In-EVM Mina State Verification

Technical Reference

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November 29, 2021

Contents

1	Intr	roduction	2			
	1.1	Overview	2			
2	Stat	State Proof Generator 3				
	2.1	Introduction	3			
	2.2	Optimizations	3			
		2.2.1 Batched FRI	3			
		2.2.2 Hash By Column	3			
		2.2.3 Hash By Subset	4			
	2.3	RedShift Protocol	4			
		2.3.1 Prover View	4			
		2.3.2 Verifier View	6			
	2.4	Introduction	6			
	2.5	Preliminaries	7			
		2.5.1 Pasta Curves	7			
		2.5.2 Verification Algorithm	7			
	2.6	Elliptic Curve Arithmetic	10			
		2.6.1 Addition	10			
		2.6.2 Doubling and Tripling	11			
		2.6.3 Variable Base Scalar Multiplication	11			
		2.6.4 Variable Base Endo-Scalar Multiplication	12			
		2.6.5 Fixed-base scalar multiplication circuit	12			
	2.7	Multi-Scalar Multiplication Circuit	13			
		2.7.1 Naive Algorithm	13			
		2.7.2 Simultaneous Doubling	14			
	2.8	Poseidon Circuit	15			
	2.9	Other Circuits	15			
		2.9.1 Combined Inner Product	16			
3	In-EVM State Proof Verifier 17					
	3.1	Verification Logic Architecture	17			
	3.2	Verification Logic API Reference	17			
	3.3	Input Data Structures	17			
Bi	ibliog	graphy	17			

Chapter 1

Introduction

This document is a technical reference to the in-EVM Mina state verification project.

1.1 Overview

The project's purpose is to provide Ethereum users with reliable Mina Protocol's state proof. The project UX consists of several steps:

- 1. Retrieve Mina Protocol's state proof.
- 2. Preprocess it by generating an auxiliary proof.
- 3. Submit the preprocessed proof to EVM-enabled cluster.
- 4. Verify the proof with EVM.

Such a UX defines projects parts:

- 1. Mina Protocol's state retriever (O1Labs' or Chainsafe's protocol implementation).
- 2. State proof generator.
- 3. Ethereum RPC proof submitter.
- 4. EVM-based proof verificator.

Each of these parts will be considered independently.

Chapter 2

State Proof Generator

This introduces a description for Mina Protocol's state auxiliary proof generator. Crucial components which define this part design and performance are:

- 1. Input data format (Pickles proof data structure: 2.5.2)
- 2. Proof system used for the proof generation.
- 3. Circuit definition used for the proof system.

2.1 Introduction

WIP

To prove Mina blockchain's state on the Ethereum Virtual Machine, we use Redshift SNARK[1]. RedShift is a transparent SNARK that uses PLONK[2] proof system but replaces the commitment scheme. The authors utilize FRI[3] protocol to obtain transparency for the PLONK system.

However, FRI cannot be straightforwardly used with the PLONK system. To achieve the required security level without huge overheads, the authors introduce *list polynomial commitment* scheme as a part of the protocol. For more details, we refer the reader to [1].

The original RedShift protocol utilizes the classic PLONK[2] system. To provide better performance, we generilize the original protocol for use with PLONK with custom gates [4], [5] and lookup arguments [6], [7].

2.2 Optimizations

WIP

2.2.1 Batched FRI

Instead of checking each commitment individualy, it is possible to aggregate them for FRI. For polynomials f_0, \ldots, f_k :

- 1. Get θ from transcript
- 2. $f = f_0 \cdot \theta^{k-1} + \dots + f_k$
- 3. Run FRI over f, using oracles to f_0, \ldots, f_k

Thus, we can run only one FRI instance for all committed polynomials. See [1] for details.

2.2.2 Hash By Column

Instead of committing each of the polynomials, it is possible to use the same Merkle tree for several polynomials. This leads to the decrease of the number of Merkle tree paths which are required to be provided by the prover.

See [8], [1] for details.

2.2.3 Hash By Subset

Each i+1 FRI round supposes the prover to send all elements from a coset $H \in D^{(i)}$. Each Merkle leaf is able to contain the whole coset instead of separate values.

See [8] for details. Similar approach is described in [1]. However, the authors of [1] use more values per leaf, that leads to better performance.

2.3 RedShift Protocol

WIP

Notations:

$N_{\mathtt{wires}}$	Number of wires ('advice columns')
$N_{\mathtt{perm}}$	Number of wires that are included in the permutation argument
$N_{\mathtt{sel}}$	Number of selectors used in the circuit
$N_{\mathtt{const}}$	Number of constant columns
\mathbf{f}_i	Witness polynomials, $0 \le i < N_{\text{wires}}$
\mathbf{f}_{c_i}	Constant-related polynomials, $0 \le i < N_{\text{const}}$
\mathbf{gate}_i	Gate polynomials, $0 \le i < N_{\tt sel}$
$\sigma(\operatorname{col}:i,\operatorname{row}:j) = (\operatorname{col}:i',\operatorname{row}:j')$	Permutation over the table

For details on polynomial commitment scheme and polynomial evaluation scheme, we refer the reader to [1].

- 1. $\mathcal{L}' = (\mathbf{q}_0, ..., \mathbf{q}_{N_{\text{sel}}})$
- 2. Let ω be a 2^k root of unity
- 3. Let δ be a T root of unity, where $T \cdot 2^S + 1 = p$ with T odd and $k \leq S$
- 4. Compute N_{perm} permutation polynomials $S_{\sigma_i}(X)$ such that $S_{\sigma_i}(\omega^j) = \delta^{i'} \cdot \omega^{j'}$
- 5. Compute N_{perm} identity permutation polynomials: $S_{id_i}(X)$ such that $S_{id_i}(\omega^j) = \delta^i \cdot \omega^j$
- 6. Let $H = \{\omega^0, ..., \omega^n\}$ be a cyclic subgroup of \mathbb{F}^*
- 7. Let $Z(X) = \prod a \in H^*(X a)$

${\bf Preprocessing:}$

2.3.1 Prover View

1. Choose masking polynomials:

$$h_i(X) \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\leq k}[X] \text{ for } 0 \leq i < N_{\text{wires}}$$

Remark: For details on choice of k, we refer the reader to [1].

2. Define new witness polynomials:

$$f_i(X) = \mathbf{f}_i(X) + h_i(X)Z(X)$$
 for $0 < i < N_{\text{wires}}$

- 3. Add commitments to f_i to transcript
- 4. Get $\beta, \gamma \in \mathbb{F}$ from hash(transcript)
- 5. For $0 \le i < N_{\text{perm}}$

$$p_i = f_i + \beta \cdot S_{id_i} + \gamma$$
$$q_i = f_i + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_i} + \gamma$$

6. Define:

$$\begin{aligned} p'(X) &= \prod_{0 \leq i < N_{\text{perm}}} p_i(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{< N_{\text{perm}} \cdot n}[X] \\ q'(X) &= \prod_{0 \leq i < N_{\text{perm}}} q_i(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{< N_{\text{perm}} \cdot n}[X] \end{aligned}$$

7. Compute $P(X), Q(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{< n+1}[X]$, such that:

$$P(\omega) = Q(\omega) = 1$$

$$P(\omega^{i}) = \prod_{1 \le j < i} p'(\omega^{i}) \text{ for } i \in 2, \dots, n+1$$

$$Q(\omega^{i}) = \prod_{1 \le j < i} q'(\omega^{i}) \text{ for } i \in 2, \dots, n+1$$

- 8. Compute commitments to P, Q and add them to transcript.
- 9. Get $\alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_5 \in \mathbb{F}$ from hash(transcript)
- 10. Get τ from hash(transcript)
- 11. Define polynomials $(F_0, \ldots, F_4$ copy-satisfability, \mathtt{gate}_0 is PI-constraining gate)):

$$\begin{split} F_0(X) &= L_1(X)(P(X)-1) \\ F_1(X) &= L_1(X)(Q(X)-1) \\ F_2(X) &= P(X)p'(X) - P(X\omega) \\ F_3(X) &= Q(X)q'(X) - Q(X\omega) \\ F_4(X) &= L_n(X)(P(X\omega) - Q(X\omega)) \\ F_5(X) &= \sum_{0 \leq i < N_{\mathrm{sel}}} (\tau^i \cdot \mathbf{q}_i(X) \cdot \mathrm{gate}_i(X)) + PI(X) \end{split}$$

12. Compute:

$$F(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{5} \alpha_i F_i(X)$$
$$T(X) = \frac{F(X)}{Z(X)}$$

- 13. $N_T := \max(N_{\text{perm}}, \deg_{\text{gates}} 1)$, where \deg_{gates} is the highest degree of the degrees of gate polynomials.
- 14. Split T(X) into separate polynomials $T_0(X), ..., T_{N_T-1}(X)^1$
- 15. Add commitments to $T_0(X), ..., T_{N_T-1}(X)$ to transcript.
- 16. Get $y \in \mathbb{F}/H$ from hash(transcript)
- 17. Run evaluation scheme with the committed polynomials and y. Remark: Depending on the circuit, evaluation can be done also on $y\omega, y\omega^{-1}$.
- 18. The proof is $\pi_{\texttt{comm}}$ and $\pi_{\texttt{eval}}$, where:
 - $\bullet \quad \pi_{\texttt{comm}} = \{f_{0,\texttt{comm}}, \dots, f_{N_{\texttt{wires}}-1,\texttt{comm}}, P_{\texttt{comm}}, Q_{\texttt{comm}}, T_{0,\texttt{comm}}, \dots, T_{N_T-1,\texttt{comm}}\}$
 - $\pi_{\texttt{eval}}$ is evaluation proofs for $f_0(y), \ldots, f_{N_{\texttt{wires}}-1}(y), P(y), P(y\omega), Q(y), Q(y\omega), T_0(y), \ldots, T_{N_T-1}(y)$

 $^{^1\}mathrm{Commit}$ scheme supposes that polynomials should be degree $\leq n$

2.3.2 Verifier View

- 1. Let $f_{0,\text{comm}}, \ldots, f_{N_{\text{wires}}-1,\text{comm}}$ be commitments to $f_0(X), \ldots, f_{N_{\text{wires}}-1}(X)$
- 2. transcript = setup_values $||f_{0,\text{comm}}|| \dots ||f_{N_{\text{wires}}-1,\text{comm}}|$
- 3. $\beta, \gamma = hash(transcript)$
- 4. Let $P_{\text{comm}}, Q_{\text{comm}}$ be commitments to P(X), Q(X)
- 5. transcript = transcript $||P_{comm}||Q_{comm}||$
- 6. $\alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_5 = hash(transcript)$
- 7. $\tau = hash(transcript)$
- 8. $N_T := \max(N_{\text{perm}}, \deg_{\text{gates}} 1)$, where \deg_{gates} is the highest degree of the degrees of gate polynomials.
- 9. Let $T_{0,\text{comm}},...,T_{N_T-1,\text{comm}}$ be commitments to $T_0(X),...,T_{N_T-1}(X)$
- 10. transcript = transcript $||T_{0,\text{comm}}||...||T_{N_T-1,\text{comm}}|$
- 11. $y = hash|_{\mathbb{F}/H}(\text{transcript})$
- 12. Run evaluation scheme verification with the committed polynomials and y to check values $f_i(y), P(y), P(y\omega), Q(y), Q(y\omega), T_j(y)$.

Remark: Depending on the circuit, evaluation can be done also on $f_i(y\omega)$, $f_i(y\omega^{-1})$ for some i.

13. Calculate:

$$\begin{split} F_0(y) &= L_1(y)(P(y) - 1) \\ F_1(y) &= L_1(y)(Q(y) - 1) \\ p'(y) &= \prod p_i(y) = \prod f_i(y) + \beta \cdot S_{id_i}(y) + \gamma \\ F_2(y) &= P(y)p'(y) - P(y\omega) \\ q'(y) &= \prod q_i(y) = \prod f_i(y) + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_i}(y) + \gamma \\ F_3(y) &= Q(y)q'(y) - Q(y\omega) \\ F_4(y) &= L_n(y)(P(y\omega) - Q(y\omega)) \\ F_5(y) &= \sum_{0 \leq i < N_{\rm sel}} (\tau^i \cdot \mathbf{q}_i(y) \cdot \mathrm{gate}_i(y)) + PI(y) \\ T(y) &= \sum_{0 \leq j < N_T} y^{n \cdot j} T_j(y) \end{split}$$

14. Check the identity:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{5} \alpha_i F_i(y) = Z(y) T(y)$$

2.4 Introduction

WIP

High level description according to RfP²

- 1. Computing several hash values from the data of the proof. This involves using the Poseidon hash function with 55 full rounds both over \mathbb{F}_p and \mathbb{F}_q with round constants and MDS matrix specified for \mathbb{F}_p^3 and for \mathbb{F}_q^4 .
- 2. Checking arithmetic equations.
- 3. Performing one multi-scalar multiplication (MSM) of size $2n_2 + 4 + (2 + 25) = 63$, for which some of the bases are fixed and some are variable.
- 4. For each $i \in \{1, 2\}$, performing a multi-scalar multiplication over \mathbb{G}_i of size 2^{n_i} with a fixed array of bases, and with scalars that can be very efficiently computed from the proof.

²https://hackmd.io/u_2Ygx8XS5Ss1aObgOFjkA

³https://github.com/o1-labs/proof-systems/blob/master/oracle/src/pasta/fp.rs

⁴https://github.com/o1-labs/proof-systems/blob/master/oracle/src/pasta/fq.rs

Note that for MSM in Step 4:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{2^{n_k}-1} s_i \cdot G_i = H$$

$$s_i \coloneqq \prod_{\substack{0 \le j \le n_k \\ \text{bits}(i)[j]=1}} \phi(c_j),$$

where:

- $\phi: \{0,1\}^{128} \to \mathbb{F}$ is defined as to_field in the implementation⁵.
- Given an integer $i < 2^{n_k}$, bits(i) is defined as the little-endian bit array of length n representing the binary expansion of i.
- $G_0, ..., G_{2^{n_k-1}} \in \mathbb{G}_k$ is a fixed sequence of group elements⁶.
- $c_0, ..., c_{n_k-1} \in \{0, 1\}^{128}$ is a sequence of challenges.

We use the same 15-wires PLONK circuits that are designed for Mina.⁷

2.5 Preliminaries

WIP

2.5.1 Pasta Curves

Let $n_1 = 17$, $n_2 = 16$. Pasta curves parameters:

- $p = 2^{254} + 45560315531419706090280762371685220353$
- $q = 2^{254} + 45560315531506369815346746415080538113$
- Pallas:

$$\mathbb{G}_1 = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p | y^2 = x^3 + 5\}$$
$$|\mathbb{G}_1| = q$$

• Vesta:

$$\mathbb{G}_2 = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_q | y^2 = x^3 + 5\}$$

 $|\mathbb{G}_2| = p$

2.5.2 Verification Algorithm

Notations

N.T.	N1(\)
$N_{\mathtt{wires}}$	Number of wires ('advice columns')
$N_{\mathtt{perm}}$	Number of wires that are included in the permutation argument
$N_{\mathtt{prev}}$	Number of previous challenges
$S_{\sigma_i}(\mathbf{X})$	Permutation polynomials for $0 \le i < N_{\tt perm}$
pub(X)	Public input polynomial
$w_i(X)$	Witness polynomials for $0 \le i < N_{\tt wires}$
$\eta_i(X)$	Previous challenges polynomials for $0 \le i < N_{prev}$
ω	<i>n</i> -th root of unity

Denote multi-scalar multiplication $\sum_{s_i \in \mathbf{s}, G_i \in \mathbf{G}} [s_i] G_i$ by $MSM(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{G})$ for $l_{\mathbf{s}} = l_{\mathbf{G}}$ where $l_{\mathbf{s}} = |\mathbf{s}|$, $l_{\mathbf{G}} = |\mathbf{G}|$. If $l_{\mathbf{s}} < l_{\mathbf{G}}$, then we use only first $l_{\mathbf{s}}$ elements of \mathbf{G}

⁵https://github.com/o1-labs/proof-systems/blob/49f81edc9c86e5907d26ea791fa083640ad0ef3e/oracle/src/sponge.rs#L33

 $^{^{6}} https://github.com/o1-labs/proof-systems/blob/master/dlog/commitment/src/srs.rs\#L70$

⁷https://o1-labs.github.io/mina-book/specs/15_wires/15_wires.html

Proof π constains (here \mathbb{F}_r is a scalar field of \mathbb{G}):

- Commitments:
 - Witness polynomials: $w_{0,\text{comm}},...,w_{N_{\text{wires}},\text{comm}} \in \mathbb{G}$
 - Permutation polynomial: $z_{\mathtt{comm}} \in \mathbb{G}$
 - Quotinent polynomial: $t_{\texttt{comm}} = (t_{1,\texttt{comm}}, t_{2,\texttt{comm}}, ..., t_{N_{\texttt{perm}},\texttt{comm}}) \in (\mathbb{G}^{N_{\texttt{perm}}} \times \mathbb{G})$
- Evaluations:
 - $w_0(\zeta),...,w_{N_{\mathrm{wires}}}(\zeta) \in \mathbb{F}_r$
 - $w_0(\zeta\omega),...,w_{N_{\text{wires}}}(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r$
 - $z(\zeta), z(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r$

 - $$\begin{split} \bullet \ S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta),...,S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}}(\zeta) \in \mathbb{F}_r \\ \bullet \ S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta\omega),...,S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}}(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r \end{split}$$
 - $\bar{L}(\zeta\omega) \in \mathbb{F}_r^8$
- Opening proof o_{π} for inner product argument:
 - $(L_i, R_i) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G}$ for $0 \leq i < lr_rounds$
 - $\delta, \hat{G} \in \mathbb{G}$
 - $z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{F}_r$
- previous challenges:
 - $\{\eta_i(\xi_j)\}_j, \eta_{i,\text{comm}}, \text{ for } 0 \leq i < \text{prev}$

Remark: For simplicity, we do not use distinct proofs index i for each element in the algorithm below. For instance, we write pub_{comm} instead of $pub_{i,comm}$.

⁸See https://o1-labs.github.io/mina-book/crypto/plonk/maller_15.html

Algorithm 1 Verification

```
Input: \pi_0, \ldots, \pi_{\mathtt{batch\_size}} (see 2.5.2)
 Output: acc or rej
             1. for each \pi_i:
                              1.1 pub_{comm} = MSM(\mathbf{L}, pub) \in \mathbb{G}, where \mathbf{L} is Lagrange bases vector
                              1.2 random_oracle(p_{\text{comm}}, \pi_i):
                                          1.2.1 H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.absorb(pub_{\mathtt{comm}}||w_{0,\mathtt{comm}}||...||w_{N_{\mathtt{wires}},\mathtt{comm}})
                                          1.2.2 \ \beta, \gamma = H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}()
                                         1.2.3 H_{\mathbb{F}_a}.absorb(z_{\text{comm}})
                                          1.2.4 \alpha = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                          1.2.5~H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{absorb}(t_{1,\mathtt{comm}}||...||t_{N_{\mathtt{perm}},\mathtt{comm}}||...||\infty||)
                                         1.2.6 \zeta = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                         1.2.7 Transfrorm H_{\mathbb{F}_q} to H_{\mathbb{F}_r}
                                         1.2.8~H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{absorb}(pub(\zeta)||w_0(\zeta)||...||w_{N_{\mathrm{wires}}}(\zeta)||S_0(\zeta)||...||S_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}(\zeta))
                                         1.2.9 \ H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{absorb}(pub(\zeta\omega)||w_0(\zeta\omega)||...||w_{N_{\mathrm{wires}}}(\zeta\omega)||S_0(\zeta\omega)||...||S_{N_{\mathrm{perm}}}(\zeta\omega))
                                    1.2.10~H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.absorb(\bar{L}(\zeta\omega))
                                    1.2.11 v = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_r}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                    1.2.12 u = \phi(H_{\mathbb{F}_n}.\mathtt{squeeze}())
                                    1.2.13 Compute evaluation of \eta_i(\zeta), \eta_i(\zeta\omega) for 0 \le i < N_{\text{prev}}
                                    1.2.14 Compute evaluation of L(\zeta)
                              1.3 \ \mathbf{f}_{\mathrm{base}} \coloneqq \{S_{\sigma_{N_{\mathtt{perm}}-1},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{mult},\mathtt{comm}}, w_{0,\mathtt{comm}}, w_{1,\mathtt{comm}}, w_{2,\mathtt{comm}}, q_{\mathtt{const},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{psdn},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{psdn},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt{comm}}, \mathtt{gate}_{\mathrm{rc},\mathtt
                                                \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_add},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_dbl},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_endo},\texttt{comm}}, \texttt{gate}_{\texttt{ec\_vbase},\texttt{comm}} \}
                              1.4 s_{\text{perm}} := (w_0(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_0}(\zeta)) \cdot \dots \cdot (w_5(\zeta) + \gamma + \beta \cdot S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{near}}}}(\zeta))
                              1.5 \ \mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}} \coloneqq \{ -z(\zeta\omega) \cdot \beta \cdot \alpha_0 \cdot zkp(\zeta) \cdot s_{\text{perm}}, w_0(\zeta) \cdot w_1(\zeta), w_0(\zeta), w_1(\zeta), 1 \}
                                                s_{\text{psdn}}, s_{\text{rc}}, s_{\text{ec\_add}}, s_{\text{ec\_dbl}}, s_{\text{ec\_endo}}, s_{\text{ec\_vbase}}
                              1.6 f_{\text{comm}} = \text{MSM}(\mathbf{f}_{\text{base}}, \mathbf{f}_{\text{scalars}})
                              1.7 \bar{L}_{\text{comm}} = f_{\text{comm}} - t_{\text{comm}} \cdot (\zeta^n - 1)
                              1.8 PE is a set of elements of the form (f_{\texttt{comm}}, f(\zeta), f(\zeta\omega)) for the following polynomials:
                                                \eta_0, \ldots, \eta_{N_{\text{prev}}}, pub, w_0, \ldots, w_{N_{\text{wires}}}, z, S_{\sigma_0}, \ldots, S_{\sigma_{N_{\text{perm}}}}, L
                              1.9 \mathcal{P}_i = \{H_{\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta, v, u, \mathbf{PE}, o_{\pi_i}\}
             2. final_check(\mathcal{P}_0, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{\mathtt{batch\_size}})
```

Algorithm 2 Final Check

Input: $\pi_0, \dots, \pi_{\mathtt{batch_size}}$, where $\pi_i = \{H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}, \zeta_i, \zeta_i\omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i, o_{\pi_i}\}$

Output: acc or rej

- 1. $\rho_1 \to \mathbb{F}_r$
- 2. $\rho_2 \to \mathbb{F}_r$
- 3. $r_0 = r'_0 = 1$
- 4. for $0 \le i < \mathtt{batch_size}$:
 - 4.1 $cip_i = \texttt{combined_inner_product}(\zeta_i, \zeta_i \omega, v_i, u_i, \mathbf{PE}_i)$
 - $4.2~H_{i,\mathbb{F}_a}$.absorb (cip_i-2^{255})
 - 4.3 $U_i = (H_{i,\mathbb{F}_a}.squeeze()).to_group()$
 - 4.4 Calculate opening challenges $\xi_{i,j}$ from o_{π_i}
 - 4.5 $h_i(X) := \prod_{k=0}^{\log(d+1)-1} (1 + \xi_{\log(d+1)-k} X^{2^k})$, where $d = \text{lr_rounds}$
 - $4.6 \ b_i = h_i(\zeta) + u_i \cdot h_i(\zeta\omega)$
 - 4.7 $C_i = \sum_j v_i^j (\sum_k r_i^k f_{j,\text{comm}})$, where $f_{j,\text{comm}}$ from \mathbf{PE}_i .
 - 4.8 $Q_i = \sum (\xi_{i,j} \cdot L_{i,j} + \xi_{i,j}^{-1} \cdot R_j) + cip_i \cdot U_i + C_i$
 - $4.9 \ c_i = \phi(H_{i,\mathbb{F}_q}.\mathtt{squeeze}())$
 - $4.10 \ r_i = r_{i-1} \cdot \rho_1$
 - 4.11 $r'_i = r'_{i-1} \cdot \rho_2$
 - 4.12 Check $\hat{G}_i = \langle s, G \rangle$, where s is set of h(X) coefficients.

Remark: This check can be done inside the MSM below using r'_i .

5.
$$res = \sum_{i} r^{i} (c_{i}Q_{i} + delta_{i} - (z_{i,1}(\hat{G}_{i} + b_{i}U_{i}) + z_{i,2}H))$$

6. return res ==0

Algorithm 3 Combined Inner Product

Input: $\xi, r, f_0(\zeta_1), \dots, f_k(\zeta_1), f_0(\zeta_2), \dots, f_k(\zeta_2)$

Output: s

1.
$$s = \sum_{i=0}^{k} \xi^{i} \cdot (f_{i}(\zeta_{1}) + r \cdot f_{i}(\zeta_{2}))$$

2.6 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic

WIP

2.6.1 Addition

Row 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
$$i$$
 x_1 y_1 x_2 y_2 x_3 y_3 r

Constraints:

•
$$(x_2-x_1)\cdot(y_3+y_1)-(y_1-y_2)\cdot(x_1-x_3)$$

- $(x_1 + x_2 + x_3) \cdot (x_1 x_3) \cdot (x_1 x_3) (y_3 + y_1) \cdot (y_3 + y_1)$
- $(x_2 x_1) \cdot r = 1$

2.6.2 Doubling and Tripling

```
Row
                       3
                                       6
                                            7
                                                        9
                                                              10
                                                                          12
                                                                                      14
                             4
                                                 8
                                                                    11
                                                                                13
       x_1
            y_1
                  x_2
                       y_2
                            x_3
                                  y_3
                                      r_1
                                            r_2
```

Constraints:

- Doubling:
 - $4 \cdot y_1^2 \cdot (x_2 + 2 \cdot x_1) = 9 \cdot x_1^4$
 - $2 \cdot y_1 \cdot (y_2 + y_1) = (3 \cdot x_1^2) \cdot (x_1 x_2)$
 - $y_1 \cdot r_1 = 1$
- Addition (for tripling):
 - $(x_2-x_1)\cdot(y_3+y_1)-(y_1-y_2)\cdot(x_1-x_3)$
 - $(x_1 + x_2 + x_3) \cdot (x_1 x_3) \cdot (x_1 x_3) (y_3 + y_1) \cdot (y_3 + y_1)$
 - $(x_2-x_1)\cdot r_2=1$

2.6.3 Variable Base Scalar Multiplication

For
$$S = [r]T$$
, where $r = 2^n + k$ and $k = [k_n...k_0], k_i \in \{0,1\}$:

- 1. S = [2]T
- 2. for i from n-1 to 0:

$$2.1 \ Q = k_{i+1} ? T : -T$$

$$2.2 R = S + Q$$

$$2.3 \ S = R + S$$

3.
$$S = k_0 ? S - T : S$$

Constraints for i + z, where $z \mod 2 = 0$:

- $b_1 \cdot (b_1 1) = 0$
- $b_2 \cdot (b_2 1) = 0$
- $(x_P x_T) \cdot s_1 = y_P (2b_1 1) \cdot y_T$
- $s_1^2 s_2^2 = x_T x_R$
- $(2 \cdot x_P + x_T s_1^2) \cdot (s_1 + s_2) = 2y_P$
- $\bullet \ (x_P x_R) \cdot s_2 = y_R + y_P$
- $(x_R x_T) \cdot s_3 = y_R (2b_2 1) \cdot y_T$
- $s_3^2 s_4^2 = x_T x_S$
- $(2 \cdot x_R + x_T s_3^2) \cdot (s_3 + s_4) = 2 \cdot y_R$
- $\bullet \quad (x_R x_S) \cdot s_4 = y_S + y_R$
- $n = 32 \cdot \text{next}(n) + 16 \cdot b_1 + 8 \cdot b_2 + 4 \cdot \text{next}(b_1) + 2 \cdot \text{next}(b_2) + \text{next}(b_3)$

Constraints for i + z, where $z \mod 2 = 1$:

⁹Using the results from https://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0208038.pdf

- $b_1 \cdot (b_1 1) = 0$
- $b_2 \cdot (b_2 1) = 0$
- $b_3 \cdot (b_3 1) = 0$
- $(x_P x_T) \cdot s_1 = y_P (2b_1 1) \cdot y_T$
- $(2 \cdot x_P + x_T s_1^2) \cdot ((x_P x_R) \cdot s_1 + y_R + y_P) = (x_P x_R) \cdot 2y_P$
- $(y_R + y_P)^2 = (x_P x_R)^2 \cdot (s_1^2 x_T + x_R)$
- $(x_T x_R) \cdot s_3 = (2b_2 1) \cdot y_T y_R$
- $(2x_R s_3^2 + x_T) \cdot ((x_R x_V) \cdot s_3 + y_V + y_R) = (x_R x_V) \cdot 2y_R$
- $(y_V + y_R)^2 = (x_R x_V)^2 \cdot (s_3^2 x_T + x_V)$
- $(x_T x_V) \cdot s_5 = (2b_3 1) \cdot y_T y_V$
- $(2x_V s_5^2 + x_T) \cdot ((x_V x_S) \cdot s_5 + y_S + y_V) = (x_V x_S) \cdot 2y_V$
- $(y_S + y_V)^2 = (x_V x_S)^2 \cdot (s_5^2 x_T + x_S)$

2.6.4 Variable Base Endo-Scalar Multiplication

For S = [r]T, where $r = [r_n...r_0]$ and $r_i \in \{0, 1\}$: 10

- 1. $S = [2](\phi(T) + T)$
- 2. for i from $\frac{\lambda}{2} 1$ to 0:

2.1
$$Q = r_{2i+1} ? \phi([2r_{2i} - 1]T) : [2r_{2i} - 1]T$$

- 2.2 R = S + Q
- $2.3 \ S = R + S$

Constraints:

- $b_1 \cdot (b_1 1) = 0$
- $b_2 \cdot (b_2 1) = 0$
- $b_3 \cdot (b_3 1) = 0$
- $b_4 \cdot (b_4 1) = 0$
- $((1 + (endo 1) \cdot b_2) \cdot x_T x_P) \cdot s_1 = (2 \cdot b_1 1) \cdot y_T y_P$
- $(2 \cdot x_P s_1^2 + (1 + (\text{endo} 1) \cdot b_2) \cdot x_T) \cdot ((x_P x_R) \cdot s_1 + y_R + y_P) = (x_P x_R) \cdot 2 \cdot y_P$
- $(y_R + yP)^2 = (xP x_R)^2 \cdot (s_1^2 (1 + (\text{endo} 1) \cdot b_2) \cdot x_T + x_R)$
- $((1 + (\text{endo} 1) \cdot b_2) \cdot x_T x_R) \cdot s_3 = (2 \cdot b_3 1) \cdot y_T y_R$
- $(2 \cdot x_R s_3^2 + (1 + (\text{endo} 1) \cdot b_4) \cdot x_T) \cdot ((x_R x_S) \cdot s_3 + y_S + y_R) = (x_R x_S) \cdot 2 \cdot y_R$
- $(y_S + y_R)^2 = (x_R x_S)^2 \cdot (s_3^2 (1 + (endo 1) \cdot b_4) \cdot x_T + x_S)$
- $n = 16 \cdot \text{next}(n) + 8 \cdot b_1 + 4 \cdot b_2 + 2 \cdot b_3 + b_4$

2.6.5 Fixed-base scalar multiplication circuit

We precompute all values $w(B, s, k) = (k_i + 2) \cdot 8^s B$, where $k_i \in \{0, ...7\}$, $s \in \{0, ..., 83\}$ and $w(B, s, k) = (k_i \cdot 8^s - \sum_{j=0}^{84} 8^{j+1}) \cdot B$, where $k_i \in \{0, ...7\}$, s = 84.

¹⁰Using the results from https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1021.pdf

Define the following functions:

- $\begin{array}{l} 1. \ \phi_1: (x_1,x_2,x_3,x_4) \mapsto \\ x_3 \cdot (-u_0' \cdot x_2 \cdot x_1 + u_0' \cdot x_1 + u_0' \cdot x_2 u_0' + u_2' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 u_2' \cdot x_2 + u_4' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 u_4' \cdot x_2 u_6' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 + u_1' \cdot x_2 \cdot x_1 u_1' \cdot x_1 u_1' \cdot x_2 + u_1' u_3' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 + u_3' \cdot x_2 u_5' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 + u_5' \cdot x_2 + u_7' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2) (x_4 u_0' \cdot x_2 \cdot x_1 + u_0' \cdot x_1 + u_0' \cdot x_2 u_0' + u_2' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 u_2' \cdot x_2 + u_4' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 u_4' \cdot x_2 u_6' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2) \end{array}$
- $2. \ \phi_2: (x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) \mapsto \\ x_3 \cdot (-v_0' \cdot x_2 \cdot x_1 + v_0' \cdot x_1 + v_0' \cdot x_2 v_0' + v_2' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 v_2' \cdot x_2 + v_4' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 v_4' \cdot x_2 v_6' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 + v_1' \cdot x_2 \cdot x_1 v_1' \cdot x_1 v_1' \cdot x_2 + v_1' v_3' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 + v_3' \cdot x_2 v_5' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 + v_5' \cdot x_2 + v_7' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2) (x_4 v_0' \cdot x_2 \cdot x_1 + v_0' \cdot x_1 + v_0' \cdot x_2 v_0' + v_2' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 v_2' \cdot x_2 + v_4' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2 v_4' \cdot x_2 v_6' \cdot x_1 \cdot x_2)$

Constraints:

- For i + 0:
 - $b_i \cdot (b_i 1) = 0$, where $i \in \{0, ..., 5\}$
 - $\phi_1(b_0, b_1, b_2, u_0) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, 0, i)$
 - $\phi_1(b_3, b_4, b_5, u_1) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, 1, i)$
 - $\phi_2(b_0, b_1, b_2, v_0) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, 0, i)$
 - $\phi_2(b_3, b_4, b_5, v_1) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, 1, i)$
 - $acc = b_0 + b_1 \cdot 2 + b_2 \cdot 2^2 + b_3 \cdot 2^3 + b_4 \cdot 2^4 + b_5 \cdot 2^5$
 - $(x_1, y_1) = (u_0, v_0)$
 - $(x_2, y_2) = (x_1, y_1) + (u_1, v_1)$ incomplete addition, where $x_1 \neq u_1$
- For $i + z, z \in 1, ..., 41$:
 - $b_i \cdot (b_i 1) = 0$, where $i \in \{0, ..., 5\}$
 - $\phi_1(b_0, b_1, b_2, u_0) = 0$, where $(u'_i, v'_i) = w(B, z \cdot 2, i)$
 - $\phi_1(b_3, b_4, b_5, u_1) = 0$, where $(u'_i, v'_i) = w(B, z \cdot 2 + 1, i)$
 - $\phi_2(b_0, b_1, b_2, v_0) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, z \cdot 2, i)$
 - $\phi_2(b_3, b_4, b_5, v_1) = 0$, where $(u'_i, v'_i) = w(B, z \cdot 2 + 1, i)$
 - $acc = b_0 + b_1 \cdot 2 + b_2 \cdot 2^2 + b_3 \cdot 2^3 + b_4 \cdot 2^4 + b_5 \cdot 2^5 + acc_{prev} \cdot 2^6$
 - $(x_1, y_1) = (u_0, v_0) + (x_2, y_2)_{prev}$ incomplete addition, where $u_0 \neq x_2$
 - $(x_2, y_2) = (x_1, y_1) + (u_1, v_1)$ incomplete addition, where $x_1 \neq u_1$
- For i + 42:
 - $b_i \cdot (b_i 1) = 0$, where $i \in \{0, ..., 2\}$
 - $\phi_1(b_0, b_1, b_2, u_0) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, 84, i)$
 - $\phi_2(b_0, b_1, b_2, v_0) = 0$, where $(u_i', v_i') = w(B, 84, i)$
 - $b = b_0 + b_1 \cdot 2 + b_2 \cdot 2^2 + acc_{prev} \cdot 2^3$
 - $(x_w, y_w) = (u_0, v_0) + (x_2, y_2)_{prev}$ complete addition from Orchard

2.7 Multi-Scalar Multiplication Circuit

WIP

Input: $G_0, ..., G_{k-1} \in \mathbb{G}, s_0, ..., s_{k-1} \in \mathbb{F}_r$, where \mathbb{F}_r is scalar field of \mathbb{G} . Output: $S = \sum_{i=0}^k s_i \cdot G_i$

2.7.1 Naive Algorithm

Using endomorphism:

- 1. $A = \infty$
- 2. for j from 0 to k-1:
 - $2.1 \ r := s_i, T := G_i$
 - $2.2 \ S = [2](\phi(T) + T)$
 - 2.3 for i from $\frac{\lambda}{2} 1$ to 0:

2.3.1
$$Q = r_{2i+1} ? \phi([2r_{2i} - 1]T) : [2r_{2i} - 1]T$$

$$2.3.2 R = S + Q$$

 $2.3.3 S = R + S$
 $2.4 A = A + S$

rows
$$\approx k \cdot (sm_rows + 1 + 2) \approx 67k$$
,

where sm_rows is the number of rows in the scalar multiplication circuit.

Without endomorphism:

- 1. $A = \infty$
- 2. for j from 0 to k-1:

$$2.1 \ r \coloneqq s_j, T \coloneqq G_j$$

$$2.2 S = [2]T$$

2.3 for i from n-1 to 0:

$$2.3.1 \ Q = k_{i+1} ? T : -T$$

$$2.3.2 R = S + Q$$

$$2.3.3 \ S = R + S$$

$$2.4 \ S = k_0 ? S - T : S$$

$$2.5 \ A = A + S$$

rows
$$\approx k \cdot (sm_rows + 1 + 1) \approx 105k$$
,

where sm_rows is the number of rows in the scalar multiplication circuit.

2.7.2 Simultaneous Doubling

Remark: Simultaneous doubling incurs a negligible completeness error for independently chosen random terms of the sum.

Using endomorphism:

1.
$$A = \sum_{j=0}^{k} [2](\phi(G_j) + G_j)$$

2. for i from $\frac{\lambda}{2} - 1$ to 0:

2.1 for j from 0 to k-1:

$$2.1.1 \ r \coloneqq s_i, T \coloneqq G_i$$

2.1.2
$$Q = r_{2i+1} ? \phi([2r_{2i} - 1]T) : [2r_{2i} - 1]T$$

$$2.1.3 \ A = A + Q$$

2.2 if $i \neq 0$:

$$2.2.1 \ A = 2 \cdot A$$

rows
$$\approx \frac{\lambda}{2} \cdot (k \cdot \texttt{add_rows} + \texttt{dbl_rows}) + 2k \approx 64 \cdot (k+1) \approx 66k + 64$$
,

where

- add_rows is the number of rows in the addition circuit.
- dbl_rows is the number of rows in the doubling circuit.

Without endomorphism:

1.
$$A = \sum_{j=0}^{k} [2]G_j$$

2. for i from n-1 to 0:

2.1 for j from 0 to k-1:

$$2.1.1 \ r := s_j, T := G_j$$

$$2.1.2 \ Q = k_{i+1} ? T : -T$$

$$2.1.3 \ A = A + Q$$

2.2 if $i \neq 0$:

$$2.2.1 \ A = 2 \cdot A$$

3.
$$A = A + \sum_{j=0}^{k} [1 - s_{j,0}]G_j$$

rows
$$\approx \frac{2}{5}n \cdot (k \cdot add_rows + dbl_rows) + k \approx 103 \cdot (k+1) + 2k \approx 104k + 103$$
,

where

- add_rows is the number of rows in the addition circuit.
- dbl_rows is the number of rows in the doubling circuit.

Poseidon Circuit 2.8

WIP

Mina uses Poseidon hash with width = 3. Therefore, each permutation state is represented by 3 elements and each row contains 5 states.

Denote *i*-th permutation state by $T_i = (T_{i,0}, T_{i,1}, T_{i,2})$.

State change constraints:

$$STATE(i+1) = STATE(i)^{\alpha} \cdot MDS + RC$$

Denote the index of the first state in the row by start (e.g. start = 50 for 10-th row). We can expand the previous formula to:

- For i from start to start + 5:
 - $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \ T_{i+1,0} = T_{i,0}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[0][0] + T_{i,1}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[0][1] + T_{i,2}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[0][2] + \mathrm{RC}_{i+1,0} \\ \bullet \ T_{i+1,1} = T_{i,0}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[1][0] + T_{i,1}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[1][1] + T_{i,2}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[1][2] + \mathrm{RC}_{i+1,1} \\ \bullet \ T_{i+1,2} = T_{i,0}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[2][0] + T_{i,1}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[2][1] + T_{i,2}^5 \cdot \mathrm{MDS}[2][2] + \mathrm{RC}_{i+1,2} \end{array}$

Notice that the constraints above include the state from the next row (start + 5).

2.9 Other Circuits

WIP

2.9.1 Combined Inner Product

$$\sum_{i=0}^{k} \xi^{i} \cdot (f_{i}(\zeta_{1}) + r \cdot f_{i}(\zeta_{2}))$$

Constraints for i + z, where $z \mod 2 = 0$:

- $(w_0 + w_1 \cdot \text{next}(w_5)) \cdot w_6 = w_7$
- $(w_2 + w_3 \cdot \operatorname{next}(w_5)) \cdot w_9 = w_8$
- $\bullet \quad w_5 \cdot w_6 = w_9$
- $w_5 \cdot w_9 = \operatorname{next}(w_9)$
- $w_5 \cdot \text{next}(w_9) = \text{next}(w_5)$
- $w_4 + w_7 + w_8 + \text{next}(w_7) + \text{next}(w_8) = \text{next}(w_4)$

Constraints for i + z, where $z \mod 2 = 1$:

- $(w_0 + w_1 \cdot w_5) \cdot w_9 = w_7$
- $(w_2 + w_3 \cdot w_5) \cdot w_6 = w_8$

Chapter 3

In-EVM State Proof Verifier

This introduces a description for in-EVM Mina Protocol state proof verification mechanism. Crucial components which define this part design are:

- $1. \ \ Verification \ architecture \ description.$
- 2. Verification logic API reference.
- 3. Input data structures description.
- 3.1 Verification Logic Architecture
- 3.2 Verification Logic API Reference
- 3.3 Input Data Structures

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