

1 Paper, Draft 7

Who Heeds the Call in the U.S. Senate?

Reelection and Member Responsiveness to the Party

Abstract

In this paper, we replicate the findings of Minozzi & Volden (2013) with some modifications of their methodology. We show that their hypotheses regarding party unity coming through the party working to unite more extreme (rather than more moderate) members holds not only in the House, but also the Senate. Further, we show the usefulness of separating votes in this way by considering changes in member behavior when they are up for reelection.

1.1 Introduction

Minozzi & Volden (2013) developed the notion of the ‘party call’ vote as one in which the party is clearly present alongside ideology. Party call votes were hypothesized by the authors to produce party unity, not through pressuring of moderates, but calling on all members to support the position of the party. Their central hypothesis - the ‘responsive extremists hypothesis’ - held that the most ideologically extreme members would be most likely see the benefit of aiding the party brand and thus would more often get in line with these votes than would moderates. Minozzi & Volden considered the House of Representatives in Congresses 93-109. This study intends to replicate their findings in the House and extend them into Congresses 110-112 and the Senate.

We view the party call as a valuable tool in explaining the behavior of members of Congress in relation to parties. It is dangerous to attribute legislator behavior either to party or ideology given the high correlation between these characteristics (Krehbiel, 1993; Lee, 2009). Decomposing votes into party calls and non party calls could allow for better understandings of the role played by parties in Congress.

We expect that party calls will be present and on the rise during our period of analysis in both chambers. This expectation comes from increasing partisanship and party brand

management in Congress in recent decades (Lee, 2009, 2016). While the Senate has typically been viewed as a less partisan chamber, partisanship is presently on an upward trend within it (Theriault, 2013; Smith, 2014). For both chambers, we expect their influence to be similar to what Minozzi & Volden found in the House of Representatives.

As an additional test, we consider an area shown to change member response to the party : proximity reelection in the Senate (Levitt, 1996). Members' primary goal is to be reelected (Mayhew, 1974). Legislators who are out of line with their district or who seem to be merely following the party will be electorally punished (Canes-Wrone, Brady & Cogan, 2002; Carson et al., 2010). Therefore, members should be expected to more clearly take the preferences of their district into account as reelection approaches. Party call votes could give members a clear opportunity to differentiate themselves from the party in the eyes of their constituents. These votes are likely to be visible times of party unity and brand management. Thus, we should expect Senators to be less responsive to party calls when they are up for reelection.

We find, as hypothesized, that party calls are present in the Senate and that they are on the rise in both chambers. Further, we are able to show rigorously that it is on party call votes votes which we see changes to member behavior as reelection approaches. As expected, Senators are less likely to vote with the party on party call votes - but not other vote types - when they are up for reelection at the end of a Congress. We take this as strong evidence that the party call vote is explaining the place of the party in Congressional roll call behavior. In the next section we show the results of our replication with the section following it dedicated to additional tests concerning reelection before concluding the paper.


1.2 Replication

In this section we detail the results of our extended replication. This analysis involved the use of an algorithm which sorted votes into party calls and party free votes based on whether vote choice was significantly predicted by party status in addition to ideology. Member ideology is calculated on the party free votes from the previous iteration of the algorithm for each

iteration. Our model is a modified version of the one described in Minozzi & Volden (2013). As in their work, our measure of ideological extremism is member party free ideal point from the final iteration, with sign reversed for Democrats (so that it is higher for members of each party as they become more extreme).¹

We find, as expected, that party calls are present in both the House and Senate. Additionally, we find that in both chambers their incidence has been on an upward trend during our period of analysis (1973 - 2013). It is possible that parties are calling more because increased ideological purity within them makes a party call more effective, or because they need members to rally more to get their agendas through. We believe that the underlying cause of this trend merits further investigation, but initially take it as evidence of increased partisanship in recent decades, in line with others' findings (Lee, 2009, 2016; Theriault, 2013; Smith, 2014). This trend holds regardless of which party is in the majority in the chamber.

Figure 1: Party Calls as a Percentage of Votes, Congresses 93-112



Note: This figure shows the percentage of votes classified as party calls per Congress in each chamber. Blue circles denote Democrat majority Congresses while Red triangles denote Republican majority Congresses.

¹A more thorough overview of the methodology is detailed in an appendix.

Models based on those of Minozzi & Volden show the responsive extremists hypothesis to hold. In both chambers we find that increased ideological extremism leads to increased responsiveness on party call votes. This finding holds whether we consider all members together, or consider subsets by party or majority status. Below, in Figure 2, we show this to broadly hold when separate Congresses and majority party statuses are considered in each chamber.

We expected that reelection would make members less responsive to the call of the party as they work to show constituents that they are taking their desires into account. We find that for all models categories that the sign is in the expected direction and that for all, save Democrats, it achieves statistical significance. Further, we should expect that those retiring are no longer beholden to their constituents and thus would not have this draw on their attention when the party calls. We find across all models that retirees' responsiveness to party calls takes a positive coefficient and that for all, save Democrats, that it is statistically significant.

We find that minority party women are substantially more responsive to party calls than their male counterparts in both chambers. Others have found that minority party women remain more focused on legislative agendas than their male counterparts (Volden, Wiseman & Wittmer, 2013), and we take this finding as being in line with this account. While results for this are mixed, we find generally that increased same-party presidential vote share (an indicator of party strength in the district) increases responsiveness to party calls while increased personal vote share (an indicator of member popularity in the district) decreases responsiveness. However, this relationship does not present itself for Democrats.

Table 1: House Responsiveness to Party Calls

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Majority	Minority
Ideological Extremism	7.766*** (0.130)	8.350*** (0.168)	5.873*** (0.207)	6.713*** (0.157)	8.655*** (0.201)
Baseline Rate of Voting With Party	0.575*** (0.012)	0.636*** (0.015)	0.414*** (0.020)	0.522*** (0.015)	0.632*** (0.020)
Vote Share	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.058*** (0.013)	0.021 (0.022)	-0.125*** (0.015)	-0.109*** (0.019)
Pres. Vote Share	0.028** (0.010)	0.099*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.020)	0.204*** (0.012)	0.185*** (0.018)
Party Leader	1.811*** (0.497)	1.972** (0.599)	2.787*** (0.761)	2.627*** (0.647)	1.843** (0.653)
Committee Chair	4.960*** (0.456)	2.552*** (0.498)	9.779*** (0.803)	1.964*** (0.444)	
Power Committee	2.756*** (0.235)	1.801*** (0.275)	2.931*** (0.374)	2.972*** (0.269)	1.135** (0.361)
Best Committee	-0.169*** (0.016)	-0.038* (0.019)	-0.240*** (0.025)	-0.178*** (0.019)	-0.161*** (0.023)
Female	1.173*** (0.322)	0.615 (0.353)	-0.078 (0.574)	0.037 (0.404)	2.228*** (0.442)
African American	1.835*** (0.429)	-0.470 (0.441)	5.089 (2.972)	-3.014*** (0.536)	3.402*** (0.610)
Latino	3.221*** (0.507)	1.711*** (0.514)	2.405* (1.153)	2.453*** (0.626)	3.191*** (0.705)
South	-0.922*** (0.205)	-2.640*** (0.276)	3.610*** (0.329)	-2.180*** (0.244)	-0.667* (0.313)
Seniority	-0.053 (0.028)	0.049 (0.031)	-0.334*** (0.050)	0.011 (0.034)	0.015 (0.041)
Freshman	0.834** (0.297)	-0.058 (0.356)	1.167* (0.464)	0.346 (0.348)	-0.456 (0.446)
Intercept	30.952*** (1.217)	21.282*** (1.495)	53.412*** (2.174)	30.032*** (1.390)	12.343*** (2.106)

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Results are produced by OLS regressions for all members for the entire period in the first column, with additional analyses for all Democrats and Republicans as well as all members of the Majority and Minority party in Congresses 93-112 in the House of Representatives. Most variables provided by the Legislative Effectiveness Project, committee data come from Charles Stewart's data page, and vote share data provided by Gary Jacobson.

Table 2: Senate Responsiveness to Party Calls


	All	Democrats	Republicans	Majority	Minority
Ideological Extremism	6.239*** (0.252)	3.136*** (0.409)	7.792*** (0.357)	4.708*** (0.315)	7.949*** (0.400)
Baseline Rate of Voting with Party	0.737*** (0.021)	0.759*** (0.030)	0.742*** (0.031)	0.702*** (0.025)	0.702*** (0.035)
Up For Reelection	-0.908* (0.353)	-0.630 (0.426)	-1.436** (0.538)	-0.951* (0.411)	-1.204* (0.603)
Retiree	2.103** (0.693)	1.599 (0.897)	2.290* (0.997)	1.816* (0.850)	2.575* (1.110)
Vote Share	0.029 (0.018)	-0.053* (0.022)	0.149*** (0.028)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.076* (0.030)
Presidential Vote Share	0.097*** (0.018)	0.234*** (0.024)	-0.134*** (0.031)	0.182*** (0.020)	0.006 (0.032)
Party Leader	1.604** (0.539)	2.218** (0.712)	0.910 (0.776)	1.441* (0.661)	1.940* (0.899)
Committee Chair	2.105*** (0.452)	0.852 (0.543)	3.626*** (0.700)	-0.017 (0.517)	
Power Committee	-0.684 (0.620)	-0.855 (0.772)	-0.325 (0.924)	-0.052 (0.719)	-1.468 (1.064)
Best Committee	0.163 (0.101)	0.237 (0.124)	0.008 (0.154)	0.027 (0.118)	0.373* (0.174)
Female	2.041** (0.638)	1.690* (0.730)	0.451 (1.132)	0.532 (0.758)	4.256*** (1.113)
African American	-4.769 (2.486)	-1.164 (2.789)	-10.789* (4.278)	1.531 (4.184)	-5.519 (3.219)
Latino	5.717** (1.816)	1.814 (2.198)	7.264** (2.779)	4.781* (1.878)	6.253 (3.506)
South	0.613 (0.362)	-1.690** (0.557)	0.872 (0.578)	0.054 (0.427)	1.085 (0.622)
Seniority	0.002 (0.044)	0.041 (0.052)	-0.024 (0.072)	0.077 (0.060)	0.118 (0.070)
Freshman	0.859 (0.566)	0.769 (0.708)	0.358 (0.842)	0.600 (0.631)	0.996 (1.032)
Intercept	11.611*** (2.274)	9.447** (2.906)	18.182*** (3.489)	16.365*** (2.644)	10.799** (4.009)
R ²	0.632	0.689	0.641	0.684	0.615
Adj. R ²	0.629	0.684	0.635	0.679	0.608
Num. obs.	1993	1042	951	1052	843
RMSE	6.967	6.118	7.255	5.865	7.749

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Results are produced by OLS regressions for all members for the entire period in the first column, with additional analyses for all Democrats and Republicans as well as all members of the Majority and Minority party in Congresses 93-112 in the Senate. Most variables provided by the Legislative Effectiveness Project, with supplementary data for committees from Charles Stewart's Congressional data and retirement data from the Congressional Bioguides.

Finally, we consider ideological extremism as a predictor for member behavior in each chamber broken down by Congress and majority party status. We note in the House that across parties and chambers, ideological extremism takes a positive coefficient for all but 4 cases and in the Senate for all but 2. In the House, all positive coefficients are statistically significant and in the Senate 29 of the positive coefficients are statistically significant and 1 of the negative coefficients is. Thus, we are confident in this finding.

Figure 2: Ideology and Responsiveness to Party Calls, Congresses 93-112



Note: This coefficient plot is produced by the same formula shown in the House and Senate regression tables with results decomposed by individual Congresses for the Majority and Minority parties. Coefficients shown are for the effect of ideological extremism on party free votes in relation to party call votes. 50% and 95% confidence intervals are shown from the points.

Having established that the responsive extremists hypothesis holds, we turn to further exploration of reelection in the Senate. We view this as not only providing an opportunity

to more thoroughly consider the role of party calls, but as providing a demonstration of their usefulness in analysis. Initial results have shown members to be less responsive to party calls when they are up for reelection, and in the next section we seek to further investigate this by considering members who are up for reelection in comparison with their same-state partner.

1.3 Reelection in the Senate


In this section, we consider the role of proximity to reelection in changing member behavior on different types of votes, separating them into party calls and party free votes. We theorize that a member will have the preferences of their constituents induced as they approach reelection. Members' trying to gain the favor of their constituents could stand to gain by voting against the call of the party at key moments in order to establish how they take their constituents' desires into account. So, we expect members will be more likely to ignore the call of the party during periods which they are nearing reelection.

To test this hypothesis, we estimate models which rely on same-state Senator pairs when one of them is up for reelection at the end of the Congress. These pairings are ideal since an expectation is that members will respond according to their voters and same-state Senators are elected by the same voters. So, we are confident in assuming that these pairs will change their behavior in comparable ways as reelection approaches. As a placebo test, we consider the possibility that the relationship being viewed is due to increasing seniority, rather than increased attention being paid to the district.

The fact that same-state Senators are not up for reelection at the same time allows us to estimate a generalization of a difference-in-differences design on pairs in Congresses which one is up for reelection. We use this to compare member responsiveness to the party on party calls, the baseline rate of voting with the party, and the difference between these two quantities between the member up for reelection and the member in the beginning or middle of their term. For each of these, a placebo test with randomly assigned treatment is also

shown.² Cases which have more than two Senators from a state during a single Congress (due to deaths and retirements) are dropped from the analysis.


Figure 3: Senate Rate of Voting With Party by Vote Type



Note: This coefficient plot is produced by a paired differences model which uses same-state Senators as a natural pairing. Differences between member responsiveness to party calls are shown by the first two points with the second set representing differences in baseline rate of voting with the party. The first and third columns use proximity to reelection as a treatment which are compared in columns 2 and 4 with a placebo treatment of the Senator with higher seniority in Congresses which neither are up for reelection as a comparison. 50% and 95% confidence intervals are shown.

²Reported 50% and 95% confidence intervals are developed by a bootstrap sample. More details about this and other areas of the methodology can be found in an appendix.

Figure 4: Senate Rate of Voting With Party by Vote Type



Note: This coefficient plot is produced by a paired difference-in-differences model which considers the difference between same-state Senator responsiveness to party calls from their baseline rate of voting with the party. The first column uses proximity to reelection as a treatment while the second uses higher seniority in Congresses which neither is up for reelection as a placebo treatment. 50% and 95% confidence intervals are shown.

The results of these tests clearly show that member responsiveness to party calls declines, on average, about 1.5% when they are up for reelection. However, their baseline rate of voting with the party is in line with what would be expected during other Congresses. During the period of analysis, 52% of votes are classified as party calls and the average rate of responsiveness to party calls is 85%. The average rate of voting with the party on non-party call votes is 82%. Thus, while there is still an effect of the call of the party during a period of reelection, the induced preferences of the constituents reduces its impact.

Member voting behavior on other votes does not exhibit this relationship. Party call votes serve not only to establish brands for the party, but also for the members. Ignoring the call of the party at key times could allow Senators to show their state's voters that they

are taking their desires into account over those of the party.

1.4 Conclusion

In this paper, we tested if members respond to party calls in the Senate as they do in the House, using analyses based on those of Minozzi & Volden (2013). This allowed us not only to confirm their results, but also to show the potential advantages of party calls as a method for viewing member behavior related to ideology and partisanship. We showed that reelection modifies member behavior on roll call votes which party is a factor in, but not those which are based primarily on ideology.

This is in line with expectations of members working to consider voter preferences more highly as reelection becomes more proximate, though it expands on previous studies by highlighting the votes on which member behavior changes. We determine that party calls are an effective measure for the role of the party in roll call voting behavior and see that conditions shown to affect member's responsiveness to the party affect them but not other vote types.

Having shown this, we believe future work would do well to consider the separation of roll call votes by party calls and non party calls. We demonstrated their usefulness by using them to locate the changes in behavior which occur as Senators approach reelection. During this time, the preferences of the district are on the mind of legislators and thus we hypothesized - and found - that member behavior would change in response to party call votes, though on other vote types they would vote with the party as they normally do.

2 Appendices

2.1 Appendix A: Detailing the New Sorting Algorithm

As was done by Minozzi & Volden (2013) we develop an algorithm to sort votes based on the degree to whether vote choice can be significantly predicted by party or caucus membership after ideology is accounted for. In this algorithm, member ideology in one iteration is calculated on the votes which were not party calls in the previous iteration since party is accounting for some of the weight in decision on the other set. Ideology for the first iteration is calculated on votes which have more than 65% or less than 35% of members of the chamber voting on the same side. The algorithm has a 15 iteration burn in period for each Congress. Once this has concluded, the algorithm continues either until the number of votes switched has hit a minimum and begun to climb or until there are fewer than 5 votes which switch between iterations. Once these conditions are met, it continues for 15 additional iterations, the last 5 of which are used to identify party calls and non calls. Any votes which switched between party calls and non party calls during the final 5 iterations are dropped from our analyses.

One of the key changes was the use of the `binIRT()` R function from the `emIRT` in order to calculate members' party free ideology, replacing `ideal()` which was used by Minozzi & Volden. The `binIRT()` function was developed by Imai, Lo & Olmsted in order to produce estimates analagous to those of `ideal()` with reduced computational taxation. We find both of these aims to be met.

We find that the party call is not merely produced by a tradeoff of party and ideology explaining different votes; they are on the same side approximately two-thirds of the time in the House and three-fifths of the time in the Senate.

Table 3: House Sorting Algorithm Coefficient Signs

	(-) Ideal	(+) Ideal
(-) Party	0.38	0.15
(+) Party	0.17	0.30

The party variable used in this analysis is an indicator for status as a Republican, and thus would be expected to correlate positively with ideal points.

Table 4: Senate Sorting Algorithm Coefficient Signs

	(-) Ideal	(+) Ideal
(-) Party	0.33	0.16
(+) Party	0.23	0.28

The party variable used in this analysis is an indicator for status as a Republican, and thus would be expected to correlate positively with ideal points.

We found that the lowered number of both members and bills in the Senate required a few changes to the vote sorting method, however. Since p -values will necessarily be lower with fewer observations, we had to change the threshold for party calls to $p < 0.05$ (from $p < 0.01$). Next, since the ideal point algorithm uses a logistic regression, problems arose in vote sorting when we also tried to use another to sort vote type with this in the Senate. Neither change leads the sorting in the House to differ for the most part. We find that the sorting of close and lopsided votes by this method to be in line with Minozzi & Volden’s findings.

Table 5: House Vote Coding for Close and Lopsided Votes

	Party Call	Noncall
Lopsided	4245	6123
Close	9308	1090

The threshold for a vote to be lopsided was 65% of members (or conversely, 35%) voting on the same side of a roll call vote.

Table 6: Senate Vote Coding for Close and Lopsided Votes

	Party Call	Noncall
Lopsided	2063	4876
Close	5233	1851

The threshold for a vote to be lopsided was 65% of members (or conversely, 35%) voting on the same side of a roll call vote.

2.2 Appendix B: Methodology for Senate Reelection Section

In order to better test the role of reelection we use same-state senators as a natural pairing. These results were shown in figures 2 and 3 in the paper. The analyses we performed on these pairs were generalizations of the difference in differences design, in which the member not up for reelection had their response rate subtracted from that of the member who was up for reelection. Figure 2 showed the differences by vote type and figure 3 showed the change between vote types between these pairs. For each of these, we also performed analyses on Congresses which neither was up for reelection as a placebo test, with the “treatment” being based on which member was more senior. Here we show the results in tables, with breakdowns by seat pair type.

Table 7: Reelection and Response to Party Calls, Difference in Differences

Test	DV	Estimate	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Effect	pirate100	-1.569	-2.139	-1.001
Placebo	pirate100	-0.331	-1.281	1.259
Effect	pfrate100	-0.297	-0.798	0.126
Placebo	pfrate100	-0.644	-1.074	1.143

Table 8: Diff in Diff, Subgroup Condition, Party Influenced Rate

Test	DV	Estimate
2 Maj Dems Effect	pirate100	0.0708958
2 Maj Dems Placebo	pirate100	-0.4769119
2 Min Dems Effect	pirate100	-1.8733904
2 Min Dems Placebo	pirate100	-1.2633351
2 Maj Reps Effect	pirate100	-1.1307379
2 Maj Reps Placebo	pirate100	-2.2707921
2 Min Reps Effect	pirate100	0.3990873
2 Min Reps Placebo	pirate100	-1.9947329
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Effect	pirate100	3.8789004
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Placebo	pirate100	0.7159106
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Effect	pirate100	-8.6767819
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Placebo	pirate100	-1.0729345
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Effect	pirate100	-8.0169523
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Placebo	pirate100	-2.1276690
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Effect	pirate100	0.0096892
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Placebo	pirate100	0.0232939

Table 9: Reelection and Response to Party Calls, Difference in Differences

test	DV	Estimate	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-1.272	-1.775	-0.794
Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	-0.292	-0.904	0.935

Table 10: Diff in Diff, Subgroup Condition, Party Influenced Rate

Test	DV	Estimate
2 Maj Dems Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-0.1191943
2 Maj Dems Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	0.5657017
2 Min Dems Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-1.8253378
2 Min Dems Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	-0.4463733
2 Maj Reps Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-2.2112471
2 Maj Reps Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	-0.1749949
2 Min Reps Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	0.7774782
2 Min Reps Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	-0.4516436
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-0.8756821
Split, Maj Dem, Dem Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	-1.8454871
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-1.4582552
Split, Maj Dem, Rep Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	0.0117995
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	-7.1166813
Split, Maj Rep, Dem Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	-3.4630959
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Effect	pirate100 - pfrate100	0.3772151
Split, Maj Rep, Rep Placebo	pirate100 - pfrate100	0.2964502

As a further test, not shown in the paper, we estimated the effect of reelection and other variables with a fixed effects model. This produces substantively similar effects to those reported in the main paper. Most notable to us is that the effect produced by being up for reelection is in line with findings shown in the main paper.

Table 11: Senate Fixed Effects Models, Party Call Response Rate

	Democrats	Republicans	Majority	Minority
Ideological Extremism	2.88*** (0.69)	4.00*** (0.75)	1.80** (0.64)	3.93*** (0.97)
Baseline Rate of Voting with Party	0.37*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.18* (0.07)
Up For Reelection	-0.55* (0.27)	-1.55*** (0.34)	-1.02*** (0.28)	-1.04** (0.37)
Vote Share	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
Presidential Vote Share	0.27*** (0.04)	0.09 (0.05)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.14* (0.06)
Freshman	0.71 (0.48)	0.98* (0.46)	0.77 (0.46)	0.78 (0.76)
Retiree	0.25 (0.83)	0.88 (0.83)	0.36 (0.99)	0.75 (0.91)
Best Committee	0.14 (0.12)	0.11 (0.16)	0.29 (0.15)	0.36* (0.18)
Power Committee	-0.48 (0.70)	-0.22 (0.98)	-1.26 (0.89)	-0.45 (1.01)
Leader	0.87 (0.47)	1.46* (0.62)	1.39 (0.78)	1.31 (0.80)
Committee Chair	0.38 (0.64)	0.65 (0.71)	-0.57 (0.56)	
Num. obs.	1042	951	1052	843
R ²	0.89	0.91	0.92	0.94
Adj. R ²	0.87	0.88	0.89	0.91

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

2.3 Appendix C: Other Tables and Figures from Replication

In Minozzi & Volden (2013), the regression table produced shows results in Congresses 97, 102, and 107 divided by party. Here, we produce the results from our analyses in the House of these chambers for ideological extremism³.

³Since distance from floor median was not calculated for or used by any of our analyses, we do not replicate any of their analyses which use it

Table 12: Replication of Minozzi & Volden (2013), Table 3

	Democrats			Republicans		
	97th	102nd	107th	97th	102nd	107th
Ideological Extremism	9.34*** (0.53)	4.76*** (0.68)	-1.03 (1.42)	5.15*** (0.71)	6.48*** (0.76)	-0.29 (0.61)
Baseline Rate of Voting With Party	1.04*** (0.07)	0.69*** (0.08)	1.06** (0.34)	0.51*** (0.08)	0.44*** (0.08)	0.35** (0.11)
Vote Share	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.09* (0.04)
Pres. Vote Share	0.15** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.26** (0.08)	0.20*** (0.04)
Party Leader	6.42* (2.90)	2.29 (1.92)	0.38 (2.30)	0.50 (2.42)	3.75 (2.22)	3.45** (1.22)
Committee Chair	2.53 (1.52)	1.21 (1.32)				1.39 (0.90)
Power Committee	1.03 (1.02)	1.34 (0.89)	-1.08 (1.26)	-1.19 (1.34)	0.34 (1.40)	-0.27 (0.63)
Best Committee	0.08 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.23* (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.09 (0.11)	0.17** (0.05)
Female	0.12 (2.07)	-1.42 (1.20)	2.03 (1.14)	-4.12* (2.01)	-1.66 (2.22)	-1.41 (0.83)
African American	-2.38 (2.13)	-1.90 (1.55)	-1.53 (1.66)		3.22 (6.08)	-3.62 (3.55)
Latino	3.83 (2.93)	2.51 (1.86)	1.24 (1.81)	-1.65 (5.79)	2.48 (6.27)	0.69 (1.48)
South	-4.73*** (1.02)	-1.23 (0.77)	-3.09* (1.19)	1.91 (1.15)	0.06 (1.16)	1.47** (0.51)
Seniority	0.11 (0.12)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.71*** (0.15)	-0.16* (0.08)
Freshman	-0.93 (1.42)	-0.29 (1.16)	-0.97 (1.90)	3.06* (1.35)	2.87 (1.78)	0.37 (0.78)
Intercept	-23.98*** (6.79)	18.85* (7.28)	-39.78 (33.81)	13.21 (8.22)	23.66** (7.78)	44.77*** (10.25)
R ²	0.81	0.67	0.41	0.53	0.62	0.53
Adj. R ²	0.80	0.65	0.37	0.50	0.59	0.50
Num. obs.	233	263	209	187	162	217
RMSE	5.49	4.88	6.12	5.63	5.79	3.24

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$