The Quantum Revolution

Making and breaking cryptography using quantum technology

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



Outline

- Quantum Computing
- Breaking modern cryptography
- Defending against quantum adversaries
- Making new cryptography

Quantum Computing

- End of Moore's Law
- Q-Computing 101





Quantum tunneling

expected to end in 2025-2030

How to prevent this?

- Manage tunneling noise
- Make more complex chips
- Use another technology


expected to end in 2025-2030

How to prevent this?

- Manage tunneling noise → Working on it
- Make more complex chips → Too expensive now


→ Quantum ? 🔀

Use another technology




Quantum effects to get over quantum

Quantum vs classical, what's the difference?



When measured, qubit collapses to 0 or 1



2 values at the same time is only 2x speedup!

What's so good about quantum computers?

Quantum intrication : when working with multiple qubits, we can link their states!

Instead of N independent qubits, we have a combination representing all 2^{N} bit vectors

- 1 qubit : 2 states
- 10:1024 states
- 100:1267650600228229401496703205376 states

Exponential speedup!


Key concepts


- 2^N simultaneous states
- 1 single measure


Current issues:


- Qubit are fragile
- Algorithms
- Connecting Qbits

0.01°C above absolute zero









Braking modern cryptography

Two main attacks:

- Shor's Algorithm
- Grover's Algorithm

$$N = \rho \times q$$

$$4088459 = 2017 \times 2027$$



MIT + Bell Labs
1994







Find a divisor of N?

1. Pick a random number a



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- **2.** Find $p \to a^p \% N = 1$



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$$a^p % N = 1?$$



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$$a^{1} % N = 13$$

 $a^{2} % N = 25$



$$a^p % N = 1?$$

$$a^{1} % N = 13$$
 $a^{2} % N = 25$
...
 $a^{p} % N = 1$
 $a^{p+1} % N = 43$
...
 $a^{2p} % N = 1$
 $a^{2p+1} % N = 43$



$$a^p % N = 1?$$

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•••

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1 frequency measure



Find a divisor of N?

- 1. Pick a random number a
- **2.** Find $p \to N \mid (a^p 1)$
- 3. $(a^{p/2}-1)$ or $(a^{p/2}+1) \rightarrow 36.5\%$ chance!

$$n = \rho \times q$$

Quantum = death of RSA, DH, El Gamal, ...

N-bit prime -> ~N qubits

State of the art

 $4088459 = 2017 \times 2027$

Key length	Classical CPU	Quantum CPU
N	2 ^{N/2}	N^3
64 (easy CTF)	10 ¹⁰	10 ⁶
2048 (ANSSI)	10 ³⁰⁸	10 ¹⁰

Solves an NP problem in polynomial time!

Versatile algorithm for search



Finds a valid input that results in YES

Can be used for bruteforce search

Reduces the search space from size K to √K

Key search

"Does AES key xxx give a valid plaintext?"

Hash cracking (incl. Bitcoin)
"Is md5(xxx) equal to a77b94ffab...?"


Attacks on N-bit search space are reduced to N/2 bits

Only double key size to resist Grover's attack, but SHA1 and AES-128 will die

Why are quantum algorithms so hard to make?

- Relatively new area of computer science
- Hard to simulate beyond 50 qubits
- Need to rely more on formal proofs
- Very particular end conditions needed

Particular conditions



Superposition of all possible states

Measure outputs a single state, destroying intrication

Output state is unreliable, will change every time

state	ρ(state)
000	0.24
001	0.02
010	0.06
011	0.13
100	0.16
101	0.11
110	0.18
111	0.10

Output state is reliable Run a few times to be sure

state	ρ(state)
000	0
001	0
010	0
011	0.01
100	0
101	0.99
110	0
111	0

With many qubits, need to make every incorrect state probability very close to 0

state	ρ(state)
000	0
001	0
010	0
011	0.01
100	0
101	0.99
110	0
111	0

Cryptography cemetery:

- RSA
- Diffie-Hellman
- SHA-1 (not only collision)
- AES-128


Are the others safe?

Should we panic?




Are our current communications safe?

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Defending against quantum advortion in the security of the sec

Are our current communication





OPEN QUANTUM SAFE





NIST Contest





Longer keys (~300B-1kB) slower handshakes than TLS (~10%)

BUT It's there!

How can we design a perfect cryptosystem over an unsafe channel?

Key entropy ≥ message entropy

Perfect key sharing scheme

Authentication

Perfect implementation

- Key entropy ≥ message entropy
 - \rightarrow One-Time Pad
- Perfect key sharing scheme
 - → How?
- Authentication
 - → Interesting but complex problem
- Perfect implementation (lol)

How to share keys securely?

Mainly two schemes:

- Pre-Shared Key
- Key exchange


Pre-shared key is perfect but unrealistic:

- If using OTP, <u>huge</u> storage
- Can't communicate with new peers

What about key exchange?


Mainly based on Diffie-Hellman, which is broken by Shor :(

Remember this bad boy?



We can also use quantum superposition for secure exchanges!

Introducing Quantum Key Distribution, BB84




Data transmitted is random

- Cannot send the message directly
- Use the shared bits as a key

How does BB84 work?

Each photon carries 2 informations:

- Base
- Value



The receiver chooses a base randomly

If base is correct, original value recovered

Sent
$$\sqrt{\frac{1}{1}} - \sqrt{\frac{0}{1}}$$
 Measure base $\times + + \times + \times$ Recovered bit $= 0.1$ 0 0 0 1


If base is incorrect, random value recovered and the original value is destroyed

Sent
$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ -1 & -1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$
Measure base $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 \\ + & \times & + & \times \\ -1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$
Recovered bit $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

Someone intercepting the exchange doesn't know the base and risks altering the bits




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






Sent
















Attacker has a 25% chance to flip each

intorpootool bit

Verif

intercepted bit Verification fails

Sent $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$ Measure base $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

Verif

With N verification bits, probability 1-0.75^N to discover the attack

Only 100 verification bits give the attacker a 1:3000000000000 chance of stealth

Conclusion

Many unknowns about quantum technology

Likely to be the next tech revolution

Will change the face of crypto as we know it

Take quantum as an ally

About h25

We do serious stuff

- Coding challenges
- CTFs







About h25

... but mostly fun stuff







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Thanks!

Any questions?