

External Regret Framework

Lecture 6.4

The setting: Iterative process between a player and an adversary.

- For each time step $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ {
 - the player picks a probability distribution $p_t \in \Delta(A)$. // A is the set of actions available to the player
 - Adversary picks a utility function $\pi_t: A \rightarrow [0, 1]$}

- The player samples an action $a_t \sim p_t$ and receives a reward $\pi_t(a_t)$.
- The player gets to know π_t .

}

Total expected utility : $\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{a \in A} \pi_t(a) \cdot p_t(a)$

Regret : $\underbrace{\left(\sum_{t=1}^T \max_{a \in A} \pi_t(a) \right)}_B - \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{a \in A} \pi_t(a) p_t(a)$

Time-averaged regret : $\frac{1}{T} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T \max_{a \in A} \pi_t(a) \right] - \left[\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{a \in A} \pi_t(a) p_t(a) \right]$

No regret dynamic / algorithm: if time-averaged regret
goes to zero when $T \rightarrow \infty$

Q: Does there exist any no regret algorithm?

Ans. NO!

$$n = |A|, \quad n = 2, \quad A = \{a_1, a_2\}$$

Adversary:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \pi_t(a_1) = 1 \\ \pi_t(a_2) = 0 \end{array} \right\} \text{ if } p_t(a_1) < p_t(a_2)$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \pi_t(a_1) = 0 \\ \pi_t(a_2) = 1 \end{array} \right\} \text{ if } p_t(a_1) \geq p_t(a_2)$$

$$B = T,$$

Expected utility of the player $\leq \frac{T}{2}$

$$\text{Time averaged - regret} \geq \frac{1}{T} \left[T - \frac{T}{2} \right] = \frac{1}{2}$$

Weaken the benchmark:

$$B = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{t=1}^T \pi_t(a) \quad : \text{External regret benchmark.}$$

Q. Does there exist any no-external regret algorithm?

Ans. YES!

No-Regret Algorithm

Theorem: Let $|A| = n$. Then there exists a no-regret algorithm whose time averaged regret is $O\left(\sqrt{\frac{\log n}{T}}\right)$.

Corollary: There exists a no-regret algorithm whose expected time averaged regret is at most ε , for

any $\epsilon > 0$, after $O\left(\frac{\log n}{\epsilon^2}\right)$ iterations.

The algorithm is called multiplicative weight (MW) /
hedge algorithm.

