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## Computer and Network Security: Homework 1

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### Instructions

- Please answer 5 of the 6 problems. All questions are weighted equally.
- Please send your solution to 2160853158@qq.com by Oct. 8 midnight.

**Problem 1 Vigenère Cipher.** Suppose you have a language with only the 3 letters A, B, C, and they occur with frequencies 0.7, 0.2, and 0.1. The following ciphertext was encrypted by the Vigenère cipher:

*ABCBABBBAC.*

Suppose you are told that the key length is 1, 2, or 3. Show that the key length is probably 2, and determine the most probable key.

### Problem 2 Perfect secrecy and one-time-pad.

1. For a perfect secret encryption scheme  $E(K, M) = C$ , prove:  $\Pr[C = c | M = m] = \Pr[C = c]$ .
2. Consider a biased one-time-pad system, where  $\Pr[M = b] = p_b$ ,  $b = 0, 1$  and  $\Pr[K = 0] = 0.4$ . The first attacker Randy randomly guesses  $M = 1$  or  $M = 0$ : prove that the probability of success is 0.5. The second attacker Smarty guesses  $M$  based on  $C$  and  $p_0, p_1$ : suggest a good attack strategy.

**Problem 3 DES.** Before 2-DES and 3-DES was invented, the researchers at RSA Labs came up with DESV and DESW, defined by

$$DESV_{kk_1}(M) = DES_k(M) \oplus k_1, \quad DESW_{kk_1}(M) = DES_k(M \oplus k_1).$$

In both schemes,  $|k| = 56$  and  $|k_1| = 64$ . Show that both these proposals do not increase the work needed to break them using brute-force key search. That is, show how to break these schemes using on the order of  $2^{56}$  DES operations. You have a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

**Problem 4 RSA.** Alice and Bob love each other, so they decide to use a single RSA modulus  $N$  for their key pairs. Of course each of them does not know the private key of the other. Mathematically, Alice and Bob have their own key pairs  $(e_A, d_A)$  and  $(e_B, d_B)$  sharing the same  $N$ . Demonstrate how Bob can derive the private key of Alice.

**Problem 5 Operation mode of block ciphers.** Chloé invents a new operation mode as below that can support parallel encryption. Unfortunately, this mode is not secure. Please demonstrate how an attacker knowing IV,  $C_0$ ,  $C_1$ ,  $C_2$ , and  $M_1 = M_2 = M$  can recover  $M_0$ .




Figure 1: Chloé's invention

**Problem 6 Hash functions.** One-wayness and collision-resistance are two indispensable properties of hash functions. They are in fact independent one to the other.

1. Give a function that is one-way, but not collision-resistant.
2. Give a function that is collision-resistant, but not one-way.