



AliumSwap

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

22.03.2021

Made in Germany by Chainsulting.de



Table of contents

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. Disclaimer | 4 |
| 2. About the Project and Company | 5 |
| 2.1 Project Overview | 6 |
| 3. Vulnerability & Risk Level..... | 7 |
| 4. Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied | 8 |
| 4.1 Methodology..... | 8 |
| 4.2 Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts | 9 |
| 4.3 Tested Contract Files..... | 10 |
| 4.4 Metrics / CallGraph | 11 |
| 4.6 Metrics / Capabilities..... | 13 |
| 4.7 Metrics / Source Unites in Scope..... | 14 |
| 5. Scope of Work..... | 15 |
| 5.1 Manual and Automated Vulnerability Test | 16 |
| 5.1.1 Same require checks in every function | 16 |
| 5.1.2 Missing natspec documentation | 17 |
| 5.2. SWC Attacks & Special Checks | 18 |
| 7. Test Deployment..... | 22 |
| 7.1 Deployment AliumCollectible Contract | 22 |
| 7.2 Deployment DAI Contract..... | 22 |
| 7.3 Create new token type | 22 |
| 7.4 Deployment NFTPrivateSeller Contract | 23 |
| 7.5 Add buyer to whitelist (only by owner)..... | 23 |



| | | |
|------|--|----|
| 7.6 | Buy one token with whitelisted address | 24 |
| 7.7 | Buy Batch | 25 |
| 7.8 | Change founder by owner | 26 |
| 7.9 | Transfer ownership of NFTPrivateSeller | 26 |
| 7.10 | Unit Test | 27 |
| 8. | Verify claims | 28 |
| 9. | Executive Summary | 29 |
| 10. | Deployed Smart Contract..... | 29 |



1. Disclaimer

The audit makes no statements or warranties about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only.

The information presented in this report is confidential and privileged. If you are reading this report, you agree to keep it confidential, not to copy, disclose or disseminate without the agreement of AliumSwap. If you are not the intended receptor of this document, remember that any disclosure, copying or dissemination of it is forbidden.

| Major Versions / Date | Description |
|-----------------------|---|
| 0.1 (15.03.2021) | Layout |
| 0.5 (16.03.2021) | Verify Claims and Test Deployment |
| 0.6 (17.03.2021) | Testing SWC Checks |
| 0.8 (17.03.2021) | Automated Security Testing Manual Security Testing |
| 0.9 (18.03.2021) | Summary and Recommendation |
| 1.0 (19.03.2021) | Final document |
| 1.1 (22.03.2021) | Added fixed commits |
| 1.2 (23.03.2021) | Added deployed contracts |

2. About the Project and Company

Company address: NA (ANON)

Website: <http://alium.finance>

Twitter: <http://twitter.com/alium.finance>

Medium: <https://aliumswap.medium.com>

Telegram (ENG): https://t.me/aliumswap_official

Telegram (RU): https://t.me/aliumswap_ru

Telegram (JP): https://t.me/aliumswap_jp

Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/user/AliumSwap_Official

Discord: <https://discord.gg/BU6m6zqpVZ>

LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/company/75861509>



2.1 Project Overview

AliumSwap is a decentralized AMM Exchange with multi-blockchain option and NFTs. Aliumswap claims to be the first AMM DEX with multi-chain support, which starts on the Binance Smart Chain blockchain (BSC). BSC is very similar in its user properties to Ethereum, but the fees are currently hundreds of times lower.

AMM DEX Alium (AliumSwap) allows users to reduce the costs of commissions, they have improved and added some features that are not available on other exchanges on Binance Smart Chain. For example, they allow the user the ability to create any trading pair on their own, without unnecessary coordination with the exchange support.

3. Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level | Value | Vulnerability | Risk (Required Action) |
|---------------|---------|---|---|
| Critical | 9 – 10 | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |
| High | 7 – 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible. |
| Medium | 4 – 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |
| Low | 2 – 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| Informational | 0 – 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

4. Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

4.1 Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

4.2 Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)


| Dependency / Import Path | Source |
|--|---|
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/access/Ownable.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/ERC721/ERC721.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Counters.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/utils/Counters.sol |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol | https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/v3.4.0/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol |
| Whitelist.sol | https://github.com/HQ20/contracts/blob/6a4f166ca8ae0789955a33a0175edfa2dcb4b69f/contracts/access/Whitelist.sol |

4.3 Tested Contract Files

The following are the MD5 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different MD5 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different MD5 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review


| File | Fingerprint (MD5) |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| AliumCollectible.sol | 0689a8a1214ba28e45e437ab9d19f4f1 |
| AliumCollectionMintable.sol | 8817fcc598447a182fec2a7a176b8983 |
| IAliumCollectible.sol | e1d9f59f9e74a9dbb59b8b92a613a6f7 |
| IERC20Optional.sol | 41b6568ec414a00e2946f3a486c60f9a |
| NFTPrivateSeller.sol | 8295bb0a9481e1f6eefad3d0d68f48e4 |
| Whitelist.sol | f58ed7fdd5c62855f19f7d9d46708bd7 |

4.4 Metrics / CallGraph






Full version: http://chainsulting.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/aliumswap_solidity-metrics.html

4.5 Metrics / Source Lines




4.6 Metrics / Capabilities





| Solidity Versions observed | |  Experimental Features | |  Can Receive Funds | |  Uses Assembly | |  Has Destroyable Contracts | | | |
|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| <div>=0.6.2</div> | | | | <div></div> | | <div>**** (0 asm blocks)</div> | | <div></div> | | | |
|  Transfers ETH | |  Low-Level Calls | |  DelegateCall | |  Uses Hash Functions | |  ECTrecover | |  New/Create/Create2 | |
| <div>yes</div> | | <div></div> | | <div></div> | | <div>yes</div> | | <div></div> | | <div></div> | |

|  Public |  Payable |
|--|---|
| 37 | 0 |

| External | Internal | Private | Pure | View |
|----------|----------|---------|------|------|
| 15 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 9 |



4.7 Metrics / Source Unites in Scope

| File | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score | Capabilities |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|----------------|---|
| contracts/NFTPrivateSeller.sol | 1 | | 208 | 185 | 148 | | 114 |  |
| contracts/AliumCollectible.sol | 1 | | 161 | 140 | 110 | | 74 | |
| contracts/IERC20Optional.sol | | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | | 3 |  |
| contracts/Whitelist.sol | 1 | | 72 | 72 | 35 | 25 | 33 | |
| contracts/IAliumCollectible.sol | | 1 | 42 | 4 | 3 | | 23 | |
| contracts/AliumCollectionMintable.sol | 1 | | 22 | 22 | 18 | | 15 |  |
| Totals | 4 | 2 | 510 | 427 | 317 | 25 | 262 |  |

Legend: []

- **Lines**: total lines of the source unit
- **nLines**: normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
- **nSLOC**: normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
- **Comment Lines**: lines containing single or block comments
- **Complexity Score**: a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

5. Scope of Work

The AliumSwap Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested. The scope of the audit is the AliumSwap NFT Collectible contract.

Following contracts with the direct imports has been tested:

- AliumCollectible.sol
- NFTPrivateSeller.sol

The team put forward the following assumptions regarding the security, usage of the contracts:

- A user can buy exact amount of nft cards from one pool at a time, i.e. if a user pays for 5 cards from pool 2 he gets 5 cards from pool 2.
- A user is charged for the exact amount of fee and in selected currency only, i.e. if a user buys 5 cards from pool 3 and has selected to pay in USDT he is charged for 5 cards x 15 000 USDT = 75 000 USDT.
- A user cannot buy more cards than are left in a pool, i.e. if there are 3 cards left in pool 1 a user can't buy 4 or more cards.
- The fee is sent only to the Founders address and can't be changed by anyone except the owner.
- Bought cards are sent to the buyer's address and can't be intercepted in the process.
- Owner rights are transferrable by the current owner.
- The owner can edit the Whitelist (can add and remove addresses that are allowed to make purchases).
- Only the owner is allowed to edit the Whitelist.
- Overall smart contract security needs to be checked

The main goal of this audit was to verify these claims. The auditors can provide additional feedback on the code upon the client's request.

5.1 Manual and Automated Vulnerability Test

CRITICAL ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Critical issues** in the code of the smart contract.

HIGH ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no High issues** in the code of the smart contract.

MEDIUM ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Medium issues** in the code of the smart contract.

LOW ISSUES

5.1.1 Same require checks in every function

Severity: LOW

Status: **FIXED**

File(s) affected: AliumCollectible.sol

| Attack / Description | Code Snippet | Result/Recommendation |
|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Same require checks in every function. | Line: 63 – 66, 80-83, 93-96 | It is recommended to use modifiers. For admin roll checks, there is already „onlyAdmin“ modifier (used in line 145), which should be used. |

INFORMATIONAL ISSUES



5.1.2 Missing natspec documentation

Severity: INFORMATIONAL

Status: **FIXED**

File(s) affected: NFTPrivateSeller.sol, AliumCollectible.sol





| Attack / Description | Code Snippet | Result/Recommendation |
|--|--------------|--|
| Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This special form is named the Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format (NatSpec). | NA | <p>It is recommended to include natspec documentation and follow the doxygen style including @author, @title, @notice, @dev, @param, @return and make it easier to review and understand your smart contract.</p> <p>The team addressed the issue while auditing and added more documentation parts. https://github.com/1inch-exchange/mooniswap-v2/pull/13/commits</p> |

5.2. SWC Attacks & Special Checks

| ID | Title | Relationships | Test Result |
|-------------------------|---|--|---|
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code |  |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information |  |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator |  |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |  |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality |  |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order |  |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition |  |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller |  |

| ID | Title | Relationships | Test Result |
|-------------------------|---|--|-------------|
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | ✓ |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | ✓ |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values | ✓ |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | ✓ |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | CWE-665: Improper Initialization | ✓ |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | ✓ |
| SWC-116 | Timestamp Dependence | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | ✓ |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | ✓ |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | ✓ |

| ID | Title | Relationships | Test Result |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions |  |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere |  |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function |  |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation |  |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer |  |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards |  |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow |  |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control |  |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control |  |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value |  |

| ID | Title | Relationships | Test Result |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|--|---|
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime |  |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities |  |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation |  |
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards |  |

7. Test Deployment

7.1 Deployment AliumCollectible Contract

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0xb8fa5be59e0244da6f06065c159766e89cc07ca2e04b9378505ca17dd7bb5394>

Contract: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/address/0x02eda4046af868744c7f6240ee1e810f7fac173c>

7.2 Deployment DAI Contract

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0x27d7cd468ad5ddcf52407e332c6d6e6cbe98327e0609678a62781f3ebbd911cb>

Contract: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/address/0x55927b6269f08faca91fc1b827dd99042c64f1f0>


7.3 Create new token type

createNewTokenType

_nominalPrice:

_maxTotal:

_info:



Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0xdd24ca9c5b6f2ebf176388112733c56bf0954ae7334b3c4309fa0f36779f7b48>

7.4 Deployment NFTPrivateSeller Contract

CONTRACT

NFTPrivateSeller - browser/contracts/NFTPrivateSeller.sol

DEPLOY

_NFT: 0x02EDA4046af868744C7F6240ee1E810F7fac173C

_FOUNDERDETAILS: 0x2F1602FD37228b32Ad8D13137b1B620862771909

_NFTTYPES: [2]

_STABLECOINS: ["0x55927B6269f08Faca91fc1B827dd99042c64f1F0"]

_WHITELIST: []

transact

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0xd705db130e90c0c27d4d981ab8835789f6f96e202b1ea0bc7c0d8c04cc66b0e0>

Contract: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/address/0xc6f29eb74d39631bb056baff50860cc8c26681ac>

7.5 Add buyer to whitelist (only by owner)

The owner and only the owner can edit the whitelist of NFTPrivateSeller.

addMember 0x97E1cD3a5a366fc624399A4209C8E681EcFE3c1a

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0xe728aec499461c8519c0fc46087797a3cccc4cd34d6f6b9c8c781fe6cf80a9b0>

7.6 Buy one token with whitelisted address

Only whitelisted addresses are able to buy tokens. The total supply increases correctly by buying. The purchased item is mapped correctly to the buyers address and is send to the correct address. The purchased value is sent directly to the founder.

buy

^

_stablecoin: 0x55927B6269f08Faca91fc18827dd99042c64f1F0

_type: 2

_amount: 1000000000000000000

transact

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0x012593216d605708b27aeeb8b0d57f0584bc49fdd9f9ac390c2e66c8d5950ff0>

getTypeInfo

2

▼

0:

uint256: nominalPrice 100

1:

uint256: totalSupply 1

2:

uint256: maxSupply 5

3:

string: info second best nft

4:

address: minterOnly 0xC6F29Eb74d39631bB056baFf50860Cc8c26681AC

balanceOf

0x97E1cD3a5a366fc624399A4209C8E681EcF3c1a

▼


0:

uint256: 1

7.7 Buy Batch

Buy batch is working as expected. The price is purchased to the founder and the correct amount of tokens is send to the buyer.

buyBatch



_stablecoin: 0x55927B6269f08Faca91fc1B827dd99042c64f1F0

_type: 2

_amount: 20000000000000000000

_items: 2

transact

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0x90e9d277925dcce23b8a43ee38be41b737469a89703d8f7fbd2e5a1f3f2a4911>

7.8 Change founder by owner

Only the owner is able to change the founder of NFTPrivateSeller.



A screenshot of a web interface showing a function call. On the left is an orange button labeled 'changeFounder'. To its right is a text input field containing the hexadecimal address '0x5A5F0bC152E94fcEF03540426FD64ecFd204CB70'. A small blue downward arrow icon is visible to the right of the input field.


Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0xfc696ac21815e215942ab551bfa55561d7e7d957d719456f2a7da8905b4e577b>

After buying again, the purchased value is sent to the new founder:

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0x969c96a8ac4ec099ef6c868ccb3ad12be36ab031569a384fd259827f9cff15b2>


7.9 Transfer ownership of NFTPrivateSeller

The ownership is transferable by the current owner.



A screenshot of a web interface showing a function call. At the top is a blue button labeled 'owner'. Below it, the text '0: address: 0x2F1602FD37228b32Ad8D13137b18620862771909' is displayed. Below this is the function name 'transferOwnership' in blue. Underneath is a text input field labeled 'newOwner:' containing the hexadecimal address '0x5A5F0bC152E94fcEF03540426FD64ecFd204CB70'. To the right of the input field is a small blue upward arrow icon. At the bottom right is an orange button labeled 'transact' with a clipboard icon to its left.

Tx: <https://kovan.etherscan.io/tx/0x74efa42d1bfb813f28bc4acc623357e4bc2f01c341c3ce325d5b4d8d47c74d7d>



A screenshot of a web interface showing a blue button labeled 'owner'. Below it, the text '0: address: 0x5A5F0bC152E94fcEF03540426FD64ecFd204CB70' is displayed.

7.10 Unit Test

NFTPrivateSeller

Management

✓ should change founder (721ms)

✓ should repair tokens (1525ms)

Sell

✓ should buy 1 nft token type 1 (2124ms)

✓ should buy batch 2 nft token type 2 (2592ms)


✓ should fail on batch buy 2'nd nft token type 1 (collection type limit 1 item) (1111ms)

✓ should fail on buy 2'nd nft token type 1 (collection type limit 1 item) (2117ms)


6 passing (11s)

8. Verify claims


8.1 A user can buy exact amount of nft cards from one pool at a time, i.e. if a user pays for 5 cards from pool 2 he gets 5 cards from pool 2

Status: tested and verified 


8.2 A user is charged for the exact amount of fee and in selected currency only, i.e. if a user buys 5 cards from pool 3 and has selected to pay in USDT he is charged for 5 cards x 15 000 USDT = 75 000 USDT.

Status: tested and verified 


8.3 A user cannot buy more cards than are left in a pool, i.e. if there are 3 cards left in pool 1 a user can't buy 4 or more cards.

Status: tested and verified 


8.4 The fee is sent only to the Founders address and can't be changed by anyone except the owner.

Status: tested and verified 


8.5 Bought cards are sent to the buyer's address and can't be intercepted in the process.

Status: tested and verified 


8.6 Owner rights are transferrable by the current owner.

Status: tested and verified 

8.7 The owner can edit the Whitelist (can add and remove addresses that are allowed to make purchases).

Status: tested and verified 

8.8 Only the owner is allowed to edit the Whitelist.

Status: tested and verified 

9. Executive Summary

Two (2) independent Chainsulting experts performed an unbiased and isolated audit of the smart contract codebase. The overall code quality of the project is very good, and the simplicity greatly benefits the overall security. It correctly implemented widely-used and reviewed contracts from OpenZeppelin and for safe mathematical operations. It is recommended to include natspec documentation and follow the doxygen style including @author, @title, @notice, @dev, @param, @return and make it easier to review and understand your smart contract.

The main goal of the audit was to verify the claims regarding the security of the smart contract and the functions. During the audit, no critical issues were found after the manual and automated security testing.

10. Deployed Smart Contract

VERIFIED

Smart Contract is deployed here:

Alium NFT

<https://bscscan.com/address/0x2991cc4aB9286416b7925916aE6bD2Dc5AF7bAcb#code>

NFT private seller

<https://bscscan.com/address/0xcde039E55eaFf293e40085a1BccEBdaDb445d626#code>