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audit torrent implementation for IP leaks #274

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adrelanos opened this issue Feb 20, 2016 · 9 comments

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@adrelanos
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@adrelanos adrelanos commented Feb 20, 2016

I understand, ZeroNet internally uses torrent.

Have you seen the following paper?

Bittorrent over Tor isn't a good idea

Torrent clients (libraries) use socks proxy settings for connectivity. Not anonymity. The threat in essence boils down to torrent clients using fancy techniques (similar to "sudo ifconfig"), finding out their real external clearnet IP, and then sending that IP through the proxy.

Connection from Tor exit coming and including the information "hi, my real name is...".

Are you sure, that zeronet's usage of torrent does not suffer from the same issue?

@TheNain38

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@TheNain38 TheNain38 commented Feb 20, 2016

It uses .onion HS to communicate

@adrelanos

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@adrelanos adrelanos commented Feb 20, 2016

What in case only Tor proxy settings without Tor ControlPort - hence without Tor hidden services?

@HelloZeroNet

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@HelloZeroNet HelloZeroNet commented Feb 20, 2016

ZeroNet protocol is totally different from bittorrent and does not use any torrent liblary, so it's not an issue here.

@maxogden

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@maxogden maxogden commented Mar 2, 2016

@adrelanos from what I understand ZeroNet relies on BitTorrent Trackers for peer discovery, which means the ips, ports and hashes being advertised by ZeroNet clients can be leaked from any of the Trackers (due to the tracker scrape API)

@HelloZeroNet

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@HelloZeroNet HelloZeroNet commented Mar 2, 2016

ips are not leaked when connecting to trackers, it uses the exit node ip

@maxogden

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@maxogden maxogden commented Mar 2, 2016

@HelloZeroNet but torrent trackers themselves leak IPs and hashes, which from a mass surveillance standpoint might make deanonymizing users easier. Is there any security threat model documentation on ZeroNet available?

@HelloZeroNet

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@HelloZeroNet HelloZeroNet commented Mar 2, 2016

The trackers also requested using the exit nodes, so i think it's not an issue

@maxogden

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@maxogden maxogden commented Mar 2, 2016

@HelloZeroNet one attack I can think of off the top of my head for example is:

  • I use the tracker scrape API on these
    trackers = [
  • Now I know the IPs of all the tor exit nodes of ZeroNet users (and the sha1 of their site addresses)
  • If I want to prevent a specific user from being able to discover peers I can DDOS announces to the tracker they are using which will bump them from the LRU resulting in them never being announced to other peers because mine will probabilistically win
@ghost

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@ghost ghost commented Apr 14, 2017

althrou it's an attack aganst availability not data leak as OP speculated.
But it could make sense.
To confirm it would need a reproductible ProofOfConcept for this attack.

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