Homework 3

Tate Mason

An ECON - 8010 Homework Assignment

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1 Question 3.I.5

1.1 Problem

Show that if u(x) is quasilinear with respect to the first good $(p_1 \text{ fixed at } 1)$, then $CV(p^0, p^1, w) = EV(p^0, p^1, w)$ for any (p^0, p^1, w) .

1.2 Solution

2 Question 5.C.9

2.1 Problem

Derive the profit function $\pi(p)$ and supply function y(p) for the single output technologies whose production functions f(z) are given by:

(b)
$$f(z) = \sqrt{\min\{z_1, z_2\}}$$

(c)
$$f(z) = (z_1^{\rho} z_2^{\rho})^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$
 for $\rho \le 1$

2.2 Solution

3 Question 5.C.10

3.1 Problem

Derive the cost function c(w,q) and conditional function demand functions (or correspondences) z(w,q) for each of the following single-output constant return technologies with production functions:

(b)
$$f(z) = \min\{z_1, z_2\}$$
 (Leontief technology)

(c)
$$f(z) = (z_1^{\rho} z_2^{\rho})^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$
 for $\rho \le 1$ (CES technology)

3.2 Solution

(c) Derive cost function and conditional demand functions:

$$_{\vec{z} \geq 0}^{\max} - \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z}$$

s.t.

$$\begin{split} -(z_1^{\rho} z_2^{\rho})^{\frac{1}{\rho}} &\geq q \\ -\vec{z} &\leq 0 \\ \vec{w} &= \lambda \begin{bmatrix} p(z_1^{\rho} z_2^{\rho})^{\frac{1}{\rho}-1} \cdot (z_1^{\rho-1} z_2^{\rho}) \\ p(z_1^{\rho} z_2^{\rho})^{\frac{1}{\rho}-1} \cdot (z_1^{\rho} z_2^{\rho-1}) \end{bmatrix} + \vec{\mu} \end{split}$$

s.t.

$$\vec{\mu} \cdot \vec{z} = 0$$
$$\lambda(q - f(\vec{z})) = 0$$

From FOC's

$$\frac{w_1}{w_2} = \frac{z_2}{z_1} \Rightarrow z_2 = z_1(\frac{w_1}{w_2})$$

Now, plug into $f(\vec{z})$

$$\begin{split} z_1^{\rho}(z_1(\frac{w_1}{w_2}))^{\rho} &= q \\ z_1^2 &= q^{\frac{1}{\rho}}(\frac{w_2}{w_1}) \\ z_1(w,q) &= q^{\frac{2}{\rho}}(\frac{w_2}{w_1})^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ z_2(w,q) &= q^{\frac{2}{\rho}} \end{split}$$

4 Question 5.C.11

4.1 Problem

Show that $\frac{\partial z_l(w,q)}{\partial q} > 0$ if and only if marginal cost at q is increasing in w_l .

4.2 Solution

Proof. This can be proven using Shephard's Lemma such that $z_l(w,q) = \frac{\partial C(w,q)}{\partial w_l}$. Marginal cost, then, is given as $\frac{\partial c(w,q)}{\partial q}$. So, we should show that $\frac{\partial z_l(w,q)}{\partial q} \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial^2 c(w,q)}{\partial q \partial w_l}$. Using Shephard's Lemma and symmetry of second derivatives, it can be shown that $\frac{\partial z_l(w,q)}{\partial q} = \frac{\partial^2 c(w,q)}{\partial w_l \partial q} = \frac{\partial^2 c(w,q)}{\partial w_l \partial q}$. Thus, $\frac{\partial z_l(w,q)}{\partial q} > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial^2 c(w,q)}{\partial q \partial w_l} > 0$, showing that conditional factor demand for input l increases with output if and only if the marginal cost is increasing in the price of input l.

5 Question 5

5.1 Problem

A firm uses 2 inputs, z_1 and z_2 , which it purchases at prices w_1 and w_2 to produce a single output. The firm's technology is described by production function f which is strictly increasing and obeys the Inada conditions $\lim_{z_1 0} \frac{\partial f(z_1, z_2)}{\partial z_1} = \lim_{z_1 \to 0} \frac{\partial f(z_1, z_2)}{\partial z_2} = \infty$ for each x. (Hence, the firm will always choose to use a strictly positive quantity of each input.)

- (a) Set up firm's cost minimization problem, write down its Lagrangian, find firm's first order conditions for cost minimization.
- (b) Use the envelope theorem to find an expression (possibly involving a Lagrange multiplier) for the firm's marginal cost $\frac{\partial c(w,q)}{\partial q}$.
- (c) An economist wishes to measure the firm's markup-ratio of price of output, p, to its marginal cost $\frac{\partial c(w,q)}{\partial q}$. However, she does not know what kind of competition the firm faces in the production market. In fact, the only data she has are:
 - the marginal product of input 1 at the input fix selected by the firm:

$$\frac{\partial f(z(w,q))}{\partial z_1}$$

- the price of input 1, w_1
- the price of firm's output p.

How can she use these data to recover the firm's markup?

5.2 Solution

6 Question 6.B.2

6.1 Problem

Show that if the preference relation \succeq on \mathcal{L} is represented by a utility function $U(\cdot)$ that has the expected utility form, then \succeq satisfies the independence axiom.