22 March 2017

1 Overview

At our previous meeting we decided to do the following:

- Begin work on framing/writing an article about the role of reelection in party calls and noncalls
- Present DV/IV plots for Republicans and Democrats, the Majority and Minority caucuses, and combinations thereof
- Work with subgroups in the nonparametric analyses, especially separating cases of states with different party Senators by which is up for reelection; work to come up with explanations of why we see what we see
- Redo intra-party coefficient plots to focus on Congresses in which subgroups

These are included below. For analysis of reelection, William and I settled on a generalized version of difference in differences estimation, which is detailed below.

2 First Stab at Reelection Paper

2.1 Introduction

In this paper, we provide a replication of Minozzi & Volden (2013), extending analysis into the Senate. Extending results into the Senate allows us not only to see if members respond to party pressure in the Senate as they do in the House, but also to test the role of proximity to reelection in members' behavior.

As with much work considering the behavior of members of Congress, we begin with the assumption that chief among a member's goals is reelection (Mayhew, 1974). While this would seem to indicate that members would act according to the preferences of their district above those of their party, we know from Lee (2009) that the name brands of parties confer advantages on members and that members are thus willing to take actions and positions that are either beneficial to their own party relative to the opposition. However, we also know from Carson, Koger, Lebo & Young (2010) that following the party line too closely can be electorally costly to an individual member. It is therefore worth considering whether proximity to election changes the costs and benefits of aiding the party as perceived by members.

Levitt (1996) finds members' behavior (as proxied by ADA score) is less a factor of the party (as proxied by party leaders) and more of those of their home state (as proxied by the average ADA score of House members from their state). While these results are highly persuasive and indicative of general aspects of the decision-making

process of Senators approaching reelection, what is missing is trends in member behavior relating to party influence. It remains possible that members behave differently on votes less influenced by the party in order to differentiate themselves in these years in order to still aid the party while still allowing themselves to stake out a claim of being more than a mere partisan.

Thus, an additional goal to replication in this paper is to test how Senators roll call voting differs on votes more and less influenced by the party in Congresses which they are up for reelection compared to those which they are not. We conduct tests using same-state Senators as a natural matched pair, following Levitt (1996), as well as fixed effects modeling to consider within member variation resulting from reelection.

2.2 Replication

In this section we show that the results from Minozzi & Volden (2013) hold when analysis is included for later Congresses in the House as well as those Congresses Senate. We draw on Congressional roll call data for Congresses 93-112 for both chambers in order to view the behavior of members. As in Minozzi & Volden (2013), we iteratively sort votes based on the the predictive power of party in vote decision taken alongside ideology. We dub those votes which are significantly predicted by party as "party calls" and those which are not as "noncalls."

We have made some changes to the sorting algorithm used to sort votes. One of the key changes was the use of the `emIRT()` R function as described in Imai, Lo & Olmsted (2016) in order to obtain member ideology. This function was developed by those authors in order to produce estimates analagous to those of the `ideal()` function developed by Clinton, Jackman & Rivers (2004) and used in the prior party call sorting algorithm. These and other changes, as detailed in an appendix, produce highly similar results to those found in Minozzi & Volden (2013) when applied to both chambers. We find for each chamber that party call votes are more often close votes and the opposite holds for noncalls.

Table 1: House Vote Coding for Close and Lopsided Votes

	Party Call	Noncall
Lopsided	4245	6123
Close	9308	1090

Table 2: Senate Vote Coding for Close and Lopsided Votes

	Party Call	Noncall
Lopsided	2063	4876
Close	5233	1851

2.3 Extension

Table 3: Reelection and Response to Party Calls, Difference in Differences

test	DV	Estimate	Lower_Bound	Upper_Bound
Effect	pirate100	-1.569	-2.094	-0.996
Placebo	pirate100	-0.604	-1.282	1.285

Table 4: Reelection and Response to Non Party Calls, Difference in Differences

test	DV	Estimate	Lower_Bound	Upper_Bound
Effect	pfrate100	-0.297	-0.735	0.138
Placebo	pfrate100	-0.312	-1.057	1.067

2.4 Results

2.5 Conclusion

3 Other Items for This Week

3.1 Expanded Diff in Diff Breakdown

In the following tables, the diff in diff estimation groups in which states have split party representation are broken down further by which party is up for reelection. Two tables each are included for the pirate100 and pfrate100 variables; one in which only effects are reported and another which a placebo treatment is included by random assignment. Weird things happen with the placebos for the split seats when we further divide them by who is up for reelection, so if we want to include this subgroup analysis I will need to change the method of doing these.

Table 5: Diff in Diff, Subgroup Condition, Party Influenced Rate, No Placebo

Test	DV	Estimate
2 Maj Dems Effect	pirate100	0.0708958
2 Min Dems Effect	pirate100	-1.8733904
2 Maj Reps Effect	pirate100	-1.1307379
2 Min Reps Effect	pirate100	0.3990873
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Effect	pirate100	3.8789004
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Effect	pirate100	0.0096892
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Effect	pirate100	0.0708958
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Effect	pirate100	-1.8733904

Table 6: Diff in Diff, Subgroup Condition, Party Influenced Rate, With Placebo

Test	DV	Estimate
2 Maj Dems Effect	pirate100	0.0708958
2 Maj Dems Placebo	pirate100	-0.4036702
2 Min Dems Effect	pirate100	-1.8733904
2 Min Dems Placebo	pirate100	-0.8782579
2 Maj Reps Effect	pirate100	-1.1307379
2 Maj Reps Placebo	pirate100	0.2951320
2 Min Reps Effect	pirate100	0.3990873
2 Min Reps Placebo	pirate100	0.1967755
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Effect	pirate100	3.8789004
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Placebo	pirate100	-40.1325468
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Effect	pirate100	-8.6767819
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Placebo	pirate100	-40.5585422
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Effect	pirate100	-8.0169523
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Placebo	pirate100	-42.9719651
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Effect	pirate100	0.0096892
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Placebo	pirate100	-42.1846488

Table 7: Diff in Diff, Subgroup Condition, Party Free Rate, With Placebo

Test	DV	Estimate
2 Maj Dems Effect	pfrate100	0.1900901
2 Min Dems Effect	pfrate100	-0.0480525
2 Maj Reps Effect	pfrate100	1.0805092
2 Min Reps Effect	pfrate100	-0.3783909
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Effect	pfrate100	4.7545825
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Effect	pfrate100	-0.3675259
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Effect	pfrate100	0.1900901
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Effect	pfrate100	-0.0480525

Table 8: Diff in Diff, Subgroup Condition, Party Free Rate, With Placebo

Test	DV	Estimate
2 Maj Dems Effect	pfrate100	0.1900901
2 Maj Dems Placebo	pfrate100	-0.9693719
2 Min Dems Effect	pfrate100	-0.0480525
2 Min Dems Placebo	pfrate100	-0.4318845
2 Maj Reps Effect	pfrate100	1.0805092
2 Maj Reps Placebo	pfrate100	0.4701269
2 Min Reps Effect	pfrate100	-0.3783909
2 Min Reps Placebo	pfrate100	0.6484191
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Effect	pfrate100	4.7545825
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Placebo	pfrate100	-38.2870597
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Effect	pfrate100	-7.2185267
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Placebo	pfrate100	-40.5703417
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Effect	pfrate100	-0.9002709
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Placebo	pfrate100	-39.5088692
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Effect	pfrate100	-0.3675259
Split, Maj Rep, REp Placebo	pfrate100	-42.4810991

3.2 Re-Scaled Coefficient Plots

Figure 1: Senate Ideological Extremism Coefficient Plot, Gingrich Senators and Other Republicans



Figure 2: Senate Ideological Extremism Coefficient Plot, Southern and Other Democrats