level, levelPrice);\
  }
    function refundRequest(address accountAddress)
    external
    onlyDistributor
    levelTreeInitialized
    accountInTree(accountAddress)
    nonReentrant {
      uint refundAmount = levelPrice;
     if (tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[1] == 0) { refundAmount += levelPrice /
2; }
      else { refundAmount += tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[1]; }
     if (tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[2] == 0) { refundAmount += levelPrice /
2; }
     else { refundAmount += tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[2]; }
      delete tree.accounts[accountAddress];
      IERC20Token.transfer(accountAddress, refundAmount);
  }
```

Recommendation

Increase test coverage to eliminate possible problems with insufficient funds.

C43Id5 The getTrinaryBonus() function is callable with High Partially fixed zero amount, leading to bonus being lost

The <code>getTrinaryBonus()</code> function allows the caller to specify an amount, which is used to transfer the bonus to the <code>receiverAddress</code>. There is no check in place to ensure that this amount is greater than zero. If called with a zero amount, the function will effectively delete the bonus for the specified <code>accountAddress</code> without actually transferring any bonus to the receiver. This could lead to unintentional loss of bonuses, especially if the function is called programmatically.

```
function getTrinaryBonus(address accountAddress, uint amount, address receiverAddress)
external onlyDistributor {
    AccountsLocalMatrixes.LevelTree storage tree = matrixLevelTrees[0];
    require(
        roots[accountAddress] != address(0),
        "LME: 21"
    );
    require(
        tree.getAccountBalance(accountAddress) >= amount,
        "LME: 22"
    );
    IERC20Token.transfer(receiverAddress, amount);
    delete tree.accounts[accountAddress];
}
```

Recommendation

Add a require check to avoid invertedly passing not initialized parameter to the function.

C43Id6 Refund success flag is not updated

High



The refundRequest() function checks whether a refund has been processed for an account

using the condition **if** (!tree.accounts[accountAddress].isRefundDone). However, within this conditional block, there's no code that updates the **isRefundDone** attribute for the given account. This omission allows the condition to always be met, potentially allowing users to request multiple refunds which can be exploited to drain funds from the contract.

```
function refundRequest(address accountAddress)
    external
    onlyDistributor
    levelTreeInitialized
    accountInTree(accountAddress)
    nonReentrant {
        AccountsLocalMatrixes.LevelTree storage tree = matrixLevelTrees[0];
            tree.accounts[accountAddress].programPurchaseTime + 365 days <=</pre>
block.timestamp,
            "IMF: 9"
        );
        require(
            tree.accounts[accountAddress].reinvestCount == 0,
            "LME: 10"
        );
        require(
            roots[accountAddress] == address(0),
            "LME: 20"
        );
        if (!tree.accounts[accountAddress].isRefundDone) {
            uint refundAmount = levelPrice;
            address[3] memory childs;
            (childs,) = tree.getAccountMatrix(accountAddress);
            if (tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[1] == 0) { refundAmount +=
levelPrice / 2; }
            else { refundAmount += tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[1]; }
            if (tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[2] == 0) { refundAmount +=
levelPrice / 2; }
            else { refundAmount += tree.accounts[accountAddress].balance[2]; }
            delete tree.accounts[accountAddress];
            IERC20Token.transfer(accountAddress, refundAmount);
            distributor.emitRefundsEvent(accountAddress, refundAmount, level);
        }
    }
```

Recommendation

Update the tree.accounts[accountAddress].isRefundDone instead of fully deleting mapping item.


C43Id9 Gas optimizations

- 🔵 Low 🔑 Partially fixed
- 1. The **distributor**, **IERC20Token**, **level**, **levelPrice**, **activationPrice** variables can be declared immutable.
- 2. The **selfAddress** variable is not initialized nor used anywhere.
- 3. The childs[] array is not used in the refundRequest() function.

C43Id4 Default visibility of state variables

The contract contains several variables (distributor, IERC20Token, selfAddress, and matrixLevelTrees) that use the default visibility. By not explicitly specifying a visibility (like public, internal, or private), it can lead to confusion about the intended accessibility of these variables, possibly exposing them to unintended access patterns or making it harder to discern the contract's intended behavior.

C43le2 Typographical error





The term "referer" is used in the contract, which is presumably a typographical error. The correct term should be "referrer". Misnaming variables can lead to confusion for developers,

maintainers, and auditors, potentially obscuring the intent and functionality of the code.

C44. AccountsLocalMatrixes

Overview

A library contract for LocalMatrix referral tree functions.

Issues

C44Idb Possible math problem

Medium

Acknowledged

The Matrix contract receives not more than levelPrice amount of payment tokens for LocalMatrix.addAccountInLevelTree(), and _initiatePayment() spends at most full levelPrice amount. Then _proceedReinvest() tries to spend more, and these payments may cause a general withdrawal failure due to insufficient funds.

```
function paste(
    LevelTree storage self,
    address accountAddress,
    address refererAddress,
    bool isRefererSurrogate,
    address levelsContractAddress,
    address distributorAddress
) internal {
    uint8 position = _findFreePosition(parentMatrix.connections);
    _initiatePayment(
        self,
        accountAddress,
        parentMatrixOwner.addr,
        position,
        levelsContract,
        distributorAddress
    );
    if (_isReinvest(position)) {
        IDistributor distributorContract = IDistributor(distributorAddress);
        proceedReinvest(
            self,
            parentMatrixOwner,
```

```
levelsContract,
                distributorAddress
            );
        }
    }
function _initiatePayment(
        LevelTree storage self,
        address sender,
        address receiver,
        uint position,
        ILevelsContract levelsContract,
        address distributorAddress
    ) private {
        uint amount;
        Account storage receiverAccount = self.accounts[receiver];
        if (position == 3) {
            amount = levelsContract.getLevelPrice();
        }
        if (amount != 0) {
            levelsContract.pay(receiver, amount);
            levelsContract.emitEvent(sender, receiver, position,
receiverAccount.reinvestCount, amount);
    }
    function _proceedReinvest(
        LevelTree storage self,
        Account storage reinvestAccount,
        ILevelsContract levelsContract,
        address distributorAddress
    ) private {
        . . .
        paste(
            self,
            reinvestAccount.addr,
            reinvestReferer,
            isRefererSurrogate,
            address(levelsContract),
            distributorAddress
        );
```

}

Recommendation

Increase test coverage to eliminate possible problems with insufficient funds.

C44ldc Possible surrogate handling logic problem





The function designed for reinvestment has inconsistent logic for handling surrogate referrers. Initially, it checks if the referrer is a surrogate, and subsequently, it calls <code>_closeAccountMatrix()</code>, which seems to be designed for non-surrogate referrers. Then, when the function tries to get the reinvest referrer, and if this referrer isn't a surrogate, it ends up calling <code>_closeAccountMatrixWithSurrogateReferer()</code>, which appears to be designed specifically for surrogate referrers. This logic can lead to potential discrepancies in how matrices are closed based on the referrer type.

```
function _proceedReinvest(
    LevelTree storage self,
   Account storage reinvestAccount,
    ILevelsContract levelsContract,
    address distributorAddress
) private {
    IDistributor distributorContract = IDistributor(distributorAddress);
    if (!reinvestAccount.isRefererSurrogate) {
        _closeAccountMatrix(self, reinvestAccount);
        paste(
            self,
            reinvestAccount.addr,
            reinvestAccount.refererAddress,
            address(levelsContract),
            distributorAddress
        );
        return;
    }
    (
        address reinvestReferer,
        bool isRefererSurrogate
```

Update

The Trinity team answered that this behaviour is intended.

C45. Core

Overview

A simple authorization model for a single address ownership.

Issues

C45lbf No mechanism to transfer contract • Medium Ø Acknowledged ownership

The **Core** contract designates the contract deployer as the **contractOwner** upon deployment. However, there is no function available to transfer the ownership to another address after the contract has been deployed. This limitation means that if the original deployer's address gets compromised or if there's a need to delegate administrative control to another address, there's no way to do so, leaving the contract potentially stuck or at risk.

Recommendation

Use OpenZeppelin's Ownable contract for managing ownership.

C47. Interface and imports

Overview

Various interface contracts and direct forks from OpenZeppelin repository:

Context, IERC20, IERC20 Metadata, IGTToken, IDistributor, ILevels Contract, IMatrix.

No issues of any severity were found.

6. Conclusion

4 high, 2 medium, 8 low severity issues were found during the audit. 2 high, 3 low issues were resolved in the update. The reviewed contracts are highly dependent on the owner's account. See the centralization risks chapter.

This audit includes recommendations on code improvement and the prevention of potential attacks.

Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
 May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. Vulnerabilities checked

Unchecked math	passed
Reentrancy attacks	passed
Front-run attacks	passed
Flashloat attacks	passed
DoS with (unexpected) revert	passed
DoS with block gas limit	passed
Transaction-ordering dependence	passed
ERC/BEP and other standards violation	passed
Implicit visibility levels	passed
Excessive gas usage	passed
Timestamp dependence	passed
Forcibly sending ether to a contract	passed
Weak sources of randomness	not passed
Shadowing state variables	passed
Usage of deprecated code	passed

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