

EDUCATION

Stanford Graduate School of Business PhD student in Economics	Stanford, CA Current
University College London BSc. in Economics with a year abroad, First Class Honours (80.72/100) – Year of exchange at the University of Pennsylvania	London, United Kingdom 2015–2020
Lycée Français de Marrakech Baccalauréat Scientifique - Spécialité en Mathématiques (20.30/20.00)	Marrakech, Morocco 2012–2015

WORK EXPERIENCE

Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research Research Assistant to Professor Matthew Gentzkow	Palo Alto, CA 2020–Current
J.P. Morgan Trader - Emerging Markets Debt	London, United Kingdom May 2019–June 2020
CORE Economics Content Editor	London, United Kingdom 2017–2018
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) Research Intern	Geneva, Switzerland Summer 2016

SCHOLARSHIPS, HONOURS AND AWARDS

• EDGE Fellowship - Stanford University	Current
• UCL Record Holder for Highest Grade in Econometrics Sequence (98.00/100)	2018
• Hume-Lloyd Economics Sessional Prize, UCL (both years)	2016–2017
• Academic Excellence - King Mohamed VI Scholarship	2015–2019
• Excellence-Major Scholarship from French Ministry of Education	2012–2015
• Concours Général de Physique-Chimie, laureate	2015
• 2 nd Highest Grade in the World in French Scientific Baccalaureate (Ranked 2/12,519)	2015

RESEARCH

1. **“Utilitarian Beliefs on Social Networks: Explaining the Emergence of Hatred”** (*Work in Progress*)
We study the dynamics of opinions in a setting where a leader has a payoff that depends on agents’ beliefs and where agents derive psychological utility from their beliefs. Agents sample a signal that maximises their utility and then communicate with each other through a network formed by disjoint social groups. The leader has a choice to target a finite set of social groups with a specific signal to influence their beliefs and maximise his returns. Heterogeneity in agents’ preferences allows us to analyse the evolution of opinions as a dynamical system with asymmetric forces. We apply our model to explain the emergence of hatred and the spread of racism in a society. We show that when information is restricted, the equilibrium level of hatred is determined solely by the belief of the most extremist agent in the group regardless of the inherent structure of the network. On the contrary, when information is dense, the

space is completely polarised in equilibrium with the presence of multiple “local truths” which oscillate in periodic cycles. We find that when preferences are uniformly distributed, the equilibrium level of hatred depends solely on the value of the practical punishment associated with holding a hate belief. Our finding suggests that an optimal policy to reduce hatred should focus on increasing the cost associated with holding a racist belief.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- **Volunteer work in Colombia and Lebanon** 2017–2018
Worked with local charities to help displaced populations and refugees
- **France Culture: Les Chemins de la Philosophie** 2016–2017
Radio Script Writer

OTHER

- **Citizenship:** Morocco
- **Languages:** Berber (native), Arabic (native), French (native), Spanish (fluent), English (fluent), Russian (professional working proficiency)