

**Bratislava Model United Nations 2011**

**SPECIAL POLITICAL AND DECOLONIZATION  
COMMITTEE**



**CYPRUS DISPUTE**

**Study Guide**

**Chair: Zuzana Vančová**

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## Letter from the chair

Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Bratislava Model United Nations Conference. I look forward to acting as your chair in the Special Political and Decolonization Committee.

To introduce you to the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, it is a particularly interesting one due to the scope and magnitude of the issues which it addresses. This background guide will be a useful starting point for your research into your country's position on the topics at hand. Outside research is also expected, as is a thorough understanding of your country's foreign policy in general. By doing so, we can greatly enhance the quality of the debate. So suit up and get ready for the conference of your life.

My name is Zuzana Vančová and I am in my final year in here in Bratislava, studying the International Baccalaureate Programme at the Gymnázium Jura Hronca. My interest in Economics and Politics guided me to take the position of Chair of this committee. My other interests include involvement in various programmes and their organization, inline skating and dancing. I am a fan of dance parties, and as members of SPECPOL, you should adequately prepare for this to happen.

I hope that the conference will be an enriching experience for all of you delegates, as well as for me. I hope each attending delegate will be motivated, thrilled and helpful and present themselves and their given nations with well prepared, to-the-point speeches and comments. If you have any questions regarding the background guide or the committee, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Zuzana Vančová, Chair of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee

## What is SPECPOL?

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, almost one-third of the member nations' people were living in a territory that was dependent on a colonial government, with no right to self-rule. The Special Political and Decolonization Committee has since been a forum for the discussion of the rights of self-determination and self-governance. Since the founding of the United Nations, more than eighty colonies have gained their independence.

The mandate of SPECPOL now covers a wide variety of issues, making it arguably the most dynamic committee in the General Assembly. The Fourth Committee covers such issues as the rights of refugees, peacekeeping, mining action, public information, atomic radiation, and outer space. As a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, SPECPOL is open to all 192 member states of the United Nations, which provides a very diverse cross-section of opinions and a strong international mandate for action.


The diversity of topics available to SPECPOL makes it possible for every nation to have a large stake in the debate. This committee often leads delegates to ask some of the most basic and challenging questions that the United Nations faces: Where is the line between national sovereignty and international collaboration? Is there a moral imperative to intervene during a crisis? Does the United Nations allow for an effective way for nations to discourse, or is it dominated by the more powerful nations? SPECPOL will undoubtedly be an exciting and intellectually stimulating experience for everyone involved.



## Introduction

The strategic significance of Cyprus has made it a target of foreign intervention many times in its long history; numerous conquerors over the centuries occupied the island. Cyprus finally achieved its independence in 1960. Fourteen years later a large part of its territory was destined to be occupied again.

In July 1974 Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus in violation of the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law. The tragic consequences of the military invasion and subsequent occupation of nearly forty percent of the sovereign territory of the Republic are still felt today by the people of this new EU member-state. Turkey's military aggression against Cyprus continues unabated for more than three decades. The military occupation, forcible division, population displacement, ethnic segregation, massive violation of human rights, colonization, attempted secession, cultural destruction and property usurpation, imposed since Turkey's invasion, constitute the status quo on the island since 1974. As the President of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, told the UN General Assembly (19 September 2006), "The Cyprus Problem essentially epitomises the inability of the international community to redress this set of massive violations of international legality." Today, Turkey, an aspiring member of the European Union, still stands guilty of international aggression against a member-state of the Union. The status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of an independent, sovereign state is certainly unacceptable and must be redressed by the international community.



## History of the conflict

### Enosis

The origins of this situation date back over a century, to the era of high Victorian imperialism. In 1878 the island was acquired by Britain from the Ottoman Empire. The new colony had from antiquity been Greek in population and culture, with a Turkish minority introduced after Ottoman conquest in the 16th century. Eventually, in 1931, desire for an equivalent *Enosis* as in Greece boiled over in a spontaneous island-wide rebellion against British rule that left Government House in flames and required the descent of bombers, cruisers and marines to quell. Thereafter, Britain's response to this outbreak of feeling was unique in the annals of the empire: a colonial regime that ruled by decree until the day the flag would be formally hauled down in Nicosia.

It was not until the post-war period, however, that a national movement really crystallised as an organised force on the island. But it was still quite powerful enough to capture the expression of popular revolt on the island after the Second World War. Once they awoke politically, the mass of the population wanted union, not independence. That was the natural goal of this self-determination.

Since the 1920s onwards, mindful of overwhelming majority aspirations, AKEL – as the Cypriot CP was now called – has also campaigned for union with Greece when the war came to an end. In 1945, it had every reason to do so, since the Communist resistance in Greece had been by far the leading force in the struggle against the Nazi occupation, in a strong position to take power once the country was cleared of it. To avert this danger, military intervention by Britain – on a scale exceeding later Soviet actions in Hungary – installed a conservative regime. The result was a civil war, in which the left was crushed only after Britain and America, playing the role of Italy and Germany in Spain, weighed into the conflict to ensure the victory of the right.

So long as the outcome in Greece was in the balance, AKEL could continue to support *Enosis* without undue strain, at least outwardly. Indeed, in November 1949 – a month after the final defeat of the Democratic Army on the mainland – it fired what turned out to be the starting-pistol of national liberation in Cyprus, by calling on the United Nations to organise a referendum on 'the right of self-determination, which means union of Cyprus with Greece'. But this was to be its last moment in the van of the movement.

The Labour government in London, naturally, ignored this expression of the democratic will, its local functionaries dismissing it as 'meaningless'. But in the shepherd of the referendum, Michael Mouskos, it had met with more than it reckoned. Five months later, he was elected head of the church, at the age of 37, as Archbishop Makarios III. The referendum had demonstrated a general will. Over the next four years, Makarios set about organising it. Conservative peasant associations, right-wing trade unions and a popular youth group were built into a powerful mass base for the national struggle, directly under the aegis of the Church. Mobilisation at home was accompanied by pressure abroad, in the first place on Athens to take up the issue of self-determination in Cyprus at the UN, but also –

departing from the traditions of the Church – rallying support from Arab countries in the region.

### **Treaty of establishment**

After four years of trying in vain to arouse international opinion to bring pressure to bear on Britain, in early 1954 Makarios met secretly with a retired colonel of the Greek army, George Grivas, to plan a guerrilla campaign to liberate the island.

On 1 April 1955, Grivas set off his first explosives on the island. Over the next four years, his National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters – EOKA – waged a guerrilla war of lethal efficacy, which London never succeeded in stamping out. As a purely military performance, the EOKA campaign was perhaps the most successful of all anti-colonial resistances in the post-war period.

Politically, its impact was much more ambiguous. Grivas's virulent anti-Communism left no room for AKEL in the armed struggle, in which EOKA repeatedly shot down its militants, even as the British proscribed the party and put its leaders into detention camps. The main force of the Cypriot left, which in normal circumstances would have been a central component of the national liberation movement, was thus effectively deleted from it.

In London, hints began to be dropped that some kind of partition of Cyprus might be a solution. In 1958, a few violent actions were taken by Turks against the Greeks and Britain assured its leaders that the Turkish community would enjoy 'a specially favoured and specially protected state' under future British arrangements. A few months later, the colonial secretary was publicly referring to Cyprus as 'an offshore Turkish island'.

Seeing which way the wind was blowing, and fearing that Greece would buckle under British pressure, Makarios confronted the Greek premier, Constantine Karamanlis, in Athens. Implementation of the Anglo-Turkish plan for Cyprus, he pointed out, could be blocked simply by a Greek threat to withdraw from NATO if it went ahead. Karamanlis refused out of hand even to consider the idea. Makarios drew the necessary conclusion. Three days later, without giving any warning to the Greek regime, which was caught flatfooted, he came out publicly for the independence of Cyprus.

For the British, this had always been the worst of all conceivable scenarios. Grivas could be respected as a staunchly right-wing foe that one day might even make – so Julian Amery thought – a good dictator of Greece. Handing the island over to him would be the ultimate defeat. When the UN met to debate Cyprus three months later, the US ensured that a Greek resolution calling for self-determination of the island was once again scuppered – this time thanks to a resolution moved at its behest by the dictatorship in Iran – and that instead, direct talks would be held between Turkey and Greece, to hammer out a deal between them. In short order, Karamanlis and Menderes reached one at a hotel in Zurich.

The outcome was entirely predictable. Turkey was not just the bigger military power, and on the closest terms with the colonial proprietor of the island. Menderes had no difficulty imposing terms on an interlocutor who retreated to his bedroom as details of the agreement were fastened down.



To avoid *Enosis*, Cyprus would be given a neutered independence, with a constitution stationing troops from Ankara and Athens on its soil, a foreign head of the supreme court, a Turkish vice-president with powers to veto all legislation, separate voting blocs for Greeks and Turks in a house of representatives and in municipal administrations, 30 per cent of the civil service and 40 per cent of any armed force composed of Turks, plus a requirement that all taxes be approved by a vote of Turks as well as Greeks. Rounding off this package was a secret annexe, in the form of a gentleman's agreement – here American supervisors, hovering nearby, made themselves felt – committing the future Republic of Cyprus to join NATO and to ban AKEL. Last and most important of all, a Treaty of Guarantee between Britain, Turkey and Greece would allow any of these powers to intervene in the island, if it held there had been a breach of the settlement under it – in effect, a variant of the Platt Amendment that authorised the United States to intervene in Cuba when it so decided after 1901.

The area gulped down was forty times the size of Gibraltar, and when the final treaties establishing the new state and its constitution were signed, more pages were devoted to British bases in Cyprus than to all its other provisions combined – a juridical unicum. These three treaties were named the **Treaty of Establishment**, the **Treaty of Guarantee**, and the **Treaty of Alliance**. Makarios, presented with a diktat which Karamanlis told him was nonnegotiable, had to submit, taking office in 1960 as president of the new republic. Independence had been granted, but as Holland writes: 'In Cyprus "freedom" as most people understood it had not been won; self-determination, however partisanly defined, was not applied.' Far from ending the grief of Cyprus under colonial rule, what the treaty guaranteed was only worse suffering to come. The constitution of Zurich, designed to serve diplomatic imperatives rather than practical needs, let alone principles of equity, rapidly proved unworkable. Separate municipal administrations raised explosive issues of how to demarcate them, which even the British had not wanted to touch. Lack of progress in drawing their boundaries prompted a Turkish veto of the budget, threatening more general paralysis. No agreement could be reached on forming an inter-communal army, leaving the field to the formation of irregulars on both sides.

By the end of 1963 Makarios sent in late November a thirteen-point set of proposals to his Turkish vice-president, Kutchuk, which intended to create a more conventional democracy in Cyprus, with a unified administration and majority rule. This plan was rejected. Three weeks later, amid high tension, communal fighting broke out in Nicosia. This time it was not planned by either side, but after initial random incidents, Greeks inflicted more casualties than Turks, before a ceasefire was effected. All Turkish representatives in the state withdrew from their posts, and Turkish inhabitants increasingly regrouped in consolidated enclaves with strong lines of defence. British troops policed a truce in Nicosia, but clashes persisted through February, the balance of attacks lying on the Greek side. By March a UN force (UNFICYP, formed following United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, passed on March 4, 1964) had arrived to secure each community from further violence.

On the surface, Makarios could seem to have emerged from the breakdown of the Zurich arrangements in a stronger position. The UN force had brought a precarious peace. Turkey's threats to invade Cyprus were quashed by a brusque missive from President Johnson. American schemes for 'double enosis', dividing the island into portions to be



allocated to Greece and Turkey, got nowhere. In late 1965, the UN General Assembly formally called on all states to 'respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus' – the high point of Makarios's efforts to secure the international position of the republic, free from interference by outside powers.

In April 1967, the weak government in Greece that had succeeded Papandreou was overthrown by a military junta (coup d'état), installing a full-blown dictatorship of the right in Greece. AKEL, fearing what might be coming, readied plans to go underground. Grivas, predictably emboldened, launched an all-out assault on two strategically placed Turkish villages. At this, Turkey mobilised to invade Cyprus, where ten thousand Greek troops were now stationed. With war seemingly imminent between two NATO allies, the US persuaded the junta to back down and agree to the withdrawal of all Greek forces from the island.

Once they were gone, and Grivas with them, communal tensions dropped, and Makarios could reassert his authority. Re-elected president with a landslide majority, he lifted roadblocks around Turkish enclaves, and started talks with a view to a domestic settlement. A modest economic boom took off. In this new situation, the ambiguity of Makarios's political identity – champion of union or symbol of independence – was of necessity resolved. Merging Cyprus into Greece under the junta was unthinkable. *Enosis* was tacitly dropped, and Cypriot linkage with Third and Second World countries strengthened. But popularity at home and prestige abroad could not offset the increasing difficulty of his underlying position. Had it been possible to abjure *Enosis* when colonial rule ended, and propose genuine independence as an unconditional goal to both communities, Turkish opinion might have been affected. By now, animosities had hardened: the Turkish community was entrenched in defensive enclaves and more tightly policed by Ankara than ever. But if such independence was too late on the Turkish side, it was too early for a still powerful minority on the Greek side, which denounced Makarios for betraying *Enosis*, and now had formidable backing in Athens. For the colonels, Makarios was not only a traitor to Hellenism, but a stalking-horse for Communism. Turkey had always viewed him with cold hostility. Once the colonels were in power, it was Greece that became a deadlier threat.

### **Turkish military invasion of 1974**

In 1970, several attempts on Makarios's life had been made. The next year, Grivas returned secretly to Cyprus. Soon, all three metropolitan bishops were calling on Makarios to resign. By 1973, EOKA-B – Grivas's new organisation – was setting off bombs across the island, attacking police stations, and preparing snipers to pick off Makarios.

This was Grivas's last campaign. In January 1974 he died while still underground, and control of actions against Makarios passed back directly to the junta in Athens, now under still more violent leadership. The paroxysm came quickly. In July, an attack has been made on Presidential palace and Makarios was airlifted to the British base in Akrotiri and out of the country to Malta.

Resistance to the coup was crushed within a few days. So completely controlled was it from Athens that the junta had not even prepared a local collaborator to front it, fetching about vainly among different candidates after the event, before eventually resorting to Nikos Sampson, a swaggering gunslinger from EOKA-B with a reputation for reckless brutality

dating back to the colonial period. Nikos Sampson, 'the hammer of the Turks', was declared provisional president of the new government. Sampson was a Greek ultra nationalist who was known to be fanatically anti-Turkish and had taken part in violence against Turkish civilians in earlier conflicts. In the coup itself, an estimated 650 people were killed or wounded, but in the days following, as many as 2,000 Makarios supporters, including many members of AKEL, the communist political party, were killed and many more were jailed. At this phase, the main targets of the coup forces were Makarios supporters and other political opponents. Ethnic violence committed by both sides became prevalent later in the conflict. The coup was undoubtedly a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, and within 48 hours the Turkish premier, Ecevit, was at the door of Downing Street, flanked by ministers and generals, demanding that Britain join Turkey in taking immediate action to reverse it.

The meeting that ensued settled the fate of the island. It was a talk between social-democrats: Wilson, Callaghan and Ecevit, fellow members of the Socialist International. Turkey issued a list of demands to Greece, which included the immediate removal of Nikos Sampson, the withdrawal of 650 Greek officers from the Cypriot National Guard, the admission of Turkish troops to protect their population, equal rights for both populations, and access to the sea from the northern coast for Turkish Cypriots. These demands were rejected as they would have given Turkey an unacceptable amount of power on the island. Turkey, led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, then appealed to Britain as a signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee to take action to return Cyprus to its neutral status. Britain declined this offer, and refused to let Turkey use its bases on Cyprus as part of the operation. The next day, Turkey readied a naval landing. Britain had warships off the coast, and could have deterred a unilateral Turkish invasion with equal ease. Again, London did nothing.

The result was the catastrophe that shapes Cyprus to this day. Turkey invaded Cyprus on Saturday, 20 July 1974. In complete command of the skies, Turkish forces seized a bridgehead at Kyrenia, and dropped paratroops further inland. Turkish forces primarily used a clear and hold strategy, forcing many Greek Cypriots to flee to the south. By the time a ceasefire was agreed three days later, Turkish troops held 3% of the territory of Cyprus. Five thousand Greek Cypriots had fled their homes. Within three days, the junta had collapsed in Greece and Sampson had quit. After a few weeks' ceasefire, during which Turkey made clear it had no interest in the treaty whose violation had been the technical grounds for its invasion, but wanted partition forthwith, its generals unleashed an all-out blitz – tanks, jets, artillery and warships – on the now restored legal government of Cyprus. In less than 72 hours, Turkey seized two-fifths of the island, including its most fertile region, up to a predetermined Attila Line running from Morphou Bay to Famagusta. With occupation came ethnic cleansing. Some 180,000 Cypriots – a third of the Greek community – were expelled from their homes, driven across the Attila Line to the south. About 4000 lost their lives, another 12,000 were wounded: equivalent to over 300,000 dead and a million wounded in Britain. Proportionately as many Turkish Cypriots died too, in reprisals. In due course, some 50,000 made their way in the opposite direction, partly in fear, but principally under pressure from the Turkish regime installed in the north, which needed demographic reinforcements and wanted complete separation of the two communities. Nicosia became a Mediterranean Berlin, divided by barbed wire and barricades, for the duration. Turkish forces agreed to a cease-fire on 23 July 1974. The same day civilian government under

Karamanlis took office in Athens and the Sampson coup collapsed and Glafcos Clerides became the Acting President in absence of Makarios.

The first round of peace talks took place in Geneva, Switzerland from July 25–30, 1974, which the representative of the Greek-Cypriots, Glafcos Clerides, the representative of the Turkish-Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş participated in. Turkey agreed to halt its advance on the condition that it would remain on the island until a political settlement was reached between the two sides. At the second round of peace talks that started on 14 August 1974, Turkey demanded from the Cypriot government to accept its plan for a federal state, and population transfer, giving the Turkish Cypriot community 34% of the island. When the Cypriot acting president Clerides asked for 36 to 48 hours in order to consult with Athens and with Greek Cypriot leaders, the Turkish Foreign Minister denied Clerides that opportunity on the grounds that Makarios and others would use it to play for more time. Within hours, Turkey had resumed its second offensive. By the time a new and permanent ceasefire was called, 36 per cent of the island was under the control of the Turkish military. The partition was marked by the **United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus or the "Green line"** running east to west across the island.

### 1975 - 1979

Major breakthrough has come on February 12, 1977, when Makarios and Denktas signed a four point agreement envisaging that a future Cyprus establishment would be based on a federation - **The Makarios-Denktaş High Level Agreement of 1977**. This agreement consisted of a few agreements including the size of the states, which should be determined by economic viability and land ownership, the central government, which would be given powers to ensure the unity of the state. Other issues should have been further discussed. Just months later, in August 1977, Makarios died. He was replaced by Spyros Kyprianou, the foreign minister.

In May 1979, Waldheim (the UN Secretary General who had previously launched a course of 10-month discussion between Clerides and Denktas, but attempts to make progress on substantial issues such as territory and nature of the central government failed.) visited Cyprus and secured a further ten-point set of proposals 1979 from the two sides - **The Kyprianou-Denktaş High Level Agreement of 1979**, priority to be given GC resettlement of Varosha. In addition to re-affirming the 1977 High Level Agreement, these included provisions for the demilitarisation of the island and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and actions.

A new round of discussions began in Nicosia. However, the two sides failed to agree on the concept of 'bi-communality'. The Turkish Cypriots believed that the Turkish Cypriot federal state would be exclusively Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot state would be exclusively Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots believed that the two states should be predominantly, but not exclusively, made up of a particular community.

### **Turkish Cypriots' Unilateral Declaration of Independence**

In 1983, Turkish Cypriots took advantage of post election political instability in Turkey. The subordinate local administration in the north declared independence under the name "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Immediately upon this declaration Britain

convened a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to condemn the declaration as "legally invalid". United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the "attempt to create the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus". It went on to state that it "Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal". Such autonomy is severely limited, since the local state, which provides the bulk of employment, depends entirely on subsidies from Ankara to cover its costs, and the police are under the direct control of the Turkish army. Development has come mostly from construction, the supply of cheap degrees from over-the-counter colleges, and tourism, catering principally to mainlanders. Average incomes are less than half those on the Greek side of the island. Poverty and crime remain widespread.

### **1990 onwards**

If the military division of the island has remained static for thirty years, its diplomatic setting has been transformed. In 1990 Cyprus applied for membership of the EU. Although its application was accepted three years later in principle, in practice no action was taken on it. In Brussels, the prize was enlargement to Eastern Europe, on which all energies were focused. Cyprus was viewed as at best a distraction, at worst a troubling liability. For Turkey, which had applied to join in 1987, and whose suit had been stalled, was bound to be angered at the prospect of Cyprus achieving membership before itself. For Council and Commission alike, Cyprus was the least welcome of candidates for admission to the Union. Good relations with Ankara were of much greater moment.

There matters stood until Greece, at last helping rather than harming its compatriots, in late 1994 blocked the customs union Brussels was offering Turkey, to keep it sweet while its application to join the EU remained on hold. The foreign minister at the time, Theodore Pangalos, greatly disliked in Brussels for his refusals to truckle, made it clear that the Greek veto would not be lifted until Cyprus was given a date for the start of negotiations for its accession. In March 1995, a reluctant France, presiding over an EU summit at Cannes, brokered the necessary deal: Cyprus was assured an accession process by 1998, and Turkey granted its customs union.

As the deadline for negotiations on Cypriot accession came closer, the Clinton administration sprang into action, with pressure on European governments to admit Turkey that even Hannay found 'heavy-handed'. But manners aside, Britain and the US were at one on the need to ensure that there be no entry of Cyprus into the EU without a settlement of the island palatable to Turkey beforehand. This left only one course open: to fix Cyprus itself. In the summer of 1999, the UK and the US got a resolution through the G8 pointedly ignoring the legal government of the Republic of Cyprus, and calling on the UN to superintend talks between Greeks and Turks on the island with a view to a settlement.

This was then rubber-stamped by the Security Council, formally putting Kofi Annan in charge of the process. Successive Annan Plans for Cyprus which materialised over the next four years were essentially his work, the details supplied by an obscure scrivener from the crannies of Swiss diplomacy, Didier Pfirter.

The first of these plans was produced punctually a few days before the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, at which the Council was due to consider the upshot of negotiations with Cyprus.

The UN Plan – Annan I – was adjusted at the last minute to give further satisfaction, and – as Annan II – presented to Clerides, now president of Cyprus. It was vital, in the eyes of its architects, to get the plan agreed by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots before the Council took any decision on Cypriot entry into the EU. Clerides indicated, with a nod and a wink, that he was ready to sign. But Denktash – controlling the Turkish Cypriot delegation from afar – refused to have anything to do with it. Cyprus was accepted into the Union, effective from spring 2004, and Turkey – provided it met EU norms for human rights – was promised negotiations on its candidature, effective from winter 2004.

Since then, the third, fourth and fifth versions of the Annan plan were not agreed upon. However, the essence of the ‘Annan’ plan remained unaltered throughout. It contained three fundamental elements. The first prescribed the state that would come into being. The Republic of Cyprus, as internationally recognised for forty years – repeatedly so by the UN itself – would be abolished, along with its flag, anthem and name. In its stead, a wholly new entity would be created, under another name, composed of two constituent states, one Greek and the other Turkish, each vested with all powers in its territory, save those – principally concerned with external affairs and common finance – reserved for a federal level. There a senate would be divided 50:50 between Greeks and Turks, a lower chamber elected on a proportionate basis, with a guaranteed 25 per cent for Turks. There would be no president, but an executive council, composed of four Greeks and two Turks, elected by a ‘special majority’ requiring two-fifths of each half of the senate to approve the list. In case of deadlock, a supreme court composed of three Greeks, three Turks and three foreigners would assume executive and legislative functions. The central bank would likewise have an equal number of Greek and Turkish directors, with a casting vote by a foreigner.

The second element of the plan covered territory, property and residence. The Greek state would comprise just over 70 per cent, the Turkish state just under 30 per cent, of the land surface of Cyprus; the Greek state just under 50 per cent, the Turkish state just over 50 per cent, of its coast-line. Restitution of property seized would be limited to a maximum of a third of its area or value, whichever was lower, the rest to be compensated by long-term bonds issued by the federal government at tax-payers’ cost, and would carry no right of return. Of those expelled from their homes, the maximum number allowed to recover residence, over a period of some twenty years, would be held below a fifth of the population of each zone, while just under 100,000 Turkish settlers and incomers would become permanent residents and citizens in the north. The third element of the plan covered force and international law. The Treaty of Guarantee, giving three outside powers rights of intervention in Cyprus, would continue to operate – ‘open-ended and undiluted’. The new state would have no armed forces, but Turkey would maintain 6000 troops on the island for another eight years, and after a further interval, the military contingent accorded it at Zurich, permanently. Britain’s bases, somewhat reduced in size, would remain intact, as sovereign possessions of the UK. The future Cypriot state would drop all claims in the



European Court of Human Rights, and last but not least, bind itself in advance to vote for Turkish entry into the EU.

The enormity of these arrangements to 'solve the Cyprus problem, once and for all', as Annan hailed them, speak for themselves. Not only does the plan absolve Turkey from any reparations for decades of occupation and plunder, imposing their cost instead on those who suffered them. It is further in breach of the Geneva Convention, which forbids an occupying power to introduce settlers into conquered territory. Far from compelling their withdrawal, the plan entrenched their presence: no one 'will be forced to leave'. So little did legal norms matter in the conception of the plan that care was taken to remove its provisions from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice in advance.

There was, however, logic to this. The rationale for the entire scheme, like that of its predecessor in 1960, lay outside Cyprus itself, the interests of whose communities were never more than an ancillary in its calculus. The fundamental drive behind the plan, in all its versions, was the fear that if Cyprus, as constituted, were admitted to the EU without being taken apart and retrofitted beforehand, it could veto the entry of Turkey into the Union until Turkey relinquished its grip – soldiers and settlers – on the island.

In the final episode, however, a new actor stepped on stage: Verheugen attempted to intervene directly in the Cypriot referendum with a lengthy interview on behalf of the plan. Incensed when no television station would touch it, he was little short of apoplectic when the plan was rejected. Such was, indeed, the general reaction in Brussels to the refusal of Greek voters to fall in with its will: an incredulous fury also expressed by virtually the entire European public sphere, FT and Economist in the lead, that has scarcely died down since. Were another lesson needed in what the Union's dedication to international law and human rights is worth, its conduct over Cyprus supplies one of the most graphic to date. Nor, of course, is it over. Having escaped from the trap set in Switzerland, Cyprus entered the EU politically intact a week after the referendum, on 1 May 2004. In the four years since, the scene on the island has altered significantly for the better.

## Current Situation

Physical partition has diminished since the opening of checkpoints by Denktash in 2003, allowing travel across the Green Line between the north and the south. The immediate effect was a huge wave of visits – more than two million in a couple of years – by Greeks to the north, often to look at their former homes, and an inflow of Turkish workers to the south, where they now make up a tenth of the labour force in the building industry. The more lasting result has been the granting of a large number of official Cypriot documents to Turks with legitimate rights on the island (by spring 2005, some 63,000 birth certificates, 57,000 identity cards and 32,000 passports), reflecting the magnet of EU membership, and economic growth well above the Union average. In 2008, Cyprus became only the second member state since enlargement, after Slovenia, to enter the Eurozone.

Still, there is some common history linking the two sides across the ethnic boundary in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot political class is attached to its local privileges, which it would lose were Turkey to absorb the north, and would like to enjoy the advantages of being truly within the EU, rather than in a condition of semi-limbo. The local population does not get on particularly well with the desolate seasonal migrants – mostly from the area around Iskenderun, the nearest port on the mainland – who perform most of the manual labour the Greeks condemn in exchange for the more profitable employment by the state.

The economy remains dependent on huge subsidies from Ankara, bloating public employment at wages much higher than in Turkey itself: retired policemen get pensions larger than the salaries of associate professors on the mainland, while private enterprise is represented by no less than six ‘supermarket’ universities doling out degrees to dud students from the mainland, or nearby regions of the Middle East or Central Asia. Against the potential advantages of integration into the EU stands the artificial character of the economy that would be exposed to the potential impact of the *acquis*. It is possible that the adjustment would be as painful as in East Germany.

Reunification would thus require not just institutional protections, but economic buffers for the Turkish minority, something an AKEL president would understand better than any other. A real settlement on the island can only come from within, rather than being externally imposed, as it has been invariably to this date. The demilitarisation of the island that AKEL has long demanded, with the exit of all foreign troops and bases – the withdrawal not just of the Turkish army, but the shutting down of the anachronism of British enclaves – is a condition of any true resolution. A constitution with meticulous safeguards against any form of discrimination, and genuinely equitable compensation for losses on all sides, is a far better guarantee of the welfare of a minority than provocative over-representation in elected bodies, or preordained gridlock in the state, neither of which is sustainable in the long-term. To devise a political system that meets these goals is hardly beyond the bounds of contemporary constitutional thought.

In the past, there was no possibility even of raising such principles, given the Turkish military grip on the island. Today, however, what the whole UN process was designed to avert has come to pass. Cyprus possesses a veto over Turkish entry into the EU, and is in a position to force it to pull out its troops, on pain of exclusion. This enormous potential



change has been the hidden stake of all the frantic diplomacy of the past years. It is true that a French refusal to admit Turkey to the EU, or a Turkish nationalist decathexis from the EU, might deprive Cyprus of the lever now resting in its hands. The Western interests vested in Turkish entry and the Turkish interests – not least those of capital – vested in Western status are so great that the balance of probability is against either. That does not mean Cyprus will ever use the power it now has. It is a small society, and immense pressures will be brought to bear to ensure that it does not – for the EU, notoriously, referendums are mere paper for reversal. Sometimes small countries defy great powers, but it has become increasingly rare. The more likely outcome remains, in one version or another, the sentence pronounced on another Greek island: ‘The strong do what they can; the weak do what they must.’



## What ought to the delegates attempt to achieve

Both the debate and policy statement presentation during the council gathering will be aimed into final creation of a resolution that will improve the economic and social situation within the area. Therefore, in order to make the preparation of the resolution drafts easier we have distinguished several points which should be taken into the consideration while preparing your resolutions for the conference. The points can be treated by you as particular sub-issues in the drafts of your resolutions on the given topic. The main issues which the delegates in the committee should become acquainted with, and which are to be raised in the resolution draft are listed below.

### Primary questions

*What should the parameters of the new constitution of Cyprus be?*

Recently, many talks have been held about whether Cyprus should become a bi-communal federation or it should be reunified. Since 2008, the course of Cyprus Dispute was getting closer to reunification, however, as in 2010 a new president in Northern Cyprus has been elected, the reunification talks complicated – since Dervis Eroglu was now in favour of a federal state – which only prolonged the process of resolving.

*What should the role of UNFICYP in the buffer zone be?*

The UN blue berets (UNFICYP) control 180 km long and about 3km wide buffer zone dividing Cyprus into two states – The Republic of Cyprus and The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is considered to be illegal. The main aim of this body is to supervise ceasefire, but it also undertakes the humanitarian activities.

### Supplementary questions

*How to break the possible deadlocks between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot community and open the road toward a comprehensive solution?*

In the past years, no agreement about new settlement about Cyprus has been reached. This was mainly due to the historical events, which created high tension between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community. Nowadays the chance of resolving the issue seems to be as far off as ever.

*How to stop the policy and methods of "Ethnic Cleansing" followed by the Turkish Cypriots?*

Turkish settlers significantly changed the ethnic structure of the society of Cyprus. There are problems of social basis due to the fact that Turkish immigrants are given privileges which discriminate the local population. Turkish acts are considered to be illegal and staying in contradiction to Geneva Conventions, European Convention on Human Rights but also Treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus. The methods used in order to achieve the aim of the policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" are: forcible mass displacements, detention of both combatants and civilians, discrimination.

*What should be done about the Turkish troops occupying the island and what agent should be in force to keep order and peace on the island?*


Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkey intervened after a coup by supporters of a union with Greece. Turkey keeps about 30,000 troops in northern Cyprus and previously, its military operations and occupation resulted in looting of houses, murders, disappearances, rape and forced labour.

*What should be done about the Greek Cypriots that were displaced during the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus?*

It is estimated that 40% of the Greek population of Cyprus, as well as over half of the Turkish Cypriot population, were displaced by the Turkish invasion. The figures for internally displaced Cypriots vary, the United Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) estimates 165,000 Greek Cypriots and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots. The UNHCR registers slightly higher figures of 200,000 and 65,000 respectively, being partly based on official Cypriot statistics which register children of displaced families as refugees.

*How should the growing dispute between Turkey and Greek Cyprus over offshore gas and oil exploration be resolved?*

Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as a sovereign country and opposes any Greek Cypriot oil and gas search, insisting that Turkish Cypriots should also reap any windfall that may come from any discoveries. The drilling could damage long-running reunification talks.



## Tips for further research and sources

This study guide has been written to give you, the delegates, an overview of the problem in Cyprus. Because each nation will have a different view upon this issue, it is highly necessary for you delegates, to read objective sources provided here, and then for you to harvest your own (nations) unique view on the issue. It is strongly advisable that you will read much more additional information to attain a picture of your own country's views on Cyprus problem.

More information on the various dimensions of the Cyprus problem can be found on the website [www.moi.gov.cy/pio](http://www.moi.gov.cy/pio) and in other publications of the Press and Information Office (PIO). It is a convenient, comprehensive venue for current development, background information and useful links to many other relevant sources.

You can also use Wikipedia.org; many of the articles are quite valuable and have a lot of good content, but make sure the information is properly cited.

It is essential that you also research the official UN website. In writing this study guide, these sources have been used; visit them for more information on the topic:

<http://www.un.org/en/>

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/background.shtml>

<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n08/perry-anderson/the-divisions-of-cyprus>

<http://www.trncinfo.com/index.asp>

<http://www.kypros.org/>

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/9379711/2007-Cyprus-A-Historical-Sketch>

<http://www.wikipedia.org/>

If you wish to explore more, here are some other publications:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/background.shtml>

<http://www.trncinfo.com/index.asp>

[http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus\\_Problem/Turkish-Atrocities.html](http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/Turkish-Atrocities.html)

[www.cypruspolicycenter.org/dosyalar/Georgziegler.doc](http://www.cypruspolicycenter.org/dosyalar/Georgziegler.doc)

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/9379711/2007-Cyprus-A-Historical-Sketch>

Basis for agreement on a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem:

[http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/1revised\\_un\\_plan.pdf](http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/1revised_un_plan.pdf)

[http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/2revision2\\_un\\_plan.pdf](http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/2revision2_un_plan.pdf)