



Gravis Finance

Gravis Chef

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

20.10.2021

Made in Germany by Chainsulting.de



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1. Disclaimer

The audit makes no statements or warranties about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only.

The information presented in this report is confidential and privileged. If you are reading this report, you agree to keep it confidential, not to copy, disclose or disseminate without the agreement of Gravis Finance. If you are not the intended receptor of this document, remember that any disclosure, copying or dissemination of it is forbidden.

Major Versions / Date	Description
0.1 (06.09.2021)	Layout
0.2 (07.09.2021)	Test Deployment
0.5 (08.09.2021)	Automated Security Testing Manual Security Testing
0.6 (08.09.2021)	Testing SWC Checks
0.7 (08.09.2021)	Verify Claims
0.9 (08.09.2021)	Summary and Recommendation
1.0 (08.09.2021)	Final document
1.1 (20.10.2021)	Adding deployed contract address

2. About the Project and Company

Company address:

Gravis Finance
KYC verified



Website: <https://www.gravis.finance>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/gammarosigma>

Telegram: <https://t.me/gravisfinance>

Medium: <https://gravis-finance.medium.com>

GitHub: <https://github.com/gravis-finance>

Discord: <https://discord.gg/Mg2rQcFx>

Documentation: <https://docs.gravis.finance>

2.1 Project Overview

Gravis Finance uses the Multi-chain and Cross-chain philosophy that allows players to receive GRVX tokens on various Blockchain networks (Polygon, Ethereum, and Binance Smart Chain).

A simple bridge between different blockchains avoids high commissions, and smart farming technology. (A)steroid Mining is being created as a community-driven project that will allow users to add game mechanics, generate asteroids for farming, and even entire worlds in the Gravis Finance Universe.

3. Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 – 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

4. Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

4.1 Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Chainsulting describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

4.2 Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)



Dependency / Import Path	Source
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.1.0/contracts/access/Ownable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.1.0/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.1.0/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/v3.1.0/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol

4.3 Tested Contract Files



The following are the MD5 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different MD5 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different MD5 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review

File	Fingerprint (MD5)
./GravisChef.sol	f1232af96440aa4f958ccf6fcf829dcb

4.4 Metrics / CallGraph



4.5 Metrics / Source Lines & Risk



4.6 Metrics / Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed		❓ Experimental Features	❓ Can Receive Funds	❓ Uses Assembly	❓ Has Destroyable Contracts
<code>^0.6.12</code>				**** (0 asm blocks)	
❓ Transfers ETH	❓ Low-Level Calls	❓ DelegateCall	❓ Uses Hash Functions	❓ ECREcover	❓ New/Create/Create2
<code>yes</code>					

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Public	Payable			
20	0			
External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
2	23	0	2	5

StateVariables

Total	Public
13	13

4.7 Metrics / Source Unites in Scope

Type	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
?	GravisChef.sol	1		513	505	301	121	234	?
?	Totals	1		513	505	301	121	234	?

Legend: [+]

- **Lines:** total lines of the source unit
- **nLines:** normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
- **nSLOC:** normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
- **Comment Lines:** lines containing single or block comments
- **Complexity Score:** a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

5. Scope of Work

The Gravis Finance Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested. The scope of the audit is the Gravis Chef contract.

The team put forward the following assumptions regarding the security, usage of the contracts:

- Deposit and withdraw of LP Token is working as expected
- Fees / rewards are calculated correctly
- Owner cannot burn or lock user funds
- Owner cannot pause the contract
- The smart contract is coded according to the newest standards and in a secure way.

The main goal of this audit was to verify these claims. The auditors can provide additional feedback on the code upon the client's request.

5.1 Manual and Automated Vulnerability Test

CRITICAL ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Critical issues** in the code of the smart contract.

HIGH ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no High issues** in the code of the smart contract.

MEDIUM ISSUES

During the audit, Chainsulting's experts found **no Medium issues** in the code of the smart contract

LOW ISSUES

5.1.1 Design flaw in massUpdatePools() function

Severity: LOW

Code: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

File(s) affected: ALL

Status: **FIXED**

Attack / Description	Code Snippet	Result/Recommendation
The massUpdatePools() function executes the updatePool() function, which is a state modifying function for all added pools. With the current design, the added	Line 153 - 158: <pre>function massUpdatePools() public { uint256 length = poolInfo.length; for (uint256 pid = 0; pid < length; ++pid) { updatePool(pid); } }</pre>	We suggest making the contract capable of removing unnecessary/ended pools to reduce the loop round in the massUpdatePools() function as follows: require(_pid < poolInfo.length);

<p>pools cannot be removed. They can only be disabled by setting the pool.allocPoint to 0. Even if a pool is disabled, the updatePool() function for this pool is still called. Therefore, if new pools continue to be added to this contract, the poolInfo.length will continue to grow and this function will eventually be unusable due to excessive gas usage.</p>	<pre> } } </pre>	<pre> poolInfo[_pid] = poolInfo[poolInfo.length-1]; poolInfo.length--; </pre>
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5.1.2 Potential reentrancy risk

Severity: LOW

Code: CWE-663 / SWC-107

File(s) affected: ALL

Status: **FIXED**

Attack / Description	Code Snippet	Result/Recommendation
<p>A common coding best practice in Solidity is the adherence of checks-effects-interactions principle. This principle is effective in mitigating a serious attack vector known as re-entrancy. Via this particular attack vector, a malicious contract can be reentering a vulnerable</p>	<p>Ex. Line: 332 – 346</p> <pre> function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid) public { PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid]; UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender]; uint256 amount = applyFee(feeStage[0], user.amount); uint256 feeAmount = calculateFee(feeStage[0], user.amount); </pre>	<p>We should mention that the supported token in the contract do implement standard ERC20 interfaces and their related token contract is not vulnerable or exploitable for re-entrancy. However, it is important to take precautions in making use of nonReentrant to block possible re-entrancy.</p> <p>We recommend to add a nonReentrant modifier to the following functions: emergencyWithdraw (),</p>

<p>contract in a nested manner. Specifically, it first calls a function in the vulnerable contract, but before the first instance of the function call is finished, second call can be arranged to re-enter the vulnerable contract by invoking functions that should only be executed once. We notice there is an occasion where the checks-effects-interactions principle is violated. Using the GravisChef as an example, the emergencyWithdraw() function is provided to externally call a token contract to transfer assets. However, the invocation of an external contract requires extra care in avoiding the above re-entrancy. Apparently, the interaction with the external contract starts before effecting the update on internal states hence violating the principle. In this particular case, if the external contract has certain hidden logic that may be capable of launching re-entrancy via the same entry function.</p>	<pre> user.amount = 0; user.rewardDebt = 0; pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), amount); pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(feeRecipient), feeAmount); emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg.sender, _pid, amount); } </pre>	<p>deposit (), withdraw () and adding the Reentrancy Guard library from Open Zeppelin.</p>
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INFORMATIONAL ISSUES

5.1.3 A floating pragma is set.

Severity: INFORMATIONAL

Code: SWC-103

File(s) affected: ALL

Status: ACKNOWLEDGED

Attack / Description	Code Snippet	Result/Recommendation
The current pragma Solidity directive is "^0.6.12". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.	Line 1: <code>pragma solidity ^0.6.12;</code>	It is recommended to follow the latter example, as future compiler versions may handle certain language constructions in a way the developer did not foresee. i.e. Pragma solidity 0.6.12 See SWC-103: https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-103

5.1.4 Improper function visibility

Severity: INFORMATIONAL

Code: CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

File(s) affected: ALL

Status: **FIXED**

Attack / Description	Code Snippet	Result/Recommendation
Functions with public visibility copy calldata to memory when being executed, while external functions can read directly from calldata. Memory allocation uses more resources (gas) than reading directly from calldata. The following functions are set to public and never called from any internal function.	Functions add(), set (), deposit (), withdraw (), emergencyWithdraw (), claimReward (), setTokenPerBlock ()	We suggest changing all functions' visibility to external if they are not called from any internal function.

5.2. SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	✓
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	✓
SWC-129	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	✓
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	✓
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	✓
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	✓
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	✓
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	✓


ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	✓
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	✓
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	✓
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	✓
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	✓
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	✓
SWC-116	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	✓
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	✓
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	✓

ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	✓
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	✓
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	✓
SWC-110	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	✓
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	✓
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	✓
SWC-107	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	✗
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	✓
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	✓
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	✓


ID	Title	Relationships	Test Result
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	X
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	✓
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	✓
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	X

5.3. Verify Claims


5.3.1 Deposit and withdraw of LP Token is working as expected

Status: tested and verified 

5.3.2 Fees / rewards are calculated correctly


Status: tested and verified 

5.3.3 Owner cannot burn or lock user funds

Status: tested and verified 


There aren't such functions to burn or lock

5.3.4 Owner cannot pause the contract

Status: tested and verified 

There is no function to pause the contract

5.3.5 The smart contract is coded according to the newest standards and in a secure way.

Status: tested and verified 

6. Executive Summary

Two (2) independent Chainsulting experts performed an unbiased and isolated audit of the smart contract codebase. The final debriefs took place on the September 08, 2021.

The main goal of the audit was to verify the claims regarding the security of the smart contract and the functions. During the audit, no critical issues were found after the manual and automated security testing and the claims been successfully verified. Please check the low and informational issues and get back to your auditor.

7. Deployed Smart Contract

VERIFIED

<https://polygonscan.com/address/0x9d8718a14fcd3fd71e7fa7ba6b8d9f813e168807#code>

<https://bscscan.com/address/0x68671Ee67A6EBB95AB737c389D73e99BdAfAA917#code>

