Security Review Report
for 1inch

August 2025

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1. About Hexens

Hexens is a pioneering cybersecurity firm dedicated to establishing robust security standards for Web3 infrastructure, driving secure mass adoption through innovative protection technology and frameworks. As an industry elite experts in blockchain security, we deliver comprehensive audit solutions across specialized domains, including infrastructure security, Zero Knowledge Proof, novel cryptography, DeFi protocols, and NFTs.

Our methodology combines industry-standard security practices combined with unique methodology of two teams per audit, continuously advancing the field of Web3 security. This innovative approach has earned us recognition from industry leaders.

Since our founding in 2021, we have built an exceptional portfolio of enterprise clients, including major blockchain ecosystems and Web3 platforms.

2. Executive Summary

This audit covers 1inch Network Fusion Atomic Swaps, a two-party swap mechanism optimized for EVM-compatible chains, with well-aligned incentives to ensure fair and fast execution for all participants.

Our security assessment spanned four days and involved a thorough review of the Solidity smart contracts intended for deployment on EVM-compatible chains.

During the audit, we did not identify any major vulnerabilities. However, we did identify one optimization.

The reported issue was addressed by the development team and subsequently verified by our team.

As a result, we can confidently state that the protocol's security posture and code quality have improved following our audit.

3. Security Review Details

- ### Review Led by

Trung Dinh, Lead Security Researcher

- ### Scope

The analyzed resources are located on:

🔗 https://github.com/1inch/cross-chain-swap/
- contracts/BaseEscrow.sol
- contracts/BaseEscrowFactory.sol
- contracts/Escrow.sol
- contracts/EscrowDst.sol
- contracts/EscrowFactory.sol
- contracts/EscrowSrc.sol
- contracts/interfaces/IBaseEscrow.sol
- contracts/interfaces/IEscrowFactory.sol
- contracts/libraries/ImmutablesLib.sol
- contracts/mocks/ResolverExample.sol
- contracts/zkSync/EscrowDstZkSync.sol
- contracts/zkSync/EscrowFactoryZkSync.sol
- contracts/zkSync/EscrowSrcZkSync.sol
- contracts/zkSync/EscrowZkSync.sol

📌 Commit: `d0a59ab2c4b6be5c9769d5775769681873fcf162`

The issues described in this report were fixed in the following commit:

🔗 https://github.com/1inch/cross-chain-swap/pull/139

📌 Commit: `339ab27e5a542737de610e0ebdae6f95dc20cd63`

▪ Changelog

11 August 2025	Audit start
13 August 2025	Initial report
19 August 2025	Revision received
21 August 2025	Final report

4. Severity Structure

The vulnerability severity is calculated based on two components:

1. Impact of the vulnerability
2. Probability of the vulnerability

Impact	Probability			
	Rare	Unlikely	Likely	Very likely
Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium
Medium	Low	Medium	Medium	High
High	Medium	Medium	High	Critical
Critical	Medium	High	Critical	Critical

- **Severity Characteristics**

Smart contract vulnerabilities can range in severity and impact, and it's important to understand their level of severity in order to prioritize their resolution. Here are the different types of severity levels of smart contract vulnerabilities:

Critical	Vulnerabilities that are highly likely to be exploited and can lead to catastrophic outcomes, such as total loss of protocol funds, unauthorized governance control, or permanent disruption of contract functionality.

High	Vulnerabilities that are likely to be exploited and can cause significant financial losses or severe operational disruptions, such as partial fund theft or temporary asset freezing.

| Medium | Vulnerabilities that may be exploited under specific conditions and result in moderate harm, such as operational disruptions or limited financial impact without direct profit to the attacker. |

| Low | Vulnerabilities with low exploitation likelihood or minimal impact, affecting usability or efficiency but posing no significant security risk. |

| Informational | Issues that do not pose an immediate security risk but are relevant to best practices, code quality, or potential optimizations. |

▪ Issue Symbolic Codes

Each identified and validated issue is assigned a unique symbolic code during the security research stage.

Due to the structure of the vulnerability reporting flow, some rejected issues may be missing.

5. Findings Summary

Severity	Number of findings
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	0
Informational	1
Total:	**1**

Informational

Fixed

6. Weaknesses

This section contains the list of discovered weaknesses.

OIN11-2 | Redundant conversion from address to Address when encoding   Fixed ✓

Severity:	Informational	Probability:	Rare	Impact:	Informational

Path:

contracts/BaseEscrowFactory.sol#L141-L146

Description:

In the function **BaseEscrowFactory._postInteraction()**, the **immutablesComplement.parameters** value is computed (line 141 - line 146) as:

```
parameters: abi.encode(
    protocolFeeAmount,
    integratorFeeAmount,
    Address.wrap(uint160(protocolFeeRecipient)),
    Address.wrap(uint160(integratorFeeRecipient))
)
```

Here, the **address** values **protocolFeeRecipient** and **integratorFeeRecipient** are explicitly converted to the **Address** type (an alias for **uint256**, 32 bytes).

This conversion is unnecessary because **abi.encode()** already pads **address** types to 32 bytes automatically.

Remediation:

Consider modifying line 141 - line 146 to:

```
parameters: abi.encode(
    protocolFeeAmount,
    integratorFeeAmount,
--  Address.wrap(uint160(protocolFeeRecipient)),
--  Address.wrap(uint160(integratorFeeRecipient))
++  protocolFeeRecipient,
++  integratorFeeRecipient
)
```