


WannaStart

smart contracts final audit report

January 2022





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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below - please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the WannaSwap team to perform an audit of their WannaStart contract. The audit was conducted between January 19 and January 21, 2021.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code is available at the WannaStart GitHub repository. The code was audited after the commit fd0b00a.

Update: A recheck was made on commit <u>21b3997</u>. The same code was deployed to the Aurora network at the address <u>0x72dC6953F48b44488BAB73Ec3EA3BcBefd119A0A</u>.


2.1 Summary

| Project name | WannaStart |
|--------------|----------------------------|
| URL | https://wannaswap.finance/ |
| Platform | Aurora |
| Language | Solidity |

2.2 Contracts

| Name | Address |
|------------|--|
| WannaStart | 0x72dC6953F48b44488BAB73Ec3EA3BcBefd119A0A |

3. Found issues



C1. WannaStart

| ID | Severity | Title | Status |
|-------|--------------------------|--|----------------|
| C1-01 | High | Sale parameters can be changed after sale is started | |
| C1-02 | High | Pool can be finalized several times | |
| C1-03 | Medium | Wrong token balance check | |
| C1-04 | Low | Lack of tests | Ø Acknowledged |
| C1-05 | Low | Lack of checks on the input parameters | |
| C1-06 | Info | Unused variable | |
| C1-07 | Info | Lack of NatSpec documentation | Ø Acknowledged |
| C1-08 | Info | Supported token types restrictions | Ø Acknowledged |
| C1-09 | Info | Require statement in a view-function | |

4. Contracts

C1. WannaStart

Overview

The WannaStart contract is a decentralized launchpad. There are 4 stages:

- 1. Users deposit purchase tokens (named LP tokens in the contract). Based on the timeweighted value of the deposited token maximum commitment value is calculated.
- 2. Users deposit purchase tokens to the contract, the value that can be deposited is capped by the maximum commitment value.
- 3. After end time users claim their reward token and get a refund if more tokens than max cap were committed.

Issues

C1-01 Sale parameters can be changed after sale is ● High ⊘ Resolved started

The owner can break contract calculations by updating the pool after the start time. Moreover, the owner can block all withdrawals by setting the **startTime** parameter far in the future.

```
function withdraw(uint _pid, uint _amount) external nonReentrant {
    require(_pid < poolInfo.length, "withdraw: BAD POOL");
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
    require(block.timestamp >= pool.startTime, "withdraw: NOT NOW");
    ...
}
```

Recommendation

Disable pool updates after startTime.

```
function setPool(uint _pid, address _lpToken, address _token, address _mustHoldToken,
uint _totalAmount, uint _mustHoldAmount, uint _totalLp, uint _startTime, uint _commitTime,
uint _endTime, uint _claimTime) external onlyOwner {
    require(_pid < poolInfo.length, "setPool: BAD POOL");
    require(poolInfo[_pid].startTime > block.timestamp, "setPool: RESTRICTED");
    ...
}
```

C1-02 Pool can be finalized several times



The function finalizePool() sends totalRaised amount to the feeTo and _fundTo addresses. The value of the totalRaised variable is supposed to be not more than the sale cap (the totalLp variable). This check is done in L299:

```
uint totalRaised = totalCommitment > totalLp ? totalLp : totalCommitment;
uint balance = lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
if (totalRaised > balance) totalRaised = balance;
uint totalFee = totalRaised.mul(fee).div(100e18);
uint amount = totalRaised.sub(totalFee);
// send fee to converter
lpToken.safeTransfer(feeTo, totalFee);
// send fund to offerer
lpToken.safeTransfer(_fundTo, amount);
```

The excess of **totalCommitment** is claimable by users via a refund mechanism. However if the function **finalizePool()** is called twice with the same ID, it sends the excess to the **feeTo** and **_fundTo** addresses and users won't be able to get refunds.

By this mechanism, all the deposits and commitments that haven't been withdrawn can be withdrawn by the project owner.

Recommendation

Add a check that the finalizePool() can be called only once for a pool.

Update on commit 6cab18b

This function now can be called only once. But because of the reentrancy vulnerability in the first call there can be multiple internal calls of this function. It is recommended to use ReentrancyGuard on this function.

C1-03 Wrong token balance check





The function claim() in L281 checks the balance of the token, but sends the lpToken.

```
function claim(uint _pid) external nonReentrant {
    ...
    if(pendingRefund > 0) {
        uint balanceRefund = token.balanceOf(address(this));
        if (pendingRefund > balanceRefund) {
            pendingRefund = balanceRefund;
        }
        user.claimedRefundAmount = user.claimedRefundAmount.add(pendingRefund);
        IERC20(pool.lpToken).safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), pendingRefund);
    }
    emit Claim(msg.sender, _pid, pending, pendingRefund);
}
```

C1-04 Lack of tests

Low

Acknowledged

There are no tests in the contract repo. We strongly recommend having a full unit-test coverage to ensure that the contracts work as expected and minimize the possibility of bugs.

C1-05 Lack of checks on the input parameters

Low

Resolved

The function setFeeTo() lacks a zero-check on the _feeTo parameter. If it is mistakenly initialized with a zero address the funds sent to _feeTo maybe burnt.

```
function setFeeTo(address _feeTo) external onlyOwner {
    feeTo = _feeTo;

emit SetFeeTo(_feeTo);
}
```

C1-06 Unused variable

Info

Resolved

The variable <u>mustHoldAmount</u> declared in <u>L107</u> is not used.

```
function setPool(uint _pid, address _lpToken, address _token, address _mustHoldToken, uint _totalAmount, uint _mustHoldAmount, uint _totalLp, uint _startTime, uint _commitTime, uint _endTime, uint _claimTime) external onlyOwner {
    ...
}
```

Recommendation

Update the mustHoldAmount in the pool or remove the parameter from the function.

C1-07 Lack of NatSpec documentation

Info

Acknowledged

There is no <u>NatSpec</u> documentation in the audited contract. We recommend adding documentation on all public and external functions to provide a better user experience for users interacting with the smart contract.

C1-08 Supported token types restrictions

Info

Acknowledged

The contract does not support deflationary tokens or tokes with rebase. Also no **lpToken** in the pool can be equal to the offering **token** as it will break calculations.

C1-09 Require statement in a view-function

Info

Resolved

The function maxCommitment() has a view-modifier and has a require statement inside. In case of a requirement failure, the node on an RPC call may not return failure but an arbitrary value.

Recommendation

Refactor the function to return 0 on a wrong _pid parameter.

5. Conclusion

2 high and 1 medium severity issues were found.

This audit includes recommendations on the code improving and preventing potential attacks.

Update: issues that could potentially allow the owner to withdraw users' funds are fixed in the update.

Appendix A. Issues severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
 May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Info.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, info severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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