

Symmetric Cryptosystems

Lesson 3

Initial examples

- Ex1: let p be a large prime, $2^{159} < p < 2^{160}$. $K = \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = Z_p^*$.

$$E_k(m) \equiv k * m \pmod{p}$$

$$D_k(c) \equiv k' * c \pmod{p}$$

- Ex2: let $K, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C} = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^B - 1\}$ be the sets of all binary strings of length B .

$$E_k(m) = k \oplus m$$

$$D_k(c) = k \oplus c$$

Analysis

If $(K, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, E, D)$ is to be a successful cipher, it must have the following properties (Kerckhoff principal):

1. For any $k \in K$, $m \in \mathcal{M}$, it must be easy to compute the cipher text $E_k(m)$.
2. For any $k \in K$, $c \in \mathcal{C}$, it must be easy to compute the plaintext $D_k(c)$.
3. Given one or more $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n \in \mathcal{C}$ are encrypted using $k \in K$, it must be difficult to compute any of the corresponding plaintexts $D_k(c_1), D_k(c_2), \dots, D_k(c_n)$ without knowing k .
4. Given one or more pairs $(m_1, c_1), \dots, (m_n, c_n)$, it must be difficult to decrypt any cipher c that is not in the given list without knowing k (chosen plaintext attack).

Analysis...

- Ex1: $E_k(m) \equiv k * m \pmod{p}$. It doesn't have Property 4 (**chosen cipher/plaintext attack**).
- Ex2: $E_k(m) = k \oplus m$ (**chosen plaintext attack**)

Random bit sequences...

Suppose that we could construct a function $R: K \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ with the following properties:

1. For all $k \in K, j \in \mathbb{Z}$, it is **easy to compute** $R(k, j)$.
2. Given an arbitrarily long sequence of integer j_1, \dots, j_n and given all of values $R(k, j_1), \dots, R(k, j_n)$, it is **hard to determine** k .
3. Given any list j_1, \dots, j_n and given all of $R(k, j_1), \dots, R(k, j_n)$, it is **had to guess the value** of $R(k, j)$ with better than 50% chance of success for any j not already in the list.

...and symmetric cipher

- There are **two basic approaches to constructing** candidates for R , and these two methods provide a good illustration of the fundamental conflict in cryptography between security and efficiency.
- The first approach is to repeatedly apply an ad hoc collection of **mixing operations** that are well suited to efficient computation and that appear to be very hard to untangle. This method is the basic of all most modern symmetric cryptosystems (DES, AES, ...)
- The second approach is to construct R using a function whose efficient inversion is a **well-known mathematical** problem that is believed to be difficult. This method is less attractive for real-world ciphers.

Modern symmetric cryptosystems

- DES – Data Encryption Standard (IBM,1970).
- DES uses a 56-bit key and encrypts blocks of 64 bits at a time.
- DES mixing operations are linear, with the only nonlinear component being the use of eight S-box (Substitution box).
- Each S-box is a look-up table in which six input bits are replaced by four output bit.

DES S-Box

- Here is how an S-box is used. The input is a list of 6 bit Input = $\beta_1\beta_2\beta_3\beta_4\beta_5\beta_6$.
- First use the 2-bit binary number $\beta_1\beta_6$ to choose the row of the S-box, then use the 4-bit binary number $\beta_2\beta_3\beta_4\beta_5$ to choose the column of the S-box.
- The output is the entry of the S-box for the chosen row and column, and converted into a 4-bit binary number.

S-box and Example

- Suppose that Input = '110010'. '10' = 2 → use row 2, and '1001' = 9, use column 9. Output will be 12 = 1100.
- $S\text{-box}(x) = F(A(x))$ where A : affine, $F(x)$: non-linear function.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
1	0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
2	4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0
3	15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13

Advanced Encryption Standard

- AES (J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, 2000). A block cipher in which the plaintext-cipher text blocks are 128 bits in length and the key size may be 128, 192, 256 bits.
- AES is similar to DES in that it encrypts/decrypts by repeating a basic operation several times (10, 12, or 14 rounds depending on the size key).
- AES **S-box** is constructed using the operation of taking multiplication inverses in the field F_2^8 .

block cipher mode of operation

Mode		Formulas	Ciphertext
Electronic codebook	(ECB)	$Y_i = F(\text{PlainText}_i, \text{Key})$	Y_i
Cipher block chaining	(CBC)	$Y_i = \text{PlainText}_i \text{ XOR } \text{Ciphertext}_{i-1}$	$F(Y, \text{Key}); \text{Ciphertext}_0 = \text{IV}$
Propagating CBC	(PCBC)	$Y_i = \text{PlainText}_i \text{ XOR } (\text{Ciphertext}_{i-1} \text{ XOR } \text{PlainText}_{i-1})$	$F(Y, \text{Key}); \text{Ciphertext}_0 = \text{IV}$
Cipher feedback	(CFB)	$Y_i = \text{Ciphertext}_{i-1}$	$\text{Plaintext XOR } F(Y, \text{Key}); \text{Ciphertext}_0 = \text{IV}$
Output feedback	(OFB)	$Y_i = F(Y_{i-1}, \text{Key}); Y_0 = F(\text{IV}, \text{Key})$	$\text{Plaintext XOR } Y_i$
Counter	(CTR)	$Y_i = F(\text{IV} + g(i), \text{Key}); \text{IV} = \text{token}()$	$\text{Plaintext XOR } Y_i$