Introduction to Natural Language Processing

Forest, Karson, Morgan, and Nargiz



Objectives



- Understand Natural Language Processing (NLP) fundamentals
- Expand knowledge of the history of NLP development
- Introduce the basics of generative adversarial examples
- Discuss the cumulative and future trajectory of NLP
- Explore adversarial examples in modern LLMs

Data Collection

Goal: Write a ML algorithm to classify text sentiment.

Dilemma: We need text data that is already categorized in some way in order to train that model.

Where better to find categorized English text sentiment than a reviews section for a retail website?

Who bigger than Walmart?



Fully autonomous webscraper:

- ➔ Collects product data
- ➔ Structures data into a dictionary
- ➔ Stores this data in MongoDB

All said and done, over the course of 3 days, we stole approximately 3 MB of text data from Walmart…

Natural Language Processing



Let's say, hypothetically, you were traveling in a foreign country and you're lost. Ahead of you is this road sign:

Unfortunately, you don't speak the native language so the words on the sign signify little, but you can use the **symbolic clues** like the arrows and images to draw some conclusion as to your current location from the sign.

The same symbol-recognition logic you perform to make sense of your current location can be applied to NLP ML models

- Today, **NLP** is largely used as a blanket term for ML models capable of generating predictions on text data. Modern **Large Language Models** are exceptional predictors trained on unfathomably large text datasets.
- In order to safely implement LLMs in production, it is necessary to understand the fundamentals.

Nothing Naive about these Bayes!

Two components to our first NLP model:

1. Tokenizer + Transformer

   TF-IDF tokenizer - tokenization process of splitting the text data into character sequences that can be encoded (tokenized) and transformed based on the respective probability distributions throughout the training corpus

2. Classifier

   Naive Bayes Binary Classifier -







Naive Bayes Model:

	precision	recall	f1-score	support
0.0	0.96	0.85	0.90	539
1.0	0.88	0.97	0.92	576
accuracy			0.91	1115
macro avg	0.92	0.91	0.91	1115
weighted avg	0.92	0.91	0.91	1115

Confusion Matrix:
[[460 79]
[18 558]]

Text example:
I love the price, color, and fast service for my new television!! It looks good in my Guest room!!

Naive Bayes Prediction: positive
Actual: positive

Text example:
This tv is the cheapest TV Ive ever seen. Is made in old school technology like the little legs that keeps it standing are sooo thin it barely holds the TV steady. Not only did the TV arrived cracked and broken into pieces when deliver which is a shame. I had a VIZIO for over 6 years was looking for an upgrade and is sad to see how low there standards have gone down.

Naive Bayes Prediction: positive
Actual: negative

Task-specific to General-purpose



Sentiment Encoded as
(1) Positive
(0) Negative

Naive Bayes Model:

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Confusion Matrix:
[[460 79]
[18 558]]

Sentiment Encoded as
(1) Positive
(0) Neutral
(-1) Negative

SGD Model:

	precision	recall	f1-score	support
-1	0.71	0.84	0.77	1148
0	0.56	0.16	0.25	632
1	0.75	0.89	0.81	1338
accuracy			0.72	3118
macro avg	0.67	0.63	0.61	3118
weighted avg	0.70	0.72	0.68	3118

Confusion Matrix:
[[961 43 144]
[277 103 252]
[112 38 1188]]

*Goal of model to predict star count

Regression Model:

	precision	recall	f1-score	support
1	0.60	0.79	0.68	732
2	0.40	0.11	0.17	439
3	0.39	0.43	0.41	580
4	0.48	0.31	0.38	596
5	0.64	0.85	0.73	771
accuracy			0.55	3118
macro avg	0.51	0.50	0.48	3118
weighted avg	0.52	0.55	0.51	3118

Confusion Matrix:

	1	2	3	4	5
1	544	39	81	21	25
2	182	43	134	27	43
3	121	38	245	91	85
4	44	13	124	171	223
5	31	1	23	76	693

```
Binary Naive Bayes Predictions:
The sentence "I like this product." is 1.0
The sentence "I dislike this product." is 0.0
The sentence "The product is amazing." is 1.0
The sentence "The product is terrible." is 0.0
The sentence "The world is good." is 1.0
The sentence "The world is bad." is 0.0
```

```
Polar SGD Classifications
The sentence "I like this product." is 1
The sentence "I dislike this product." is -1
The sentence "The product is amazing." is 1
The sentence "The product is terrible." is -1
The sentence "The world is good." is 1
The sentence "The world is bad." is -1
```

```
Star Count Regression Predictions:
The sentence "I like this product." is 5
The sentence "I dislike this product." is 1
The sentence "The product is amazing." is 5
The sentence "The product is terrible." is 2
The sentence "The world is good." is 4
The sentence "The world is bad." is 2
```

Luke... I am your model



VADER

- **Pretrained** on 250k+ social media text dataset
- Increased performance from TF-IDF
- Classified sentiment polarity [-1,1]

  * any positive or negative movement of the compound score greater than or less than 0.05 indicated a polarity shift. If the aggregate polarity shifting was within 0.05 of 0 then its predicted as neutral

- Revealed weaknesses for the generalizability of our model's ability

```
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
 -- Text at index 9:
It doesn't keep my drink cold for that long
- Actual Sent:negative
- Model Sent: positive
- SIA prediction:{'neg': 0.0, 'neu': 1.0, 'pos': 0.0, 'compound': 0.0}
```

```
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
 -- Text at index 6:
[This review was collected as part of a promotion.] Just got this last week. Nice quality but the volume has to be changed a
lot. Some stuff is too low, then gets too high. Might be me, looking to invest in a surround sound or sound board to help.
- Actual Sent:neutral
- Model Sent: neutral
- SIA prediction:{'neg': 0.052, 'neu': 0.841, 'pos': 0.107, 'compound': 0.4215}
```

Intro to Adversarial Attacks



K. Ren, T. Zheng, Z. Qin et al., Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Deep Learning, Engineering, 2019

Adversarial examples introduce untrained variation to the data which causes the ability of the model to greatly diminish, even when the task is simple for humans to perform

Above is one of the most empirically validated adversarial attacks on a DNN.

> In NLP, the adversarial architecture is different, because the only data types are text and a label.

Original Input	Connoisseurs of Chinese film will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: **Positive (77%)**
Adversarial example [Visually similar]	**Aonnoisseurs** of Chinese film will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: **Negative (52%)**
Adversarial example [Semantically similar]	Connoisseurs of Chinese **footage** will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: **Negative (54%)**

Morris et all, TextAttack: A Framework for Adversarial Attacks, Data Augmentation, and Adversarial Training in NLP, 2020

In this project, we utilize an open source adversarial attack API library called *TextAttack* to conduct a **transformation attack** on our dataset and "poison" our binary sentiment classifier.

First Wave

In the first wave, we only used the TF-IDF tokenizer to preprocess;

we call this the **Unstemmed Attack.**



Single Word Transformation Attacks

```
---------------------------------------------- Result 5 ----------------------------------------------
[[1 (79%)]] --> [[0 (55%)]]

She loved it   I bought this as a gift for my mother  she had a     unknown band with a bad controller [[so]] this was an AMAZING surprise when came home from church

She loved it   I bought this as a gift for my mother  she had a     unknown band with a bad controller [[after]] this was an AMAZING surprise when came home from church
```

```
---------------------------------------------- Result 5 ----------------------------------------------
[[0 (72%)]] --> [[1 (60%)]]

[[We]] bought a twin mattress  and let it air for    hours or longer   It smells like mildew  I m concerned and am not sure I should let my son sleep on it

[[Our]] bought a twin mattress  and let it air for    hours or longer   It smells like mildew  I m concerned and am not sure I should let my son sleep on it
```

```
[[1 (100%)]] --> [[0 (68%)]]

This Xbox series X  Oh my gosh I literally [[love]] this game it s smoother to up   Fps and    Fps

This Xbox series X  Oh my gosh I literally [[loving]] this game it s smoother to up   Fps and    Fp
```

Background about Attacker Model:

We fitted a pretrained 'attacker' utilizing the *TextFooler* model from Jin et al 2019 on our naive Bayes binary sentiment classifier

The "very", "good" to "absolutely", "adequate" pipeline

```
[[Very]] [[good]] [[quality]] television   [[Easy]] [[set]] up   Only caveat is

[[Absolutely]] [[adequate]] [[caliber]] television   [[Convenience]] [[configura
```

```
:hat I [[want]]   [[Picture]] quality is [[very]] [[good]] and [[price]] was excellent

:er than straight to cable that I [[will]]   [[Footage]] quality is [[absolutely]] [[adequate]] and [[award]] was excellent
```

First Wave Results

Attack Results	
Number of successful attacks:	6
Number of failed attacks:	3
Number of skipped attacks:	1
Original accuracy:	90.0%
Accuracy under attack:	30.0%
Attack success rate:	66.67%
Average perturbed word %:	14.56%
Average num. words per input:	43.9
Avg num queries:	234.33

> Undoubtedly, rendered useless

So, how do we teach our model to "recognize" adversarial examples like we saw before?

> Increase text data?

> Increase information about the text?

Porter Stemming Algorithm

Originally developed in the early 1980s, the algorithm assigns every character in a token a "c" for consonant and "v" for vowel. Similarly, subsequent consonants are labeled "C" and subsequent vowels labeled "V". The algorithm is able to "root" its understanding of word composition and detect "stem" changes based on their character composition.

Source: M.F. Porter, 1980, An algorithm for suffix stripping, *Program*, **14**(3) pp 130−137.





Second Wave

In the second dataset, we tokenized the text by Porter “stemming” the tokens of every word in the text and transforming into TF-IDF vectors.

We call this the **Stemmed Attack**

> **Takeaway**: It was **not sufficient** to only increase the size of the dataset, we found that **introducing semantics** to the model strengthened performance, **then adding more training data** further fortified predictive capability.

	Training data = 85%	Training data = 70%	Training data = 60%
Unstemmed	Number of successful attacks: 5 Number of failed attacks: 2 Number of skipped attacks: 3 Original accuracy: 70.0% Accuracy under attack: 20.0% Attack success rate: 71.43% Average perturbed word %: 13.26% Average num. words per input: 25.3 Avg num queries: 110.86	Number of successful attacks: 4 Number of failed attacks: 5 Number of skipped attacks: 1 Original accuracy: 90.0% Accuracy under attack: 50.0% Attack success rate: 44.44% Average perturbed word %: 4.46% Average num. words per input: 46.1 Avg num queries: 381.44	Number of successful attacks: 6 Number of failed attacks: 3 Number of skipped attacks: 1 Original accuracy: 90.0% Accuracy under attack: 30.0% Attack success rate: 66.67% Average perturbed word %: 14.56% Average num. words per input: 43.9 Avg num queries: 234.33
Stemmed	Number of successful attacks: 1 Number of failed attacks: 7 Number of skipped attacks: 2 Original accuracy: 80.0% Accuracy under attack: 70.0% Attack success rate: 12.5% Average perturbed word %: 6.17% Average num. words per input: 25.3 Avg num queries: 166.12	Number of successful attacks: 2 Number of failed attacks: 6 Number of skipped attacks: 2 Original accuracy: 80.0% Accuracy under attack: 60.0% Attack success rate: 25.0% Average perturbed word %: 5.37% Average num. words per input: 46.2 Avg num queries: 358.88	Number of successful attacks: 4 Number of failed attacks: 4 Number of skipped attacks: 2 Original accuracy: 80.0% Accuracy under attack: 40.0% Attack success rate: 50.0% Average perturbed word %: 17.27% Average num. words per input: 22.1 Avg num queries: 161.38

*Hyperparameter: **test_size**

Discussion

We found that **stemming during tokenization** and **increasing training data** gives the model **more understanding** about words, which better **shields our model** from transformation attacks.

NLP has come a long way from these types of simple sentiment classifiers, but demonstrating flaws in controlled environments is how we have been able to construct the **vast architectures of LLMs** in production today.

View from Dr Sameer Singh

Era of VADER:



Era of BERTs:



Singh, Sameer 2023 *How large language models work* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlfwxk7VQUU

Adversarial Examples in LLMs



Zhou et al 2023[Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models]

Adversarial Examples in LLMs

Universal Transferable Suffix

Wei et al 2023 [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?]



Represents the Base64 encoding of the prompt



Zhou et al 2023[Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models]

Adversarial Examples in LLMs