

# Collective Recommendations

Haukur Jónsson

haukurpalljonsson@gmail.com and Silvan Hungerbühler  
silvan.hungerbuehler@bluewin.ch and Grzegorz Lisowski  
grzegorz.adam.lisowski@gmail.com and Max Rapp  
maxgrapp@gmail.com

## Abstract

Some abstract

## References

[Elkind *et al.*, 2015] Edith Elkind, Jérôme Lang, and Abdallah Saffidine. Condorcet winning sets. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 44(3):493–517, 2015.

## 1 Section

This is how you *do italics*.

And this is how you *emphasize*

### 1.1 Subsection

Reference to Section 1

code text

And a quote

Footnote<sup>1</sup>

A bold **letter**

## References

Referencing [2015] in text. Speaking about work [Elkind *et al.*, 2015].

### 1.2 Haukur’s work

#### Capturing interest groups

Instead of considering the borda scoring vector when maximizing utility we might want to use a vector which gives the first candidate marginally more points than the second candidate and so on until we reach the middle candidate then the margin starts to grow again until it reaches what it was in the beginning. This allows voters to select a few items which they ”really like” and a few items which they ”really hate”.

#### $\Theta$ -Smith set

The  $\Theta$ -Smith set is the smallest non-empty set of candidates s.t. each member of the set defeats every other member outside the set in  $\Theta\%$  of cases.

#### K-plurality rule

The *k-plurality rule* with  $k < |A|$  is a *positional scoring rule* with the same scoring vector as the normal *plurality rule*,  $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$ , but instead of electing the alternative(s) with the highest score it elects the alternative(s) with the highest score, if the number of winners is strictly less than  $k$  then the alternative(s) with the second highest score is elected. This is done until  $|W| \geq k$ . If  $|W| > k$  then a tie-breaker should be applied on the last iteration.

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