

### **Gravis Finance**

**Farm** 

**SMART CONTRACT AUDIT** 

14.10.2021

Made in Germany by Chainsulting.de



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### 1. Disclaimer

The audit makes no statements or warrantees about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only.

The information presented in this report is confidential and privileged. If you are reading this report, you agree to keep it confidential, not to copy, disclose or disseminate without the agreement of Gravis Finance. If you are not the intended receptor of this document, remember that any disclosure, copying or dissemination of it is forbidden.

Major Versions / Date	Description
0.1 (27.08.2021)	Layout
0.2 (28.08.2021)	Test Deployment
0.5 (28.08.2021)	Automated Security Testing
	Manual Security Testing
0.6 (28.08.2021)	Testing SWC Checks
0.7 (30.08.2021)	Verify Claims
0.9 (30.08.2021)	Summary and Recommendation
1.0 (30.08.2021)	Final document
1.1 (14.10.2021)	Adding deployed contract address



# 2. About the Project and Company

### **Company address:**

Gravis Finance KYC verified

Website: <a href="https://www.gravis.finance">https://www.gravis.finance</a>

Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/gammarosigma">https://twitter.com/gammarosigma</a>

Telegram: <a href="https://t.me/gravisfinance">https://t.me/gravisfinance</a>

Medium: <a href="https://gravis-finance.medium.com">https://gravis-finance.medium.com</a>

**GitHub**: <a href="https://github.com/gravis-finance">https://github.com/gravis-finance</a>

**Discord**: <a href="https://discord.gg/Mg2rQcFx">https://discord.gg/Mg2rQcFx</a>

**Documentation**: <a href="https://docs.gravis.finance">https://docs.gravis.finance</a>





# 2.1 Project Overview

Gravis Finance uses the Multi-chain and Cross-chain philosophy that allows players to receive GRVX tokens on various Blockchain networks (Polygon, Ethereum, and Binance Smart Chain).

A simple bridge between different blockchains avoids high commissions, and smart farming technology. (A)steroid Mining is being created as a community-driven project that will allow users to add game mechanics, generate asteroids for farming, and even entire worlds in the Gravis Finance Universe.



# 3. Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 – 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	1	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	
Low	2 – 3.9	have a significant impact on	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk



## 4. Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## 4.1 Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i.Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii.Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i.Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.



# 4.2 Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Dependency / Import Path	Source
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v4.2.0/contracts/access/Ownable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v4.2.0/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v4.2.0/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol


### 4.3 Tested Contract Files


The following are the MD5 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different MD5 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different MD5 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review

File	Fingerprint (MD5)
./Farming.sol	d9b59bdcdabb07b16efae10631248d69
./ITypedNFT.sol	21f32dd8c4482de29de2470077753b73




# 4.4 Metrics / CallGraph







## 4.5 Metrics / Source Lines & Risk





# 4.6 Metrics / Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed							Has Destroyable Contracts	
^0.8.4						**** (0 asn	n blocks)	
Transfers ETH	≯ Lo Calls	ow-Level	DelegateCa	ıll	Uses Hash Functions		<b>ECRecover</b>	6 New/Create/Create2

## Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.



#### StateVariables

Total	<b>Public</b>
7	6



# 4.7 Metrics / Source Unites in Scope

Typ e	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Line s	nLine s	nSLO C	Comme nt Lines	Comple x. Score	Capabilities
Q	contracts/ITypedNFT.		1	20	5	3	1	9	
South from	contracts/Farming.sol	1		142	142	104	5	53	
and the state of t	Totals	1	1	162	147	107	6	62	

#### Legend: [-]

- Lines: total lines of the source unit
- **nLines**: normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
- nSLOC: normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
- Comment Lines: lines containing single or block comments
- **Complexity Score**: a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)




# 5. Scope of Work

The Gravis Finance Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested. The scope of the audit is the Farming contract.

The team put forward the following assumptions regarding the security, usage of the contracts:

- Staking and rewards are working as expected
- Owner cannot burn or lock user funds
- Owner cannot pause the contract
- The smart contract is coded according to the newest standards and in a secure way.

The main goal of this audit was to verify these claims. The auditors can provide additional feedback on the code upon the client's request.





## 5.1 Manual and Automated Vulnerability Test

#### **CRITICAL ISSUES**

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found no Critical issues in the code of the smart contract.

### **HIGH ISSUES**

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found no High issues in the code of the smart contract.

#### **MEDIUM ISSUES**

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found no Medium issues in the code of the smart contract

### **LOW ISSUES**

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Low issues** in the code of the smart contract

### **INFORMATIONAL ISSUES**

5.1.1 Missing natspec documentation

Severity: INFORMATIONAL

Status: FIXED

File(s) affected: Farming.sol, ITypedNFT.sol

Attack / Description	Code Snippet	Result/Recommendation
Solidity contracts can use a	NA	It is recommended to include natspec documentation
special form of comments to		and follow the doxygen style including @author,
provide rich documentation for		@title, @notice, @dev, @param, @return and make
functions, return variables and		it easier to review and understand your smart
more. This special form is		contract.



named the Ethereum Natural	
Language Specification Format	
(NatSpec).	

# 5.2. SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	<b>✓</b>
<u>SWC-130</u>	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	<b>✓</b>
SWC-129	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	<u>~</u>
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	<u>~</u>
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	<b>✓</b>
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	<u>~</u>



ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
<u>SWC-124</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	<b>✓</b>
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	<u>~</u>
<u>SWC-122</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	<b>✓</b>
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	<b>✓</b>
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	<b>✓</b>
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	<b>✓</b>
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	<u>~</u>
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	<u>~</u>
SWC-116	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	<u>~</u>



ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	<u>~</u>
<u>SWC-114</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	<b>✓</b>
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	<b>✓</b>
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	<b>✓</b>
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	<b>✓</b>
SWC-110	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	<b>✓</b>
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	<b>✓</b>
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	<b>✓</b>
SWC-107	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	<b>✓</b>
<u>SWC-106</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	<b>✓</b>



ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	<b>✓</b>
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	<b>✓</b>
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	X
<u>SWC-102</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	<b>✓</b>
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	<b>✓</b>
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	<b>✓</b>



## 5.3. Verify Claims

#### 5.3.1 Staking and rewards are working as expected

Status: tested and verified

Farming

Contract: https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x638f0435f43f7efac5d245cf38f9190edb6dbbc9

Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x004d013b0cdaa56984d2b03db174909d3748183cb0c162929dd9642d8e1a81a4

#### MAINCOLLECTIBLE

Contract: https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x08a6adc2a3cb68bb896b987b777b1f01ce74f71a

Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x8a56332d5abe4ea6be8ff82f0e2d9b71b1189a21215f237dfaa3f8b90250c783

#### SIDECOLLECTIBLE

Contract: https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xd30e4c18e5bb8aabeca142d981f753c32f0c4b41

Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x6fb73540f688b16924e6c1acb5c592375a8c2a23cc210f050e342b870971071e

#### REWARDSTOKEN

Contract: https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x53ab547be6dfa79f2e2b966a27c546497c03cb04

Tx: https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x85a844c48d9a538aa61b514d2ba156e20c5d7e8cb7a9bdb0386f58113eb7e8fd



#### 5.3.2 Owner cannot burn or lock staked NFTs

**Status:** tested and verified

There aren't such functions to burn or lock

### 5.3.3 Owner cannot pause the contract

Status: tested and verified ✓

There is no function to pause the contract



5.3.4 The smart contract is coded according to the newest standards and in a secure way.

Status: tested and verified ✓



# 6. Executive Summary

Two (2) independent Chainsulting experts performed an unbiased and isolated audit of the smart contract codebase. The final debriefs took place on the August 30, 2021.

The main goal of the audit was to verify the claims regarding the security of the smart contract and the functions. During the audit, no critical issues were found after the manual and automated security testing and the claims been successfully verified.

# 7. Deployed Smart Contract

**VERIFIED** 

https://bscscan.com/address/0x68671Ee67A6EBB95AB737c389D73e99BdAfAA917#code

