

Party Calls and Reelection in the U.S. Senate*

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Abstract

Minozzi and Volden (2013) advance the idea that a substantial portion of partisan voting activity in Congress is a simple call to unity that is especially easily embraced by ideological extremists. If correct, their findings should extend from the House to the Senate, despite Senate leaders lacking many of the sticks and carrots found in the House. We adapt the theory and measurement of party calls to the Senate. In so doing, we find that both the House and the Senate have relied heavily (and increasingly) on party calls over the past four decades. In the Senate in particular, the lens of party calls opens new opportunities for scholars to explore partisan legislative behavior. We take advantage of one such opportunity to show how electoral concerns limit Senators' responsiveness to party calls.

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When scholars think of partisan influence in legislative voting they often conceive of pressure exerted on fence-sitting legislators to win them over to the party leaders' preferred position. Given such a conception, party leaders in the Senate are thought to be less influential than their House counterparts because they possess fewer tools and opportunities to exert pressure.¹ In contrast with a pressure-based approach to understanding parties, Minozzi and Volden (2013) offer a theory of party calls. They suggest that, on many issues, unity among party members serves broad partisan ends, such as brand development (e.g., Snyder and Ting 2002), apart from attempts to win closely contested votes on legislation. As a result, leaders' attempts to call party members to vote together will be more influential on extremists (who benefit from a coherent brand) than on cross-pressured moderates. Minozzi and Volden (MV) identify party-call votes and find enhanced responsiveness to them among extremists in the U.S. House.

In this paper, we argue that the logic of party calls extends to the U.S. Senate, even absent strong tools to coerce the institution's individualistic members. We adapt MV's approach to the Senate and find strong evidence of party calls uniting party members, especially inducing ideological extremists to vote with the rest of the party, above and beyond their natural tendencies.

In addition to extending the examination of party calls to the Senate, we expand the time period of examination from MV to include the 93rd through the 112th Congresses (1973-2012) for both the House and the Senate. Consistent with other evidence of partisan polarization across this era, we see a steady rise in the use of party calls over time across both chambers and regardless of Democrat or Republican control. Finally, we argue that extending the study of party calls to the Senate opens numerous opportunities for important new scholarship. Illustrating one such possibility, we show that Senators up for reelection are significantly less responsive to party calls, consistent with bucking the party when it is out of line with voters in their home states.

1. Yet, recent work has shown significant party effects in the Senate (e.g., Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Monroe, Roberts and Rohde 2008; Patty 2008; Volden and Bergman 2006).

Party Calls in the Senate

To explore party calls, MV use a two-step process, first dividing floor votes into “party-free votes” and “party calls,” and then examining which legislators are most responsive to party calls beyond their baseline partisan support on party-free votes. Identifying party calls is itself a difficult classification problem, requiring researchers to identify a strong party-based voting pattern apart from that produced by ideological differences alone. We mimic the iterative approach in MV that produces the list of party-call votes and simultaneously generates party-free ideal points for each legislator.²

As detailed in the Supplemental Appendix A, the party calls identified through this process broadly reflect properties expected of partisan votes. For example, party calls tend to drive a further wedge between Democrats and Republicans who are already initially separated on ideological grounds. Moreover, party calls are more likely to occur among close votes than lopsided votes, perhaps because the close votes offer greater opportunity for parties to differentiate themselves. In total, these patterns lend confidence that our classification of party-call votes is meaningful in capturing broad and consistent underlying behavior.

Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of party calls among all votes in the House and Senate. Across both chambers, the use of party calls has been steadily increasing over time.³ It is possible that parties are calling more because partisan ideological alignment has made party calls more effective, or because parties need members to rally more to get their agendas through a heavily gridlocked Congress. We believe that the underlying cause of this trend merits further investigation, but take it as consistent with the much discussed increased partisanship and polarization in

2. Minor modifications were made to adapt this method to the Senate and to reduce computational burdens (see Supplemental Appendix A).

3. Because of the different threshold for identifying party calls across chambers, as well as their different membership sizes, direct House-Senate comparisons in the proportion of party-call votes would be inappropriate.

recent decades (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde (2001); Lee (2009, 2016); Theriault (2013); Smith (2014)). This trend holds regardless of which party is in the majority in the chamber.

Fundamental to the theory of party calls is the idea that substantial partisan activity in Congress is designed to align members who might otherwise wander away from the party for idiosyncratic reasons, rather than solely winning close votes. As such, those most responsive to party calls are the extremists who benefit from coherent party positions, rather than cross-pressured, fence-sitting moderates. To test this “responsive extremists hypothesis,” we run a series of linear models of *Responsiveness* to party calls, legislator’s percentage support for the party position on party-call votes. Throughout, we cluster observations by legislator and congress to account for possible dependence. Table 1 shows that the responsive extremists hypothesis holds up well in the extended period over which we examine the House, and nearly as prominently in the Senate.

We include all of the control variables used by MV, notably accounting for the *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party on party-free votes.⁴ Although some House-Senate differences emerge, such as for Southerners or those on power committees, many broad patterns are consistent across institutions.⁵ For example, positive coefficients show *Party Leaders* and *Committee Chairs* to be understandably highly responsive to party calls.

As shown by the coefficients on *Ideological Extremism*, and in strong support of the theory of party calls, each one-standard-deviation increase in that variable is associated with a nearly eight-percentage-point increase in *Responsiveness* in the House, and more than a six-percentage-point rise in the Senate.⁶ This party alignment extends above and beyond the baseline support on party-free votes.

4. See Supplemental Appendix B for descriptions and summary statistics for all variables.

5. Given the small size of the Senate, most members are included in one of the top committees, limiting the variance that allowed patterns based on committee assignments to be discerned in the House.

6. These effect sizes are consistent with those uncovered by MV in the House between 1973 and 2006.




Figure 1: Party calls as a percentage of all votes, 1973-2012. This figure shows the percentage of votes classified as party calls per Congress in each chamber. Blue circles denote Democrat-majority Congresses while Red triangles denote Republican-majority Congresses.

Table 1: Models of Responsiveness to Party Calls, 1973-2012

	House	Senate	
Ideological Extremism	7.75*** (1.26)	6.29*** (0.82)	6.23*** (0.82)
Baseline Rate	0.57*** (0.12)	0.73*** (0.07)	0.74*** (0.07)
Up For Reelection			-0.95*** (0.19)
Vote Share	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Pres Vote Share	0.03 (0.08)	0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)
Leader	1.81** (0.56)	1.64* (0.72)	1.63* (0.72)
Chair	4.98*** (0.95)	2.13** (0.79)	2.10** (0.79)
Power Committee	2.76*** (0.76)	-0.67 (0.71)	-0.67 (0.72)
Best Committee	-0.17 (0.10)	0.16 (0.14)	0.16 (0.14)
Female	1.17 (0.63)	2.05* (0.88)	2.03* (0.89)
African American	1.90 (1.36)	-4.58 (2.49)	-4.69 (2.46)
Latino	3.27** (1.16)	5.60* (2.54)	5.66* (2.52)
South	-0.89 (0.54)	0.60 (0.70)	0.60 (0.70)
Seniority	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
Freshman	0.78 (0.67)	1.08* (0.54)	0.80 (0.56)
Intercept	31.78** (11.77)	11.67 (6.93)	11.90 (6.90)
R ²	0.46	0.63	0.63
Adj. R ²	0.46	0.63	0.63
Num. obs.	8544	1991	1991
RMSE	8.44	6.98	6.97

The table presents linear models of *Responsiveness to Party Calls*, from the 93rd-112th Congresses (1973-2012). Standard errors are clustered by Congress and by member *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

The pattern of ideological extremists being more responsive to party calls than moderates holds for both Democrats and Republicans, for both those in the majority party and those in the minority party (see Supplemental Appendix C for details). This robust support is illustrated in Figure 2 based on separate regressions for each party in each Congress, which is a tough test of the responsive extremists hypothesis, especially given the small membership of the Senate. In the House, *Ideological Extremism* takes a positive coefficient for all but four cases, and in the Senate for all but two. Further, in the House, all positive coefficients are statistically significant; in the Senate, 29 of the 38 positive coefficients are statistically significant, while only one negative coefficient is. These results add confidence to the aggregate findings above.

In sum, the results reported here offer a coherent portrait of party calls in both chambers of the U.S. Congress. Party-call votes are widespread and increasing over the past four decades. They divide Democrats from Republicans, but especially draw ideologically extreme party members toward a unified partisan position.

Beyond uncovering such a systematic and important partisan process in Congress, the party calls identified here offer the potential to significantly enhance scholarly exploration of parties in the Senate. New research based on party calls could contribute to a fuller understanding of partisan practices and norms spreading from the House to the Senate (e.g., Theriault 2013), of the role of partisanship in advancing and overcoming filibusters (e.g., Wawro and Schickler 2004), and of electoral constraints on partisan behavior (e.g., Levitt 1996), to name a few opportunities.

To illustrate the usefulness of party calls, we tackle the last of these possibilities. Specifically, in the final column of Table 1, we include an indicator variable for whether a Senator is in her final Congress before reelection. Based on the theory of party calls, we expect Senators to be more free to help develop a party brand, even in contrast to their constituents' preferences, when electoral threats are close behind them rather than when the next election is imminent. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 1 shows about one percentage point lower responsiveness to party calls among those *Up for Reelection* than among those in their first four years following an election, all else equal. In the next section, we explore this result more fully.




Figure 2: Extremists are responsive to party calls in both chambers. This coefficient plot is produced by the same formula shown in the House and Senate regression table with results decomposed for the majority and minority parties in each of the 93rd-112th Congresses (1973-2012). Coefficients shown are for the effect of ideological extremism on party-call votes, with both 50% and 95% confidence intervals shown.

Reelection Limits Responsiveness to Party Calls

We argue that Senators up for reelection will be more attuned to their electoral needs than to broad party interests. Put simply, they will use some party-call votes to improve their personal—rather than the party—brand (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Carson et al. 2010). We detected evidence consistent with such a pattern above.

As an alternative test, we build a design on same-state Senator pairs in which one Senator is *Up for Reelection* at the end of the Congress. These pairings are ideal because same-state Senators are elected by the same constituents, but not at the same time, allowing us to estimate the effects of being *Up for Reelection* using a model with fixed effects for each state-Congress pair. We further control for all relevant covariates and adjust for lagged *Ideological Extremism*, *Responsiveness*, and *Baseline Rate*; similar results hold if these control variables are omitted. Based on the logic above, we expect that the Senator *Up for Reelection* will have lower *Responsiveness* to party calls than her same-state Senate partner. In contrast, we expect no difference between the *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party on party-free votes, which therefore comprises a test of our design. See Supplemental Appendix D for details.

Figure 3 shows that *Responsiveness* to party calls declines an average of about 1.3% when a Senator is *Up for Reelection*.⁷ However, their *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party is unchanged by electoral considerations, which serves to validate our design insofar as such an effect was un-

7. In an alternative approach, we compare all three possibilities for same-state Senator pairs based on proximity to upcoming election. Comparing those *Up for Reelection* to those in the first Congress after election shows a similar effect to that in Figure 3. Likewise, comparing those *Up for Reelection* to those in the middle two years of their six-year term reveals lower *Responsiveness* for those *Up for Reelection*. In contrast, comparing same-state Senators neither of whom are *Up for Reelection*, we find no difference in *Responsiveness*, treating the more senior Senator as the one closer to election. Across all three cases, we find no differences in their *Baseline Rate*, which acts as a design test.




Figure 3: Senators up for reelection are less responsive to party calls, yet there is no evidence that reelection affects *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party. This figure summarizes fixed effects models of same-state Senator pairs in which one is *Up for Reelection*. Estimates are differences in *Responsiveness* to party calls and the *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party, with 50% and 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors.

expected and inconsistent with the party calls theory. During the period of analysis, the average *Responsiveness* to party calls is 85%. Across the 365 party-call votes in the average Senate, a Senator not *Up for Reelection* therefore averages 53 defections from her party. In contrast, those *Up for Reelection* defect from party calls 58 times on average, almost a ten percent increase. Such deviations may limit the party's effectiveness in lawmaking and in developing a coherent brand. But they offer the election-seeking Senator an opportunity to build her support and reputation back home.

Conclusion

In this paper, we established that legislators respond to party calls in the Senate as they do in the House. In both chambers, party calls have become more prominent over the past forty years. In line with expectations, when leaders issue party calls, legislators align with their party, with the greatest effect being among ideological extremists.

One especially noteworthy finding is therefore the nature of the relationship we uncover between party and ideology. In contrast to Krehbiel's (1993) view that partisanship is often merely a reflection of ideology, or Lee's (2009) view that party extends well beyond ideology, we find party and ideology to be largely complementary yet distinct. When the party calls its members together, those who benefit the most—typically ideological extremists—respond most vigorously to the call.

We further showed the value of party calls as a tool for studying legislative behavior. We found that reelection reduced member responsiveness to party calls. Under electoral threat, constituent preferences are front and center in Senators' minds, and thus we hypothesized—and found—that members up for reelection are less responsive to the party. This finding shows one of the limits to the party-building efforts inherent in party calls.

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Supplemental Appendices to Party Calls and Reelection in the U.S. Senate

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Appendix A: Classifying Party Calls

As in Minozzi and Volden (2013), we use an algorithm to classify votes as “party calls”—that is, whether votes are predicted by party membership even after controlling for ideology. We classify the complement of votes as “party free,” and we use them to estimate ideal points absent party influence. The classification algorithm is iterative. In each iteration of the algorithm, ideal points are estimated based only on the votes which were classified as “party free” in the previous iteration. All votes are then regressed on ideal points and party membership, and votes are re-categorized based on the explanatory power of party in these regressions. To begin the process we need an initial classification, and so ideal points in the first iteration are estimated using lopsided votes (which have more than 65% or less than 35% of members of the chamber voting on the same side). We then use a 15 iteration “burn-in” period for each Congress. During this early period, many votes switch categories from iteration to iteration. This number of switchers also declines rapidly in these early iterations. After burn-in, the algorithm continues until either (1) the number of votes that switch classifications stops declining, or (2) until there are fewer than 5 votes that switch. Once either condition is met, it continues for an additional 15 iterations. Finally, we use the last five iterations to provide a final classification of votes. During these final iterations, any vote that does not switch is classified in its appropriate category. Any vote which does switch is dropped from further analysis, on the basis that these votes could not be credibly classified.

Our algorithm departs from MV’s in a few ways, most of them minor. However, a key change was the use of the `binIIRT` command from the R package `emIIRT` (Imai, Lo and Olmsted, 2016) to estimate ideal points, replacing the `ideal` command from the R package `pscl` (Jackman, 2015) used by MV. The `binIIRT` function is considerably faster than `ideal`, and by using it, we were able to test a much wider variety of alternative specifications to the original algorithm.

The results of these alternative specifications culminated in a few alterations to the original algorithm. Throughout, to ensure continuity of method, we vetted alternatives by re-estimating the results from MV. Those results are remarkably robust to the alternatives we explored. Such

robustness notwithstanding, we elected to make two minor changes. First, the original classification algorithm used logistic regression to predict votes, meaning that party-line votes suffered from separation, which was resolved using a method for that purpose (Zorn, 2005). In this paper’s classification method, we used linear models of roll call votes. Second, the original algorithm classified votes as “party calls” if the p -value on the party indicator in a regression of a roll call vote was smaller than 0.01. However, the House roll call data features many more votes cast per roll call than the Senate, since the lower chamber is much larger. As such, the threshold of 0.01 evenuated in classifying very few Senate votes as party calls, essentially because of the smaller n . We explored a variety of alternative p -value thresholds and settled on 0.05, as it resulted in similar fractions of party calls across the two chambers. Third, we also explored a variety of alternatives to the algorithm used here, but ultimately rejected them in order to maintain as much consistency with MV as possible. These included using random initial classifications of votes, adding a “simulated annealing”-style heating and cooling schedule to categorizations, and alternative stopping rules. We found that none of these alternatives significantly altered the results presented in the paper, and therefore elected to use an algorithm that closely matched the early effort.

Finally, with this algorithm in hand, we probed for differences in vote classifications between the two chambers. First, we broke down votes by close/lopsideness and classification as party calls/party free. Table A1 shows these comparisons for each chamber. In each panel, there is a notable, though far from perfect, correlation between close votes and party calls. This correlation is higher in the House (0.51) than in the Senate (0.45), but the two are remarkably close. We take this as *prima facie* evidence that the classification algorithm is at work on similar data-generating processes.

Next, we focus on whether party influence exacerbates or moderates ideological tendencies. In the regression models we use to classify votes, both ideal points and party are included as predictors of roll call behavior. We can therefore compare the signs on the coefficients of these variables to understand how the two variables interact on the average vote. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that the two coefficients have the same sign a majority of the time, regardless of

Table A1: Party Calls and Close/Lopsided Votes

	<u>House</u>		<u>Senate</u>	
	Party Call	Party Free	Party Call	Party Free
Lopsided	4245 (20%)	6123 (29%)	2063 (15%)	4876 (35%)
Close	9308 (45%)	1090 (5%)	5233 (37%)	1851 (13%)

The threshold for a vote to be lopsided was more than 65% of members voting on the same side of a roll call vote.

chamber (see top third of Table A2). Interestingly, we further find that party calls explain most of this relationship; similar signs appear for party and ideal points for about 75% of party calls (middle of Table A2), yet less than 50% of non-calls (bottom of Table A2). We interpret this evidence as consistent with the idea that party calls typically act to attract extremists back into the party fold.

Table A2: Comparing Coefficient Signs from Roll Call Regressions

	<u>House</u>		<u>Senate</u>	
	(-) Ideal	(+) Ideal	(-) Ideal	(+) Ideal
All Votes				
(-) Party	8159 (38%)	3180 (15%)	4581 (33%)	2264 (16%)
(+) Party	3739 (17%)	6405 (30%)	3224 (23%)	4010 (28%)
Party Calls Only				
(-) Party	6522 (44%)	1569 (11%)	2812 (39%)	822 (11%)
(+) Party	1627 (11%)	5070 (34%)	1045 (15%)	2476 (35%)
Party Free Only				
(-) Party	1637 (26%)	1611 (25%)	1769 (26%)	1442 (22%)
(+) Party	1976 (31%)	1132 (18%)	2052 (31%)	1425 (21%)

Each observation is a roll call vote, and the table categorizes these votes based on the signs of the Party and Ideal Point coefficients. The Party variable is an indicator for Republican and is positively correlated with ideal points.

Appendix B: Summary Statistics

Here we give descriptions of report summary tables of the variables used in our paper. Members are grouped either as Democrats or Republicans, with independents being grouped with the party they caucus with in each chamber. The data are constructed with observations for members in each Congress they were present in. Values are according to member status in each Congress. Members who changed parties have multiple observations in the Congress which they did so to have observations for them in each. In each chamber, *Majority* is an indicator variable for if a members' party is in the majority during a Congress, which is used to divide results and summary statistics.¹

The bulk of the data were provided by the Legislative Effectiveness Project (Volden and Wiseman, 2014) or constructed from those data, with a few exceptions. Keith Poole furnished the roll call data. Committee data for all Senate terms and the 110th-112th in the House are from Charles Stewart's Congressional data page, with committee value ranks based on (Groseclose and Stewart, 1998). Committee data from the 93rd-109th terms in the House come from the replication data for MV. House elections data were provided to us by Gary Jacobson, and Senate elections data come from Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas. Gingrich Senators were identified based on (Theriault, 2013).

Party-Free Ideal Point is a member's ideal point, estimated with the binIRT function from the R package emIRT using only party-free votes, mean-centered at zero, scaled to have unit standard deviation, and oriented so that Democrats' values are on average lower (i.e., further left) than Republicans'. *Ideological Extremism* is simply the *Party Free Ideal Point* value for Republicans and sign-reversed for Democrats, so that higher numbers represent more extreme members for both parties. *Responsiveness to party calls* is the percentage of party calls on which a member

1. Each party held the majority for a portion of the 107th Senate, with Democrats in control for most of the term. Therefore, for the purposes of analyses, Democrats were coded as the majority of this term. This decision does not meaningfully affect the inferences in the paper.

voted with a majority of their party; *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party is that percentage for party-free votes.

Up for Reelection is a Senate-specific variable, representing whether a member's election falls during a Congress. *Vote Share* is calculated by the member's share of the vote relative to their nearest opponent.² *Presidential Vote Share* in each chamber is an indication of Democrat or Republican (depending on who the member caucused with) presidential candidate 2-party vote share in the previous election based on the previous presidential election. *Party Leader* is an indicator for if a member is in one of the positions identified as the congressional leadership (other than committee positions) in the *Almanac of American Politics* for a particular Congress. *Committee Chair* is an indicator for whether held such a position in that Congress. *Power Committee* represents a member being on one of the top four ranked committees. *Best Committee* takes a value based on the highest ranked committee a member was on with ranks reversed so that higher means better, i.e., values range from zero (member not on a committee) to the number of committees in the chamber (member served on the highest ranked committee). *Female* is an indicator variable for female legislators. *African American* is an indicator for African American legislators. *Latino* is an indicator for Hispanic and Latino legislators. *South* is an indicator for if a member represents a state or district from 13-state south. *Seniority* is a count of consecutive terms a member has served. *Freshman* is an indicator variable for the first Congress of a member previously not in Congress.

2. In the House, we report above or below average centered at zero since unchallenged runs were coded as missing, to avoid selecting values for these. This decision had no impact on results.

Table A3: Senate Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Responsiveness to Party Calls	85.5	11.4	8.8	100
Party Free Ideal Point	0.00	1.00	-3.22	3.40
Ideological Extremism	0.69	0.72	-1.63	3.40
Baseline Rate of Voting with Party	82.0	8.2	45.1	100
Up for Reelection	0.33	0.47	0	1
Vote Share	61.2	9.9	50.0	100
Pres. Vote Share	52.1	9.7	20.1	78.0
Party Leader	0.10	0.30	0	1
Committee Chair	0.18	0.39	0	1
Power Committee	0.73	0.45	0	1
Best Committee	12.3	2.7	0	15
Female	0.07	0.25	0	1
African American	< 0.01	0.06	0	1
Latino	0.01	0.09	0	1
South	0.26	0.44	0	1
Seniority	6.25	4.62	1	26
Freshman	0.11	0.32	0	1

$N = 1,993$

Table A4: House Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Responsiveness to Party Calls	85.8	11.5	8.0	100
Party Free Ideal Point	0.00	1.00	−4.08	9.35
Ideological Extremism	0.60	0.80	−4.32	9.35
Baseline Rate of Voting With Party	87.0	7.5	0	100
Vote Share vs. Mean Vote Share	0.0	9.2	−15.7	31.4
Pres. Vote Share	56.6	12.4	16.3	96.1
Party Leader	0.04	0.19	0	1
Committee Chair	0.05	0.22	0	1
Power Committee	0.26	0.44	0	1
Best Committee	13.8	6.4	0	22
Female	0.09	0.29	0	1
African American	0.06	0.24	0	1
Latino	0.04	0.18	0	1
South	0.30	0.46	0	1
Seniority	5.33	4.05	1	29
Freshman	0.16	0.36	0	1

$N = 8,544$

Supplemental Appendix C: Regression Models of Responsiveness

In this appendix, we present results from regression models in the House and Senate which model *Responsiveness* to party calls separately by party and majority status. Table ?? presents results for the House, and Table ?? those for the Senate.

Three sets of results are clear from these models. First, in keeping with the theory and evidence in MV, we expected that members with higher *Ideological Extremism* would also have higher levels of *Responsiveness*. Indeed, even with the amendments to the classification algorithm described in Supplemental Appendix A, we see similar evidence to this effect across all subgroups in the House (first row of Table ??). We see similar evidence from the Senate (first row of Table ??), and, moreover, the magnitude of these coefficients is remarkably consistent across subgroup and chamber.

Second, one of the benefits of replicating MV's findings in the Senate is that there is variation in whether members were up for reelection. We expected that reelection would make members less responsive to the call of the party as they work to pivot to their districts when approaching reelection. The results appear in the third row of Table ?. We find first that the sign is in the expected direction and similar magnitude (about one percentage point) for all subgroups. We also find that the coefficient achieves statistical significance for all subgroups save Democrats, for which the two-sided p -value rises to about XXX.

We find that minority party women are substantially more responsive to party calls than their male counterparts in both chambers. Others have found that minority party women remain more focused on legislative agendas than their male counterparts Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer (2013), and we take this finding as being in line with this account. While results for this are mixed, we find generally that increased same-party presidential vote share (an indicator of party strength in the district) increases responsiveness to party calls while increased personal vote share (an indicator of member popularity in the district) decreases responsiveness. However, this relationship does not present itself for Democrats. A number of factors complicate this relationship for Democrats, such as landslide presidential election losses and the presence of Southern Democrats early on

who were more moderate than their copartisans.

Table A5: Responsiveness to Party Calls in the U.S. House, 1973-2012

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Majority	Minority
Ideological Extremism	7.75*** (1.26)	8.30*** (0.89)	5.88*** (1.70)	6.57*** (1.44)	8.73*** (1.16)
Baseline Rate	0.57*** (0.12)	0.63*** (0.09)	0.41* (0.19)	0.51** (0.16)	0.63*** (0.08)
Vote Share	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Pres Vote Share	0.03 (0.08)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.21* (0.09)	0.16* (0.08)
Leader	1.81** (0.56)	1.96** (0.73)	2.80** (0.99)	2.60*** (0.56)	1.83* (0.81)
Chair	4.98*** (0.95)	2.50** (0.92)	9.72*** (2.02)	1.85*** (0.56)	
Power Committee	2.76*** (0.76)	1.83*** (0.44)	2.93** (0.96)	3.00*** (0.87)	1.07 (0.82)
Best Committee	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.24 (0.13)	-0.18 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.11)
Female	1.17 (0.63)	0.56 (0.53)	-0.08 (1.50)	-0.02 (0.66)	2.18** (0.77)
African American	1.90 (1.36)	-0.47 (1.08)	5.12*** (1.31)	-2.80 (1.77)	3.13 (1.77)
Latino	3.27** (1.16)	1.78 (1.07)	2.33 (1.71)	2.97** (0.93)	3.00* (1.50)
South	-0.89 (0.54)	-2.47** (0.85)	3.56*** (0.78)	-1.77** (0.59)	-0.54 (0.89)
Seniority	-0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.34* (0.14)	0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.10)
Freshman	0.78 (0.67)	-0.07 (0.53)	1.19 (1.01)	0.22 (0.51)	-0.09 (0.54)
Intercept	31.78** (11.77)	25.15** (8.49)	52.01* (20.32)	38.88* (15.37)	17.13* (8.60)

Results are produced by OLS regressions for all members for the entire period in the first column, with additional analyses for all Democrats and Republicans as well as all members of the Majority and Minority party in Congresses 93-112 in the House of Representatives. Details on the variables are provided in Appendix C. Standard errors are clustered by Congress and by member. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A6: Responsiveness to Party Calls in the U.S. Senate, 1973-2012

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Majority	Minority
Ideological Extremism	6.23*** (0.82)	3.12** (1.16)	7.80*** (1.02)	4.81*** (0.99)	7.99*** (0.95)
Baseline Rate	0.74*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.09)	0.74*** (0.08)	0.70*** (0.07)	0.72*** (0.09)
Up For Reelection	-0.95*** (0.19)	-0.73** (0.23)	-1.39** (0.48)	-1.08** (0.33)	-0.90* (0.44)
Vote Share	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.15** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)
Pres Vote Share	0.10 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.18** (0.07)	0.03 (0.12)
Leader	1.63* (0.72)	2.26* (1.04)	0.91 (0.78)	1.56* (0.64)	1.84 (1.09)
Chair	2.10** (0.79)	0.83 (1.27)	3.69* (1.49)	0.19 (0.65)	
Power Committee	-0.67 (0.72)	-0.80 (0.81)	-0.37 (1.33)	-0.05 (0.87)	-1.41 (1.19)
Best Committee	0.16 (0.14)	0.22 (0.16)	0.02 (0.25)	0.02 (0.16)	0.37 (0.22)
Female	2.03* (0.89)	1.66* (0.74)	0.42 (2.29)	0.72 (0.65)	3.48* (1.75)
African American	-4.69 (2.46)	-1.00 (2.44)	-10.99*** (1.90)	1.27 (1.10)	-5.00* (1.95)
Latino	5.66* (2.52)	1.76 (1.23)	7.20 (4.43)	4.68 (3.18)	5.98 (3.44)
South	0.60 (0.70)	-1.67 (0.95)	0.86 (1.21)	-0.11 (0.72)	1.21 (1.04)
Seniority	0.01 (0.07)	0.05 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.06 (0.09)	0.13 (0.10)
Freshman	0.80 (0.56)	0.68 (0.68)	0.35 (0.73)	0.38 (0.66)	0.93 (1.06)
Intercept	11.90 (6.90)	9.61 (7.58)	18.44* (7.21)	16.92* (7.32)	8.99 (7.58)
R ²	0.63	0.69	0.64	0.68	0.62
Adj. R ²	0.63	0.68	0.64	0.67	0.61
Num. obs.	1991	1041	950	1099	892
RMSE	6.97	6.12	7.24	5.91	7.68

Results are produced by OLS regressions for all members for the entire period in the first column, with additional analyses for all Democrats and Republicans as well as all members of the Majority and Minority party in Congresses 93-112 in the Senate. Details on the variables are provided in Appendix C. Standard errors are clustered by Congress and by Senator. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Supplemental Appendix D: Senate Reelection Fixed Effects Models

To better test the role of reelection, we use same-state senators as a natural pairing. Table ?? presents the results of fixed effects regression models which were summarized in Figure 2 in the main text. The first two models include no control variables beyond the fixed effects, while the latter two also adjust for relevant control variables including lagged values of *Responsiveness* to party calls, *Ideological Extremism*, and *Baseline Rate* of voting with the party.

Table A7: Senate Fixed Effects Models

	Responsiveness	Baseline Rate	Responsiveness	Baseline Rate
Up For Reelection	-1.62*	-0.08	-1.34*	0.33
	(0.63)	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.47)
Lag Responsiveness To Party Calls			0.31	0.06
			(0.19)	(0.12)
Lag Ideological Extremism			4.71*	1.26
			(1.86)	(1.08)
Lag Baseline Rate			0.37*	0.56***
			(0.16)	(0.09)
Republican			0.67	-0.34
			(1.53)	(2.02)
Majority			4.49*	1.69
			(1.98)	(2.08)
Vote Share			-0.00	0.00
			(0.06)	(0.03)
Pres Vote Share			0.01	-0.04
			(0.11)	(0.08)
Leader			0.86	0.90
			(0.64)	(1.09)
Chair			-0.97	0.68
			(0.80)	(1.21)
Power Committee			0.51	1.10
			(1.30)	(0.99)
Best Committee			-0.02	-0.11
			(0.16)	(0.23)
Female			-0.09	-0.13
			(0.58)	(1.54)
African American			0.66	-2.79
			(2.46)	(2.83)
Latino			-2.89	1.76
			(4.92)	(6.99)
Seniority			0.09	0.00
			(0.13)	(0.08)
Num. obs.	1130	1130	952	952
R ²	0.71	0.65	0.93	0.85
Adj. R ²	0.41	0.30	0.84	0.66

The table presents fixed effects regressions of *Responsiveness* to party calls and *Baseline Rate* of voting with party for the Senate, with fixed effects for Same State-Congress pairs, including 565 fixed effects for the models in the first two columns and 476 for the latter two models. Standard errors are clustered by legislator and Congress. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

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