Evaluation Service Evaluation of UNHCR’s implementation of three of its protection strategies: the Global Education Strategy, the Updated SGBV Strategy, and the Child Protection Framework July 2017 Full Report ES/2017/02 Commissioned by UNHCR Evaluation Service and Conducted by Oxford Policy Management 12 July 2017

2.1.2 Summary of the SGBV Strategy 17. The SGBV Strategy builds on UNHCR’s legacy of commitment toward the protection of POCs against SGBV. Since the release of UNHCR’s first document on SGBV in 1990, the Policy on Refugee Women, the organisation has strengthened its guidelines, policies, and evaluations of SGBV toward refugees, including contributing to the formulation of policies and recommended guidelines for all humanitarian and state actors.11, 12 18. In summary, the revised strategy recommends actions to prevent, identify and respond to six ‘action areas’ of SGBV and identifies areas of UNHCR capacity building. This is in contrast to the other strategies, which stipulate objectives. These action areas, which are propagated by comprehensive programming and an Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) approach, have been identified ‘to increase the quality of protection and improve services for particular at-risk populations’. 19. Although the strategy lacks explicit objectives, by targeting ‘action areas’ of concern the strategy implies that this will ultimately contribute to the protection of refugees. Each action area has respective actions to ensure prevention and response, as well as recommended actions to identify challenges or problems. For example, in relation to ‘engaging men and boys’ one of the recommended preventative actions is to ‘explore and expand the use of male and female outreach workers’. 20. Unlike the Global Education Strategy and Child Protection Framework, there were no countries identified as priority for roll-out. Thus, regional workshops for the SGBV Strategy were not offered to all countries. A regional workshop was organised in Panama for the offices in the Americas. As with the two other strategies, however, the SGBV Strategy is applicable to all UNHCR operations, extending beyond the pilot countries. 2.1.3 Summary of the Child Protection Framework13 21. UNHCR has a significant history of child protection policies and agreements, most notably the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Children,14 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child15 and the UNHCR Agenda for Protection.16 UNHCR has further contributed to the advocacy and standard setting for child protection via the protection cluster, the child protection working group, and other global forums.17, 18 22. The goals of the Child Protection Framework are coupled with cross-cutting principles (e.g. do no harm, AGD approach, child participation, etc.). The framework details benchmarks and suggested actions corresponding to each of its six goals. The benchmarks are generally activities or processes UNHCR will undertake to achieve each child protection goal. The framework also defines six ‘systems components’ that influence the goals for children (e.g. legal and policy framework, coordination, etc.). 23. The framework also includes clear activities to be undertaken by UNHCR and partners to improve planning, implementing and monitoring and reporting of child protection activities. 11 UNHCR (1990) Policy on refugee women, www.unhcr.org/3ba6186810.html 12 Global Protection Cluster (2010) Handbook for coordinating gender-based violence interventions in humanitarian settings, www.unicef.org/protection/files/GBV\_Handbook\_Long\_Version.pdf 13 Please note that although this is termed a ‘framework’ rather than a ‘strategy’, for all intents and purposes it is treated like a strategy and was treated as such in this evaluation. 14 UNHCR (1993) Policy on Refugee Children, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f9e6a534.html 15 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1990) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx. 16 UNHCR (2003) UNHCR agenda for protection, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4714a1bf2.html 17 World Vision (2012) Minimum interagency standards for protection mainstreaming, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full\_Report\_3752.pdf 18 Global Protection Cluster (2013) Minimum standards for child protection in humanitarian action, http://cpwg.net/?get=006914%7C2014/03/CP-Minimum-Standards-English-2013.pdf © Oxford Policy Management 5

24. In 2012, when the Child Protection Framework was formulated, ten target countries were identified. The number has increased to twelve as of 2015. 2.2 UNHCR’s strategy and planning process 2.2.1 High-level strategic planning 25. The three global protection strategies were developed at HQ, by DIP. In addition to the regional bureaux providing support, guidance and oversight of field operations, both DIP and the Division of Programme Support and Management (DPSM) provide support and expert advice to field operations in their specific area of expertise. Figure 1 provides an organogram of HQ. 26. Interviews with DIP staff indicated that the Division seeks to establish child protection, education and SGBV as core elements of programming at the country office level, integrating these as constant operational concerns, beyond annual budget and planning cycles. DPSM, on the other hand, focuses principally on operational effectiveness and efficiency, with a need for clear priorities and relevant but parsimonious guidelines, while also providing expert support and advice in specific technical areas within their remit, such as shelter and health. 27. UNHCR has guiding documents and policies additional to the global strategies. Policies such as the Policy on Refugee Children (1993) and the Policy on Refugee Women (2002) set organisational goals, guiding principles and strategic objectives for UNHCR. Further, UNHCR has presented the High Commissioner’s Five Commitments to Refugee Children and Five Commitments to Refugee Women. These documents and policies seem to provide long-term grounding for the direction of the organisation, including the direction taken by the strategies. However, it is unclear how well their implementation is monitored. 28. UNHCR also establishes Global Strategic Priorities (GSPs), which are meant to guide the biannual planning cycle. Indeed, interview data revealed that the GSPs are used during the prioritisation of operational needs during the COP process, which is described in the next sub-section. The GSPs are monitored and reported against. 2.2.2 Country-level planning and budgeting 29. The main planning exercise in UNHCR takes place in field operations and HQ annually in February/March. At country level, this results in COPs that include the operational plan budget. They are needs based, building upon participatory assessments with refugees and consultations with key partners. All operations budgets (both field and HQ) form the overall UNHCR budget. UNHCR has a biennial budget that is submitted for approval by its governing body, the Executive Committee, in its annual session in October. It covers two calendar years and it is divided into two annual budgets. If unexpected events during the year require additional budget needs, which were not foreseen and therefore not included in its approved annual budget (e.g. new emergency operations), they will be reflected in separate supplementary budgets. 30. Prior to the start of the new calendar year, country offices receive the authority to spend/commit funds for a prioritised part of their COP budget. The level of the (initial) spending authority is decided at HQ on an annual basis, taking into consideration GSPs and the submissions received from the country offices. It is based on the expectation that the organisation globally will be able to at least secure this income in the course of the year. If more funding becomes available, either globally or for specific operations/thematic areas due to earmarking, the authority to spend/commit funds may be increased during the year (depending on whether the funds are assessed to be new and additional and not part of the projections or pledges already made). © Oxford Policy Management 6

31. When the budget envelope is determined by each bureau and communicated to country representatives, a prioritisation process takes place. Through this process, operations determine which needs will be prioritised within the (expected) funding available during the year. All units within an operation negotiate how to best allocate the limited funds available. Interview data from country offices revealed that, at this point, negotiation between programme and protection units tends to be strong. Protection areas such as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and livelihoods fall under programme, while protection areas such as child protection and SGBV fall under protection. Thus, tension may arise regarding which objectives and output should be prioritised and often difficult decisions may have to be taken in terms of deprioritising certain activities. 32. Fundraising is targeting a broad variety of donors, both bilateral and multilateral, as well as the private sector. © Oxford Policy Management 7

Figure 1: UNHCR organisational structure (simplified, January 2016) High Commissioner Evaluation Service (ES) Assistant High Commissioner - Assistant High Commissioner - Deputy High Commissioner Protection Operations DHRM, DIST, DFAM, DER, ODMS Division of International Division of Programme Support and Protection (DIP) Management (DPSM) Bureaux Division of Emergency Security Supply Deputy Director Policy and Law (RSD, Deputy Director (Programme resettlement, migration, asylum) Analysis & Support, Field Country Offices Information) Deputy Director Protection Operational Support (IDP, statelessness, protection Deputy Director cluster) (Public Health, Operational Solutions, Shelter, Settlement, Cash based interventions) Deputy Director Comprehensive Solutions (Community based protection, child protection, education, gender) © Oxford Policy Management 8

3 Evaluation methodology 3.1 Evaluation questions 33. As described in Chapter 1, the evaluation was designed to answer three headline questions:19 A. Quality: Are the three strategies relevant, coherent, informed by evidence, and adequately designed? B. Implementation: To what extent have the strategies been implemented? C. Contribution to results: What were the results of the strategies? 34. Under these three headline evaluation questions, detailed questions and sub-questions were specified. These headline evaluation questions provide the overarching framework for the evaluation, with the evaluation findings and respective evidence structured around the corresponding three main themes of (1) quality of the strategy, (2) implementation and (3) contribution to results. 35. An initial evaluation matrix was developed during the inception phase. The matrix was revised in January 2017 in line with the revised evaluation questions and broadened approach. A simple final evaluation matrix is provided below. This summarises the data sources used to answer each set of the evaluation sub-questions, which in turn provide the basis to answer the headline evaluation questions. 19 The methodological design has evolved over the course of the evaluation. In response to feedback on the initial draft report in November 2016, the scope and design of the evaluation was reviewed and revised to enable a more comprehensive and robust assessment of the global strategies. As part of this review, the evaluation questions (headline, detailed and specific sub-questions) were reviewed and restructured and finalised following further discussions. © Oxford Policy Management 9

Table 2: Evaluation Matrix Headline questions Detailed evaluation questions Specific sub-questions Data sources A 1.1 What was the (rationale) purpose of the strategies? A 1.2 How were the strategies developed? How consultative was this process? How did this process influence the strategies? Document review of HQ-level A.1.3 What evidence was used to design the strategies? A.1 To what extent are the documents A.1.4 How was evidence used in the design of the strategies? strategies relevant to the needs of Detailed sector expert reviews of UNHCR [the organisation] and the A.1.5 To what extent are the strategies and their objectives appropriate global strategies in light of the evidence available? context of implementation [POCs, Interviews with HQ staff countries of operation]? A.1.6 How relevant are the strategies to the needs of key stakeholders, Interviews with staff from 15 country such as the needs of partners, and governments and POCs? offices A.1.7 How relevant are the strategies to the global and country-level contexts of implementation? [particularly the fact that they will be implemented in vastly differing contexts] A.2.1 To what extent are terminology and structure consistent between Quality the strategies? Detailed sector expert reviews of A.2.2 To what extent are the strategies coherent with each other and A.2 To what extent are the three global strategies with other UNHCR policies and strategies? (How relevant are the Are the three strategies coherent (internally and Document review of HQ-level strategies to the needs, processes and operating environment of strategies relevant, externally)? documents UNHCR?) coherent, informed by Interviews with HQ staff A.2.3 To what extent are the strategies coherent with global evidence and frameworks and commitments? adequately designed? A.3.1 Do the strategies provide a clear framework to guide key Detailed sector expert reviews of interventions and prioritisations at global and country level? global strategies A.3 To what extent are the A.3.2 Do the strategies have clear, appropriate, and measurable Document review of HQ-level strategies adequately designed to objectives? documents achieve their purpose? A.3.3 What is the availability and clarity of support, advice and Interviews with HQ staff guidance accompanying the roll-out of the strategies at country level? Interviews with staff from 15 country Was it clear and user-friendly? offices A.4.1 To what extent was the roll-out process implemented as envisioned? What factors may have affected this? How well did it work? Document review of HQ-level A.4.2 How were the countries selected for the roll-out? What were the A.4 How were the strategies documents criteria? rolled out from HQ to country Interviews with HQ staff A.4.3 To what extent was the roll-out adequately resourced and offices? Interviews with staff from 15 country supported? offices A.4.4 To what extent has there been a process of lesson-learning and sharing during roll-out? © Oxford Policy Management 10

Document review of 15 country B.1 To what extent have the B.1.1 How have country offices adapted the global strategy to local operations global strategies been reflected context and priority needs? Interviews with staff from 15 country /incorporated into standalone and B.1.2 How have country offices engaged with other stakeholders in this offices /or overall protection and process? Interviews with government, Implementation solutions strategies, and COPs at B.1.3 Which factors supported or constrained implementation of the country level? strategies at country level? partners and POCs from five case- study country offices To what extent have Document review of HQ-level the strategies been documents implemented? B.2.1. How was the implementation of the strategies monitored and B.2 How did monitoring of the Document review of 15 country reported on at the global and country level? strategies take place and was it operations B.2.2. How adequate and appropriate was this to credibly measure adequate? Interviews with HQ staff results? Interviews with staff from 15 country offices Document review of 15 country C1.1 To what extent have the strategies improved core protection operations C.1 To what extent have the services? Interviews with staff from 15 country strategies contributed to achieving C1.2 To what extent have the strategies contributed to the enabling offices Contribution to results at the institutional level? environment? Interviews with government, results C1.3 To what extent have the strategies strengthened partnerships? partners and POCs from five case- study country offices What were the results C.2.1 To what extent have the objectives of the strategies been Interviews with staff from five case- of the strategies? C2. To what extent have the achieved? study country offices strategies contributed to C.2.2 To what extent and how has this resulted in improved protection Document review of five country improving protection results for for POCs? operations POCs? C.2.3 What factors have influenced the extent to which protection Interviews with government, results have been achieved? partners and POCs © Oxford Policy Management 11

3.2 Evidence sources 36. The evidence and analysis needed to answer the three headline evaluation questions was generated and triangulated across many different sources and types of data. 37. Data collection and analysis (both in-country and desk-based) focused on the period from the introduction of the strategies around 201220 to the time of the evaluation data collection, which began in March 2016. Data from the COPs were analysed up to mid-year 2016. Further details on the different data-collection tools and how they were used are provided in Annex B. 38. The evaluation drew from two broad sources of evidence: key informant interviews (KIIs) and desk- based documentation review. Both took place at the HQ and country level. 39. It was not feasible to conduct country-level interviews and documentation reviews for all countries covered by the global strategies, so a case-study approach was taken. Five countries were selected for in-depth assessment (including missions to each country for face-to face interviews, documentation gathering and qualitative data collection). An additional ten countries were also selected for lighter-touch assessment through desk review and remote interviews.21 The basis for the case-study selection is outlined in the next sub-section. 40. Specifically, the evidence sources used for the evaluation were as follows:  Detailed sector expert reviews of global strategies: undertaken by education, child protection and SGBV sector experts to assess the technical content of the global strategies. The reviews focused on the extent to which the global strategy objectives made sense given sector best practice and were in line with the available evidence base. The set of questions used by the sector experts in conducting these reviews is provided in Annex C.  Document review of HQ-level documents: included review of strategy documents, monitoring and reporting frameworks and data, reporting documents, meeting agendas, presentation material, monitoring material, UNHCR policy documents, and interagency policy documents and frameworks.  Document review of 15 country operations: mainly centred on country-level strategy documents and drafts, and COPs for 2012 and 2016 (data at mid-year). Year-end data for 2016 was not available when the data analysis for the evaluation took place and may thus reflect changes not reflected in this evaluation. The rationale for this choice was that the 2012 COPs were produced just before global strategy roll-out (or just after) so would not have been influenced by them, while those of 2016 were the most recent available at the time the desk analysis was carried out and were intended to have been devised in line with the global strategies.  KIIs with HQ staff: undertaken during two missions to Geneva, with follow-up interviews conducted remotely as required. In total, five additional interviews were conducted in early 2017.  KIIs with staff from 15 country offices: conducted face-to-face in-country for the five case- study countries and remotely for the other ten country offices.  KIIs with government and partners: only conducted in the five case-study countries (face-to- face; in-country).  Focus group discussions (FGDs) with POCs: conducted in the five case-study countries with children receiving child protection interventions, and with the caregivers of children exposed to education and child protection interventions in the camps, shelters and residences of refugees.  Household case studies with POCs: conducted in the five case-study countries with households with children in school or receiving child protection interventions. 20 All three strategies had different inception dates, falling around the year 2012. 21 The original evaluation design was based on just the five in-depth case-study countries. However, following the review of the evaluation design in late 2016, a further ten case-study countries were selected to ensure greater breadth of analysis and to enable us to make more robust evaluative judgements about the overall performance of the global strategies. This assessment was based on desk review and remote interviews, with a focus on data gaps identified. A total of nine interviews took place after January 2017, covering all ten countries except Niger (which was due to scheduling issues). © Oxford Policy Management 12

 Participatory Ethnographic Evaluation and Research (PEER)22 with POCs: focusing on self- identified women. This technique was intended to be applied only in countries implementing the SGBV Strategy (i.e. Bangladesh, Egypt and Rwanda)23. 41. A range of additional documents were developed by the evaluation team to enable effective analysis of the extremely large volume of data that needed to be examined per strategy and per country. They include: (i) detailed desk-based analysis of all countries included in the evaluation, focusing on the three main areas of inquiry relating to the headline evaluation questions; (ii) a systematic comparison of performance and impact indicators in 2012 and 2016 (mid-year) COPs; and (iii) additional reference documents examining implementation and examples of contribution to system-level results for the additional ten countries studied.24 3.3 Case-study country selection and evaluation scope 42. Five countries were selected for in-depth assessment (including missions to each country for data collection): Bangladesh, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico and Rwanda. An additional ten countries were also selected for assessment through desk review and remote interviews: Chad, India, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Niger, Pakistan, Uganda and Zambia. 43. The case-study countries were chosen to ensure geographical representation and variability in number and type of strategies implemented. Variables considered for the selection included: geographical representation; type of operational context; number and type of strategies rolled out and implemented; relationship between UNHCR and host government; and emergency context. 44. The choice of the five in-depth case-study countries also considered pragmatic factors, such as access and evaluation resources, and evolved over time. There were initially supposed to be six in-depth case-study countries but this was reduced to five due to scheduling issues and to allow for more extensive primary data collection activities with refugees in the countries visited. India and Chad were originally among the five selected but were substituted by Iran and Mexico. However, India and Chad were eventually still covered among the ten additional case-study countries. 45. Not all five in-depth case-study countries covered all three global strategies, as they were not chosen as pilots for priority roll-out. This is shown in Table 3. The same applies to the additional ten case-study countries, as shown in Table 4. Table 3: Global strategies rolled out in the five in-depth case-study countries Child protection Education SGBV Rwanda    Egypt    Bangladesh   Mexico  Iran  22 PEER is a participatory qualitative research method. It draws on the principles of ethnography and recent developments in rapid appraisal techniques. Members of a community (peer researchers) are trained to carry out in-depth conversational interviews with friends in their social networks, and to report back findings in a series of in-depth interviews with a social scientist. Peer researchers are often from marginalised and harder-to-reach social groups. 23 As noted later in this chapter, PEER was only administered in Egypt, given constraints speaking with refugees in Bangladesh, and discomfort voiced by the Rwandan country office with the evaluation team conducting PEER in the camps. 24 These reference documents are available through UNHCR Evaluation Service. © Oxford Policy Management 13

Table 4: Global strategies rolled out in the ten additional countries reviewed Child protection Education SGBV Chad    India   Jordan   Kenya    Lebanon   Malaysia   Niger   Pakistan   Uganda    Zambia  3.4 Limitations 46. There were some limitations regarding the evaluation methodology, both anticipated and unanticipated. Some of these were addressed in the review of the evaluation design in late 2016, summarised at the start of this section. 47. The general limitations related to data collection and analysis included the following: a. Identifying interviewees best placed to provide insights particularly on strategy roll-out, country-level adaptation and influence on strategic results. This required additional efforts (for instance, snowball sampling, through which interviewees suggested the evaluation team speak to other UNHCR staff) to ensure adequate coverage of the evaluation issues. b. Analysing CO-level data given the inconsistency of indicators reported on. c. Establishing whether the strategies influenced changes at the level of UNHCR, government, and partner systems. Despite efforts to make extensive use of interview data to triangulate, confirm, and provide context to the findings emerging from the document review, evidence surrounding the contribution of the strategies to specific operational decisions remained weak. d. Carrying out the analysing of results at the individual / POC-level mostly relied on the document review and interview data from the five case-study countries only. As noted in Section 4.7, there was great variance in the impact and performance indicators reported on across years, which makes year-to-year comparisons difficult. The indicators reported in the COPs also vary across response and population groups (e.g. emergency response, non- emergency response, urban response, Iraqi refugees versus Syrian refugees, etc.) for the same year, adding another level of unreliability to comparisons. Thus, determining whether changes occurred at the individual level required a deeper understanding of context, as well as a careful comparison of all indicators relevant to the strategies. This level of analysis was therefore only appropriate for the five case-study countries, from which primary data was gathered. e. Establishing and tracing the strategies’ contribution and influence to higher-level / strategic results. 48. There were also a few country-specific limitations: a. In Bangladesh, the evaluation team could not access the camps and thus data collection with refugees was not possible. b. In Egypt, one of the partners failed to select a socioeconomically diverse sample of respondents. To mitigate this, the evaluation team worked with partners to more clearly convey the purpose of the evaluation and resample the initial list of respondents. © Oxford Policy Management 14

c. In Iran, an important limitation related to observation and reporting bias – particularly during KIIs and FGDs – was the presence of government representatives during. An additional limitation concerned the inability for a national researcher to support data-collection activities. As mitigation, the UNHCR office proposed that their own staff provide support to data- collection activities. Although this was the only alternative, it increased the potential for social and reporting bias. d. A similar concern regarding social bias and reporting bias applies to Rwanda, where the UNHCR office in Kigali assigned a staff member to be present during all data-collection activities with refugees in one of the camps. e. An important limitation affecting data-collection activities in Mexico was the low number of youth who met the inclusion criteria for FGDs (i.e. youth aged 14+ and a refugee claimant), which resulted in smaller than expected groups. There were higher numbers of children under age 14, but ethics protocols (as discussed in Annex D) prevented the inclusion of those groups of children in the evaluation. In Tapachula, the evaluation team attempted to speak with a group of adolescents at a detention centre that receives both refugees and migrants. However, the group convened for FGDs did not include any youth intending to file an asylum claim. This prevented the gathering of insights about the experience of asylum- seeking/refugee children. Section 6.4 provides more detail on the reasons why adolescents often do not plan to submit asylum claims. f. Insights from the ten additional case-study countries included in the evaluation, which did not host an evaluation mission, are more limited given that the countries were covered through desk review and remote interviews. 3.5 Ethical clearance 49. Ethical, safety and informed consent protocols were developed, tested and refined prior to the start of data-collection activities with refugees. 50. The ethical and safety protocol detailed important measures that were considered during interviews and other data-collection activities with refugees with respect to: (1) explaining the purpose of data- collection activities used for an evaluation; (2) obtaining consent; (3) explaining the renewable nature of consent;25 (4) explaining the relationship between the interviewer and UNHCR (in order to assert that there would be no consequences to the services they can access if they refused to participate in the interview); (5) stressing the confidential and private nature of the interview; (6) probing on sensitive issues and asking difficult questions; (7) responding to emotional reactions as well as verbal and non-verbal distress; and (8) researchers and respondents’ physical and emotional safety. 51. With regards to post-interview measures, these included: (1) providing information and referrals to services available; and (2) research support during data collection (through daily debriefs) and post-data collection (through periodic debriefs between the evaluation team and local research team leaders). 52. Specific considerations for the PEER approach were necessary given that the researchers would not be present during PEER interviews, and thus would be unable to respond to ethical concerns. The evaluation team instructed the local research teams to facilitate conversations surrounding ethics during debriefs with PEER facilitators (see Annex D). 53. Ethical clearance was obtained through a submission to the LSHTM Ethical Review Board of the draft of all data-collection instruments, as well as details on the research, sampling methodology, and proposed ethics and informed consent protocols. 25 In other words, participants could leave and re-enter the interview as they wished – offering consent at the start of the interview did not subject them to remaining participants for its duration. © Oxford Policy Management 15

4 Evaluation findings: Quality of the strategies 54. This chapter analyses the design process behind the global strategies – which mostly occurred between 2011 and 2012 – and what may have influenced it. 55. The evidence presented is based on (i) a close reading of the three strategy documents; and (ii) secondary documents describing the strategy design process or discussing the overall corporate goals and structures of UNHCR. The document review has been supplemented by interview data collected at UNHCR HQ and in country offices. HQ-level interviews focused on the design, consultation and strategy roll-out process, while country office-level interviews focused on the relevance of the global strategies at the country level. 56. The chapter presents findings on the relevance of the strategies. In other words, it explores to what extent the strategies are appropriate to support UNHCR’s overall purpose. It also discusses (i) if the strategies are coherent with other UNHCR documents as well as external processes; (ii) what type of evidence has been used, and if the objectives formulated in the strategies are adequate, i.e. were they clear, measurable and appropriate? 4.1 Terminology 57. Table 5 shows a comparison of the terminology used in the strategies. Given the variance in the terms, the evaluation team has chosen to use some “generic terms” throughout the report. Table 5: Terms used across all three strategies Generic terms Description used in the Child Protection Education SGBV evaluation report Name of The strategies Framework Strategy Updated Strategy document Main aim Objective Goal Action Action area Outcome for Intermediate aim Outcome Objective Missing children Outcome or Indicator Benchmark Expected Result Missing outcome indicator Country of implementation Pilot country Target country Priority country Not applicable 4.2 Relevance 58. This section examines to what extent the strategies are appropriate to serve UNHCR’s corporate purpose. 4.2.1 Purpose 59. Each of the three strategies has an ultimate purpose linked to UNHCR’s mandate of refugee protection. The Education Strategy is motivated by the observation that many refugee children are without access to education or education delivering learning outcomes and do not feel safe at school. The Child Protection Framework is motivated by the fact that almost half of forcibly displaced persons are children, who are at greater risk of abuse, neglect, violence, exploitation, © Oxford Policy Management 16

trafficking and forced recruitment. The Updated SGBV Strategy intends to re-emphasise six often overlooked or inadequately addressed areas26 of SGBV protection. 60. The education and the SGBV strategies are based on previous versions, both running out in 2012. The new strategies reaffirm objectives made by their predecessors. The 2012 UNHCR Education Strategy restates that education strategies offer a comprehensive framework covering UNHCR activities in the education area of responsibility. The Updated SGBV Strategy follows on from a 2010–2012 SGBV Strategy preceding it. 61. Each of the three strategies had specific contextual motivations, related to particular shortcomings in perceived performance. The Child Protection Framework was motivated by concerns about UNHCR’s narrow focus on child protection work and best interest determinations for durable solutions, and sought to broaden it. The Education Strategy was informed by a 2011 Global Review, highlighting shortcomings in access and learning outcomes. The Updated SGBV Strategy sought to ensure the six action areas, which had been often overlooked, are adequately addressed. 62. The Education Strategy and the Child Protection Framework are both comprehensive documents intending to cover all UNHCR activities in the respective protection areas, while the Updated SGBV Strategy is not comprehensive but emphasises the six specific areas, updating the original strategy. 63. The evaluation team could not identify a definitive statement of what the purpose of the strategies was, and how they were expected to be used by country offices. At the operational level, all three strategies strive for the same goal: to embed education, SGBV and child protection as a core protection concern in country operations. It seems that a general purpose of the strategies is to provide a global framework for the development of country-level strategies and intend to fill a need for technical guidance. However, there appeared to be inconsistencies in the understanding of use of the strategies from both the perspective of HQ and CO staff. 4.2.2 Strategy development and consultation on strategy design 64. The development of all three strategies was led by the respective protection advisers within DIP. The senior education adviser and the child protection adviser remained in office throughout the process, while three consecutive advisers were involved in designing the SGBV Strategy. 65. All three strategies were shared with HQ colleagues, including regional bureaux, and partner organisations prior to finalisation. In addition, prior to designing the strategy the child protection unit at UNHCR HQ launched a consultation initiative involving children, partners and UNHCR colleagues. The education team set up a reference group of 15 external partners to whom the strategy was circulated. 4.2.3 Relevance of the strategies to the needs of stakeholders 66. All three global strategies work toward meeting the global protection needs of refugees. They align directly with a number of UNHCR GSPs for 2012/13. 67. From the country office perspective, the three strategies were found to be generally relevant to context and generally compatible with government approaches to child protection as well as SGBV prevention and response, and education. However, there are important examples where government policies are not aligned with strategy objectives for education and SGBV. For education, the strategy stipulates integration of refugees into public schools as a core approach; however, this is not possible when government legislation prevents refugees from integrating into the national school system (as is the case in Bangladesh, and for the non-Syrian refugee population in Egypt, for example). Similarly, achieving progress in the various actions of the SGBV Strategy is challenging and requires more advocacy on the part of UNHCR in country contexts where the strategy conflicts with government regulations (e.g. Bangladesh, Egypt and Rwanda), especially 26 The first three refer to groups at heightened risk of SGBV: (1) children, (2) persons with disabilities and (3) LGBTI persons. The remaining three refer to (4) greater engagement of men and boys in SGBV strategies, (5) safer environments and safer access to domestic energy, and (6) mitigation of risk factors related to survival sex. © Oxford Policy Management 17

with regards to Action Area 5 on the protection of LGBTI persons. However, the SGBV Strategy may help in championing a sensitive cause by establishing international doctrinal standards in line with international human rights, and offering country offices UNHCR HQ support. With regards to Child Protection, UNHCR was able to shape government regulations in this area in a few instances – including Mexico and Egypt. Importantly, noting differences between UNHCR strategies and government policies does not necessarily indicate that a strategy is not relevant, especially as one of its purposes is to serve as a basis for advocacy to influence change in government policies. 68. If partner capacity is constrained, the strategies appear difficult to translate into programmes and appear to be perceived as having more limited relevance in-country. This especially holds for the SGBV Strategy and to a lesser extent the Child Protection Framework. 69. The Education Strategy was felt by country offices to be too ambitious. Country offices considered that the expected results associated with strategy actions would be difficult to attain in reality, especially in the context of declining funds. Interview evidence from HQ indicates that the strategy is intentionally ambitious to galvanise action around it. For child protection, some offices found that the framework did not offer sufficiently detailed guidance for the formulation of goals and to aid prioritisation. 70. All three strategies emphasise partnerships and a multi-sectoral approach, and they are well aligned with the relevant current international agendas with two exceptions. First, the Updated SGBV Strategy diverges from the GBV Area of Responsibility (AoR). UNHCR continues with the use of SGBV not GBV, since sexual violence remains a significant and challenging problem among refugees. Further, UNHCR affirms a focus on men and boys as well as protection of LGBTI persons, while the GBV AoR strives to maintain a focus on women and girls. Second, in the Child Protection Framework the role of families in protecting children could be better explored under the ‘family and community-based approach27,’ and could link more strongly with the UNHCR Community Based Approach.28 4.3 Coherence 71. This section examines whether the strategies are internally coherent, feasible and realistic, coherent with each other, and coherent with global frameworks. 72. All three strategies have very different structures, making it difficult to compare them directly. The following section examines the structure of each strategy before outlining common challenges. 4.3.1 Coherence within the strategies 73. The Education Strategy and Child Protection Framework both specify six objectives, while the SGBV Strategy defines six activities or processes. These are called actions in the Education Strategy and are precisely and clearly phrased. The six objectives are called goals in the Child Protection Framework, and are more loosely phrased. The Updated SGBV Strategy does not state objectives but action areas, which are phrased as activities or processes. They do not spell out what specifically UNHCR intends to achieve in SGBV protection; objectives are instead implicit. 74. Each strategy spells out activities associated with each objective. These describe ‘how’ the objectives could be achieved. The Education Strategy also proposes four specific strategic approaches to achieving the six objectives. 75. The activities suggested under the SGBV and child protection strategies are not always programmable activities but read like an objective statement. This applies to activities 5.5, 5.6, 3.3 or 1.6 for the Child Protection Framework or activities phrased such as ‘work to identify groups of children of concern’ or ‘supply appropriate tools’ in the SGBV Strategy. 27 See page 15 in the Framework for the Protection of Children. 28 The ‘community-based approach’ was introduced with the release of the UNHCR Manual on a Community-Based Approach in UNHCR Operations. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Manual on a Community Based Approach in UNHCR Operations, March 2008. © Oxford Policy Management 18

76. There is restatement of very similar activities in the Child Protection Framework, to the point of repetition. Not all activities of the SGBV Strategy are internally coherent; for instance, men and boys are a key protection group and yet many of the activities suggested are limited to women and girls. This could lead to confusion when translating the suggested activities into programmes. 77. All three strategies are unclear about the pathway of change between the suggested activities and how they contribute to achieving the strategic objectives. Pathways of change, and the related evidence base and assumptions underlying the proposed activities are mostly left implicit or not clearly articulated. For instance, the Child Protection Framework assumes that training of children will lead to empowerment or compliance with codes of conduct. The Education Strategy assumes that making data on learning outcomes available can help promoting learning in schools, while the SGBV Strategy assumes that livelihood skills and access to finance will lead to safe and decent work for women. These may all be reasonable pathways of change but they nonetheless rest on several assumptions that need to be stated and validated. 4.3.2 Feasibility of the strategies 78. Some objectives suggested by the strategies may only be achieved in the mid- or longer term, especially when they relate to engaging with and improving national systems. UNHCR aims to integrate refugees into national social service systems and therefore several protection activities listed in the strategies are ultimately delivered by host government institutions. These include that refugees are safely attending host government schools or that host governments’ justice systems operate child-friendly procedures and are capable and interested in protecting refugees from SGBV. Ensuring that these activities are delivered as stated in the strategies requires engagement with middle level government to foster behaviour change. This calls for long term technical assistance projects, working with ministerial staff.29 79. The strategies acknowledge, to a limited extent, that not all governments support UNHCR’s drive for integration of refugees into national systems. For instance, the Education Strategy notes that, for countries that are not signatories to the 1951 Convention, integration into national systems is not immediately possible or may not be appropriate30. Governments may restrict access to schools and their labour market and often do so. This affects programming and makes achievement of the strategies’ objectives less likely. 80. All three strategies note that partnerships with other organisations are necessary to deliver on their objectives. Examples from interview data revealed several examples of partnership with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) on improving school management or child-friendly procedures, or with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to support the justice system. 4.3.3 Coherence between the three strategies 81. The three protection strategies were developed separately and – as discussed above – apply their own terminology and structure. Nevertheless, despite their separate planning processes all three strategies are coherent with each other. The Education Strategy proposes actions and activities coherent with the Child Protection Framework and SGBV Strategy. The Child Protection Framework explicitly draws on the education and SGBV strategies, by pointing out which sections of the two strategies contribute to child protection. The Updated SGBV Strategy cites the Education Strategy as a reference and several child protection mechanisms are also referred to. 82. Table 5 showed the variations in the terminology used in the strategy documents. The consistent use of key building blocks of a strategy is important for a coherent approach.31 While all three 29 Note that this paragraph refers to long term institutional change that improves systems. We do not discuss, in this instance, examples of UNHCR/government coordination but the fact that some objectives suggested by the strategies require technical assistance 30 UNHCR (2012) Education Strategy, 2012-2016, p. 31. 31 Bradley, C., Dawson, A. and Montard, A. (2013) ‘Mastering the building blocks of strategy’. McKinsey Quarterly. www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/mastering-the-building-blocks-of- strategy#0 © Oxford Policy Management 19

strategies have six objectives, the building blocks below these objectives differ across strategies. Each strategy had its own motivation and development timeline, resulting in different structures and terminologies. 83. A workshop held in 2012 among the education, SGBV and child protection units of DIP identified intersections between and across the three protection areas, and focused on how the strategies could work together to contribute to achieving protection outcomes. The different strategies were pulled together, after the fact, by the Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the three strategies (see section 4.6). 4.3.4 Coherence with other UNHCR strategies 84. The three strategies are used as references across UNHCR, reflecting coherence between the protection strategies and other UNHCR strategies. The Education Strategy is referred to in the Global Strategy for Public Health (2014). The Strategy for Livelihoods (2014–2018) is seeking to provide durable life-skills, which is in line with the lifelong learning action of the Education Strategy. The Child Protection Framework is referred to in the Global Strategy to Support Governments to End Detention (2014). Similarly, all four DPSM strategies (Safe Access to Fuel and Water, Settlement and Shelter, Livelihoods, and Public Health) take an AGD mainstreaming approach, where the age lens ensures that they are in line with the Child Protection Framework. Protection from SGBV is considered a public health concern in the Global Public Health Strategy (2014). 85. UNHCR HQ staff noted, when discussing the three protection strategies jointly, that there is some competition between the strategies and the three DIP units on child protection, education and SGBV. Bureaux colleagues added that, from the point of view of country offices, there is a proliferation of strategies (including from DPSM, mentioned above) and some concomitant ‘strategy fatigue’ at the country office level. It was, however, noted appreciatively that the Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Framework streamlined reporting across DIP strategies. 86. Interview data also indicates that HQ colleagues across divisions do not have a coherent understanding of what the purpose of the strategies is, and what the roll-out process entails. There are misunderstandings about the degree of consultation that took place as well as the documents and frameworks that preceded and influenced the development of the strategies. 87. A further weakness of the strategies is their inconsistency in offering clarity about use and intended audience. Although all country offices understood that the global strategies should be adapted to country-level documents, it was unclear how these country-level strategy documents should be incorporated into decision-making processes, priority setting and programming at country level. Country offices did not generally understand how these strategies were different from other internal documents and how they were supposed to be linked to existing planning and programming tools. In general, they therefore used the strategies as broad policy guidance. Indeed, direction-setting was primarily informed by the COP process and internal data-collection activities. 88. Interviews did indeed suggest an element of ‘strategy fatigue’ at country office level, relating to both sector-specific strategies and other UNHCR and wider initiatives such as the ‘Delivering as One’ approach. Some countries, like Rwanda and India, are pilots for various strategies and initiatives from UNHCR, which puts added pressure on an already limited set of resources. 4.3.5 External coherence 89. The three strategies are coherent with international law on refugees and relevant international targets and conventions. The Education Strategy is coherent with international refugee law, the MDGs and Education for All initiative. The Child Protection Framework is coherent with international conventions on children and adopts a systems approach to child protection, which is in line with developments in the area of Child Protection. The framing of the Updated SGBV Strategy against a ‘gender equality’ background aligns with other international commitments. © Oxford Policy Management 20

Box 1: External coherence finding spotlight External coherence of the strategies Overall, the strategies are coherent with global frameworks and commitments. The Child Protection Framework is coherent with international conventions on children, and it adopts a systems approach to child protection, which is in line with developments in the sector. Eventual integration of UNHCR approaches with local structures could be discussed more prominently. UNHCR’s Framework for the Protection of Children is informed by international instruments for the protection of children such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) as well as refugee children such as the UNHCR Guidelines for the Protection and Care of Refugee Children (1994), to name but two of the list cited32 in the framework. It covers the most significant rights and approaches outlined in these documents. The Education Strategy is coherent with international law on refugees, the MDGs and Education for All initiative. The education strategy states that it is framed by the 1951 Refugee Convention, and aims to meet education for all (EFA) as well as MDG targets. It aspires to be in line with UNHCR strategic priorities. Indeed, the strategy’s actions adequately cover global priorities related to education for the time. The second millennium development goal was to “achieve universal primary education for all”. MDG 2 and EFA 2015 goals were the key global agreements related to education for the period 2012-2016. With regards to the SGBV Strategy, the framing of the updated strategy against a ‘gender equality’ background aligns with other international commitments, including the Millennium Development Goals as well as the Beijing Platform for Action, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence and the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals amongst others. These commitments acknowledge the importance of gender equality for overcoming SGBV. The strategy’s recognition that SGBV is linked with unequal gender relations is in line with wider acknowledgement that crises and emergencies take place against a backdrop of gender inequality. Thus, the consideration of ‘gender equality’ as the ‘underlying’ cause of SGBV and the changes needed in behaviours required to overcome it, is appropriate. 4.4 Use of evidence 90. None of the three strategies systematically incorporates evidence to make a case for the six “objectives”. Though it is not mentioned in the strategy, the Education Strategy used recommendations from the 2011 Global Review of Refugee Education as a basis for drawing up the strategy. The report does include figures on enrolment, teacher student ratios or funding. Data has not been used as evidence to justify actions, but the expected results of the strategy are expressed in the form of targets for specific indicators. 91. The Child Protection Framework refers to qualitative data from participants of the 2011 consultation exercise. From interviews, we noted that this data was used to identify the six goals. However, in the framework text these quotes are displayed as illustrations. They do not figure in the body of the text and are not referred to as evidence underpinning the six strategic goals. 92. The Updated SGBV Strategy refers to the data sources on which it is based only to a very limited extent. It does refer to an independent evaluation of UNHCR’s SGBV response, carried out in 2008, but this report does not include data and metrics arising from caseload on SGBV from the field.33 32 Such as: Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/09/08, December 2009, UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child, May 2008, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum, February 1997, Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care, 1994, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Children, 6 August 1993, Executive Committee No. 107 (LVIII) - 2007 on Children at Risk, 5 October 2007, Children At Risk, Standing Committee, 38th meeting, EC/58/SC/CRP.7, 22 February 2007, Meeting the rights and needs of refugee children An independent evaluation, http://www.unhcr.org/research/evalreports/3cd6363aa/meeting-rights-protection-needs-refugee-children-independent- evaluation.html 33 UNHCR (2008) Evaluation of UNHCR’s efforts to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence in situations of forced displacement, www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/48ea31062.pdf © Oxford Policy Management 21

93. In the absence of more systematic data, postulating objectives drawing from a weaker evidence base – which may have included anecdotal evidence – was likely the feasible option for the three strategies. In any case, the evidence base available should be clearly flagged, including making explicit mention of data limitations, and if no robust evidence exists around a certain issue. The danger of using anecdotal or no evidence is that the chosen objectives are not relevant to the needs to the strategies’ stakeholders. 94. The Education and SGBV strategies propose ways to systematically collect data specific to the protection area in the future. The SGBV Strategy provides a box on page 10 showcasing the GBV Information Management System, which provides for the collection and sharing of comprehensive GBV data. The Education Strategy points out that UNHCR and the UNESCO Institute for Statistics collect education data. Data collected from the latter initiative has been published in a few reports on refugee education.34 However, none of the strategies sufficiently discusses the difficulties for country offices and partners in collecting reliable data in a forced displacement setting, and the implications this has on monitoring, as well as on the measurement of progress against strategy objectives. 4.5 Roll-out plans 95. All strategies include a roll-out plan as well as supporting documents such as preparation guidelines, checklists and contact information for relevant HQ staff. Additionally, adaptation templates were prepared for the rolling out of the Child Protection Framework. All teams held roll- out workshops and offered technical support through missions or phone calls. 96. The Education Strategy spells out plans, which include pilot countries as well as roll-out support available. The suggested approach is comprehensive, involving focus groups and brain storm questions, but likely lengthy to implement. Targeted field missions and technical assistance to adapt the Education Strategy was available, especially in 2012. Twelve priority countries were chosen as a pilot, with more following. 97. The Child Protection Framework concludes with a ‘Way Forward Section’ and a ‘Three Step Process for Developing Child Protection Programmes’. The way forward recommends 11 pilot countries to start implementation in in 2012, with more countries to follow. Short-term support was offered in the form of three- to six-month deployments and regular communication. 98. The Updated SGBV Strategy includes a Strategy Matrix as a tool for programming. Roll-out took place in two phases. During the first phase selected countries were invited to HQ. The second phase took a regional approach, with regional SGBV posts leading on roll-out. 99. All three strategies mention prioritisation and adaptation to country contexts but offer little guidance on how to choose one objective or activity over another. 100. As for the HQ perspective on how well roll-out proceeded, interview data reveals that the speed with which country office staff’s technical capacity improved was faster than anticipated for the implementation of the Education Strategy. Comparatively, identifying protection staff with the necessary technical knowledge was more challenging for the roll-out of the other two strategies. Box 2: Rollout finding spotlight Rollout activities for each of the strategies To support the rollout of the Child Protection Framework, the following activities were provided:  Field missions and technical assistance from HQ/Regional experts to review existing country specific child protection strategies or to develop them  Participation in a launch workshop for the 11 pilot countries 27-30 March 2012 in Geneva 34 For instance, see: UNESCO (2016) Education for people and planet, http://en.unesco.org/gem- report/report/2016/education-people-and-planet-creating-sustainable-futures-all/page#sthash.yog8nEzm.gK4GsxiU.dpbs and UNHCR and UNESCO (2016) No more excuses: Provide education to all forcibly displaced people (Policy Paper 26), http://en.unesco.org/gem-report/no-more-excuses#sthash.GEyoqvhX.mOYK4hEh.dpbs © Oxford Policy Management 22

 Training material on the Protection Agenda to be used for country specific briefings/trainings for partners  Support with monitoring progress on protection interventions for children, including on child specific Global Strategic Priorities  Possible short term deployment of child protection expert for countries with a demonstrated need for additional support to strengthen the protection programme. The support available during rollout for the Education Strategy included:  Training on the new Education Strategy 2012-2016, the new Education Policy and Guidelines, and on education priorities  Targeted field missions and technical assistance to adapt the Education Strategy to the individual country context and continued support to implement country-based strategies  Technical support to implement an education management information system (EMIS)  Monitoring and reporting on progress, including documentation  Advocacy and fundraising The rollout of the SGBV Strategy was done through posting Senior SGBV Advisors in regional offices and through regional workshops which were helpful, as confirmed in the interview data, in getting COs to incorporate SGBV in their programming. 4.6 Results and monitoring frameworks 4.6.1 RBM and measurability 101. The six actions of the Education Strategy are clearly articulated, the goals of the Child Protection Framework are broadly formulated, and the objectives proposed in the SGBV Strategy are not all measurable. The Education Strategy includes expected results, making it more straightforward to assess implementation of its objectives. Although the Education Strategy clearly specifies its targets, they are very ambitious. The sets of outcomes associated with each goal of the Child Protection Framework are not always clear. It is not specified to what degree UNHCR hopes to achieve the stated outcomes or in what timeframe. The benchmarks proposed for monitoring the Child Protection Framework are not measurable but are largely rather a list of inputs. The SGBV Strategy does not specify how progress within each action area is expected to be measured. 102. For outcomes and activities to be appropriate, they need to sufficiently acknowledge the specific needs of persons of concern. For instance, the Child Protection Framework does not explicitly recognise the varying cognitive and psychosocial abilities of children, which affect children’s capacity to exercise agency. This affects a number of objectives related to child empowerment. In its objectives, the SGBV Strategy does acknowledge that GBV programming needs to meet the needs of different populations, such as children, boys and men, LGBTI POCs and POCs with disabilities. However, the strategy does not in itself suggest specifically appropriate activities for each. 103. Since programming in UNHCR is built on the principle of results-based management (RBM), the definition of clearly defined results, rather than activities, is a cornerstone of systematic monitoring, reporting, and ultimately evaluation.35 The Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the three strategies acknowledges the focus on results as a key parameter underpinning the monitoring and reporting on the three global strategies. 104. RBM is reflected in all three strategies, although to different degrees. On the one hand, the Child Protection Framework is clearly structured around six goals that are further specified in outcome statements. The goals focus on results, using change language to describe changes in the 35 UNHCR (2015) UNHCR Programme Manual, Part I – Introduction to Programme Management. © Oxford Policy Management 23

conditions of gender-disaggregated right holders, girls and boys.36 On the other hand, the SGBV Strategy, while recognising the importance of RBM, is more action than results oriented. It promotes six action areas that mostly articulate what operations should do rather than what changes they should achieve in the conditions of people of concern. This is also reflected in the Strategy Matrix, which is meant to support country operations to identify interventions rather than results.37 The Education Strategy is organised around six thematic actions and objectives, with four management results referred to as strategic approaches. The formulation of expected results for each objective or strategic approach strengthens the results-orientation of the strategy. However, compared to the Child Protection Framework, the right-holders do not stand out consistently in all objectives. 105. None of the strategies clearly articulates the causal pathways necessary to achieve the goals or objectives and nor do they discuss the conditions that may influence the achievement of the objectives or the rationale for prioritising certain goals, objectives or action areas (see also section 4.3.1). The Child Protection Framework does link the achievement of the goals to the strengthening of child protection system components.38 However, it does not elaborate how the goals may be influenced by the different child protection system components. The lack of a well-defined results chain is partly understandable because a results chain is embedded in a given context. Since the strategies need to provide guidance across a wide range of contexts, it is challenging to synthesise a meaningful generic results chain. Nonetheless, more attention to what results are expected to be prioritised in different operational settings and why may increase the usefulness of the strategies for country operations. This seems in line with how UNHCR's Results Framework seeks to define goals and objectives by population planning group (PPG).39 106. The strategies support the measurability of the goals, objectives and action areas to different degrees. By quantifying expected results per objective and setting targets, the Education Strategy makes an appreciable effort to enhance measurability and quantify its ambition. However, many of the indicators used are not currently collected by national or international Education Management Information (EMI) systems. Furthermore, indicators of achievement are suggested at the level of key strategies. While the Child Protection Framework does present a set of indicators, they are not well linked to its goals or outcomes and no targets are set.40 The framework refers to indicator specification in follow-up guidance (see below). The SGBV Strategy again acknowledges the importance of monitoring and data collection as part of RBM but provides little guidance to enhance the measurability of its action areas.41 107. The measurability of the strategies has been strengthened by the development of the Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the accompanying integrated and strategy- specific M&E plans in 2013 (referred to as the monitoring and reporting plans below). These plans link the goals, objectives and action areas from the strategies to impact and performance indicators included in UNHCR’s Results Framework and internal global planning and reporting system FOCUS. This improved measurability, as it better aligned the strategies with UNHCR’s organisation-wide Results Framework (RF). It harmonised the confusing variety of results and indicator terminology used across the strategies, yet only to some extent, given that the strategies 36 The Handbook on Results-Based Management of the United Nations Development Group (2011) promotes the use of change language over action language because results are about change rather than the activities to achieve them. Both UNHCR and UNDG consider a rights-based approach an underlying principle of results-based programming. 37 An adapted version of this matrix was created later, which included a column to formulate objectives. However, the core of the matrix remained the identification of interventions or activities. 38 System components are: legal and policy framework, knowledge and data, coordination, human and financial capacities, prevention and response activities, and advocacy and awareness-raising. 39 A PPG is a population of concern considered to be homogenous for planning and budgeting purposes. Results chains and budgets are to be developed for each PPG according to the UNHCR Programme Manual. 40 The indicators are linked to the child protection system components rather than to the goals or outcomes presented in the strategy. 41 The SGBV Strategy does include four output-oriented indicators in the Strategy Matrix template in the annex without including targets. It is not clear whether they are provided as examples or how they relate to the action areas promoted in the strategy. © Oxford Policy Management 24

did not widely embed their goals, objectives and action areas within the Results Framework.42 Therefore, the alignment of the strategies with the RF worked well for some strategy results but a mismatch remained for others, which makes monitoring and budgeting for it difficult within UNHCR’s existing systems. 108. The country offices have flexibility regarding which indicators to monitor as part of the monitoring and reporting of their country strategies and COPs. For the purpose of strategy monitoring, a list of minimum joint and strategy-specific core indicators was provided by DIP, which were meant to be tracked by all priority roll-out countries.43 To add to the complexity of different indicators being available, the minimum core indicators do not fully align with the indicators recommended in the strategy monitoring and reporting plans supplied by DIP teams for specific protection policy areas.44 On the other hand, GSP indicators have been integrated in the list of minimum indicators relevant to the three strategies. However, GSP indicators are only relevant to the Child Protection Framework to a degree, and, although relevant to the SGBV Strategy, they do not specifically make reference to the strategy’s action areas. 109. While this flexibility in indicator selection allows for the adaptation of planning, monitoring and reporting activities to different country contexts, it jeopardises tracking progress at global as well as at country level if the indicators can be selected from one year to another. It also opens the door to the introduction of bias in indicator selection by country operations. Therefore, it is unclear whether the change in achievement of impact indicators from 2012 to 2015 presented in the global strategy implementation reports offers an accurate picture of actual progress or is determined by the fluctuations in indicators used. A comparison between the 2014 and 2015 reports indicates that the number of selected indicators varied between the two years. 110. UNHCR sets GSPs to support focused management and reporting. The GSPs include indicators drawn from UNHCR’s Results Framework. Only the Education Strategy makes explicit reference to the GSPs although the other strategies do include elements highlighted in the GSPs. For example, the 2012/13 GSPs incorporate operational impact indicators regarding SGBV survivors, children’s best interest and primary school enrolment, which are covered by the strategies. 4.6.2 Monitoring framework and processes 111. The Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Framework aimed to provide a harmonised strategy and plan for monitoring and reporting across the three strategies. Its annexes provide a set of global tools used for tracking, planning, monitoring and reporting. The framework emphasises that monitoring and reporting will make use as much as possible of existing processes, in particular the use of the existing Results Framework and information provided through the reporting tool FOCUS, to track and report on progress. It also outlines roles and responsibilities, and annual M&E activities, which were not articulated in the initial strategies. Based on the three strategies’ integrated global M&E framework, DIP is responsible for managing the framework and periodically reporting on progress made, while the country operations are meant to collect, analyse and report on the data. The framework recognises that this is a challenge, and that monitoring guidance relating to the strategies is needed and should be communicated to COs upfront, and clearly – interview data revealed that, although this guidance was incorporated at various points during rollout, it was not properly understood or reached all COs, which was reflected in their general confusion about monitoring and reporting requirements. 112. Different teams in DIP working on child protection, education and SGBV developed guidance notes and tools to support global and country-level monitoring. While the Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Plan recommended the use of common templates, the different teams developed 42 The MOPAN assessment of UNHCR in 2014 highlighted UNHCR’s complex results architecture comprising multiple frameworks and its limitations. 43 It is unclear whether the minimum core indicator list has been tracked by all country operations as part of their strategies. 44 This finding is based on a comparison between the indicator list provided in the document ‘Guidance: List of Minimum Protection Indicators’ (DIP, M&E, January 2014) and the strategy-specific M&E plans that form part of the annexes to the Integrated Global Monitoring and Reporting Framework. © Oxford Policy Management 25

strategy-specific templates and the degree of monitoring guidance varied. For example, the global child protection team created relatively extensive guidance.45 Linkage with the UNHCR Results Framework was strongly promoted. The country templates for the education and SGBV strategies include a monitoring and reporting plan format but with little detail or guidance. 113. In general, the guidance notes and tools provide limited guidance or support to country operations about how to generate the data required to estimate the indicators, although roll-out workshops did include sessions on monitoring, reporting and data management and how to develop and implement a data collection plan.46, 47 The monitoring system of the strategies is based on the assumption that data for selected indicators would be available and accessible at country level, that country staff would have the capacity to collect and analyse the data, and/or that data-collection mechanisms could be sufficiently strengthened as part of the strategy roll-out (as referenced in all three strategies). However, research conducted by the Harvard Partnership as part of the Education Strategy adaptation process pointed to the common challenge of a lack of mechanisms and capacity for collecting educational data at country level, which argues for monitoring and reporting requirements that do not tax country staff beyond their capacity.48 The evaluation of UNHCR’s SGBV efforts in situations of forced displacement highlighted the difficulties in collecting quantitative data on SGBV and that partner monitoring is often ad hoc, unsystematic and sometimes sparsely documented.49 As will be discussed in the next paragraph, the quality of data available affected the consistency and quality of the reporting on results. 114. In terms of sharing the results of the strategies, the Integrated Global Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the three strategies indicates that progress would be reported on twice a year: one internal mid-year monitoring report and one external global monitoring report. Three annual global strategy implementation reports have been produced (2013, 2014 and 2015). The reports serve a valuable function of analysing, synthesising and communicating in a visually attractive manner the strategy implementation and monitoring efforts of UNHCR’s country operations. The reports recognise that measurement of indicators remains inconsistent and data has not been validated. 45 The global child protection team created a country-level, Excel-based monitoring logframe prepopulated with the minimum core indicators and included indicator guidance in a template to create a country-level child protection strategy. 46 For example, the SGBV roll-out workshops in 2012 included a monitoring and reporting session and discussed the use of the GBVIMV and ProGres (see UNHCR (2012) Rollout of the SGBV Update Strategy, Workshop Report). It was concluded that few operations would consider introducing GBVIMV. The global integrated workshop provided guidance on monitoring and developing and implementing data collection plans. 47 UNHCR has developed guidance notes for impact indicators that are included in the Results Framework. While these guidance notes are a valuable reference for the calculation of the indicator and reference data collection methods and sources, they do not provide guidance on the data collection itself. 48 Dryden-Peterson, S. (2014). Harvard Partnership Review Report Summary on Adapting Global Policy to National Contexts. Project sponsored by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 49 UNHCR (2008) Evaluation of UNHCR’s efforts to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence in situations of forced displacement. © Oxford Policy Management 26

5 Evaluation findings: Adaptation and implementation of the strategies 115. This chapter addresses the stage following the rolling out of the global strategies in the pilot countries, focusing on the adapting of country-level strategies and the implementation of activities that align with the six priority ‘action areas’ or ‘goals’ in the global strategies. 116. Adaptation is defined as the process followed by the operations to incorporate the global strategies into their operational and strategic planning. The evaluation team assessed adaptation by looking at the country-level strategies produced, as well as reflection of the strategies’ objectives on the COPs. The section on adaptation provides a discussion of two areas. First, the evaluative analysis focuses on the level of adaptation of the three strategies, i.e. the number of pilot countries that produced standalone country strategy documents, and the action areas/goals in the global strategies that are reflected in those country-level strategy documents. Second, the analysis focuses on the process of adaptation countries went through to produce the country-level documents, drawing on interview data collected during country visits and interviews with country office staff in the additional ten countries studied, as well as document review data from all 15 countries. 117. The second section of this chapter covers the implementation of the strategies, focusing on data available in the COPs of the countries included in the evaluation sample. In particular, the evaluation looked at reported performance indicators. In various instance, the performance indicators were identified to be referring to measures of activities or inputs, rather than the results of these activities, which under the OECD-DAC criteria is referred to as an ‘output’. Input indicators provide data on the activities and programming that have been implemented. 118. For the purpose of the analysis, the indicators are categorised according to the objectives of each strategy, based on the type of activity they measured, and the perceived objective of those activities. In this section, the evaluation team provides a judgement as to the influence of the release of the global protection strategies on the education, SGBV and child protection activities implemented by country offices. As with the adaptation, the supporting analysis discusses the level of implementation, presenting the extent to which activities described in the COPs of 2016 (post-strategy release) differ from those in the COPs of 2012. The analysis also examines the approach to monitoring the activities that align with action areas/goals of the global protection strategies. 119. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the factors that influenced the adaptation and implementation of the protection strategies. Here the analysis draws heavily from the five country case studies, with supporting evidence from the other ten countries included in the evaluation. The analysis summarises the contextual and operational factors that both supported and hindered the translation of the global strategies into country-level strategies, and which enabled or created challenges for the implementation of activities aimed at achieving the objectives of the strategies. 5.1 Adaptation 5.1.1 Level of adaptation 120. Among the 15 pilot countries included in the evaluation, there were high rates of adaptation of the global strategies into standalone country-level strategy documents. Nearly every country that rolled out the education and SGBV strategies produced standalone national strategy documents, except for one country (Rwanda for SGBV). All the countries that piloted the Child Protection Framework created country-level strategy documents. 121. Country-level child protection strategies were the most likely to include all six action areas from the global strategy, while country-level education strategies were the least likely to include all six action areas from the Education Strategy. Table 6 provides an overview of the extent to which the global strategies have been reflected in country-level stand-alone strategies in the 15 countries reviewed as part of this evaluation. © Oxford Policy Management 27

Table 6: Extent of adaptation of the global strategies in country stand-alone strategies Number of Number of Number of countries Number of countries countries countries which which adapted at least which adapted all six Strategy piloting the created a half of the strategy strategy objectives in a strategy standalone objectives in a country- country-level strategy (out of 15) thematic strategy level strategy Education 13 13 13 4 SGBV 12 11 10 7 Child 7 7 6 5 Protection 5.1.2 The adaptation process 122. Most of the 15 countries included in the evaluation reported that an important contributor to the adaptation process was the supportive engagement and practical guidance provided by DIP. This was most evident in the country-level child protection strategies (with education and SGBV strategies less likely to follow a specific structure), which tended to follow the structure developed for guidance by DIP and thus include information on challenges, opportunities and strategic priorities, as well as descriptions of how child protection activities fulfil cross-sectoral objectives. However, across the three strategies, respondents reported that the regional workshops and support from DIP and the regional level that began during the roll-out period were also useful during the adaptation process, as they offered protection staff the opportunity to liaise and discuss protection issues with their counterparts from other offices. 123. The adaptation of the education, child protection and SGBV global strategies was also in some cases guided by thorough baseline assessments, participatory needs assessments and partner feasibility assessments, notably in Bangladesh, Mexico and Egypt respectively. In these cases, participatory assessments formed the basis of the data used to guide operational decision-making. It was therefore an important foundation of evidence for determining which goals and action areas would be in line with needs on the ground. 124. The process of adaptation was not always completed as envisioned, and the reasons for this vary. In Section 5.3 below, the analysis discusses which factors emerged as having influenced the adaptation of the strategies. Box 3: Case study spotlight Adaptation of the SGBV Strategy in Bangladesh The approach to SGBV in Bangladesh is an example of a strategy that has taken a different route compared to other national SGBV strategies to meet the needs of the context. It is not intervention-driven, but rather largely rooted in engaging with sociocultural dimensions of Rohingyas (refugees from Myanmar) and their environment that contribute to exposure to SGBV risk. The national SGBV strategy adaptation process went through two processes. The first process was led by protection officers, while the second process was led by a gender adviser who joined the office in 2015. Both were appropriate to national context, but each strategy maintained a different approach to working with government. For example, the first adaptation called for SGBV responses that required survivors to report to the police station and then present the case to the camp-in-charge. The camp-in-charge would then triage the case and determine if a medical referral was required. Subsequently, UNHCR staff identified protection gaps in this version, and a revision was produced in 2016. The current strategy version is based on a gender analysis conducted by UNHCR in 2015 and addresses the most pressing SGBV concerns. UNHCR’s SGBV partner was also involved in the adaptation of the country-level strategy. Both versions are coherent with the global strategy. However, the most recent country-level strategy is restructured and not built on the global strategy action areas but rather on how and where these action areas are meant to meet local needs. © Oxford Policy Management 28

5.1.3 Stakeholder engagement in adaptation 125. Country offices made use of thematic working groups in the adaptation process for all three strategies. In some instances, these were UNHCR thematic sub-working groups that existed previously and in others they were created to support the adaptation of the global strategies. In still other instances, these were existing interagency working groups or sector coordination groups that typically included larger numbers of stakeholders already working to develop a concerted approach to a particular protection issue. 126. Similarly, partners receiving funding from UNHCR were prominent stakeholders in the adaptation of the strategies, especially of the SGBV Strategy. For instance, they accompanied UNHCR staff to workshops held by HQ and the bureaux, and the adaptation started in breakout sessions at these workshops. Interviewees from India, Malaysia and Egypt all highlighted the strong contribution of partners to the adaptation of the SGBV Strategy. In comparison to the Education Strategy work, adaptations of the SGBV and child protection strategies were also more likely to involve community- level groups such as child welfare committees. This may be because a core part of the work of these strategies is to establish and capacitate community-level mechanisms to protect refugee children. 127. The adaptation of the education and child protection strategies more frequently included direct involvement from line ministries. For example, in Zambia counterparts from the Ministry of Education were involved in rolling out activities and subsequent workshops facilitated by HQ to support the adaptation of the Education Strategy. The adaptation of the SGBV Strategy likely included less input from government because of the sensitivity of the issues involved and the challenges in engaging government. 5.2 Implementation 5.2.1 Implementation of strategy-related activities 128. The influence of the global strategies on activities and programmes implemented at the country level varied. Table 7 below summarises the level of implementation of action areas present in the COPs of 2012 and the COPs of 2016 (data at mid-year) of the 15 countries sampled for the evaluation. Again, data at year-end was unavailable at the time of the evaluation – thus, data may have changed from mid-year to year-end. However, these changes are not reflected in this report. Table 7: Extent of implementation of strategy objectives (out of 15 countries) Number of Number of Number of Number countries whose Number of countries whose countries whose of 2012 COP countries whose 2012 COP 2016 COP countries included 2016 COP included included Strategy included activities piloting activities related activities related to activities related related to all six the to at least half the at least half the to all six strategy strategy strategy strategy objectives strategy objectives objectives objectives Education 13 13 13 0 0 SGBV 12 8 11 1 5 Child 7 (of which 3 were 7 14 15 4 Protection non-pilot countries) Note: For Child Protection, the number of countries exceeds the number of pilot countries in two instances given that non- pilot countries included activities in their COP reflecting strategy objectives. 129. The extent to which the strategies were implemented was influenced by their relevance to programmatic contexts. In relation to the inclusion of activities in COPs, the SGBV Strategy had the greatest influence, while being a SGBV Strategy pilot country increased the likelihood that child protection activities were incorporated in the COP. As nearly all countries were already including © Oxford Policy Management 29

in their 2012 COP education activities corresponding to the Education Strategy action areas, the direct influence of the education strategy on inclusion in the COP could not be ascertained. However, this is a limited measure that does not reflect the practical implementation of the strategies. 130. In 2012, nearly all the countries that were implementing education activities that correspond with strategy action areas were doing so in as many as four or five of the action areas. These countries then continued to implement activities corresponding with those same four or five action areas of the Education Strategy, and did not tend to include Action Area 6 in the 2016 COP activities. Thus, the analysis highlights an increase in the number of countries implementing more aspects of the Education Strategy between 2012 and 2016. The cases of Egypt and Rwanda—both of which experienced emergencies and increases in the numbers of people of concern between 2012 and 2016—may provide insight into this observation. In both countries, governments were committed to providing refugee groups most affected by the emergency with access to the education system, and integrating refugees into national schools. However, the operations have continued to provide, through partners, learning spaces as the transition to integration and building of schools requires time. The provision of learning spaces is a major suggested activity under Action Area 6. 131. The release of the SGBV Strategy had the most influence on the inclusion of activities in the COPs. A few countries went from having one or no activities related to the SGBV Strategy in their COPs in 2012 to having up to five in the 2016 COP. Niger, an SGBV pilot country, was the most positive example of this, having no activities corresponding with any of the action areas in the 2012 COP and all six covered in the 2016COP, following the roll-out and adaptation of the strategy. Among the case-study countries that rolled out the SGBV Strategy,50 there is a high level of implementation across the six strategy action areas, with the exception of action areas 4 and 5. This is likely because renewable energy (Action Area 4) is less of an issue in urban, non-camp settings and also given the cultural and political sensitivities surrounding protection of LGBTI people of concern (Action Area 5). Additionally, the SGBV Strategy influenced the inclusion of activities in countries that were not pilots. For instance, in Mexico, the COPs of 2012 and 2016 include programming targeted at LGBTI POCs, in particular youth. The Mexico operation was exposed to the SGBV Strategy through a regional workshop organised by HQ and the regional SGBV specialist during roll-out. 132. Being an SGBV Strategy pilot country influenced the likelihood of incorporating child protection activities into the COP, even if a country was not piloting the Child Protection Framework. For example, the analysis highlighted that, while Bangladesh, Jordan, Lebanon and Niger did not pilot the Child Protection Framework, their 2016 COP documents included activities specifically addressing between four and six of the action areas in the global Child Protection Framework. This is likely because of the strong overlap in protection issues, ways of working (e.g. community-level protection mechanisms) and stakeholder involvement in preventing and responding to both SGBV and child protection concerns. Additionally, in Jordan and Lebanon, the interagency environment and availability of funding played substantial roles in the implementation of protection activities beyond the strategies they were pilots for. More details on the factors of adaptation and implementation can be found in Section 5.3. 5.2.2 Monitoring of strategy-related activities 133. This section provides analysis of the progress against the strategies at country level, and the extent to which monitoring results reported in the COPs represent the work being undertaken by operations. This section contains an analysis of the approach to monitoring inputs to achieving the strategy objectives in the five case-study countries. The analysis compared the action areas being implemented with the action areas that align with performance indicators measuring activities or inputs in the 2016 COP. Overall, from the analysis it emerged that operations are generally implementing a wider range of activities than they are reporting on in the COP. 50 These countries are: Bangladesh, Chad, Egypt, India, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda and Uganda. © Oxford Policy Management 30

134. There is a high degree of variation in how operations monitor progress against the strategies and report this progress. Most operations referred to the role of partners in monitoring, and pointed to the COP as one of the main platforms they used to record and report progress on a variety of indicators. In some instances there was no ongoing monitoring of strategy activities. Table 8: Alignment of implementation and monitoring, 2016 COP (data at mid-year) Child Child EDU – EDU – SGBV – SGBV – Country protection – protection – implemented monitored implemented monitored implemented monitored 1, 2 & 3 (4 Bangladesh 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 3 & 4 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 6 in n/a n/a 6 outcomes) 1 and 2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1 and non- Egypt 1, 2, 3, 6 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, (remainder 6 and action area 1, 2, 3, 6 and general 6 in general specific outcomes) Iran 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1 and 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a Mexico 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, n/a n/a n/a n/a 1, 2, 3 6 Rwanda 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 1, 2 3, 5 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1 & 6 6 6 135. The analysis also considered how well the areas monitored in the COP reflect the overall work of operations. Given the amount of information required to make an assessment on this, the evaluation team focused on evidence from the five case-study countries, recognising the limitations with generalising these findings. The analysis looked at which activities appear in the 2016 COP and compared those against the activities for which indicators are being tracked. Table 8 above compares the activities being included in the 2016 COP that align the strategy areas with the inputs being tracked by indicators. For example, the 2016 COP for Bangladesh includes activities related to all six Education Strategy action areas, but the education indicators on outputs or objectives only reflect activities related to two of the action areas. 136. For the Education Strategy, most countries are implementing activities that cover all the action areas but are not reporting against most of related outputs in the COP. Only Rwanda’s COP-related monitoring covered performance indicators that measure outputs, and which reflect the majority of the work being done on education. 137. For child protection, reporting against indicators that measure the degree of implementation of activities is uneven among countries which rolled out the Child Protection Framework. The difference may reflect different countries’ approaches to child protection. In Egypt, for example, the operation implements activities aligning with all six action areas of the strategy. However, in Egypt reported indicators focus primarily on measuring progress against results and protection outcomes rather than progress on the implementation of activities necessary to achieve those results. Conversely, in Rwanda the latest increase in the number of POCs has led to an approach focused on building infrastructure, organisational and community structures, and capacity for child protection in emergency response. Thus, while activities linked to action areas 1 and 6 are the only ones described in the narrative of the COP, there is reporting against indicators that reflect UNHCR’s work to increase its ability to respond to all six action areas. Of the three strategies, the outputs monitored and reported in the COP for SGBV most precisely relate to the six area of the strategy areas. 138. While the scope of the COP necessarily only captures a portion of the work being done, interviews conducted suggest that operations feel that while the Results Framework indicators selected provide a good high-level overview, what is monitored captures just part of what country © Oxford Policy Management 31

offices are doing and must be complemented with other means of assessment (e.g. monitoring reports specific to protection areas, visits from HQ to operations, etc.). 5.3 Factors influencing adaptation and implementation 5.3.1 Political context 139. The existence of national government policies or frameworks compatible with or explicitly supportive of activities to promote the protection of refugees positively influenced the adaptation and implementation of the strategies. In the case of the SGBV Strategy, for example, national policies were particularly likely to have a positive influence on the adaptation of the global strategy into country-level strategies. For example, in Chad the national government launched its own national SGBV strategy the year before the global strategies were released. This presented an opportunity for UNHCR to adapt all aspects of the strategy to their country context, as the presence of a positive national framework indicated that there would be a supportive enabling environment within which to implement activities, in particular advocating for stronger legal frameworks to address SGBV within the camps. 140. Likewise, changes in government priorities and political awareness about a particular issue were an indication that activities in the strategy may be favourably received, and the analysis highlighted that operations saw this as an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with governments to accomplish strategy objectives at country level. This was the case in the Egypt and Rwanda education strategies, where government’s prioritisation of enabling refugees to access national education systems facilitated the implementation of strategy activities. Similarly, the Government of Iran allows refugee children to access education alongside Iranian children. This is in line with UNHCR’s approach of favouring integration in national systems whenever possible. The government’s approach to the right to education also mirrors international rights of the child approaches. Interview data revealed that the integration of Afghan refugee children into official schools was facilitated by a decree of the Supreme Leader, issued in 2015, which gave permission to attend school to all Afghan children, regardless of documentation status. This was partially motivated by an acknowledgment that children attending self-run Afghan schools could not receive an accredited certificate. Additionally, the insistence on integration also comes from a previous experience where undocumented Afghani children attended an informal school affiliated to the Taliban. Operations also reported that involvement with government during strategy adaptation was a crucial step in ensuring the sustainability of the response, particularly on SGBV and child protection. 141. The political environment can also be a factor presenting challenges to UNHCR country offices as they adapted the strategies. For example, some of the six action areas in the SGBV Strategy are more challenging to achieve in local contexts where effective supporting national policies and legal frameworks are lacking or weaker. There are several conditions in which the political environment hindered adaptation of the global strategies into country-level strategies. 142. First, conditions in which protective policies exist but are poorly implemented or do not include POCs also reduce the degree to which countries find a footing to adapt the strategies. Again, this was particularly the case with regards to the SGBV Strategy (for instance, in Malaysia, which was a pilot country for SGBV, the rights of refugee women and children are not included in the country’s longstanding Domestic Violence Act). It also influenced the adaptation and implementation of the Child Protection Framework, for example in Mexico where extensive child protection, child rights and child refugee rights legislation exist, but detention of unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) remains a practice in violation of such legislation. 143. Similarly, government policies that leave refugees in precarious circumstances by, for example, creating high barriers to documentation, limiting mobility and denying them access to national systems, (e.g. health, justice and education) negatively influenced the adaptation of the strategies (e.g. SGBV in Kenya and SGBV and education in Bangladesh). 144. Finally, government policies and legislation that restrict the access to refugees given to national and international non-government organisations (NGOs) and organisations such as UNHCR also © Oxford Policy Management 32

negatively affected the adaptation process. This is particularly the case in countries where refugees live in camp settings. Under such conditions, UNHCR country offices and their partners face challenges in conducting advocacy, delivering services and raising funds.51 Consequently, decisions about adapting the global strategies reflect these constraints. 5.3.2 Partnerships 145. The availability as well as the capacity of partners influenced the adaptation and implementation of the protection strategies. Where partner availability was limited, the strengths and capabilities of the existing partners could influence the choice of strategy-related activities. This was the case in Iran, for example, where interview data reflect UNHCR’s confidence in the ability of partners to implement the Education Strategy, due to them having strong technical skills and demonstrated resource and case management capabilities. Similarly, high-capacity partners with flexible mandates could also encourage operations to adapt more aspects of a strategy and support partners to build specific expertise (e.g. child protection in Mexico, where local NGOs received support and training from UNHCR to expand the scope of their activities, broaden their work to include POCs and become compliant with UNHCR’s reporting requirements). 146. Partners sometimes directly influenced the adaptation of the strategy, as described above. In such cases, partners and government actors were part of the adaptation process, which meant that the action areas covered were understood to be the most relevant and achievable for the country context. Partners also played an important role in providing an understanding of the context, through baseline assessments and institutional memory, which aided in the selection of activities to adapt to country level and the approach to implementing them. 147. Partnerships are particularly important in SGBV as it is a multi-sectoral issue, with actors in WASH, education, shelter, infrastructure, etc. ideally being involved. Particular aspects of the action areas could seem especially feasible or unfeasible depending on the partners available to UNHCR, their capacity and areas of expertise. This then had an influence on which action areas were adapted and ultimately implemented. 148. Partner capacity also influenced the degree to which UNHCR could rely on partners to provide adequate monitoring of the strategy activities. In some cases, such as Rwanda’s Child Protection Framework implementation, partners with previous experience in this protection area were stretched by the added demands of working as a partner funded by UNHCR and providing monitoring and reporting in a humanitarian or emergency situation. 5.3.3 UNHCR staffing 149. The technical capacity and time availability of UNHCR country staff, as well as support from HQ, influenced the adaptation and implementation of strategy activities. Strategies benefited from the involvement of protection area specialists in the adaptation and implementation, as well as from dedicated teams with sufficient time resources to allocate to strategy activities. 150. High staff rotation in areas with difficult operational conditions impacted the quality of implementation and reporting. Institutional memory with regards to the process of drafting the strategy may be lost in the handover, requiring time and effort to bring new colleagues to the appropriate level of understanding. 151. The SGBV Strategy was particularly affected by staff capacity. Interview data revealed that country office staff acknowledged that the implementation of SGBV programming required specialist staff, and often UNHCR offices rely on external assistance or ‘share’ a regional resource, which prolongs implementation procedures. For example, in Malaysia the team charged with adaptation had limited capacity and technical skills in both case management and programming SGBV, and did not include an SGBV specialist. Absence of staff with the requisite technical skillset can also mean that the strategy did not get adapted at all, as was the case in Rwanda. This was also the case in one 51 Interview data revealed donors often requested site visits to better understand the context of need and the programming required to address it. © Oxford Policy Management 33

of the countries reviewed for the evaluation, where the SGBV task force that was expected to drive the strategy adaptation process (including creating a workplan and ToRs for partners) was left to a single staff member with less experience and support than ideally required. Country-level adaptation was therefore not completed as intended. 152. From interview data, it emerged that, even where specialist staff are involved in the adaptation, bottlenecks can remain because of a lack of engagement from UNHCR staff at the senior level, due to competing priorities, scheduling issues and time constraints. In one of those cases, a protection area specialist drafted a country-level strategy (on one of the protection strategies), various drafts of which were then reviewed and discussed by mid-level and junior protection and programme staff from the capital as well as field offices. Despite these reviews, however, the draft strategy was not escalated within the country office and not approved by senior management for implementation.52 153. Although insufficient evidence is available to highlight the impact of UNHCR human resources structures on the implementation of the strategies, two examples raised the importance of having the education protection area under the protection unit rather than the programme unit. In Rwanda and Lebanon, the education portfolio was recently moved to the protection unit. Data suggests that this change was motivated by internal advocacy from protection unit staff. As noted by respondents, education is an essential protection issue, and it is intimately tied to child protection. Having the education portfolio in the protection unit allows protection staff to synergise protection programming. 5.3.4 Funding 154. Access to sufficient financial resources influenced the extent to which country offices engaged in the adaptation and implementation of strategy activities. While Table 7 above notes a high level of implementation of activities that align with strategy action areas, funding emerged as a recurring theme in the discussions with operations. In the positive, some operations could secure funding from non-traditional sources or leverage funding through the bureaux, and thus expressed greater ease with implementing more areas or increasing the scope of activities in a particular area of work. 155. However, shortfalls in funding also influenced views on the adaptation and implementation of the strategies, particularly the Education Strategy. For example, in Iran financial limitations have resulted in difficulties in regard to prioritisation, which has resulted in many refugee children not being able to benefit from better-equipped educational facilities, literacy courses, school-based sports and recreational activities, among other programming activities prioritised in the strategy but beyond the means of the country office to implement. According to Egypt’s 2016 COP, UNHCR’s budget had an overall reduction of almost US$ 5 million compared to 2015, and ‘funds for education grants will only cover 30% of total needs’. Bangladesh has similarly experienced a decrease in the level of education funding, while the level of needs and opportunities to support refugee-learning outcomes has increased. 5.3.5 Context 156. The implementation context influences the adaptation and implementation of the strategies, in particular the differences between camp versus urban settings and new emergencies versus protracted situations. 157. Changes in security conditions and conflict interrupt the operational movements of UNHCR and partners, and can make implementation of particular activities unsustainable. For example, in Pakistan UNHCR is required to obtain a so-called non-objection certificate issued by the 52 In this example, the country office highlighted that, while the country-level adaptation of one of the protection strategies is work in progress, other documents exist that are reflecting the orientation of the strategy. These include the UNHCR Operation planning, and multi-year multi partners (MYMP) strategy. The evaluation team has not reviewed these reports to assess the degree to which they reflect the Global Education Strategy. © Oxford Policy Management 34

government to visit refugee-hosting areas. The certificate must be applied for several days in advance and is not always issued. 158. Implementation of activities can be affected by the change from emergency to a more protracted situation. In Kenya, the level of funding for camps in the protracted situation has decreased given declining interest from donors. The same applies to the urban response in Nairobi, which is chronically underfunded. There is also an effect with new emergency operations, with changes in resourcing and prioritisation to meet the needs of a growing number of POCs. 5.3.6 Coordination 159. Coordination activities between UNHCR, government agencies and partners have served to create a cohesive network of organisations serving refugees. Such activities have proved particularly effective where state, NGO and community actors are each represented in child protection forums or similar structures facilitated by UNHCR. Strong coordination also has the potential to enhance case management activities, facilitated by UNHCR and made up of representatives from partners who are directly involved in the implementation of child-specific programming. 160. Coordination activities highlight UNHCR’s role as a catalyst for collaboration in-country. Various examples illustrate the role of country offices in coordinating and fostering partnerships. In Rwanda, for instance, the country and field offices coordinate and participate in meetings with all relevant partners in camp and urban settings. It was stressed by respondents from partner organisations that the role of UNHCR in coordination enabled better communication and more efficient use of limited partner resources, as partners were all aware of what other organisations’ protection responses entailed. The same applies to Mexico, where the country office was part of various committees and groups where civil society organisations were represented. In Mexico, collaboration with civil society organisations has been instrumental in the delivery of protection programming. The country office’s emphasis on fostering partnerships is evident, as partners previously detached from the refugee setting are now playing important roles in the delivery of UNHCR services. 161. The leadership role of UNHCR is presented in the Refugee Coordination Model, which outlines the different ways UNHCR leads and coordinates overall refugee response. 5.3.7 Culture and social norms 162. Certain cultural challenges and social norms have constrained the adaptation and implementation of the protection strategies. This is particularly the case for the SGBV Strategy, where various country-level strategies indicate challenges in addressing taboo topics about sexuality and gender relations. In these cases, the challenges presented by social norms prohibited the country offices from implementing all the objectives in the global SGBV Strategy. Stigma and condemnation associated with sexual violence and same-sex activities means that LGBTI POCs as well as survivors of gender-based violence are particularly difficult to identify and support. In addition, social attitudes may make it too challenging to implement activities under Action Area 5, which include training staff and raising awareness among legal, psychosocial and health service providers about the unique protection needs of LGBTI individuals. © Oxford Policy Management 35