Smart Grid Security: Innovative Approaches for Threat Detection and Countermeasures

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***Abstract* — Electric power networks are now more susceptible to cyberattacks due to their increased interconnectivity and digitization. The security of Smart Grids and the effects of cyberattacks on system functionality and operations are consequently raising concerns. This study addresses the growing concerns regarding the security of Smart Grids and the impact of cyberattacks on their functionality and operations. It provides an in-depth analysis of the various types, frequencies, and consequences of cyberattacks on Smart Grids, as well as their effects on system performance. Additionally, the survey explores a range of defense tactics and strategies that can be employed to mitigate the risk of cyberattacks on these systems. This study offers a thorough assessment of the state of cyber security in Smart Grids today and emphasizes the need for increased awareness and financial support for cyber security measures to safeguard these vital infrastructure components.**

Keywords — smart grids, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity attacks, industrial control systems, SCADA

I. INTRODUCTION

A smart grid is an advanced electrical network that leverages digital technologies to facilitate bidirectional communication and transfer of electricity and data. Its goal is to use information and communication technology to update conventional electrical networks (ICTs). Due to the high-voltage transmission connections, previous grids were unable to transfer significant amounts of data. Transmission lines, transformers, and substations are only a few of the electrical components used in the transmission of electric power from centralized power plants to customers. Traditional grids also don't have a lot of large-scale energy storage equipment. To enable demand response and renewable energy generation at the distribution end of a smart grid, effective communication is required for information flow across the various components. Nearly every issue that traditional networks confront can be resolved by smart grids. To improve electricity transport, dependability, security, and monitoring, researchers established communication between electrical and digital data. Smart grid security is a critical topic since digitization has made data security challenges for power networks worse [1].

It includes operational technology sub-components such as ICS, DCS, PLC, and SCADA. Moreover, networks, storage servers, management servers, and workstations based on IT are all resources used by the smart grid. Using the AMI protocol, the control center for smart grids exchanges a lot of data with smart meters [2]. Using PLC, the smart grid control center communicates with the sub-stations to send and receive data. The data and electrical flows of the smart grid are shown in Figure 1. Using the AMI network on LTE, Wi-Fi, or WAN, EVs in a vehicle to grid network exchange data with the smart grid. A basic power network model for the home is called HAN (home area network), and it allows appliances to send data to a smart meter through Wi-Fi, ZigBee, or WAN. The network is used to send the data collected at the meter to the smart grid. Several HANs make up the neighborhood area network (NAN), which connects to an SG center via the AMI network. A NAN subdivision also includes factories, office complexes, and social facilities. Using PLC, power plants and generators transmit status information to the smart grid [2].



Fig. 1. Smart Grid Energy and Information Flow Ecosystem [4]

To increase grid efficiency and dependability, smart grids also combine cutting-edge communication and information technologies like data analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. These technologies can be used, for instance, to anticipate and stop power outages, recognize, and stop cyberattacks, and maximize the usage of energy sources [3]. By utilizing smart meters, energy management systems, and demand response programs, smart grids also benefit customers by giving them more control over their energy usage and lowering their energy costs. Smart grids represent a significant development in power grid technology and provide a number of advantages, including increased efficiency, dependability, sustainability, and flexibility.

II. Technology and Communication Architecture

In this study, we also go over a few key elements that make up the heart of the suggested smart grid architecture, as shown in Fig. 2. They comprise:



Fig. 2. Smart Grid Communication and Power Networks Overview [9]

A. Smart Meter

A resource-restricted device known as the smart meter is at the very heart of smart grid applications (in terms of storage capacity, computing power, and constrained bandwidth) [5], [6]. The restrictions result from regulatory requirements from standard bodies, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and American National Standards Institute (ANSI), on meter size (form factor), cost implications, heat dissipation, and smart meter operational performance [7].

Energy services interface (ESI), which acts as the data management gateway, and energy meter (EM), which measures, records, and transfers energy usage, make up the smart meter. For smart meters dispersed throughout the network, the ESI provides network control. The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) with two-way communication, the Demand Response (DR) programs, and the transmission of energy data to the Home Energy Management System are how the service providers communicate with the clients. (HEMS) [6], [8].

More crucially, smart meters are grid management tools that support plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging as well as routine grid quality monitoring [9]. Smart meters act as various gateways, relay nodes, or forwarders to communicate with the data aggregator unit in the design, which also features mesh and peer-to-peer topologies. (DAU). By establishing redundant channels and decreasing congestion, the mesh topology offers simple scaling, self-healing, and reliability for the best performance possible in the network during peak times [10]. SUN devices have an average hop-to-hop coverage area of 100m (no line of sight) and a line-of-sight connectivity range of up to 1 km [11].

B. Data Aggregator Unit

The Data from different smart meters dispersed throughout the network are combined by the data aggregator unit (DAU), also known as the concentrator, and sent to the utility provider for grid management and invoicing [5]. Furthermore, according to the architecture shown in Fig. 3, the concentrator serves as the NAN gateway, allowing control messages to be received from service providers and delivered to clients. Regarding the technology used, like RF mesh or PLC [8], it can divide the NAN into smaller autonomous networks. The DAU also prioritizes, manages, and routes traffic [1]. Cellular (3G/4G/LTE), WiMAX, and fiber optics are candidate technologies because the utility requires a lot of capacity, whereas RF mesh or PLC alternatives are used for last-mile networks. The architecture additionally shows multiple DAU deployment options with a mesh topology for dependability, scalability, and best network performance. Numerous DAU units are needed to lessen network congestion for the large-scale deployment of smart meters in urban regions [13].

C. Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)

The HV/MV SCADA substation domain's transformer and circuit breaker management and measurement operations are carried out by IEDs connected to the FAN [5]. existing and voltage transformers, as well as the traditional Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), that were once common in the existing power system, are quickly being replaced with IED units [5], [8]. As a result, the substation's complex device topology is lessened [10]. They can support operations that were previously handled by traditional devices. However, due to the growth of variable DER, microgrids, and energy storage systems in the low-voltage distribution system [14], there will be a significant deployment of IEDs in the non-SCADA zone toward the customer's home. The dynamic low-voltage distribution system will be more automated as a result. Proximity to the devices being monitored is required by the IEEE Std 1815-2012. Although utility companies have started implementing IED units utilizing the IEC 61850 standard, IED devices now interact via the distributed network protocol (DNP3) in SCADA systems.

III. Challenges of Smart Grids

The smart grid is an advanced power grid system that incorporates information, communication, and automation technologies to improve the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. However, the development and deployment of Smart Grids face various technical, cybersecurity, and economic challenges [21]. This paper provides an overview of these challenges, along with potential strategies to address them.

A. Technical Challenges

1. Integration of Renewable Energy Sources

i) *Variability and Intermittency:* Integrating renewable energy sources (RES) such as wind, solar, and hydroelectric power poses challenges due to their intermittent and variable power output.

ii) *Grid Stability:* Managing voltage and frequency variations caused by the fluctuations in power output from RES requires advanced control and management strategies to maintain grid stability [4].

2. *Communication Infrastructure*

i) *Data Volume:* The smart grid's reliance on real-time monitoring and control necessitates robust communication infrastructure that can handle large amounts of data.

ii) *Latency:* Ensuring low latency in communication is crucial for real-time control and decision-making in the smart grid.

3. *Interoperability and Standardization*

i) *Seamless Integration:* Facilitating seamless integration and cooperation among various components, devices, and systems within the smart grid is essential.

ii) *Standard Protocols:* Developing and implementing standard communication protocols and technologies is necessary to achieve interoperability [21].

4. *Distributed Energy Management*

i) *Coordination:* Managing distributed energy resources (DERs) and coordinating their operation with the central grid is a complex task.

ii) *Advanced Algorithms:* Developing advanced algorithms and control strategies for DER management is crucial to ensure grid stability and efficiency.

B. *Cybersecurity Challenges*

1. *Data Privacy*

i) *Unauthorized Access:* Ensuring data privacy in the smart grid requires robust security measures to prevent unauthorized access to data.

ii) *Privacy Breaches:* Addressing the risks of privacy breaches and unauthorized control of grid assets is crucial.

2. *Vulnerability to Cyber Attacks*

i) *Disruption of Grid Operations:* The smart grid's reliance on digital systems makes it inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which can lead to widespread outages and damage to critical infrastructure [22].

ii) *Mitigation Strategies:* Implementing strategies to mitigate the risks associated with cyber threats is necessary.

C. *Economic and Regulatory Challenges*

1. *Investment and Financial Incentives*

i) *Infrastructure and R&D:* Significant investments in infrastructure, research, and development are required to deploy smart grid technologies.

ii) *Incentives:* Financial incentives, such as subsidies and tax breaks, are needed to encourage investment in smart grid technologies [23].

2. *Regulatory Framework*

i) *Pricing and Grid Access:* New regulatory frameworks should address issues related to pricing, grid access, and market competition.

ii) *Promotion of Smart Grid Technologies:* Regulatory frameworks should support and promote the integration of RES, energy storage, demand response, and other smart grid technologies.

3. *Consumer Participation*

i) *Awareness:* Raising awareness about the benefits of smart grid technologies is critical for their widespread adoption.

ii) *Financial Incentives:* Providing financial incentives for adopting energy-efficient practices is essential to ensure consumer participation in the smart grid.

iii) *User-friendly Interfaces:* Developing user-friendly interfaces for monitoring and controlling energy consumption can help facilitate consumer.

IV. Cyber Attack on Smart Grids

One of the most severe attacks on the Smart Grids is the False Data Injection Attack (FDIA). In FDIA, a hacker breaks into the system and alters sensor readings so that errors are introduced into the estimate of state variables and scheduling decisions without being noticed.



Fig. 3. Industrial Control Systems and Cybersecurity Layers Diagram [16]

False data injection attacks (FDIA) are one form of data attack orchestrated when adversaries can alter/modify the original measurements supplied by these sensors, affecting the control center's computational capability[15]. The False Data Injection attack is conducted by adversaries who have a limited understanding of the power network. As a result, to eavesdrop, replay, and inject fake data into the smart grid, the attacker relies on flaws in the security model of the physical network. Targeting input validation and transport layer security flaws for the delivery of fake data using methods like code injection and cross-site request forgery is a prevalent strategy for carrying out such attacks.

The following table depicts some methods for false data injection detection in Smart Grids.

TABLE I. FALSE DATA INJECTION DETECTION

Victim Device	Type of Attack	Solution Method	Description
Smart Grid	FDI-Control and Dynamic load altering attack	Adaptive sliding mode controller	By utilizing an adaptive mechanism, it provides a sliding mode adaptive controller to guarantee the stable operation of the power system against unidentified attack.
SCADA System	FDI-power grid state transitions and worst case detection delays	Quickest intrusion detection algorithm and Dynamic state estimation algorithm	Rao-CUSUM detector is used to estimate and monitor the time-varying and non-stationary power grid states.
Communication System	FDI-Generation scheduling and power shedding	LSTM	By examining the feature vectors that discover the temporal correlations of the feature vectors in time order, attacks are recognized.
Smart Grid	FDI-Power bus	Cognitive risk control	FDI attacks are detected and controlled utilizing the entropic state and CRC under task-switch control.

A. *Examples of FDIA Attacks*

1. *Stuxnet Attack*

The Stuxnet attack, discovered in 2010 but active since at least 2007, targeted Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility, marking one of the most sophisticated cyberattacks ever known. It aimed to disrupt the facility's centrifuges by feeding false data into the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) that controlled them, causing the centrifuges to spin erratically and fail [17]. The attack required detailed knowledge of the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and the development of a specific version of Stuxnet tailored to these systems.



Fig. 4. Iranian Nuclear Program Cyberattack Timeline and Impact

The attackers likely spent six months creating a mirrored environment to test their code, involving a team of core developers, quality assurance, and management. They used digitally signed driver files in their malicious binaries to avoid detection, obtaining these signatures by physically stealing them from two companies [17]. Stuxnet was introduced into the target environment, possibly through portable discs used by contractors or insiders. It then spread through networks and portable discs, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities to infect Siemens Step7 software projects, which programmed the PLCs.

The attack demonstrated the potential for cyberattacks to cause physical damage to critical infrastructure, highlighting the need for robust cybersecurity measures in industrial control systems.

2. *Dragonfly Attack*

A "dragonfly attack" in the context of a smart grid refers to a sophisticated cyber-attack on critical energy infrastructure, such as power plants and electrical distribution systems. The term "dragonfly" is derived from the Dragonfly APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) group, which is known for its highly targeted and sophisticated cyber-espionage campaigns against industrial control systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Numerous cyberattacks have been launched against Smart Grids in recent years. Nearly one-third of reported incidents in 2014, according to the US Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), were in the energy industry. [24]

The attack on the Iranian nuclear power plant in 2007 hampered the nation's crucial nuclear power development [22]. Stunt, a structured and authoritative malware designed to infect programmable industrial systems, was used in this assault. The uranium enrichment cycle may have been stopped entirely or at least significantly slowed down. By 2014, more than 1000 energy businesses had been targeted by the skilled hacking group known as Dragonfly [23]. The organization was successful in breaching the central systems that govern the energy companies in Europe and North America. Dragonfly gained access to power plant management systems mostly through malware found in emails, websites, and third-party applications. Cyber espionage was the attackers' intended target, but thankfully the interference was discovered before Dragonfly could hurt or impair electricity supply in impacted locations. On December 25, 2015, a cyberattack on the power

plant in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, during the conflict in the Donbass, knocked off electricity for 80,000 people [24].

The Dragonfly organization now possibly has the power to disrupt or take control of these systems should it want to do so. This suggests that the group is interested in both studying how energy facilities function as well as acquiring access to operational systems themselves. Customers of Symantec are shielded from the Dragonfly group's actions.



Fig. 5. Timeline of Dragonfly

i. Tools and Tactics

In its assaults, Dragonfly mostly employs two types of malwares. Both are instances of malware known as Remote Access Tool (RAT) that gives hackers access and control over infected machines. Backdoor is the preferred malware weapon of Dragonfly.Oldrea, also called the Energetic Bear RAT or Havex. To gain access to the victim's computer and extract data and install new software, Oldrea serves as a back door for the attackers. Apparently made specifically for the organization, or authored by it, Oldrea looks to be proprietary malware. This gives a general idea of the resources and talents behind the Dragonfly organization. Trojan is Dragonfly's second most important Trojan.Karagany.

Oldrea was unavailable on the black market, but Karagany was. In 2010, Karagany's version 1 source code was exposed. According to Symantec, Dragonfly could have altered this source code for its own purposes. According to Symantec, the bulk of the attackers' attacked machines had the Oldrea virus. Only around 5% of illnesses included the usage of Karagany [19]. The functionality of the two malware components is comparable, thus it is unclear what led the attackers to pick one tool over the other.

ii. Dragonfly 2.0

According to Symantec's research, the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign has been active since at least December 2015, and activity has clearly increased in 2017. According to Symantec, there are clear signs that attackers have been active in US, Turkish, and Swiss organizations, as well as hints of activity in other organizations. Although the focus on organizations in Turkey does seem to have expanded considerably in this most recent effort, the U.S. and Turkey were also among the nations targeted by Dragonfly in its previous campaign. In order to reach a victim's network, Dragonfly 2.0 employs a number of infection routes, including malicious emails, watering hole assaults, and Trojanized software, just like it did in its earlier campaign between 2011 and 2014.Throughout 2016 and into 2017, the organization carried out more individualized malicious email attacks. The emails included very specialized information about the energy industry as well as some information about broader commercial issues [18].

iii. Strong Links with Earlier Campaigns

Numerous signs connect current behavior with previous Dragonfly efforts. Trojan Heriplor one of the strongest signs that the gang that attacked the western energy industry between 2011 and 2014 is the same group behind the more recent attacks is Heriplor, a backdoor that appears to be utilized solely by Dragonfly. There is no black market for this bespoke software, and no other known attack groups have been seen using it. It has only ever been observed being utilized in assaults against energy-related targets. Consider the table below [26]:

TABLE II. FEATURE AND STRENGTH

Feature	**Dragonfly (2013-14)**	**Dragonfly 2.0 (2015-17)**	**Link strength**
Backdoor.Oldrea	✓	X	None
Trojan.Heriplor	✓	✓	Strong
Trojan.Karagany	✓	✓	Medium-Strong
Trojan.Listrix	✓	✓	Medium-Strong
“Western” energy sector	✓	✓	Medium
Strategic website	✓	✓	weak
Phishing emails	✓	✓	weak
Trojanized applications	✓	✓	weak

The instructions, encryption, and coding routines employed by trojan Karagany.B and trojan Karagany, which was previously utilized by Dragonfly, are comparable to one another. Although trojan Karagny.B has frequently been seen being used in assaults against the energy industry, it doesn't seem to be generally available. Even so, Dragonfly's usage of the previous trojan Karagany is not necessarily unique because it was disclosed on dark web marketplaces [20]. To mitigate the risks of a dragonfly attack on a smart grid, it is essential to implement robust cybersecurity measures, such as:

- Encourage users not to use the same passwords across numerous websites and restrict users from sharing their passwords with others. Limit the creation of administrative-level profiles and delete any unused credentials. Use two-factor authentication to provide an extra layer of protection and keep hackers from using any stolen information.
- Separating critical systems and networks from less critical ones can reduce the attack surface and limit the potential impact of a breach.

V. Cyberattack Detection and Mitigation Techniques

In the realm of cybersecurity for SCADA systems, the combination of Multivariate State Estimation Technique (MSET) and Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) presents a powerful method for Anomaly Detection. MSET is a non-parametric, model-based approach that excels in estimating the normal operational state of a system by capturing its multivariate relationships. When paired with SPRT, a statistical hypothesis testing method, this duo can efficiently detect subtle deviations from the norm, indicating potential cyber-attacks. By continuously monitoring system metrics and comparing them against the expected behavior modeled by MSET, and then applying SPRT to evaluate the likelihood of these deviations being anomalies, this approach offers a robust solution for safeguarding SCADA systems against cyber threats.

A. Multivariate State Estimation Technique (MSET)

MSET is a model-based approach that estimates the current state of a system using historical, multivariate data. The essence of MSET is to create a model that can predict normal behavior, and then compare new observations to these predictions to identify anomalies.

1. Model Building

First, a predictive model is built using historical data where the system is operating under normal conditions. This involves creating a matrix X of historical data vectors x_i, where each column represents a different variable, and each row represents a different observation in time.

$$X = [x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n] \tag{1}$$

Then, singular value decomposition (SVD) is applied to X to decompose it into matrices U, S, and V^T, where S contains the singular values that represent the importance of each principal component.

$$X = US*(V)^T \tag{2}$$

A reduced model is often used by selecting the first k largest singular values (principal components), which captures the most significant patterns in the data.

$$X_{approx} = U_k S_k * (V_k)^T \tag{3}$$

2. Anomaly Detection

For a new observation vector x_{new}, the model predicts what the normal values should be. The difference between the observed and predicted values is used to compute the residual vector r.

$$r = x_{new} - X_{approx} * x_{new} \tag{4}$$

B. Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)

SPRT is used to evaluate the sequence of residuals to decide if an anomaly is present. It is a hypothesis testing framework that compares the likelihood of observing the data under two hypotheses: the null hypothesis H_0 (no change) and the alternative hypothesis H_1 (change or anomaly).

1. Log Likelihood Ratio (LLR)

For each new observation, calculate the log likelihood ratio (LLR) to determine how likely the current observation is under H_1 versus H_0.

$$LLR = \log \frac{L(\mathbf{r}|H_1)}{L(\mathbf{r}|H_0)} \tag{5}$$

Where $L(\mathbf{r}/H_i)$ is the likelihood of residuals under hypothesis H_i.

2. Cumulative Sum

The LLR is cumulatively summed over time. If this sum crosses predefined thresholds, an anomaly is detected.

$$S_n = max(0, S_{n-1} + LLR) \tag{6}$$

An anomaly is detected if Sn exceeds a threshold A (indicating H_1) or falls below a threshold B (reinforcing H_0). Together, MSET + SPRT provides a robust framework for anomaly detection in multivariate systems, enabling early identification of issues before they escalate into serious problems.

A complex algorithm to detect cyber-attacks on Smart Grids using the MSET + SPRT method involves several steps, including data preprocessing, model building, residual calculation, and anomaly detection. Below is a simplified Python implementation to illustrate the concept:

VI. Future Research Directions

Legacy systems in the Smart Grid won't be able to be fixed, upgraded, or secured using conventional IT security measures. Deploying intrusion detection and prevention systems for the Smart Grid is a workable solution because it is challenging to integrate conventional cyber security methods with old systems [25]. Smart grids outperform conventional electricity grids in terms of effectiveness and output while also being safer, more secure, and ecologically friendly. They are susceptible to hacking, though. The benefits to safety and vulnerabilities of

intelligent networks, such as denial-of-service assaults and human error, have been extensively documented.

```python
import numpy as np
from scipy.linalg import svd
from scipy.stats import norm

# Step 1: Data Preprocessing
# Load historical normal data (rows: observations, columns: variables)
# For demonstration, let's create a random matrix
np.random.seed(42)
normal_data = np.random.normal(loc=0, scale=1, size=(100, 5))

# Step 2: Model Building (MSET)
# Perform Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
U, S, Vt = svd(normal_data, full_matrices=False)

# Retain the first k principal components (for simplicity, let's choose k=3)
k = 3
U_k = U[:, :k]
S_k = np.diag(S[:k])
Vt_k = Vt[:k, :]

# Approximate the original matrix using the reduced components
X_approx = np.dot(U_k, np.dot(S_k, Vt_k))

# Step 3: Residual Calculation
# For demonstration, let's use a new observation vector
new_observation = np.random.normal(loc=0, scale=1, size=(1, 5))
predicted_observation = np.dot(np.dot(new_observation, Vt_k.T), Vt_k)
residual = new_observation - predicted_observation

# Step 4: Anomaly Detection (SPRT)
# Define log likelihood ratio function
def log_likelihood_ratio(residual, mu_0, sigma_0, mu_1, sigma_1):
    llr = np.log(norm.pdf(residual, mu_1, sigma_1) / norm.pdf(residual, mu_0, sigma_0))
    return np.sum(llr)

# Hypothetical parameters for normal and abnormal distributions
mu_0, sigma_0 = 0, 1  # Parameters for normal behavior
mu_1, sigma_1 = 2, 1.5  # Parameters for abnormal behavior

# Calculate log likelihood ratio for the residual
llr = log_likelihood_ratio(residual, mu_0, sigma_0, mu_1, sigma_1)

# Cumulative sum for SPRT (simplified version for demonstration)
# In practice, this would be updated with each new observation
cumulative_sum = max(0, llr)

# Define thresholds for anomaly detection
threshold_A = 10  # Threshold for detecting an anomaly
threshold_B = -10  # Threshold for reinforcing normal behavior

# Check if an anomaly is detected
if cumulative_sum > threshold_A:
    print("Anomaly detected")
elif cumulative_sum < threshold_B:
    print("Normal behavior reinforced")
else:
    print("No conclusive evidence for anomaly")
```

Fig. 6. Python Code for Anomaly Detection in a Smart Grid System

Ransomware assaults have grown by 500% since 2018, and more study is required to understand their effects and causes on the infrastructure of smart grids. The virtual private network (VPN) to improve secure communication, the IPS, and IDS as the finest security features would all be used by the smart grid to keep service uptime while offering multiple levels of security. Cyber defense strategies should be used to protect all components of Smart Grids because they are susceptible to cyber terrorism. Diverse defense technologies, including machine learning, pre-emptive IDS/IPS systems, wireless controlled dissemination, permission, authentication, and verification, should be incorporated into these solutions. They should also be scalable, robust, and adaptive [24].

VII. Conclusion

In conclusion, electric power networks are now more susceptible to cyberattacks due to their increased interconnectedness and digitization. Concerns over the security of Smart Grids and the possible effects of cyberattacks on their functionality and operation are developing. The varied kinds, frequency, and impacts of cyberattacks on Smart Grids are discussed in this paper along with how they may affect overall performance. The report also looks at a variety of defensive measures that can be taken to lessen the danger of cyberattacks on these vital infrastructure pieces. Given the status of cybersecurity in Smart Grids today, more funding and public awareness are needed to build sufficient security measures that will shield them from future attackers.

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