

Ex: Tragedy of Commons:

- $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$
- $S_i = \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\forall i \in N$

- Utility:  $u_i(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_i, \dots, \beta_n) = u_i(\beta_i, \beta_{-i})$

$$= \beta_i - \left[ \frac{5(\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \dots + \beta_n)}{n} \right]$$

$$(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_i, \dots, \beta_n) \equiv (\beta_i, \beta_{-i})$$

Ex: (Auction)

- Players:  $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  ( $n$  sellers)

- Strategy set:  $S_i = \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ ,  $\forall i \in N$

- Valuation of the item to player  $i$ :  $v_i \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ ,  $\forall i \in N$

- Allocation function.  $a: \prod_{i \in N} S_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^N$   
 $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \mapsto (a_1, \dots, a_n)$   $a_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i \text{ "wins"} \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$

- Payment  $p: \prod_{i \in N} S_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^N$   
 $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \mapsto (p_1, \dots, p_n)$   $p_i = \text{money received by player } i.$

First price payment rule:

$$p_i = \begin{cases} s_i & \text{if } a_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{o/w} \end{cases}$$

Second price payment rule:

$$p_i = \begin{cases} \min_{j \neq i, j \in N} s_j & \text{if } a_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{o/w.} \end{cases}$$

Utility function:

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) = a_i (p_i - v_i)$$

<u>Dominant</u>	<u>Strategy</u>	<u>Equilibrium</u>
		$C \downarrow \quad nc \downarrow$
	$C$	$\underline{-5}, \underline{-5} \quad \underline{-1}, -10$
	$nc$	$\underline{-10}, -1 \quad \underline{-2}, -2$

irrespective of what other player plays, playing "C" is strictly always better. "C" is called a strongly dominant strategy.

Def<sup>n</sup>: In a normal form game  $\Gamma = \langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ , a strategy  $s_i^* \in S_i$  is called a strongly dominant strategy for player  $i$  if

$$u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \quad \forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i} \left( = \prod_{\substack{j \in N \\ j \neq i}} S_j \right), \forall s_i \in S_i, s_i \neq s_i^*$$

## Strongly dominant strategy equilibrium (SDSE)

Def<sup>n</sup>. Given  $\Gamma = \langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$  a strategy profile  $(s_i^*)_{i \in N} \in S \left( := \prod_{i \in N} S_i \right)$  is called a strongly dominant strategy equilibrium if each  $s_i^*$  is a strongly dominant strategy for player  $i$ .

Ex:  $(c, c)$  is a SDSE for the prisoner's dilemma game.