# SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

## for

## Venus Oracle

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# Contents

# 1 | Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the design document and related smart contract source code of the `Venus Oracle`, we outline in the report our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts can be further improved due to the presence of several issues related to either security or performance. This document outlines our audit results.

## 1.1 About Venus Oracle

The `Venus` protocol is designed to enable a complete algorithmic money market protocol on `BNB Smart Chain` (previously `BSC`). `Venus` enables users to utilize their cryptocurrencies by supplying collateral to the protocol that may be borrowed by pledging over-collateralized cryptocurrencies. The audited `Venus Oracle` introduces multiple price feeds (e.g., `Chainlink`, `Binance`, `PancakeSwap TWAP Price`, etc.) to strengthen the robustness of the price oracle used in the `Venus` protocol. The basic information of the audited protocol is as follows:

Table 1.1: Basic Information of The Venus Oracle

| Item | Description |
|---:|---|
| Name | Venus |
| Website | https://venus.io/ |
| Type | EVM Smart Contract |
| Platform | Solidity |
| Audit Method | Whitebox |
| Latest Audit Report | July 12, 2023 |

In the following, we show the Git repository of reviewed files and the commit hash value used in this audit:

- https://github.com/VenusProtocol/oracle.git (6d9ebc1)

And this is the commit ID after all fixes for the issues found in the audit have been checked in:

- https://github.com/VenusProtocol/oracle.git (7d72332)

## 1.2   About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [7] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystems by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).

Table 1.2:   Vulnerability Severity Classification

| | High | Medium | Low |
|---|---|---|---|
| **High** | Critical | High | Medium |
| **Medium** | High | Medium | Low |
| **Low** | Medium | Low | Low |

Impact (vertical axis) / Likelihood (horizontal axis)

**Likelihood**

## 1.3   Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [6]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;

- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;

- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

| Category | Check Item |
|---|---|
| Basic Coding Bugs | Constructor Mismatch |
| | Ownership Takeover |
| | Redundant Fallback Function |
| | Overflows & Underflows |
| | Reentrancy |
| | Money-Giving Bug |
| | Blackhole |
| | Unauthorized Self-Destruct |
| | Revert DoS |
| | Unchecked External Call |
| | Gasless Send |
| | Send Instead Of Transfer |
| | Costly Loop |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries |
| | (Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables |
| | Transaction Ordering Dependence |
| | Deprecated Uses |
| Semantic Consistency Checks | Semantic Consistency Checks |
| Advanced DeFi Scrutiny | Business Logics Review |
| | Functionality Checks |
| | Authentication Management |
| | Access Control & Authorization |
| | Oracle Security |
| | Digital Asset Escrow |
| | Kill-Switch Mechanism |
| | Operation Trails & Event Generation |
| | ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling |
| | Frontend-Contract Integration |
| | Deployment Consistency |
| | Holistic Risk Management |
| Additional Recommendations | Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array |
| | Using Fixed Compiler Version |
| | Making Visibility Level Explicit |
| | Making Type Inference Explicit |
| | Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly |
| | Following Other Best Practices |

contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

In particular, we perform the audit according to the following procedure:

- <u>Basic Coding Bugs</u>: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.

- <u>Semantic Consistency Checks</u>: We then manually check the logic of implemented smart contracts and compare with the description in the white paper.

- <u>Advanced DeFi Scrutiny</u>: We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

- <u>Additional Recommendations</u>: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [5], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development. Though some categories used in CWE-699 may not be relevant in smart contracts, we use the CWE categories in Table 1.4 to classify our findings.

## 1.4   Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.

Table 1.4: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit

| Category | Summary |
|---|---|
| Configuration | Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software. |
| Data Processing Issues | Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data. |
| Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. |
| Security Features | Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.) |
| Time and State | Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads. |
| Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes | Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function. |
| Resource Management | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. |
| Behavioral Issues | Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses. |
| Business Logics | Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application. |
| Initialization and Cleanup | Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown. |
| Arguments and Parameters | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use of arguments or parameters within function calls. |
| Expression Issues | Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code. |
| Coding Practices | Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an exploitable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained. |

# 2 | Findings

## 2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the `Venus Oracle` implementation. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logic, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

| Severity | | # of Findings |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | |
| High | 0 | |
| Medium | 1 | |
| Low | 1 | |
| Informational | 0 | |
| Total | 2 | |

We have so far identified a list of potential issues: some of them involve subtle corner cases that might not be previously thought of, while others refer to unusual interactions among multiple contracts. For each uncovered issue, we have therefore developed test cases for reasoning, reproduction, and/or verification. After further analysis and internal discussion, we determined a few issues of varying severities that need to be brought up and paid more attention to, which are categorized in the above table. More information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions of each of them are in Section 3.

## 2.2 Key Findings

Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), including 1 medium-severity vulnerability and 1 low-severity vulnerability.

Table 2.1:  Key Venus Oracle Audit Findings

| ID | Severity | Title | Category | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PVE-001 | Low | Revisited Logic of ChainlinkOracle::initialize() | Business Logic | Fixed |
| PVE-002 | Medium | Trust Issue of Admin Keys | Security Features | Confirmed |

Beside the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to Section 3 for details.

# 3 | Detailed Results

## 3.1 Revisited Logic of ChainlinkOracle::initialize()

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low

- Target: `ChainlinkOracle`
- Category: Business Logic [4]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-841 [2]

### Description

The `ChainlinkOracle` contract allows for lazy contract initialization, i.e., the initialization does not need to be performed inside the constructor at deployment. The `ChainlinkOracle::initialize()` routine is designed to perform the initialization process for the `ChainlinkOracle` contract. While examining its logic, we observe its current implementation needs to be improved.

To elaborate, we show below the related code snippet of the contracts. To facilitate the implementation and organization of the `ChainlinkOracle` contract, it makes good use of several reference contracts, e.g., `Ownable2StepUpgradeable`. In the `Ownable2StepUpgradeable()` contract, the internal `__Ownable2Step_init()` routine is designed to transfer the ownership to `msg.sender`. However, we observe it does not be executed inside the `ChainlinkOracle::initialize()` routine. That is to say, the `ChainlinkOracle` contract is not assigned a privileged `owner`, which directly undermines the assumption of the protocol design.

```
111    /**
112     * @notice Initializes the owner of the contract
113     * @param accessControlManager_ Address of the access control manager contract
114     */
115    function initialize(address accessControlManager_) public initializer {
116        __AccessControlled_init_unchained(accessControlManager_);
117    }
```

Listing 3.1: `ChainlinkOracle::initialize()`

---

```
21      function __Ownable2Step_init() internal onlyInitializing {
22          __Ownable_init_unchained();
23      }
```

Listing 3.2: `Ownable2StepUpgradeable::__Ownable2Step_init()`

Note another routine, i.e., `ResilientOracle::initialize()`, shares the same issue.

**Recommendation** Properly execute `Ownable2StepUpgradeable::__Ownable2Step_init()` routine inside the above-mentioned routines.

**Status** The issue has been addressed by the following commit: `5386ce8`.

## 3.2   Trust Issue of Admin Keys

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium

- Target: `Multiple Contracts`
- Category: Security Features [3]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-287 [1]

### Description

In the `Venus Oracle` protocol, there are a series of privileged accounts that play a critical role in governing and regulating the protocol-wide operations (e.g., configuring various system parameters). In the following, we show the representative functions potentially affected by the privilege of the accounts.

```
139     function setOracle (
140         address asset ,
141         address oracle ,
142         OracleRole role
143     ) external notNullAddress(asset) checkTokenConfigExistance(asset) {
144         _checkAccessAllowed("setOracle(address,address,OracleRole)");
145         require(!(oracle == address(0) && role == OracleRole.MAIN), "can't set zero
                address to main oracle");
146         tokenConfigs[asset].oracles[uint256(role)] = oracle;
147         emit OracleSet(asset, oracle, uint256(role));
148     }
149
150     function setTokenConfig (
151         TokenConfig memory tokenConfig
152     ) public notNullAddress(tokenConfig.asset) notNullAddress(tokenConfig.oracles[
            uint256(OracleRole.MAIN)]) {
153         _checkAccessAllowed("setTokenConfig(TokenConfig)");
154
155         tokenConfigs[tokenConfig.asset] = tokenConfig;
```

```
156          emit TokenConfigAdded(
157              tokenConfig.asset,
158              tokenConfig.oracles[uint256(OracleRole.MAIN)],
159              tokenConfig.oracles[uint256(OracleRole.PIVOT)],
160              tokenConfig.oracles[uint256(OracleRole.FALLBACK)]
161          );
162      }
```

Listing 3.3: `ResilientOracle::setOracle()&&setTokenConfig()`

We emphasize that the privilege assignment is indeed necessary and consistent with the protocol design. However, it is worrisome if the privileged account is a plain EOA account. The `multi-sig` mechanism could greatly alleviate this concern, though it is still far from perfect. Note that a compromised privileged account would allow the attacker to modify a number of sensitive system parameters, which directly undermines the assumption of the protocol design.

**Recommendation**   Suggest to introduce the `multi-sig` mechanism to manage all the privileged accounts to mitigate this issue. Additionally, all changes to privileged operations may need to be mediated with necessary timelocks.

**Status**   The issue has been confirmed by the team.

# 4 | Conclusion

In this audit, we have analyzed the design and implementation of the `Venus Oracle`, which introduces multiple price feeds (e.g., `Chainlink, Binance, PancakeSwap TWAP Price`, etc.) to strengthen the robustness of the price oracle used in the `Venus` protocol. The current code base is well structured and neatly organized. Those identified issues are promptly confirmed and addressed.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that `Solidity`-based smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

# References

[1] MITRE. CWE-287: Improper Authentication. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html.

[2] MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html.

[3] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - Security Features. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/254.html.

[4] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html.

[5] MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html.

[6] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.

[7] PeckShield. PeckShield Inc. https://www.peckshield.com.