



Horizen – Airdrop

Smart Contract Security Audit

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



1.1 INTRODUCTION

Horizen Labs engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their Airdrop smart contract beginning on February 3rd, 2022 and ending on February 7th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract provided in the GitHub repository [HorizenLabs/grapes-erc20](https://github.com/HorizenLabs/grapes-erc20).

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a week for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were addressed by [Horizen Labs team](#).

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. ([MythX](#))
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Brownie](#), [Remix IDE](#))

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following [smart contract](#):

- [AirdropGrapesToken.sol](#)

Commit ID: [941af30005fdf0079207ad025c41f0571d261cf9](#)

Fixed Commit ID: [498b5453953b33e142947f4a9365ccc88449085d](#)

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	1	1	1	3

LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

(HAL-02)				
			(HAL-01)	
		(HAL-03)		
(HAL-04) (HAL-05) (HAL-06)				

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - GAMMA TOKENS ARE SET AS CLAIMED EVEN WHEN THEY PROVIDE NO BONUS REWARDS	High	SOLVED - 02/15/2022
HAL02 - DOS WITH BLOCK GAS LIMIT	Medium	SOLVED - 02/15/2022
HAL03 - MISSING ZERO ADDRESS CHECKS	Low	SOLVED - 02/15/2022
HAL04 - UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0	Informational	SOLVED - 02/15/2022
HAL05 - USING ++I CONSUMES LESS GAS THAN I++ IN LOOPS	Informational	SOLVED - 02/15/2022
HAL06 - STATE VARIABLES MISSING IMMUTABLE MODIFIER	Informational	SOLVED - 02/15/2022



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) GAMMA TOKENS ARE SET AS CLAIMED EVEN WHEN THEY PROVIDE NO BONUS REWARDS - HIGH

Description:

The gamma tokens owned will only increase the amount of tokens that can be claimed in the case that the gamma token can be paired with another alpha/beta token owned, as it is specified in the line 167 of the contract:

```
uint256 gammaToBeClaim = min(unclaimedAlphaBalance + unclaimedBetaBalance
, unclaimedGamaBalance);
```

This means that a user who holds 1 alpha NFT and 2 gamma NFTs will always get his grapes token amount increased once by 669.627, not twice, getting 6520.054 grapes tokens airdropped because of his alpha NFT and an extra 669.627 tokens because of one of the gamma NFTs he holds.

The problem with this scenario is that the second gamma NFT of the user would also be set as claimed in the smart contract, even though that NFT did not provide him with any reward.

Proof of Concept:

[illegible]

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 4

Impact - 4

Recommendation:

It is recommended to modify the `claimTokens()` function logic in order that it only marks as claimed those gamma NFTs that were actually providing a bonus in the airdrop.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [Horizen Labs team](#) addressed the issue in the `claimTokens()` function. Now, only those gamma NFTs that are actually providing a bonus in the airdrop are marked as claimed:

```
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 10000000000000000000000  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
contract_alpha.balanceOf(user1) -> 1  
contract_beta.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
contract_gamma.balanceOf(user1) -> 2  
contract_AirdropGrapesToken.alphaClaimed(1) -> False  
contract_AirdropGrapesToken.gammaClaimed(1) -> False  
contract_AirdropGrapesToken.gammaClaimed(2) -> False  
Calling -> contract_AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens({'from': user1})  
Transaction sent: 0x4b0f02f6179d42724b9bf4597a4faefa6b40ad35bc433dlb4263790e3f1967da  
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 80000000 Nonce: 0  
AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens confirmed Block: 14216666 Gas used: 185496 (0.02%)
```

```
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 9999281031900000000000000000
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 718968100000000000000000
contract_AirdropGrapesToken.alphaClaimed(1) -> True
contract_AirdropGrapesToken.gammaClaimed(1) -> True
contract_AirdropGrapesToken.gammaClaimed(2) -> False
```

3.2 (HAL-02) DOS WITH BLOCK GAS LIMIT - MEDIUM

Description:

In the contract `AirdropGrapesToken` the function `claimTokens()`, as its name indicates, is used by the different NFT holders to claim their corresponding grapes tokens. This function iterates over the different `tokenIds` held by the caller, setting them as `claimed` so no user will be able to claim for the same `tokenId` twice.

In the case that the user calling this function is, for example, a whale that holds more than around 800 NFTs of any supported type in total, the gas costs of this function call would exceed the Ethereum mainnet block gas limit of 30 millions (block gas limit in Polygon is actually much lower than this). This means that the transaction would never get processed by a miner, making the user waste a lot of gas and not allowing the user to claim his grapes tokens:

[illegible]

Code Location:

Listing 1: AirdropGrapesToken.sol (Lines 105,113,122)


```
100     uint256 tokensToClaim;
101     uint256 gammaToBeClaim;
102
103     (tokensToClaim, gammaToBeClaim) =
104         getClaimableTokenAmountAndGammaToClaim(msg.sender);
105     for(uint256 i = 0; i < alpha.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++) {
106         uint256 tokenId = alpha.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(msg.sender, i)
107         ;
108         if(!alphaClaimed[tokenId]) {
109             alphaClaimed[tokenId] = true;
110             emit AlphaClaimed(tokenId, msg.sender, block.timestamp
111                 );
112         }
113     }
114     for(uint256 i = 0; i < beta.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++) {
115         uint256 tokenId = beta.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(msg.sender, i);
116         if(!betaClaimed[tokenId]) {
117             betaClaimed[tokenId] = true;
118             emit BetaClaimed(tokenId, msg.sender, block.timestamp)
119                 ;
120         }
121     }
122     uint256 currentGammaClaimed;
123     for(uint256 i = 0; i < gamma.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++) {
124         uint256 tokenId = gamma.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(msg.sender, i)
125         ;
126         if(!gammaClaimed[tokenId] && currentGammaClaimed <=
127             gammaToBeClaim) {
128             gammaClaimed[tokenId] = true;
129             emit GammaClaimed(tokenId, msg.sender, block.timestamp
130                 );
131             currentGammaClaimed++;
132         }
133     }
134     grapesToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, tokensToClaim);
135     totalClaimed += tokensToClaim;
136     emit AirDrop(msg.sender, tokensToClaim, block.timestamp);
137 }
```

Impact - 5

It is recommended to add a new function into the `AirdropGrapesToken` contract that allows the user to claim for a bundle of tokenIds and not all the held NFTs at once.

SOLVED: No functionality was added to the smart contract to address this. Although, **Halborn and Horizen Labs team** checked that the current top holder of alpha, beta, and gamma tokens got a total of 310 NFTs. This should not suppose a problem as the gas costs of calling **claimTokens()** with 310 NFTs are way below of the current block gas limit of **30.000.000** for the Ethereum mainnet. Some tests were executed, getting the results below:

1. A user with a total of 300 NFTs will pay 10.984.638 gas to perform the `claimTokens()` call:

[illegible]

2. A user with a total of 600 NFTs will pay 21.875.674 gas to perform the `claimTokens()` call:

```
contract_alpha.balanceOf(user1) -> 600  
contract_beta.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
contract_gamma.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 1000000000000000000000000  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
Calling -> contract_AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens({'from': user1})  
Transaction sent: 0x61b4ca754df250f8eddd139819b5c30c861f4e4cdbd8dae629ebcbaa5f563bl  
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 80000000 Nonce: 1  
AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens confirmed Block: 14217341 Gas used: 21875674 (2.73%)  
  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 9608796760000000000000000  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 39120324000000000000000000
```

3. A user with a total of 800 NFTs will pay 29.139.490 gas to perform the `claimTokens()` call:

```
contract_alpha.balanceOf(user1) -> 800  
contract_beta.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
contract_gamma.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 1000000000000000000000000  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
Calling -> contract_AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens({'from': user1})  
Transaction sent: 0xc192af8ecc158e8093624e6b164c4fc0e8f79a790588899ff63f7daa7790185c  
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 800000000 Nonce: 0  
AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens confirmed Block: 14217284 Gas used: 29139490 (3.64%)  
  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 947839568000000000000000000  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 521604320000000000000000000
```

As long as there are no holders with more than 800 NFTs in their wallet, there should be no issue in the `claimTokens()` call. Although, if that was the case, the user could also transfer some of his NFTs to another wallet and perform the claim from 2 different wallets as a mitigation.

3.3 (HAL-03) MISSING ZERO ADDRESS CHECKS - LOW

Description:

The constructor of the `AirdropGrapesToken` contract is missing address validation. Every address should be validated and checked that is different from zero. This is also considered a best practice.

Code Location:

Listing 2: `AirdropGrapesToken.sol` (Lines 62-65,70-73)

```
61 constructor(  
62     address _grapesTokenAddress,  
63     address _alphaContractAddress,  
64     address _betaContractAddress,  
65     address _gammaContractAddress,  
66     uint256 _ALPHA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT,  
67     uint256 _BETA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT,  
68     uint256 _GAMMA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT  
69 ) {  
70     grapesToken = IERC20(_grapesTokenAddress);  
71     alpha = ERC721Enumerable(_alphaContractAddress);  
72     beta = ERC721Enumerable(_betaContractAddress);  
73     gamma = ERC721Enumerable(_gammaContractAddress);  
74     ALPHA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT = _ALPHA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT;  
75     BETA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT = _BETA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT;  
76     GAMMA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT = _GAMMA_DISTRIBUTION_AMOUNT;  
77  
78     _pause();  
79 }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

It is recommended to validate that every address input is different from zero.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The **Horizen Labs team** now validates that every address input is different from zero.

3.4 (HAL-04) UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0 - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

`uint256` variables are already initialized to 0 by default. `uint256 i = 0` would reassign the 0 to `i` which wastes gas.

Code Location:

AirdropGrapesToken.sol

- Line 105: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < alpha.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){`
- Line 113: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < beta.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){`
- Line 122: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < gamma.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){`
- Line 146: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < alpha.balanceOf(_account); i++){`
- Line 153: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < beta.balanceOf(_account); i++){`
- Line 160: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < gamma.balanceOf(_account); i++){`

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to not initialize `uint256` variables to 0 to save some gas. For example, use instead:

```
for(uint256 i; i < alpha.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){.
```

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The initialization of `uint256` variables to 0 was removed by [Horizen Labs team](#) to save some gas.

3.5 (HAL-05) USING ++I CONSUMES LESS GAS THAN I++ IN LOOPS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In all the loops, the variable `i` is incremented using `i++`. It is known that, in loops, using `++i` costs less gas per iteration than `i++`. This also affects variables incremented inside the loop code block.

Code Location:

AirdropGrapesToken.sol

- Line 105: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < alpha.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){`
- Line 113: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < beta.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){`
- Line 122: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < gamma.balanceOf(msg.sender); i++){`
- Line 146: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < alpha.balanceOf(_account); i++){`
- Line 149: `unclaimedAlphaBalance++;`
- Line 153: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < beta.balanceOf(_account); i++){`
- Line 156: `unclaimedBetaBalance++;`
- Line 160: `for(uint256 i = 0; i < gamma.balanceOf(_account); i++){`
- Line 163: `unclaimedGamaBalance++;`

Proof of Concept:

For example, based in the following test contract:

Listing 3: Test.sol

```
1 //SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity 0.8.9;
3
4 contract test {
5     function postiincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
6         for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
7             }
```

```

8      }
9      function preiincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
10         for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
11             }
12         }
13     }

```

```

>>> test_contract.postiincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0x1ecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 44
test.postiincrement confirmed Block: 13622335 Gas used: 21620 (0.32%)

<Transaction '0x1ecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b'>
>>> test_contract.preiincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0x205f09a4d2268de4c1a40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c71a022b047614a
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 45
test.preiincrement confirmed Block: 13622336 Gas used: 21593 (0.32%)

<Transaction '0x205f09a4d2268de4c1a40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c71a022b047614a'>
>>> test_contract.postiincrement(10)
Transaction sent: 0x98c04430526a59balecf947c114b62666a4417165947d31bf300cd6ae68328033
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 46
test.postiincrement confirmed Block: 13622337 Gas used: 22673 (0.34%)

<Transaction '0x98c04430526a59balecf947c114b62666a4417165947d31bf300cd6ae68328033'>
>>> test_contract.preiincrement(10)
Transaction sent: 0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20e1de05
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 47
test.preiincrement confirmed Block: 13622338 Gas used: 22601 (0.34%)

<Transaction '0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20e1de05'>

```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `++i` instead of `i++` to increment the value of an `uint` variable inside a loop. This also applies to the variables declared inside the `for` loop, not just the iterator. On the other hand, this is not applicable outside of loops.

For example:

Listing 4: AirdropGrapesToken.sol (Lines 146,149)

```

146 for(uint256 i; i < alpha.balanceOf(_account); ++i) {
147     uint256 tokenId = alpha.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(_account, i);

```



```
148     if(!alphaClaimed[tokenId]) {  
149         ++unclaimedAlphaBalance;  
150     }  
151 }
```

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [Horizen Labs team](#) uses now `++i` to increment the variables inside loops, saving some gas.

3.6 (HAL-06) STATE VARIABLES MISSING IMMUTABLE MODIFIER – INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The `immutable` keyword was added to Solidity in 0.6.5. State variables can be marked `immutable` which causes them to be read-only, but only assignable in the constructor. The following state variables are missing the `immutable` modifier:

AirdropGrapesToken.sol

- Line 12: `IERC20 public grapesToken;;`
- Line 14: `ERC721Enumerable public alpha;`
- Line 15: `ERC721Enumerable public beta;`
- Line 16: `ERC721Enumerable public gamma;`

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add the `immutable` modifier to the state variables mentioned to save some gas.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Horizen Labs team` added the `immutable` modifier to the state variables suggested.



MANUAL TESTING



Halborn performed different manual tests in the `AirdropGrapesToken` contract to check for any logic flaws.

4.1 CLAIMED TOKENS CALCULATION

Multiple use cases were tested to see if the users were receiving the right amount of tokens:

Alphas owned	Betas owned	Gamma owned	Amount received	Notes
	1	0	0	6,52005E+21
	0	1	0	1,41855E+21
	0	0	1	0 (Nothing to claim)
	1	1	0	7,93861E+21
1	0	0	1	7,18968E+21 -> 6520054000000000000000 + 6696270000000000000000
0	1	1	0	2,08818E+21 -> 1418552000000000000000 + 6696270000000000000000
1	2	0	1	1,37097E+22 -> (65200540000000000000000 x 2) + 66962700000000000000000
2	0	0	2	1,43794E+22 -> (65200540000000000000000 x 2) + (66962700000000000000000 x 2)
1	1	0	3	7,18968E+21 -> 65200540000000000000000 + 66962700000000000000000

The calculation of the token amounts that can be claimed are correct.

The gamma tokens owned will only increase the amount of tokens that can be claimed in the case that the gamma token can be paired with another alpha/beta token owned, as it is specified in the line 167 of the contract:

```
uint256 gammaToBeClaim = min(unclaimedAlphaBalance + unclaimedBetaBalance
, unclaimedGamaBalance);
```

This can also be seen in the last line of the table shown above.

4.2 CONTRACT TOKEN BALANCE

100000000_000000000000000000 tokens will be distributed in this airdrop. If every NFT is claimed with the maximum bonus possible, 100000000_000000000000000000 as the balance of the contract would be enough?

Amount of alpha tokens = 10000

Amount of beta tokens = 17931

Amount of gamma tokens = 9602

In the case that each of those NFTs are claimed, this is the amount of

$$(10000 \times 6520_05400000000000000000) + (17931 \times 1418_55200000000000000000) + (9602 \times 669_62700000000000000000) = 97066354_36600000000000000000$$

In the second example, the user had, once again, only an alpha NET. He

```
contract_alpha.balanceOf(user1) -> 1  
contract_beta.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
contract_gamma.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 1000000000000000000000000  
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 0  
Calling -> contract_AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens({'from': user1})  
Transaction sent: 0x566ba59c8401b4b0b71e89254fbb6ade05ae2551bafc072571fa5904842ae272  
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 800000000 Nonce: 0  
AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens confirmed Block: 14134461 Gas used: 145963 (0.02%)
```

```
Calling -> contract AirdropGrapesToken.claimTokens({'from': user1})
```

```
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(contract_AirdropGrapesToken) -> 99993479946000000000000000
contract_ERC20_SimpleToken.balanceOf(user1) -> 6520054000000000000000000
```

```
contract ERC20 SimpleToken.balanceOf(newacc) -> 0
```



AUTOMATED TESTING



5.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABI and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither results:

AirdropGrapesToken.sol

```
AirdropGrapesToken.getClaimableTokenAmountFromClaim(address): unclaimedGmaBalance (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#159) is a local variable never initialized
AirdropGrapesToken.getClaimableTokenAmountFromClaim(address): unclaimedAlphaBalance (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#148) is a local variable never initialized
AirdropGrapesToken.getClaimableTokenAmountFromClaim(address): unclaimedBetaBalance (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#152) is a local variable never initialized
AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() currentGmaClaimed (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#131) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonuninitialized-local-variables

ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#382-403) ignores return value by ERC721Receiver(to).onERC721Received(msgSender(),from,tokenId,data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#389-399)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonunused-return

AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) has external calls inside a loop: i < alpha.balanceOf(msg.sender) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#105)
AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) has external calls inside a loop: tokenId = alpha.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(msg.sender,i) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#106)
AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) has external calls inside a loop: i_loops_0 < beta.balanceOf(msg.sender) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#113)
AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) has external calls inside a loop: tokenId_scope_1 = beta.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(msg.sender,i_scope_0) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#114)
AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) has external calls inside a loop: i_scope_2 = gamma.balanceOf(msg.sender) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#122)
AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) has external calls inside a loop: tokenId_scope_3 = gamma.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(msg.sender,i_scope_2) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#123)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonfor-in-a-loop

Variable ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes): revert (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#389) in ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#382-403) potentially used before declaration: revert (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#390)
Variable ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes): reason (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#391) in ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#382-403) potentially used before declaration: reason.length == 0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#392)
Variable ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes): reason (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#391) in ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#382-403) potentially used before declaration: revert(uint256,reason) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#394)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonpre-declaration-usage-of-local-variables

Reentrancy in AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135):
  External calls:
    - grapesToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender,tokenToClaim) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#131)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - totalClaimed += tokenToClaim (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#133)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonreentrancy-vulnerabilities-2

Reentrancy in AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135):
  External calls:
    - grapesToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender,tokenToClaim) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#131)
  Events emitted after the call(s):
    - Airdrop(msg.sender,tokenToClaim,block.timestamp) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#134)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonreentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

AirdropGrapesToken.claimToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#96-135) uses timestamp for comparisons
  - require(bool,string)(block.timestamp >= claimStartTime + claimDuration,Claimable period is finished) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#97)
AirdropGrapesToken.claimUnclaimedToken() (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#182-190) uses timestamp for comparisons
  - require(bool,string)(block.timestamp >= claimStartTime + claimDuration,Claimable period is not finished yet) (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#183)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonblock-timestamp

ERC721_checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#382-403) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#395-397)
Address.isContract(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#27-37) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#39-50)
Variable _verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#196-216) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#208-211)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationonassembly-usage

Different versions of Solidity is used:
  - Version used: ["0.8.10","0.8.0"]
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/Ownable.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/Security/Passable.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/Extensions/IERC721Enumerable.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/Extensions/IERC721Enumerable.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Introspection/IERC165.sol#4)
  - "0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Introspection/IERC165.sol#4)
  - "0.8.10 (contracts/AirdropGrapesToken.sol#1)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationondifferent-pragma-directive-are-used

Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#80-82) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#109-115) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#169-171) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#199-199) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#142-144) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#152-161) is never used and should be removed
Context._msgData() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#182-183) is never used and should be removed
ERC721._burn(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#302-314) is never used and should be removed
ERC721._mint(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#320-330) is never used and should be removed
ERC721._setIndex(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#348-350) is never used and should be removed
ERC721._setIndex(address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#356-366) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeApprove(ERC20,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#48-48) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeDecreaseAllowance(ERC20,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#48-48) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(ERC20,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#48-48) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom(ERC20,address,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#48-48) is never used and should be removed
Strings.toLowerCase(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#45-51) is never used and should be removed
Strings.toLowerCase(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#56-64) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationondead-code
```


- The Reentrancies flagged by Slither are false positives. The functions correctly follow the check, effects, interactions pattern, mitigating any Reentrancy risk.



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

// HALBORN

