

Yield Parrot

smart contracts
final audit report

October 2021



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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below - please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the Yield Parrot team to perform an audit of their smart contracts. The audit was conducted between July 25 and July 29, 2021.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts.
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

2.1 Summary

Project name	Yield Parrot
URL	https://yieldparrot.finance
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
Language	Solidity

2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
LORYToken	0xcD5D75Dbe75449A9021B6C570a41959eB571C751
MasterLory	0x1bee93b82275F3F215411bE49F948F8568e5e103

3. Found issues



● High	2 (29%)
● Medium	4 (57%)
● Low	1 (14%)

C1. LORYToken

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C1-01	● High	Delegation double spend attack	☑ Acknowledged

C2. MasterLory

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C2-01	● High	Emission is not capped	☑ Acknowledged
C2-02	● Medium	Pools can be added with the same strategy	☑ Acknowledged
C2-03	● Medium	Pool.want and pool.strat could be set disoherent	☑ Acknowledged
C2-04	● Medium	EmergencyWithdraw may fail	☑ Acknowledged
C2-05	● Medium	Return values are not checked	☑ Acknowledged
C2-06	● Low	Gas optimization	☑ Acknowledged

4. Contracts

C1. LORYToken

Issues

C1-01 Delegation double spend attack ● High ☑ Acknowledged

Delegation power is not transferred with token transfers. An attacker can receive any delegation power as he want.

C2. MasterLory

Issues

C2-01 Emission is not capped ● High ☑ Acknowledged

Owner can set arbitrary big value for the NATIVEPerBlock value. In such case token will be devalued and users will actually loose their rewards.


Team response

As the masterchef is already deployed and the function already created we are developing a timelock contract for the masterchef that will limit the max NATIVEPerBlock value to ensure there is no risk for users

C2-02 Pools can be added with the same strategy ● Medium ☑ Acknowledged

The function add() does not check if a pool with a same strategy has already been added. Adding different pools with the same strategy will result in wrong pool allocation calculations in the updatePool() function.

**C2-03 Pool.want and pool.strat could be set
discoherent**

 Medium Acknowledged

Pool.want token may be set different from the pool.strat one. In such a case pool functionality won't work.

Team response

Users can only deposit tokens in vaults where Pool.want and the wantToken in the Strat have coherency

C2-04 EmergencyWithdraw may fail

 Medium Acknowledged

The functions emergencyWithdraw() calls external contracts that are out of scope of the current audit. If the strategy contract fails, user's won't be able to withdraw their funds even with the emergencyWithdraw() function.

C2-05 Return values are not checked

 Medium Acknowledged

L1700, L1668 return value from IStrategy.withdraw is not used. Looks like IStrategy returns actual amount of tokens to be withdrawn that can be less than the passed amount to withdraw. In such a case there will be a discrepancy between stored balances and actual MasterLory token balance.

C2-06 Gas optimization

 Low Acknowledged

Gas can be saved by declaring functions as external. MasterLory.setNATIVEPerBlock, MasterLory.inCaseTokensGetStuck, MasterLory.emergencyWithdraw, MasterLory.withdrawAll, MasterLory.deposit, MasterLory.set, MasterLory.add, NATIVEToken.mint should be declared external.

MasterLory.startBlock, MasterLory.ownerNATIVEReward, MasterLory.NATIVE should be declared constant.

EnumerableSet is unused.

5. Conclusion

2 high and 4 medium severity issues were found. Team responses were added below issues description.

Audit includes recommendations on the code improving and preventing potential attacks.

Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

- **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.
- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- **Medium.** Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic. May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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