Adversarial Machine Learning Poisoning Attacks

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Attack types

Based on time of the attack:

Evasion Attacks:

- Test time
- Model is already trained
- Goal: Misclassification at test time

Poisoning Attacks:

- Training time
- Model is training
- Goal: Misclassification at test time (dropping accuracy)

Scenarios

Online training:

Machine learning models are updated based on new incoming training data

Users may:


- Mark emails as spams / change spam emails to look normal
- Mark a file as malware (VirusTotal)
- Provide movie ratings / provide untrue comments (Recommendation systems)
- Tag photos falsely (Captcha)

Users Can change:

- Labels
- Feature space
- Both

How it works

- 1. Choose a few data points (random or from clean/normal training set)
- 2. Manipulate them in a way they would be very disruptive to the test-time accuracy
- 3. Add generated poisoning points to the training set
- 4. Train the model with new dataset
- 5. Wait for model accuracy to drop when you test with real clean data later




1. Flip labels (binary labels)

Randomly

Most influential samples

- A. Representative samples (Inliers)
 - Statistical methods
 - Common features in each class
 - ...

B. Outliers



2. Bi-level optimization


Change features to get the worst accuracy

$$S_p^* \in \underset{S_p \subseteq \mathcal{Z}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad O_A = O_L(S_{val}, \mathbf{w}^*)$$

s.t. $\mathbf{w}^* \in \underset{\mathbf{w}}{\operatorname{argmin}} O_L(S_{tr} \cup S_p, \mathbf{w})$

 S_p : set of adversarial examples, S_{tr} : training set, S_{val} : validation set

O_L: Model Loss function, O_A: Adversary's objective/loss function



2. Bi-level optimization

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Inner equation:



Feed the model with both poisoning and normal data for training(get the parameters that minimize Model's loss function)

S_n: set of adversarial examples, S_{tr}: training set, S_{val}: validation set

O₁: Model Loss function, O_A: Adversary's objective/loss function

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Inner equation:



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Outer equation:




Since we trained the model based on poisoning points, it should drop the accuracy in test time (maximize the loss function on normal validation set)

How to solve:

- Calculate the derivative of O_A w.r.t S_p
- But S_p is appeared only in the inner equation
- Chain rule (w* connects two equations)
- Need to solve inner equation
- Difficult for non-convex models (NN)
- Easy on Linear regression and SVMs

Comparison to flipping attacks

- More powerful
- More complex
- Best result when they are used together



Settings

Goals:

- Degrade the overall accuracy rate
- Resulting model favors the attacker
- Plant a trapdoor

Strength:

- Add, remove, update
- Knowledge of the attacker on: (Threat Models)

Settings

- Integrated, Collaborative (limited data)
- Targeted, untargeted

Attack: Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning

Regression problem \rightarrow continuous response variable Optimization in feature space and response variables

$$\nabla_{x_{p}} O_{A} = \nabla_{w} O_{A} * \nabla_{x_{p}} w(x_{p})$$

$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad S_{p}^{*} \in \underset{S_{p} \subseteq \mathcal{Z}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad O_{A} = O_{L}(S_{val}, \mathbf{w}^{*})$$

$$\nabla_{z_{p}} O_{A} = \nabla_{w} O_{A} * \nabla_{z_{p}} w(z_{p})$$

$$z_{p} = (x_{p}, y_{p})$$

$$S_{p}^{*} \in \underset{S_{p} \subseteq \mathcal{Z}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad O_{A} = O_{L}(S_{val}, \mathbf{w}^{*})$$
s.t. $\mathbf{w}^{*} \in \underset{\mathbf{w}}{\operatorname{argmin}} O_{L}(S_{tr} \cup S_{p}, \mathbf{w})$



Attack: Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning (cont'd)

Parameters to tune

1. How to select initial points?

Flipping labels

- i) InvFlip: y = 1 y [0.1]
- ii) BFlip: $y = round(1-y) \{0,1\}$
- 2. Use validation set or training set in outer loop
- 3. X_p or Z_p

Which combination gives us the best result (most successful attack)?

Attack: Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning (cont'd)

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Which combination gives us the best result (most successful attack)?

Depends on the dataset...

Model	Dataset	Init	Argument	Objective
Ridge	Health	BFlip	(x, y)	$\mathcal{W}_{\mathrm{tr}}$
	Loan	BFlip	\boldsymbol{x}	$\mathcal{W}_{\mathrm{val}}$
	House	BFlip	(x, y)	$\mathcal{W}_{ ext{tr}}$
LASSO	Health	BFlip	(x, y)	$\mathcal{W}_{\mathrm{tr}}$
	Loan	BFlip	(x,y)	$\mathcal{W}_{ ext{val}}$
	House	InvFlip	(x, y)	$\mathcal{W}_{ ext{val}}$

Defenses

- 1. Impact of each sample on the model (RONI)
 - If it drops the accuracy → Retrain classifier
 - Specify a threshold

Problem:

- Contribution of single points
- Coordinated set of adversarial points

Defenses

- 2. Detecting outliers
 - Maximum impact on the learner
 - Minimum injected adversary examples
- Detect directly
- Bagging methods (less weight)

. . .

Other works:

- Randomness: unpredictability
- Content provenance: related meta-data
- Formal models, Robustness!

Defense: Mitigating Poisoning Attacks on Machine Learning Models: A Data Provenance Based Approach

Assumption:


- 1. Each data point has a meta data (device identification, timestamps, ...)
- 2. Defender already has access to a subset of clean training data

Goal:

To remove poisoning data from the training dataset

Defense: Mitigating Poisoning Attacks on Machine Learning Models: A Data Provenance Based Approach (con't)

Train a model based on available clean training data Segment all data based on their common metadata Check if a data segment drops the accuracy



Defense: Mitigating Poisoning Attacks on Machine Learning Models: A Data Provenance Based Approach (con't)

Similar to RONI defense method

RONI tests each data point/record separately

Retraining with and without all the records is time-consuming

This method reduces number of retraining

How accessible are metadata for different datasets?


Defense: Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning

Uses a trimmed loss function computed on a different subset of residuals in each iteration

$$\min_{oldsymbol{ heta}, \mathcal{I}} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{D}^{\mathcal{I}}, oldsymbol{ heta}) \quad ext{s.t. } I \subset [1, \dots, N] \wedge |\mathcal{I}| = n$$

TRIM


- 1. Removes points with large residuals
- 2. Estimates the regression parameters



Does not affect inliers!

Only influential poisoning points!

Defense: Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning (cont'd)



Let's have fun!

Attack: Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks

Assumptions:


- 1. No access to training dataset
- 2. Only experts can label training dataset

Goal: Attacker causes the retrained **neural network** to misclassify a special test instance of one class as another class of her choice

t: target data point from test data (with label L_t)

base class label: L_b

Attack so that t gets label L_b



Attack: Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks (cont'd)

b: from class b with L_b

f(.): propagates an input through the network to the penultimate layer

$$\mathbf{p} = \underset{\mathbf{x}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \|f(\mathbf{x}) - f(\mathbf{t})\|_{2}^{2} + \beta \|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{b}\|_{2}^{2}$$


Same output as t: NN classify it in target class

Same appearance as $b \rightarrow Expert labels it$ as L_b

Same output as f(t) would be classified same as class of b

→ t would be classified in base class

t : target data point from test data (with label $L_{t})$ base class label : L_{b} t has label L_{h}



Attack: Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks (cont'd)


Training method:

1. Transfer learning:


We already have a pre-trained model

Only softmax layer is retrained

Successful with only one poisoning point



$$\mathbf{p} = \underset{\mathbf{x}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \ \left\| f(\mathbf{x}) - f(\mathbf{t}) \right\|_2^2 + \beta \left\| \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{b} \right\|_{2\,2}^{2\,2}$$



Attack: Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks (cont'd)



2. End to end:

All layers are trainable

This method does not work anymore


Solution:

Using multiple poisoning points

Watermarking

$$\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \gamma \cdot \mathbf{\hat{t}} + (1 - \gamma) \cdot \mathbf{\hat{b}}$$
.

$$\mathbf{p} = \underset{\mathbf{x}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \ \left\| f(\mathbf{x}) - f(\mathbf{t}) \right\|_2^2 + \beta \left\| \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{b} \right\|_{2\,2}^{2\,2}$$



Thank You

Any Questions?