**Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise**



**IHE ITI**

**Technical Framework Supplement**

**Internet User Authorization   
(IUA)**

**Trial Implementation**

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**Foreword**

This is a supplement to the IHE IT Infrastructure Technical Framework V11.0. Each supplement undergoes a process of public comment and trial implementation before being incorporated into the volumes of the Technical Frameworks.

This supplement is published on August 31, 2015 for trial implementation and may be available for testing at subsequent IHE Connectathons. The supplement may be amended based on the results of testing. Following successful testing it will be incorporated into the IT Infrastructure Technical Framework. Comments are invited and may be submitted at [http://www.ihe.net/ITI\_Public\_Comments](http://www.ihe.net/ITI_Public_Comments/).

This supplement describes changes to the existing technical framework documents.

“Boxed” instructions like the sample below indicate to the Volume Editor how to integrate the relevant section(s) into the relevant Technical Framework volume.

Amend Section X.X by the following:

Where the amendment adds text, make the added text bold underline. Where the amendment removes text, make the removed text bold strikethrough. When entire new sections are added, introduce with editor’s instructions to “add new text” or similar, which for readability are not bolded or underlined.

General information about IHE can be found at: [http://www.ihe.net](http://www.ihe.net/).

Information about the IHE IT Infrastructure domain can be found at: [http://www.ihe.net/IHE\_Domains](http://www.ihe.net/IHE_Domains/).

Information about the structure of IHE Technical Frameworks and Supplements can be found at: [http://www.ihe.net/IHE\_Process](http://www.ihe.net/IHE_Process/) and [http://www.ihe.net/Profiles](http://www.ihe.net/Profiles/).

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# Introduction to this Supplement

## Problem Statement

This profile is motivated by customer requirements for authorizing network transactions, when using HTTP RESTful transports. IHE has authorization profiles for the Web Services and SOAP based transactions. This profile provides an authorization profile for the HTTP RESTful transactions, e.g., browser based.

Being authorized means that the user, patient or provider, has legitimate access to this HTTP RESTful service. The authorization includes identifying the user, device, and or application that is making the request to the HTTP RESTful server, so that server can make further access control decisions.

The HTTP RESTful transport is being used by many healthcare applications and smart devices. These share a common set of issues. A typical use case example is:

* The patient has a tablet and installs an application onto that tablet.
* An application will need to retrieve and update health related data that is stored on a resource server. It uses HTTP RESTful transactions for both retrieve and update because HTTP support is integrated into the platform services.
* The patient already has an established relationship with an authorization service, e.g., Google, Facebook, or banking service.
* The patient wants to configure the application to have access to their data without needing the IT staff at the application vendor and resource vendor to set things up.

The HTTP RESTful services may include user driven browser activity, downloaded applications, and automatic devices. The existing IHE ITI XUA Profile fills these needs for the SOAP transport based transactions. The existing IHE ITI EUA Profile fills these needs for various different transports within a single enterprise environment, including HTTP RESTful transports. The Basic Patient Privacy Consent (BPPC) Profile is associated with this profile and these other existing profile. BPPC covers the legal and administrative needs for consent documentation and associating the patient consent with policy documentation. This profile includes the ability to associate the electronic authorizations with the patient agreements and organizational policies.

Greater integration of this authorization with third party authorization and consent documentation profiles, such as those found in the IHE BPPC Profile, are a future effort. This profile starts with just the basic authorization activities.

It is important to understand that IUA is not a substitute for the administrative activities (such as withdrawing consent), policy setting, and other activities that BPPC documents.

The administrative actions needed to establish a third party as an authorization server for IUA is not covered by these actors or transactions. These activities are very much dependent upon the operational needs and privacy policies that apply to a particular deployment.

The IUA Profile does convey the identifiers and signatures needed to establish traceability between the Authorized HTTP RESTful transaction and the policies and consents behind that authorization.

### Background on the problem environment

One common pattern is to interact directly with the application to communicate with the authorization service. The application interacts with both patient and authorization service to support the granting of an access token. The application then saves the access token, and uses it to retrieve and update the health related data. Another common pattern is for the user to interact independently with the authorization service and obtain a token. This token is saved on the device for later use.

The key issues here are:

* Reliable and accurate authorization decisions, as part of an overall privacy protecting and security environment.
* Application developers want one common method for obtaining and using these tokens, not thousands. They want a method that is built into the common platforms, not one that must be added later, because it is difficult for end user oriented applications to modify the platforms.
* Resource servers want one common method for receiving these tokens as part of HTTP RESTful transactions, and one common method for processing these tokens. (They will settle for a small number of methods if they must.)
* Users, patients and providers, want to be in control, do not want to depend on support staff to set up their devices and applications, and want to minimize the interference from authorization requirements.

Similar issues arise with:

* In house application distribution that needs to authorization for devices used within the facility.
* The in house IT staff wants a common method to authorize use of in house web applications and access to in house resources.
* IT staff are more willing to run their own internal authentication and authorization servers, but want to use off the shelf software and want the option to outsource these services. They are more likely to separate authentication from authorization than end user systems. Authentication issues are closely related to HR activities like hiring and firing. Authorization issues are related to patient and work assignments. These are controlled by different parts of the organization and have different process dependencies.
* Efficient user workflow requires minimizing the number of times a person is challenged for authentication by interactive applications.
* Providers and Specialists have authorization needs for dealing with other organizations.
* Providers and specialists need to deal with hundreds of resource services. A provider panel of 10,000 patients will need hundreds of relationships with different specialists, labs, priors, and other providers.
* The providers and specialists struggle to maintain hundreds of different authentication and authorization relationships today. Their IT staff struggle to support at all these different relationships. Neither wants delays or problems that will impact patient care.
* Efficient user workflow requires minimizing the number of times a person is challenged for credentials for interactive applications.
* Granting subset access to specialized provider. E.g., read access to cardiac info to physical therapy organization, forbidding access to other data like reproductive health and addiction data.

There are also environmental assumptions made by this profile.

First, it is assumed that there will be multiple access control engines working together. The IUA activities are one part of a federated system. IUA will work in conjunction with other access control engines. For example, a glucose monitor may be authorized to have access to a patient’s medical record. The expectation is that this will mean access to all of the glucose related information, which will include a variety of measurements and prescriptions. But, it is expected that if the device requests information about sexually transmitted disease diagnosis it will be rejected.

Second, this profile is operating in an environment where access consents are managed by BPPC or other mechanisms. IUA is not a substitute for documenting, establishing, and modifying these legal agreements. It is a method by which those agreements are enforced. For example, there will be a documented consent agreement between a patient and a provider that the provider will provide medical records to a healthcare proxy that is identified and authorized by the patient. BPPC is one way to document that agreement.

## Open Issues and Question

| Issue | Description |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | This profile does not specify the internal structure of “client\_id”. This is a major concern for operations and security management. But, OAuth does not provide a full specification for client\_id. It just specifies its purpose.  DICOM’s equivalent information attributes are: Manufacturer, Model, Software Versions, and Serial Number.  The OAuth client ID must identify the device, the application (including any necessary version information), the particular instance, and any other information needed to identify the client application uniquely.  Registration of clients is a significant operational and security problem that is being postponed until there is more experience with problems in the field and reasonable solutions. There is known danger from spoofing of client\_id.  At this time, the method for assignment of client\_id is not included in the profile. In the field there are a variety of methods being tried. Many depend upon physical distribution methods or out of band communications to manage the authentication problems. |
| 2 | This profile mandates support for JWT token format. It has an XUA SAML Option defined by IHE for ease of integration with the IHE WS-Security environment. You may also use other token formats as part of a deployment. |
| 3 | Audit messages are only defined for clients that are also Secure Applications. There is no defined auditing for other clients. |
| 4 | This profile does not require client grouping with Secure Node or Secure Application because it is using the OAuth issuance rules for client\_id, see the security consideration section. It assumes that the client\_id management will deal with these security considerations in a manner similar to the certificate management assumptions made for TLS and other certificate users. |

## Closed Issues

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Issue | Description |
| 8 | This profile uses only the Authorization: header for conveying the authorization information. The parameter form is not prohibited but is not compliant with the profile. |
| 9 | This profile does not explain the ways that some Resource Servers utilize HTTP redirects to automate some kinds of authorization activities. The actual HTTP transactions used for Obtain Authorization Token and Authorized RESTful Transaction are as defined within this profile. The other transactions are under the control of the Resource Server and its design.  Is an IHE explanation of how this works needed, or is the extensive industry documentation and tutorials used in other fields sufficient? No. |
| 10 | The selected standards are   * The OAuth 2.0 Framework * JWT Token, with defined extensions * SAML Token, using the XUA extensions |

# General Introduction

Update the following Appendices to the General Introduction as indicated below. Note that these are not appendices to Volume but rather to the General Introduction.

Appendix A - Actor Summary Definitions

Add the following actors to the IHE Technical Frameworks General Introduction list of actors:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Actor | Definition |
| Authorization Client | A client that presents authorization tokens as part of transactions. |
| Authorization Server | A server that provides authorization tokens to requesting clients |
| Resource Server | A server that provides services that need authorization |

Appendix B - Transaction Summary Definitions

Add the following transactions to the IHE Technical Frameworks General Introduction list of Transactions:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Transaction | Definition |
| Incorporate Authorization Token [ITI-72] | Add an authorization token to a transaction. |
| Get Authorization Token [ITI-71] | A transaction that is used to request and obtain an authorization token for use in Authorized transactions. |

Volume 1 – Profiles

# 34 IUA Profile

The IUA Profile adds authorization information to HTTP RESTful transactions. The IUA actors and behavior will be added to other profiles and transactions that need authorization.

## 34.1 IUA Actors, Transactions, and Content Modules

The actors in the IUA Profile manage the tokens used for authorization of access to HTTP RESTful services. The Authorization Client provides the authorization token that is incorporated into HTTP RESTful transactions to indicate that this transaction is authorized. The Authorization Client can also manage the interactions with an Authorization Server to obtain the authorization token. The Resource Server provides the server side interaction to verify that the HTTP RESTful request is authorized. It blocks unauthorized uses. For authorized uses, it provides the information from the authorization token to the other server actor(s) for use as part of access control decisions.

Authorization Server

*Other client actor*

Resource Server

*Other server actor*

Incorporate Authorization Token [ITI-72]

*Other Transaction*

Get Authorization Token [ITI-71]

Authorization Client

Figure 34.1-1: IUA Actor Diagram

Table 34.1-1 lists the transactions for each actor directly involved in the IUA Profile. To claim compliance with this profile, an actor shall support all required transactions (labeled “R”) and may support the optional transactions (labeled “O”).

Table 34.1-1: IUA Profile - Actors and Transactions

| Actors | Transactions | Optionality | Reference |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Authorization Client | Incorporate Authorization Token | R | ITI TF-2c: 3.72 |
| Get Authorization Token | O | ITI TF-2c: 3.71 |
| Authorization Server | Get Authorization Token | R | ITI TF-2c: 3.71 |
| Resource Server | Incorporate Authorization Token | R | ITI TF-2c: 3.72 |

### 34.1.1 Actor Descriptions and Actor Profile Requirements

The IUA actors are expected to be combined with other actors that perform HTTP RESTful transactions. Combining an Authorization Client with another actor means that this other actor will provide an authorization token as part of the HTTP transaction to a HTTP RESTful server. It may perform the Get Authorization transaction to obtain the authorization token. The corresponding HTTP RESTful server should be combined with the Resource Service to indicate that the server can perform access control.

#### 34.1.1.1 Authorization Client

The Authorization Client performs the network transactions and user interactions needed to obtain an authorization token and to attach that token to transactions to indicate that those transactions are authorized. An Authorization Client in IUA supports the following associated transactions:

* The Incorporate Authorization Token transaction – In this case the authorization token has already been obtained and is communicated as part of the HTTP RESTful transaction for some other profile or service. This token indicates that the HTTP RESTful transaction has been authorized by the Authorization Server for a particular kind of service and particular device by an authenticated person.
* The Get Authorization Token – In this use, the authorization client interacts with an Authorization service and Authentication Service as needed to obtain a token that indicates HTTP RESTful transactions for a particular kind of service and device are authorized by a particular person. This will often include various interactions with the user for authentication purposes. Those interactions are outside the scope of this profile, and may involve biometric or other identification activities. The resulting token is saved for later use by the authorization client. These tokens are not themselves protected from copying or modification, so they must be protected by the Authorization Client and transactions.

#### 34.1.1.2 Authorization Server

The Authorization Server provides authorization tokens to requesting clients. In IUA, the Authorization Server uses an authenticated user identity, the requested HTTP RESTful service URL, and other information to determine whether HTTP RESTful transactions are allowed. If they are allowed, the Authorization Server provides a token indicating that HTTP RESTful service access is authorized.

#### 34.1.1.3 Resource Server

The Resource Server provides services that need authorization. In IUA the Resource Server accepts a HTTP RESTful transaction request with an authorization token attached. It evaluates the authorization token to verify that the Authorization Server has already determined that this transaction is authorized. The Resource Server must enforce this authorization and may perform additional authorization decisions that are specific to the requested service. The Resource Server may then allow the transaction to proceed, subject to access control constraints that may also be in place.

Notes: 1. For implementation and deployment reasons the Resource Server and Authorization Server can be combined into an integrated product together with user authentication, access control, and other services. This does not change the actor requirements or transactions used.

2. Many Resource Servers will perform additional access control decisions and may restrict responses even for authorized transactions.

## 34.2 IUA Actor Options

All actors are required to support at least the JSON Web Token format (JWT). They may support the SAML Token or OAuth Bearer Token options.

There are two token options:

The SAML Token Option enables integration of environments that use both SAML identity federation and OAuth authorization infrastructure. This enables the end user to control authorization of applications through OAuth when the user identity authentication is already provided through SAML identity federation.

The OAuth Bearer Token Option provides basic compatibility to minimal OAuth implementations and does not carry the healthcare attribute extensions.

The JWT Token type enables the Resource Server to make additional Access Control Decisions.

Table 34.2-1: IUA - Actors and Options

| IUA Actor | Option Name | Reference |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Authorization Server | SAML Token | 34.2.1 |
| OAuth Bearer Token | 34.2.2 |
| Resource Server | OAuth Bearer Token | 34.2.2 |
| Authorization Client | SAML Token | 34.2.1 |
| OAuth Bearer Token | 34.2.2 |

### 34.2.1 SAML Token Option

An Authorization Client or Authorization Server that claims the SAML Token Option shall be able to use or generate the SAML tokens defined in the SAML Token Option to exchange it for an OAuth access token for IUA. See ITI TF-2c:3.71.4.1.2.2 and 3.72.4.1.2.1.

This option allows deployments that are using the Web Services transactions and SAML Tokens to use the same SAML-based identity mechanisms for HTTP RESTful transactions.

### 34.2.2 OAuth Bearer Token Option

An Authorization Client, Resource Server, or Authorization Server that claims the OAuth Bearer Token Option shall be able to use or generate the OAuth Bearer tokens defined in the OAuth 2.0 framework as the access token for IUA. See ITI TF-2c:3.71.4.1.2.3 and 3.72.4.1.2.2.

## 34.3 IUA Required Actor Groupings

An actor from this profile (Column 1) shall implement all of the required transactions and/or content modules in this profile ***in addition to*** all of the transactions required for the grouped actor (Column 2).

| IUA Actor | Actor to be grouped with | Reference | Content Bindings Reference |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Authorization Server | Time Client | ITI TF-1:7 Consistent Time |  |
| Resource Server | Time Client | ITI TF-1:7 Consistent Time |  |
| Authorization Client | -- | -- |  |

This profile does not require client grouping with and ATNA Secure Node or Secure Application. The security requirements for either of those actors may be excessive for some of the clients that will be using HTTP RESTful transactions. The OAuth framework does have a more limited set of requirements that are imposed on the issuance of client\_id for use by OAuth. This profile assumes that those requirements are met. See the security consideration section of this profile and the OAuth framework for more details.

## 34.4 IUA Overview

### 34.4.1 Concepts

The term “authorization” and “access control” are used colloquially for a variety of related activities. All of the concepts listed below are sometimes called “authorization” or “access control”. See the IHE ITI Access Control whitepaper for a detailed discussion of Access Control concepts. This profile will use more specific terms for each of these activities. These are:

* Provisioning – Setting up the initial rules and updating them when the situation changes. The administrator may say “Authorize Dr. X to have access”. The steps taken to make this happen are called provisioning.
* Delegation – Adding, transferring and revoking authorization from one person to another. This is closely related to provisioning. It differs in that it can only transfer authority that has already been provisioned, and it may track changes to provisioned access for the original person.
* Authentication – Determining that the actual user (at the moment of authentication) is the claimed identity.
* Authorization – Determining that the authenticated user is authorized to have access to a resource (at the moment of authorization). The profile describes how to convey an access authorization decision. It is not defining how the decision is made.
* Access Control – A system of provisioning, delegation, authentication, and authorization. It is normal to have multiple nested levels of access control. This profile is concerned with whether access is allowed to make the HTTP transaction requests to the specified resources. There are likely also building access controls, resource server access controls, and other access controls involved.

Within this profile, authorization is limited to the definition of authorization above.

### 34.4.2 Use Cases

The primary use cases are for obtaining authorization for access to a resource using HTTP RESTful HTTP transactions. There are other use cases for delegation, provisioning, etc., which are out of scope for this profile.

The authorization service is separated from the HTTP RESTful access so that it can be provided by a different organization or part of the organization than the resource service. This is driven by the requirements of patients, providers, and other users to simplify and maintain autonomy and control over authorization services. A user may interact with dozens of providers. It is difficult for the user to coordinate different authorization mechanisms with each of these dozens of providers.

This pattern is a common Internet usage and there are already vendors of authorization services that are being used to solve this problem. These include Facebook, Google, and a variety of other service providers in different commercial and governmental sectors. Some countries may use their citizen identity card to access their governmental services. These overlap with providers of authentication services. These services allow a patient to establish an authentication and authorization relationship with minimal provisioning by the healthcare provider. The user can specify “use vendor X” to their healthcare provider.

The pre-requisites for this use case are:

* The User has established a relationship with both the Authentication and Authorization services. Note that this profile only specifies the Authorization transactions.
* The resource service has agreed to recognize this Authorization service. This can be easier than establishing and maintaining their own patient facing authentication and authorization services. The agreement to use an external service is a significant policy choice, because it is accepting some shared responsibility for choosing suitable authentication and authorization services. The user shares part of this decision responsibility, but local laws and regulations will affect a resource servicer’s decision to accept and use a third party authorization and authentication service.
* The authentication and authorization services have agreed to be used by the User and resource service provider.

#### 34.4.2.1 Simple Authorization

A user with a mobile device wishes to retrieve a medical document to which they have authorized access.

The user communicates first with the authentication and authorization services to obtain an authorization token that will be presented to the resource service. This authorization token will be used as part of an access control decision by the resource service.

The User could be any kind of participant, and the resource use could be retrieval, query, or storage of a resource by means of HTTP transactions.

#### 34.4.2.2 Delegation

There are multiple reasons to perform delegations. These cases primarily involve patient delegation choices. Providers rarely have the authority to delegate. IT staff may use delegation as part of the support for autonomous devices.

The IUA Profile addresses the first of these use cases. It will likely be a portion of a larger system solution for the other use cases. They involve more technical, policy, and procedural complexity. They will likely require additional actors, transactions, or content modules.

Users may delegate authority to:

* Device or applications that are performing a service for the patient, for example automatic glucose monitors that can provide monitoring records and receive control information from a healthcare provider service that is providing diabetic care.
* Applications that are distributed across multiple devices, or multiple instantiations, that are intended to act in a coordinated manner for a specific user. E.g., Kindle devices synchronize last read location, documents available, etc. across multiple Kindle devices for a single user account.
* Advocates and proxies who are authorized by the patient to make decisions for the patient.
* Organizations that are acting for the patient, such as a visiting nurse organization that is providing support to the patient.

Revocation of delegation needs to be clearly specified by policy. Revocation may be removal of rights because of swapping devices. Expiration, re-authorization, etc. also need to be covered. Revocation is not just a response to breaches and failures. Revocation is a normal response to changes in people, equipment, and relationships.

##### 34.4.2.2.1 Obtaining a token

The Incorporate Authorization Token transactions use an authorization token to indicate that this transaction is authorized. This token can be obtained by means of the Get Authorization Token, or by other methods.

Autonomous devices like patient monitors may have difficulty using the Get Authorization Token transaction. These machines often require special software and connections as part of their configuration process. Often this process is done using a PC or other system communicating with the device by USB or Bluetooth. A device specific application handles the various device specific configuration setup details for a particular patient. An appropriate authorization token can be provided as part of this configuration process. It can then be used for Request Authorized Service transactions.

In all cases, the authorization token identifies the device that is being authorized to perform the HTTP RESTful transaction and the patient involved, so that the appropriate access control decisions can be made.

## 34.5 IUA Security Considerations

IUA uses OAuth and the OAuth RFC has references to some relevant security analyses. There are also a wide variety of analyses in the public literature. This profile does not introduce new considerations to those analyses. We have not identified any new healthcare related issues.

[RFC6819, Section 3.6] categorizes four OAuth2.0 deployment scenarios, depending on the client's capabilities. For confidential apps, a deployment scenario where the client is registered using a client\_id, client\_secret, and with a fixed redirect\_uri is recommended.

It is important to understand that IUA does not address the issues around issuing and revoking client\_ids. OAuth 2.0 depends upon the client\_id to establish the degree of trust in a client. OAuth 2.0 does not define further how client\_ids are managed. The IUA requires that the Client Authorization Agent and client software shall meet the requirements of being an OAuth confidential client. The OAuth analysis indicates that without this requirement, the system is not sufficiently secure.

There are significant administrative issues dealing with establishing the appropriate level of trust with client applications, vendors, etc. These also include establishing methods for dealing with the discovery of flaws, breaches, etc. These affect both the Resource Server and Authorization Server administrative support.

The Authorization Server will have an administratively managed list of approved client\_ids for acceptable clients. This list will be updated as new clients are approved or existing clients are removed. An authorization token will not be issued for unapproved clients. This assumes that the client\_id management will deal with these security considerations in a manner similar to the certificate management assumptions made for secure communication transactions.

The Resource Server may also have such a list if there is a more precisely managed list of client\_id and resource content access requirements. This can deal with resources that have more specific client requirements than the general access authorization requirements.

## 34.6 IUA Cross Profile Considerations

None

Volume 2 – Transactions

Add Section 3.71

## 3.71 Get Authorization Token

This transaction is used to obtain access token for use in a HTTP RESTful resource request. There are many methods to obtain a token, most of them are project-and deployment-specific. [RFC6749] defines the following methods:

* *Authorization Code Grant* [RFC6749, Section 4.1]. It is optimized for confidential clients who make use of User Agents (e.g., web browsers)
* *Implicit Grant* [RFC6749, Section 4.2]. It is optimized for public clients known to operate a particular redirect URI
* *Resource Owner Password Credential Grant* [RFC6749, Section 4.3]. It is optimized for resource owners in a trust relationship with the client.
* *Client Credentials Grant* [RFC6749, Section 4.4]. It is optimized for clients requesting access tokens using only its client credentials, for confidential clients (e.g., medical devices, backend applications).

This profile is scoped to confidential clients, thus the option *Authorization Code Grant* MUST be supported*,* and *Client Credentials Grant* SHOULD be supported by the Authorization Server.

### 3.71.1 Scope

This transaction is used to obtain the access token for use in a HTTP RESTful Resource request.

### 3.71.2 Actor Roles

Authorization Client

Actor ABC

Authorization Server

Actor DEF

Figure 3.71.2-1: Use Case Diagram

Table 3.71.2-1: Actor Roles

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Actor:** | Authorization Client |
| **Role:** | Authorization portion of a HTTP RESTful transaction client. |
| **Actor:** | Authorization Server |
| **Role:** | Server that grants access tokens |

### 3.71.3 Referenced Standards

* RFC 6749 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
* RFC 7519 JSON Web Token (JWT)
* RFC 7523 JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants
* RFC 7522 SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants

### 3.71.4 Interaction Diagram



Figure 3.71.4-1: Basic Process Flow for Obtain HTTP RESTful Authorization and Incorporate Authorization Token Transaction

@startuml

group Get Authorization Token [ITI-71]

AuthorizationClient -> AuthorizationServer : Authorization Request

AuthorizationClient <- AuthorizationServer : Authorization Response + Authorization Token

end

group Incorporate Authorization Token [ITI-72]

AuthorizationClient -> ResourceServer : Resource Request + Authorization Token

AuthorizationClient <- ResourceServer : Resource Response

end

@enduml

**Pre-conditions**:

Main Flow:

1. The user provides user authentication and the intended resource request information to the authorization server.
2. The authorization server generates an authorization token that indicates that this user is authorized to have access to this resource.

The Authorization Client, Resource Service and the token source shall use the same type of authorization token for both the Get Authorization Token and associated Incorporate Authorization transactions. It can be a JWT Bearer token, or one of the two optional token types: SAML token or OAuth Bearer token.

**Post-conditions:**

The device now possesses the authorization token and can perform Incorporate Authorization Token Transactions.

Note: There are other means by which a device can get an authorization token. Some devices may be configured by device specific methods with an appropriate token.

#### 3.71.4.1 Authorization Request

The Authorization request is an HTTP GET transaction used to obtain an authorization token that will be used for subsequent HTTP RESTful transactions.

##### 3.71.4.1.1 Trigger Events

This transaction takes place whenever an Authorization Client needs an access token authorizing a HTTP RESTful transaction. This may be due to expiration of an existing token, a resource request has indicated that a new token is required, configuration or installation of a device, or as a routine request for new transactions.

##### 3.71.4.1.2 Message Semantics

The Authorization Client and Authorization Server actors shall comply with OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749. This covers the HTTP transactions and content needed for requesting an authorization token. The client shall comply with the rules for a confidential client. Client identification and authentication requirements are specified by RFC 6749, plus requirements and procedures set by the Authorization Server. (E.g., the Authorization Server may have patient registration procedures that must be followed before authorization will be granted.)

The request includes the token type requested. All actors are required to support at least the JSON Web Token format (JWT). They may support the SAML token format or OAuth Bearer Token Options.

###### 3.71.4.1.2.1 JSON Web Token (JWT)

The Authorization Client and Authorization Server actors shall support the JWS (signed) alternative of the JWT token as specified in *RFC 7519*. Any actor that supports this transaction may support the JWE (unsigned but encrypted) alternative of the JWT token.

The JWT token attribute requirements are shown in Table-3.71.4.1.2.1. The required attributes are indicated by “R”. Optional attributes are indicated by “O”. If present, the optional attributes shall be used in accordance with OAuth and JWT specifications.

Table 3.71.4.1.2.1-1: JWT Token requirements

| Parameter | Req | Definition | RFC Reference |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| iss | R | Issuer of token | RFC 7519 Section 4 |
| sub | R | Subject of token (e.g., user) | OpenID Connect Core Section 5.1 |
| name | O | Plain text user’s name | OpenID Connect Core Section 5.1 |
| aud | R | Audience of token | RFC 7519 Section 4 |
| exp | R | Expiration time | RFC 7519 Section 4 |
| nbf | O | Not before time | RFC 7519 Section 4 |
| iat | O | Issued at time | RFC 7519 Section 4 |
| typ | O | Type | RFC 7519 Section 4 |
| jti | R | JWT ID | RFC 7519 Section 4 |

The Authorized Client, Authorization Server, and Resource Server shall support the following extensions to the JWT parameters. All of these parameters are optional in the JWT token. The parameter content shall be the same as the content defined in ITI-40. The definition is summarized in this table for convenience.

Table 3.71.4.1.2.1-2: Extensions to JWT Parameters

| XUA Attribute | XUA Definition | JWT Parameter |
| --- | --- | --- |
| SubjectID | Plain text user’s name | name |
| SubjectOrganization | Plain text description of the Organization | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:SubjectOrganization |
| SubjectOrganizationID |  | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:SubjectOrganizationID |
| HomeCommunityID | Home Community ID where request originated | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:HomeCommunityID |
| NationalProviderIdentifier |  | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:NationalProviderIdentifier |
| Subject:Role |  | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:SubjectRole |
| docid | Patient Privacy Policy Acknowledgement Document ID | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:docid |
| acp | Patient Privacy Policy Identifier | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:acp |
| PurposeOfUse | Purpose of Use for the request | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:PurposeOfUse |
| Resource-ID | Patient ID related to the Patient Privacy Policy Identifier | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:resourceID |
|  | Patient ID, Citizen ID, or other similar public ID used for health identification purposes. | urn:ihe:iti:iua:2019:personID |

###### 3.71.4.1.2.2 SAML Token Option

This option enables integration of environments that use both SAML identity federation and OAuth authorization infrastructure.

Authorized Client and Authorization Server Actors claiming conformance with the SAML Token Option shall comply with the SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants (RFC- *7522*) rules for issuing and using SAML assertions and tokens. All of the SAML attributes in Table 3.71.4.1.2.1-1 shall be supported. The SAML assertion contents shall comply with XUA SAML assertion rules (see ITI TF-2b:3.40).

###### 3.71.4.1.2.3 OAuth Bearer Token Option

An Authorized Client, Authorization Server, and Resource Server Actor claiming conformance with the OAuth Bearer Token Option shall comply with the requirements in RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage. This option does not convey the healthcare information defined in Table 3.71.4.1.2.1-1.

##### 3.71.4.1.3 Expected Actions

The response token shall be in the requested format. All actors are required to support at least the JSON Web Token format (JWT). They may support the XUA SAML token format or OAuth Bearer Token format.

The specific HTTP transactions are defined in the OAuth standards in Section 3.71.3 Referenced Standards. This transaction does not modify them other than through the definition of additional token attribute rules and auditing requirements. The end result will be either an error response, as defined in the RFCs, or an access token that can be used in the Incorporate Authorization Token [ITI-72] transaction.

### 3.71.5 Security Considerations

The Authorization Client and client software shall meet the requirements of being an OAuth confidential client. The OAuth analysis indicates that without this requirement, the system is not sufficiently secure. The Authorization Client and client software may be grouped with a ATNA Secure Node or Secure Application if a higher level of security is appropriate.

#### 3.71.5.1 Security Audit Considerations

##### 3.71.5.1.1 Authorization Server Specific Security Considerations

The Authorization Servers typically produce an audit record for any failed attempt to obtain authorization. IHE does not specify the format of audit records for authorization servers. IHE does not specify the means of obtaining audit records.

##### 3.71.5.1.2 Client Authorization Agent Specific Security Considerations

The Authorization Client may generate an audit message when an authorized transaction is performed or attempted. The Authorization Client is sometimes a device that lacks audit access or has very limited audit capabilities, so this audit capability is not mandated.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Field Name | Opt | Value Constraints |
| Event  AuditMessage/ EventIdentification | EventID | M | EV(110114, DCM, “User Authentication”) |
| EventActionCode | M | “E” (Execute) |
| *EventDateTime* | *M* | *not specialized* |
| *EventOutcomeIndicator* | *M* | *not specialized* |
| EventTypeCode | M | EV(“ITI-71”, IHE, “User Authorization”) |
| **Source (1)** | | | |
| **Human Requestor (0)** | | | |
| **Destination (0)** | | | |
| **Audit Source (Client Authentication Agent) (1)** | | | |
| **Participant Object (1)** | | | |

Where:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Source  AuditMessage/ ActiveParticipant | UserID | M | The process ID as used within the local operating system in the local system logs. |
| *AlternativeUserID* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *UserName* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *UserIsRequestor* | *M* | *not specialized* |
| RoleIDCode | M | EV(110150, DCM, “Application”) |
| NetworkAccessPointTypeCode | M | “1” for machine (DNS) name, “2” for IP address |
| NetworkAccessPointID | M | The machine name or IP address |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Audit Source  AuditMessage/ AuditSourceIdentification | *AuditSourceID* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *AuditEnterpriseSiteID* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *AuditSourceTypeCode* | *U* | *not specialized* |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Token  (AuditMessage/ ParticipantObjectIdentification) | ParticipantObjectTypeCode | M | “2” (System) |
| ParticipantObjectTypeCodeRole | M | “13” (Security Resource) |
| *ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *ParticipantObjectIDTypeCode* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *ParticipantObjectSensitivity* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *ParticipantObjectID* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| *ParticipantObjectName* | *U* | *not specialized* |
| ParticipantObjectQuery | M | URL requested |
| *ParticipantObjectDetail* | *U* | *not specialized* |

Add Section 3.72

## 3.72 Incorporate Authorization Token

### 3.72.1 Scope

This transaction is used to provide authorization information as part of a HTTP RESTful transaction. This transaction specified some headers and behavior that must be part of a HTTP RESTful transaction. The rest of HTTP RESTful transaction specification for the URL, parameters, other headers, and other transaction contents is in another profile or specification.

### 3.72.2 Actor Roles

Authorization Client

Actor ABC

Resource Server

Actor DEF

Figure 3.72.2-1: Use Case Diagram

Table 3.72.2-1: Actor Roles

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Actor:** | Authorization Client |
| **Role:** | Authorization portion of a HTTP RESTful transaction client. |
| **Actor:** | Resource Server |
| **Role:** | Authorization portion of a HTTP RESTful transaction server. |

### 3.72.3 Referenced Standards

* RFC 6749 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
* RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage
* RFC 7519 JSON Web Token (JWT)
* RFC 7523 JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Token Profiles for OAuth 2.0

#### 3.72.3.1 Related IHE Profiles

XUA Cross-Enterprise User Assertion – Attribute Extension

### 3.72.4 Interaction Diagram



Figure 3.72.4-1: Process flow for Incorporate Authorization Token Transaction

@startuml

group Get Authorization Token [ITI-71]

AuthorizationClient -> AuthorizationServer : Authorization Request

AuthorizationClient <- AuthorizationServer : Authorization Response + Authorization Token

end

group Incorporate Authorization Token [ITI-72]

AuthorizationClient -> ResourceServer : Resource Request + Authorization Token

AuthorizationClient <- ResourceServer : Resource Response

end

@enduml

Main Flow:

1. The device sends a resource request to the resource server, together with the authorization token. The authorization token may be a JWT Bearer token, or another access token type that is mutually agreed between Client, Resource Service and the token source.
2. The resource service provider makes an access control decision based upon the user identity, authorization token, and resource requested. It may provide the resource, a subset of the resource, or reject the request.

Note: The token source in the diagram is not necessarily an IHE actor. It is any system that provides an authorization token. It can be the Authorization Server, or it can be some other system.

This transaction works in conjunction with some other HTTP RESTful transaction. It extends the other transaction by adding information to the HTTP request for that other HTTP RESTful transaction.

### Authorization Request message

##### 3.72.4.1.1 Trigger Events

The client system needs to make a HTTP RESTful transaction to a Resource Server that performs access authorization. The Authorization client has already obtained the necessary access token, either by means of another IHE transaction or by some other means.

##### 3.72.4.1.2 Message Semantics

The Authorization Client should:

1. Confirm that the access token is still valid. Attempts to communicate using an expired token will result in an error.
2. Include an Authorization: header in the HTTP transaction that has the access token value. See RFC 6750 Section 2.1. Further fields in the Authorization: header depend upon the token option chosen. The access token may be:

* A JWT token, encoded as defined in *RFC 7519*, *RFC 7523,* and ITI TF-2b: 3.71.4.1.2.1 JSON Web Token.
* A token of another type.

GET /example/url/to/resource/location HTTP/1.1

Authorization: Bearer fFBGasru1FQd[…omitted for brevity…]44sdfAfgTa3Zg Host: examplehost.com

The remainder of the transaction requirements are established by the HTTP RESTful transaction being protected.

###### 3.72.4.1.2.2 OAuth Bearer Token Option

An Authorized Client, Authorization Server, and Resource Server Actor claiming conformance with the OAuth Bearer Token Option shall comply with the requirements in RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage.

##### 3.72.4.1.3 Expected Actions

The Resource Server shall enforce the authorization and may further restrict based on Access Control decisions. The actor that is combined with the Resource Server will determine the responses and expected actions. The Resource Server should return an HTTP 401 (UnAuthorized) error if the token is not accepted and the combined actor does not have a specified method for responses when access is denied.

### 3.72.5 Security Considerations

The Authorization Client and client software shall meet the requirements of being an OAuth confidential client. The OAuth analysis indicates that without this requirement, the system is not sufficiently secure. The Authorization Client and client software may be grouped with a ATNA Secure Node or Secure Application if a higher level of security is appropriate. Resource Server and Authorization Server should provide equivalent protection.

#### 3.72.5.1 Security Audit Considerations

##### 3.72.5.1.1 Resource Server Specific Security Considerations

When an ATNA Audit message needs to be generated by the Resource Server and the user is authenticated by way of a JWT Token, the ATNA Audit message **UserName** element shall record the JWT Token information using the following encoding:

**alias"<"user"@"issuer">"**

where:

* **alias** is the JWT token’s “aud” parameter
* **user** is the required content of the JWT token’s “sub” parameter
* **issuer** is the JWT token’s “iss” parameter