Lecture 5.3

Finding on MSNE

Qn: What is the computational complexity of finding an MINE in a normal firm game?

- (i) do there exist at least two MSNE(?
- does there exist an MSNE where player 1 receives at least some minimum utility?
- (iii) does there exist an MSNE where both the players receive certain minimum utility?

- (iv) does there exist any MSNE which involves some strategies of player 1?
- (v) does there exist any MSNE which does not involve come strategies of player 1?

All the above problem are NP-complète.

Functional NP (FNP): This class comists of all problems in NP with the extra

requirement that for yes instances, the algorithm also needs to output a certificate

Can we show MSNE probem for bimetrix gamen is FNP-complete? NO!

Therem: If MSNE for bimatrix games in FNP-complete, then NP = co-NP.

Proof: Enough to prove NP C co-NP

Assumption: MSNE for bimatrix games in FNP-complete.

=) There exist a reduction from functional SAT to MSNE.

- =) i) An algorithm A is contruct an instance of MSNE A(f) from any Boolean farmula f.
 - ii) An algorithm B to map every MSNE st of A(f)
 to either
 c) yes and a satisfying assignment (certificate) for f

w 6) no.

claim: SAT & CO-NP.

Proof: To prove, there exist an efficiently verifiable certificate for the No impances of SAT also. Let f be a No impance. We claim $\left(\frac{A(f)}{N}\right) = \frac{N^*}{N}$ a certificate, and the algorithm $\frac{A(f)}{N} = \frac{N^*}{N} =$





