

3. Analysis Plan

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2021-06-30

Background

In an attempt to incorporate uncertainty to Gächter et al. (2017)’s dynamic public goods game (DPGG), I plan to run a series of remote online experiments using oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016). The first experiment will replicate Gächter et al.’s NOPUNISH 10-period version as close as possible (given the remote circumstances). The current demo version of the experiment can be found here. Click here to visit the corresponding Github repository.

This report is the third in a series of reports covering this project. It reads the data prepared in the previous reports and analyzes them.

Results

First Round

Provision of the public good and wealth creation

Table 1:

Statistic	replication	GMTV
Mean	764.333	478.087
Median	774.5	304.000
St. Dev.	41.790	393.575
Max	833	1,792.000
Min	646	161.000
N	30	23

The rank sum test yields a p-Value of 0.0001 for the mean **stock** a.k.a *Wealth* during the last period of the game.

Inequality

The rank sum test yields a p-Value of 0.0000 for the mean **gini** during the last period of the game.

Sample Properties

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
% Date and time: Mi, Jun 30, 2021 - 22:11:53

Chen, Daniel L., Martin Schonger, and Chris Wickens. 2016. “oTree-an Open-Source Platform for Laboratory, Online, and Field Experiments.” *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance* 9: 88–97. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001>.




Figure 1: The average amount of tokens contributed over time in treatments.

Table 2:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	All	Wealth Below median	Above median
Replication	286.25*** (72.17)	499.03*** (15.61)	63.93 (115.74)
Constant	478.09*** (54.30)	234.70*** (12.09)	731.00*** (87.91)
Observations	53	25	26
R ²	0.24	0.98	0.01
Residual Std. Error	260.41	38.24	291.56

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 2: Average wealth over time across treatments.




Figure 3: Average Gini coefficient over time across treatments.

Table 3:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	All	Gini Below median	Above median
Replication	-0.21*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.03)
Constant	0.25*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.02)
Observations	53	25	26
R ²	0.59	0.61	0.56
Residual Std. Error	0.09	0.10	0.08
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4:

Statistic	replication	GMTV
Mean	0.039	0.246
Median	0.035	0.245
St. Dev.	0.016	0.131
Max	0.074	0.479
Min	0.012	0.044
N	30	23

Table 5:

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
gender	120	0.250	0.435	0	0	0.2	1
age	120	44.125	14.817	18	31.8	59	66
switching_row	120	6.525	0.501	6	6	7	7
education	120	3.858	2.642	0	2	6	8
donation	120	1.992	1.131	0.000	1.150	2.938	4.200
pq01	120	2.683	1.996	0	1	4	6
pq02	120	3.317	1.801	0	2	5	6
pq03	120	3.133	2.000	0	1	5	6
pq04	120	2.883	1.902	0	1	4.2	6
pq05	120	3.033	2.021	0	1	5	6
pq06	120	2.667	2.039	0	1	5	6
pq07	120	3.100	1.968	0	2	5	6
pq08	120	2.950	2.033	0	1	5	6
pq09	120	2.917	2.064	0	1	5	6
pq10	120	3.100	1.964	0	1.8	5	6
pq11	120	2.967	2.086	0	1	5	6
pq12	120	2.917	1.977	0	1	5	6
pq13	120	3.375	1.949	0	2	5	6
pq14	120	3.075	2.063	0	1	5	6

Table 6:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	female	age	risk	donations
Replication	-0.13** (0.06)	13.40*** (1.56)	0.09 (0.13)	1.31*** (0.19)
Constant	0.38*** (0.05)	30.73*** (1.18)	6.44*** (0.10)	0.68*** (0.14)
Observations	212	212	207	212
R ²	0.02	0.26	0.002	0.18
Residual Std. Error	0.46	11.29	0.93	1.38
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Table 7:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	quick thinker	easily offended	very satisfied	very dependent	generally happy
Replication	-2.39*** (0.24)	-0.39 (0.24)	-1.86*** (0.24)	0.09 (0.23)	-2.61*** (0.23)
Constant	5.08*** (0.18)	3.71*** (0.18)	4.99*** (0.18)	2.79*** (0.18)	5.64*** (0.18)
Observations	212	212	212	212	212
R ²	0.32	0.01	0.23	0.001	0.37
Residual Std. Error	1.72	1.72	1.71	1.68	1.68
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table 8:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	work important	family important	friends important	religion important	politics important
Replication	-2.05*** (0.25)	-2.39*** (0.25)	-3.00*** (0.24)	0.48* (0.27)	-0.60** (0.25)
Constant	4.72*** (0.19)	5.49*** (0.19)	5.95*** (0.18)	2.43*** (0.20)	3.70*** (0.19)
Observations	212	212	212	212	212
R ²	0.25	0.30	0.43	0.02	0.03
Residual Std. Error	1.78	1.80	1.70	1.92	1.78
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table 9:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	most people trusted	hard work better	government responsible	incomes equal
Replication	−0.90*** (0.25)	−2.52*** (0.25)	−0.94*** (0.24)	−0.75*** (0.26)
Constant	3.87*** (0.19)	5.43*** (0.18)	4.32*** (0.18)	3.83*** (0.20)
Observations	212	212	212	212
R ²	0.06	0.33	0.07	0.04
Residual Std. Error	1.81	1.77	1.72	1.89

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Gächter, Simon, Friederike Mengel, Elias Tsakas, and Alexander Vostroknutov. 2017. "Growth and Inequality in Public Good Provision." *Journal of Public Economics* 150: 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.03.002>.

Table 10:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Wealth		Gini	
female	−9.36 (8.99)	−10.53 (8.62)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)
age	−0.66** (0.28)	−0.51** (0.25)	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)
risk	−7.43 (8.01)	−9.54 (7.43)	−0.001 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.003)
quick thinker	1.36 (2.06)		0.001 (0.001)	
easily offended	1.08 (2.18)		−0.0001 (0.001)	
very satisfied	0.72 (1.97)		0.001 (0.001)	
very dependent	−4.86** (2.03)		0.0005 (0.001)	
generally happy	0.64 (1.88)		0.0004 (0.001)	
work important	3.65* (1.95)		0.002** (0.001)	
family important	2.57 (2.06)		0.0000 (0.001)	
friends important	−1.56 (1.97)		−0.001 (0.001)	
religion important	−2.73 (1.85)		−0.001 (0.001)	
politics important	−3.62* (2.03)		−0.0001 (0.001)	
most people trusted	1.93 (1.90)		0.0004 (0.001)	
hard work better	1.71 (1.99)		−0.0002 (0.001)	
government responsible	−1.03 (2.06)		0.0000 (0.001)	
incomes equal	−0.93 (1.92)		0.001 (0.001)	
Constant	848.76*** (58.45)	851.75*** (49.57)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Observations	120	120	120	120