



# **Swapline**

smart contracts final audit report

October 2023





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#### 1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below - please make sure to read it in full.

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#### 2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the Swapline team to perform an audit of their smart contract. The audit was conducted between 01-09-2023 and 27-09-2023. The code is a fork of traderjoe-xyz/joe-v2 repository which was audited by Paladin Blockchain Security after the commit <u>7f71d0</u>. According to the Paladin report the original code has no critical, high or medium security unresolved issues.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues introduced with updates to the original smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind the updates in the given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code is available at @metropolis-exchange/lb-v2 and was audited after the <u>3601c1a</u> commit.

**Update**: the Swapline team has responded to this report. The updated code is located in the same repository after the <u>bc981fc</u> commit.

### 2.1 Summary

Project name	Swapline
URL	https://swapline.com/
Platform	Fantom Network, Polygon Network, Optimism, Polygon Zkevm, Base
Language	Solidity

Centralization level	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>
Centralization risk	<ul><li>High</li></ul>

# 2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
LBFactory	
LBPair	
LBQuoter	
LBRouter	
LBSwaplineQuoter	
LBToken	
Encoded	
LiquidityConfiguration	
PackedUint128Math	
SafeCast	
SampleMath	
TreeMath	
AddressHelper	
BinHelper	
Clone	

Constants		
FeeHelper		
ImmutableClone		
OracleHelper		
PairParameterHelper		
PendingOwnable		
PriceHelper		
ReentrancyGuard		
TokenHelper		

# 3. Project centralization risks

The project owner can change an implementation for pair contract, update parameters for new pairs, update fees parameters for existing pairs, manage whitelisted assets for quoting, disable selected pairs from routing.

### 4. Found issues



# C25. LBSwaplineQuoter

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C25l8f	<ul><li>Info</li></ul>	Unnecessary code	
C25I90	• Info	Not implemented safe cast fix in legacy code	

### C2c. TreeMath

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C2cl8e	Low	Not implemented fix	

#### 5. Contracts

### C21. LBFactory

#### Overview

A factory contract for Liquidity Book pairs creation. No changes were made to the original contract.

#### C22. LBPair

#### Overview

The Liquidity Book Pair is the contract for the DEX. Has low level functions for minting liquidity tokens, performing swaps, flashloans. The low-level functions are meant to be called by an external contract (a router) which makes additional checks.

The only change made to the original contract is an added modifier in mint function which makes safety checks for liquidity tokens not minted to the pair or zero addresses.

No issues were found with the introduced updates.

#### C23. LBQuoter

#### Overview

A helper contract for finding best swap path. No changes were made to the original contract.

#### C24. LBRouter

#### Overview

A user-interacting contract to swap and manage liquidity stored in LBPairs. No changes were made to the original contract.

### C25. LBSwaplineQuoter

#### Overview

Fork of LBQuoter with implemented overflow fixes.

#### Issues

#### C2518f Unnecessary code

■ Info
Ø Resolved

The original code was written to be compatible with legacy versions. The Swapline project doesn't have any legacy contracts, thus, unused code can be removed.

```
function findBestPathFromAmountIn(
    address[] calldata route,
    uint128 amountIn
) public view returns (Quote memory quote) {
    ...
    for (uint256 i; i < swapLength; i++) {
        if (_factoryV1 != address(0)) {
            ...
        }
        // Fetch swap for V2
        if (_legacyFactoryV2 != address(0)) {
            ...
        }
    }
    ...
}</pre>
```

It should be noted that the unused code only affects deployment costs. Since the \_factoryV1 and \_legacyFactoryV2 variables are declared immutable, there is no gas expenditure on reading them.

#### Recommendation

Remove unused code.

#### C25190 Not implemented safe cast fix in legacy code





The LBSwapline quoter contract incorporates SafeCast improvements to reduce the risk of integer overflow during mathematical calculations. However, these fixes are not applied to the sections of the contract that interact with legacy contracts.

```
function findBestPathFromAmountIn(
        address[] calldata route,
        uint128 amountIn
    ) public view returns (Quote memory quote) {
        for (uint256 i; i < swapLength; i++) {</pre>
            if (_factoryV1 != address(0)) {
                         quote.amounts[i + 1] = uint128(
                             JoeLibrary.getAmountOut(quote.amounts[i], reserveIn,
reserveOut)
                         );
            // Fetch swap for V2
            if (_legacyFactoryV2 != address(0)) {
                . . .
                                     quote.fees[i] = uint128((fees * 1e18) /
quote.amounts[i]); // fee percentage in amountIn
            }
        }
     }
```

#### Recommendation

Implement the safecast fixes or remove unused code.

#### C26. LBToken

#### Overview

A multi-token contract for batch operations. It's similar to ERC1155 standard but without callbacks and URI function. LBPair inherits from this contract.

The changes made to the original contracts are: removed checks for non-zero or same-contract addresses in the internal <u>\_mint</u> and <u>\_burn</u> functions and added check for <u>\_approveForAll()</u> internal function.

No issues were introduced with the updates.

#### C27. Encoded

#### Overview

A helper library used for decoding bytes32 sample.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C28. LiquidityConfiguration

#### Overview

A library containing functions to encode and decode the config of a pool and interact with the encoded bytes32.

#### C29. PackedUint128Math

#### Overview

A library containing functions to encode and decode two uint128 into a single bytes32.

No changes were made to the original contract.

#### C2a. SafeCast

#### Overview

A library containing functions to safely cast uint256 to different uint types

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C2b. SampleMath

#### Overview

A library containing functions to encode and decode a sample into a single bytes32 and interact with the encoded bytes32

No changes were made to the original contract.

#### C2c. TreeMath

#### Overview

A library contract containing functions to interact with a tree of **TreeUint24** structures. TreeUint24 is a three-level tree used to add, remove, and search for bins.

#### Issues

#### C2cl8e Not implemented fix

Low



Upon reviewing the codebase under audit, it was observed that a significant fix applied to the original repository's TreeMath library is absent. This particular fix is documented in pull request number <u>104</u>, titled "Tree issue".

#### Recommendation

We advise reviewing the changes made in pull request #104 in the original repository and integrating the necessary modifications into the code under audit to ensure its security.

### C2d. AddressHelper

#### Overview

Library contract containing functions to check if an address is a contract and catch low level errors.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C2e. BinHelper

#### Overview

A library containing functions to help interaction with bins

### C2f. Clone

#### Overview

An abstract contract with helper read functions for clone with immutable args.

No changes were made to the original contract.

#### C30. Constants

#### Overview

A library containing different constants.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C31. FeeHelper

#### Overview

A library with helper functions for fee calculation.

No changes were made to the original contract.

#### C32. ImmutableClone

#### Overview

A library implementing minimal proxy pattern for gas-efficient contract creation.

### C33. OracleHelper

#### Overview

A library containing functions to manage the oracle.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C34. PairParameterHelper

#### Overview

A library containing functions to get and set parameters of a pair.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C35. PendingOwnable

#### Overview

A contract that provides a basic access control mechanism. where there is an owner account that can be granted exclusive access to specific functions, the ownership is transferred in two steps: the current owner sets a pending owner and then that address can claim ownership.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C36. PriceHelper

#### Overview

A library contract containing funcions for prices calculation. The main purpose is to fetch a price from id and vise versa.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C37. ReentrancyGuard

#### Overview

A library contract containing functions for preventing reentrancy attacks.

No changes were made to the original contract.

### C38. TokenHelper

#### Overview

A helper library with wrappers around ERC20 token transfers. Handles tokens that do not return a boolean on transfer() and transferFrom() calls.

### 6. Conclusion

The code is a fork of traderjoe-xyz/joe-v2 repository which underwent an audit by Paladin Blockchain Security after the commit <u>7f71d0</u>. The audit confirmed that no discrepancies or vulnerabilities were added compared to the original code.

### Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
   May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

# Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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