Succinct Games LL
Graphical games, sparse games, symmetric games,
anonymous games, network congestion games.

6. Congestion game: Generalization of network congestion
game. We have a set & of resurross. A strategy
is a subset of &. A strategy set of a player
is a subset of power set of &.



load of a resource e in the number of players in a strategy profile using the fresource.

Such resource has a non-decreasing cost function.

The whilst of a player in a strategy profile in the sum of the cost of the resources it is wing.

I. Multi-metrix game: for each $(i,j) \in [n) \times [n]$, we have $i \neq j$ a m×m metrix A^{ij} The white of player i in a strategy property $(s_j)_{j \in [n]}$, $\sum_{j=1}^{n} A^{ij}_{(s_i,s_j)}$ j = 1 $j \neq i$

Potential Game

A game is called a potential game if it has a "potential function".

Theorem: (Rosenthal) Every network congestion game has at least one PSNE.

Proof: Let f be a flow in G.

f: E[G) - N associated with strategy profiler.

" potential function maps strategy profiles to real numbers."

f(e)

If there is a player i who can reduce its cost by changing its path from P; to Pi', then the veduction in cost of player i is the same as the reduction in potential value.

$$\frac{1}{f} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} - \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)} = \frac{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i' \setminus P_i'} c_e(\hat{f}_e)}{\sum_{e \in P_i' \setminus P_i$$

The domain of \$\Pi\$ is a finite set. So it allaims a minimum value. Cleary, the pure strategy profile corresponding to the minimum value is a PSNE.

Potential Game: A game T= (N, (Si)iEN, (Wi)iEN) is called a potential game if there exists a function called a potential game if there exists a function

\$\Pi \text{Si} \text{fish} \text{c} \text{Si}, \text{fish} \text{c} \text{c}