

# **Mitigation Writeup**

## **Team Members**

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# Proper Mitigation – Using HMAC

- **Secure Construction:**

```
import hmac
def generate_mac(message: bytes) -> str:
    return hmac.new(SECRET_KEY, message, hashlib.md5).hexdigest()
```

- **Why HMAC is Secure:**

- Inner and outer key padding.
- Defends against length extension
- Cryptographic security proof under certain assumptions.

# Verifying Attack Failure on HMAC

- Re-run attack against updated server
- Result:
  - Forged message is rejected
    - MAC mismatch (attacker cannot generate valid HMAC without secret)

## Screenshot:

Show failed verification on server output

```
(myenv)-(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Data_Integrity_Bouns]
$ python server_secure.py

=== Server Simulation ===
Original message: amount=100&to=alice
MAC: a86f897948d15c923c1f77133e805c707ca4fa752e3960efde47d618425027d5

— Verifying legitimate message —
MAC verified successfully. Message is authentic.

— Verifying forged message —
MAC verification failed (as expected).
```

# Conclusion

- Naive MAC constructions like MD5(secret || message) are **vulnerable** to length extension and brute-force attacks, allowing attackers to forge valid MACs without knowing the secret.
- Length extension attacks exploit the internal workings of hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA1), enabling message tampering with valid MACs.
- Brute force can reveal weak secret keys if predictable or short keys are used, further compromising message integrity.
- **HMAC** provides a secure alternative by using inner and outer key padding, preventing length extension and resisting brute-force forgery.
- Implementing **HMAC** and using strong, unpredictable keys effectively **mitigates these attacks**, ensuring message authenticity and integrity.
- Demonstrations confirmed:
  - Attacks succeed against vulnerable MACs.
  - Attacks fail when HMAC is properly implemented.