THE

FIRST ALCIBIADES,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE NATURE OF MAN.

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INTRODUCTION[1].

THE moſt peculiar and firm principle, ſays Proclus, of all the dialogues of Plato, and of the whole theory of that philoſopher, is the knowledge of our own nature; for, this being properly eſtabliſhed as an hypotheſis, we ſhall be able accurately to learn the good which is adapted to us, and the evil which oppoſes this good. For, as the eſſences of things are different, ſo alſo are their proper perfections; and this according to a ſubjection of eſſence. For, whether *being* and *the good* proceed, as Ariſtotle ſays, from the ſame Veſta and firſt fountain, it is certainly neceſſary that perfection ſhould be imparted to every thing according to the meaſures of eſſence; or whether good proceeds from a cauſe more antient and more characterized by unity, but eſſence and being are imparted to things from another cauſe; ſtill, as every thing participates of being more obſcurely and more clearly, in the ſame degree muſt it participate of good; firſt beings, in a greater and more perfect manner; but thoſe that rank in the middle orders, ſecondarily; and the laſt of things according to an ultimate ſubſiſtence. For, how otherwiſe can things participate of deity and providence, and a diſtribution according to their deſert? For it muſt not be admitted that intellect can lead things into order, and impart to each a convenient meaſure, but that *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, which is more antient than intellect, ſhould make its communications in a diſordered manner; viz. that it ſhould impart to cauſes and things cauſed the ſame portion of goodneſs, and diſtribute to the ſame things according to being the perfections of more primary and ſubordinate natures. For it neither was lawful, ſays Timæus, nor is, for the beſt of natures to effect any thing but that which is moſt beautiful and moſt commenſurate. But the ſame good is not moſt commenſurate to firſt and ſecondary

[1] The whole of this Introduction is extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on this dialogue; excepting ſome occaſional elucidations by the tranſlator.—T.

natures;

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natures; but, as the Athenian gueſt ſays, a diſtribution of inequality to things unequal, and of equality to things equal, of the greater to ſuch as are greater, and of the leſſer to ſuch as are leſſer, is of all things the moſt muſical and the beſt.

According to this reaſoning, therefore, good is different in different beings, and a certain good is naturally co-ordinated to the eſſence of every thing. Hence the perfection of intellect is in eternity[1], but of the rational ſoul in time: and the good of the rational ſoul conſiſts in an energy according to intellect, but the good of body is in a ſubſiſtence according to nature; ſo that he who thinks that though the nature in theſe is different, yet the perfection is the ſame, has an erroneous conception of the truth of things.

According to every order of beings, therefore, eſſence ought to be known prior to perfection; for perfection is not of itſelf, but of eſſence, by which it is participated. Hence, with reſpect to the eſſence of a thing, we muſt firſt conſider whether it belongs to impartible eſſences, ſuch as intellectual natures, or to ſuch as are diviſible about bodies, viz. corporeal forms and qualities, or to ſuch as ſubſiſt between theſe. Likewiſe, whether it ranks among eternal entities, or ſuch as ſubſiſt according to the whole of time, or ſuch as are generated in a certain part of time. Again, whether it is ſimple, and ſubſiſts prior to compoſition, or is indeed a compoſite, but is always in the act of being bound with indiſſoluble bonds[2], or may again be reſolved into thoſe things from which it is compoſed. For, by thus conſidering every thing, we ſhall be able to underſtand in what its good conſiſts. For, again, it is evident that the good of thoſe natures which are allotted an impartible eſſence is eternal, but that the good of partible natures is converſant with time and motion; and that the good of things ſubſiſting between theſe is to be conſidered according to the meaſures of ſubſiſtence and perfection; viz. that ſuch a nature is indeed indigent of time, but of firſt time, which is able to meaſure incorporeal periods. So that the pure and genuine knowledge of ourſelves, circumſcribed in ſcien-

[1] For, the perceptions of intellect being intuitive, whatever it ſees it ſees collectively, at once, and without time.

[2] This is the caſe with the ſenſible univerſe, conſidered as a whole.

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tific boundaries, muſt, as we have ſaid, be conſidered as the moſt proper principle of all philoſophy, and of the doctrine of Plato. For, where is it proper to begin, except from the purification and perfection of ourſelves, and whence the Delphic god exhorts us to begin? For, as thoſe who enter the Eleuſinian grove are ordered by an inſcription not to enter into the adyta of the temple, if they are uninitiated in the higheſt of the myſteries, ſo the inſcription KNOW THYSELF, on the Delphic temple, manifeſts, as it appears to me, the mode of returning to a divine nature, and the moſt uſeful path to purification, all but perſpicuouſly aſſerting to the intelligent, that he who knows himſelf beginning from the Veſtal hearth may be able to be conjoined with that divinity who unfolds into light the whole of truth, and is the leader of a cathartic life; but that he who is ignorant of himſelf, as being uninitiated both in the leſſer and greater myſteries, is unadapted to participate the providence of Apollo. Hence then let us alſo begin conformably to the mandate of the god, and let us inveſtigate in which of his dialogues Plato eſpecially makes the ſpeculation of our eſſence his principal deſign, that from hence we may alſo make the commencement of the Platonic writings. Can we then adduce any other writing of Plato except the Firſt Alcibiades, and the conference of Socrates which is delivered in this dialogue? Where elſe ſhall we ſay our eſſence is ſo unfolded? Where beſides are man and the nature of man inveſtigated? To which we may add, that it is Socrates who engages in this firſt converſation with Alcibiades, and that it is he who ſays that the beginning of perfection is ſuſpended from the contemplation of ourſelves. For we are ignorant of ourſelves in conſequence of being involved in oblivion produced by the realms of generation, and agitated by the tumult of the irrational forms of life. In the mean time, we think that we know many things of which we are ignorant, becauſe we eſſentially poſſeſs innate reaſons of things.

This dialogue therefore is the beginning of all philoſophy, in the ſame manner as the knowledge of ourſelves. Hence many logical and ethical theorems are ſcattered in it, together with ſuch as contribute to the entire ſpeculation of felicity. It likewiſe contains information with reſpect to many things which contribute to phyſiology, and to thoſe dogmas which lead us to the truth concerning divine natures themſelves. Hence too the divine

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divine Iamblichus aſſigned this dialogue the firſt rank, in the ten dialogues, in which he was of opinion the whole philoſophy of Plato was contained.

Of the particulars exhibited in this dialogue, ſome precede and others follow the principal deſign, which is the knowledge of ourſelves. For the hypotheſis of twofold ignorance[1], exhortation, and the like precede; but the demonſtration of virtue and felicity, and the rejection of the multitude of arts, as being ignorant of themſelves, of things pertaining to themſelves, and in ſhort of all things,—and every thing elſe of this kind, have a conſequent order. But the moſt perfect and leading deſign of the whole converſation is the ſpeculation of our own eſſence. So that he will not err who eſtabliſhes the care and knowledge of ourſelves, as the end of the dialogue.

Again, the amatory form of life is particularly indicated by Socrates in this dialogue. For the beginning is made from hence; and he proceeds perfecting the young man till he renders him a lover of his providential care, which is the leading good of the amatory art. And in ſhort, through all the diviſions of the dialogue, he always preſerves that which is adapted to an amatory life. As there are three ſciences, then, which Socrates appears to have teſtified that he poſſeſſed, viz. the dialectic, the maieutic, (i. e. obſtetric,) and the amatory, we ſhall find the form of the dialectic and the peculiarity of the maieutic ſcience in this dialogue, but the effects of the amatory ſcience predominate in it. For, when Socrates is calling forth the conceptions of Alcibiades, he ſtill acts conformably to the amatory character; and when he employs the dialectic ſcience, he does not depart from the peculiarity of amatory arguments. Juſt as in the Theætetus he is maieutic, is principally characterized according to this, and proceeds as far as to a purification of the falſe opinions of Theætetus: but, having effected this, he diſmiſſes him, as being now able of himſelf to know the truth, which is the buſineſs of the maieutic ſcience, as he himſelf aſſerts in that dialogue. Thus alſo he firſt indicates the amatory ſcience in this dialogue, with which both the dialectic and maieutic are

[1] Twofold ignorance takes place when a man is ignorant that he is ignorant; and this was the caſe with Alcibiades in the firſt part of this dialogue, and is the diſeaſe of the multitude.

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mingled. For every where Socrates introduces diſcourſes adapted to the ſubject perſons. And as every kind of good pre-ſubſiſts in a divine nature, which is variouſly poſſeſſed by different beings according to the natural aptitude of each, in like manner Socrates, who comprehends all ſciences in himſelf, employs a different ſcience at different times, according to the aptitude of the recipients; elevating one through the amatory ſcience; exciting another to the reminiſcence of the eternal reaſons of the ſoul through the maieutic ſcience; and conducting another according to the dialectic method to the ſpeculation of beings. Some too he conjoins to the beautiful itſelf, others to the firſt wiſdom, and others to *the good itſelf*. For through the amatory ſcience we are led to the beautiful; through the maieutic, by calling forth our latent reaſons, we become wiſe in things of which we were ignorant; and through the dialectic ſcience we aſcend as far as to *the good*.

Laſtly, it will be found by thoſe who are deeply ſkilled in the philoſophy of Plato, that each of his dialogues contains that which the univerſe contains. Hence, in every dialogue, one thing is analogous to *the good*, another to *intellect*, another to *ſoul*, another to *form*, and another to *matter*. In this dialogue therefore it muſt be ſaid, that an aſſimilation to a divine nature is analogous to *the good*; the knowledge of ourſelves to *intellect*; the multitude of the demonſtrations leading us to the concluſion, and in ſhort every thing ſyllogiſtic in the dialogue, to *ſoul*; the character of the diction, and whatever elſe pertains to the power of ſpeech, to *form*; and the perſons, the occaſion, and that which is called by rhetoricians the hypotheſis, to *matter*.

THE

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THE

FIRST ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE, (moſt probably) THE LYCEUM.

SOCRATES.

SON of Clinias! you wonder, I ſuppoſe, that I, who was the earlieſt of your admirers[1], now, when all the reſt have forſaken you, am the only one who ſtill retains unalterably the ſame ſentiments; and yet, that for ſo many years I have never ſpoken ſo much as a word to you, whilſt the others were preſſing through crowds of people to converſe with you. This reſerve and diſtance in my behaviour have been owing to no human regards, but to an impediment thrown in my way by a dæmoniacal nature[2], the power

[1] Socrates, we are told by Plutarch, had diſcovered in the countenance of Alcibiades, then in his puerile age, the ſigns of an ingenuous and noble diſpoſition. Having thence conceived expectations of the boy's becoming an extraordinary man, he had from that time, as we are told in this dialogue, been a conſtant obſerver of all his motions, ſayings and actions. When Alcibiades was grown up to his full ſtature, he was followed and ſurrounded, wherever he went, by ſuch as admired the handſomeneſs of his perſon. They flattered his vanity; but the higher opinion they raiſed in him of himſelf, the more he thought himſelf above them. His conduct towards them was ſuitable to his thoughts, was ſuch as might become an abſolute lord toward his vaſſals. See *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades.*—S.

[2] As there is no vacuum in corporeal, ſo neither in incorporeal natures. Between divine eſſences, therefore, which are the firſt of things, and partial eſſences ſuch as ours, which are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there muſt neceſſarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may be connected with man, and that the progreſſion of things may form an entire whole, ſuſpended like the golden chain of Homer from the ſummit of Olympus.

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power and force of which you ſhall by and by be made acquainted with. But now, ſeeing that this power no longer operates to hinder my approach, I am

Olympus. This middle rank of beings, conſidered according to a twofold diviſion, conſiſts of dæmons and heroes, the latter of which is proximate to partial ſouls ſuch as ours, and the former to divine natures, juſt as air and water ſubſiſt between fire and earth. Hence whatever is ineffable and occult in the gods, dæmons and heroes expreſs and unfold. They likewiſe conciliate all things, and are the ſources of the harmonic conſent and ſympathy of all things with each other. They tranſmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours to the divinities. But the characteriſtics of divine natures are unity, permanency in themſelves, a ſubſiſtence as an immovable cauſe of motion, tranſcendent providence, and which poſſeſſes nothing in common with the ſubjects of their providential energies; and theſe characteriſtics are preſerved in them according to eſſence, power and energy. On the other hand, the characteriſtics of partial ſouls are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the gods, an aptitude to receive ſomething from other natures, and to mingle together all things in itſelf, and through itſelf; and theſe characteriſtics they alſo poſſeſs according to eſſence, power and energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we ſhall find that thoſe of dæmons are, to contain in themſelves the gifts of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the gods, but yet ſo as to comprehend the conditions of ſubordinate natures, under the idea of a divine eſſence. In other words, the prerogatives of deity characterize, and abſorb as it were by their powerful light, whatever dæmons poſſeſs peculiar to inferior beings. Hence they are multiplied indeed, but unitedly—mingled, but yet ſo that the unmingled predominates—and are moved, but with ſtability. On the contrary, heroes poſſeſs unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives of ſubordinate predominate in theſe over the characteriſtics of ſuperior natures. In ſhort, dæmons and heroes are compoſed from the properties of the two extremes—gods and partial ſouls; but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the human nature.

Having premiſed thus much, the Platonic reader will, I doubt not, gratefully accept the following admirable account of dæmons in general, and alſo of the dæmon of Socrates, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

"Let us now ſpeak in the firſt place concerning dæmons in general; in the next place, concerning thoſe that are allotted us in common; and, in the third place, concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requiſite that demonſtrations ſhould begin from things more univerſal, and proceed from theſe as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is natural, and is more adapted to ſcience. Dæmons therefore, deriving their firſt ſubſiſtence from the viviſic goddeſs[1], and flowing from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an eſſence characterized by ſoul. This eſſence in thoſe of a ſuperior order is more intellectual and more perfect according to hyparxis[2]; in thoſe of a middle order, it is more rational; and in thoſe which rank in the third degree, and which ſubſiſt at the extremity of the dæmoni-

[1] i. e. Juno. [2] i. e. the ſummit of eſſence.

I am come thus to accoſt you; and am in good hopes too, that for the future the dæmon will give no oppoſition to my deſire of converſing with

acal order, it is various, more irrational and more material. Poſſeſſing therefore an eſſence of this kind, they are diſtributed in conjunction with the gods, as being allotted a power miniſtrant to deity. Hence they are in one way ſubſervient to the liberated gods[1] (απολυτοι θεοι), who are the leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane gods, who proximately preſide over the parts of the univerſe. For there is one diviſion of dæmons, according to the twelve ſuperceleſtial gods, and another according to all the idioms of the mundane gods. For every mundane god is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order, to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic god, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power; if teleſiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified with the ſame appellations as their leading gods. Hence they rejoice when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. as expreſſing the idiom or peculiarity of their proper deities. And from theſe, mortal natures alſo participate of divine influxions. And thus animals and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different gods; dæmons proximately imparting to theſe the repreſentations of their leaders. But the gods in an exempt manner ſupernally preſide over dæmons; and through this, laſt natures ſympathize with ſuch as are firſt. For the repreſentations of firſt are ſeen in laſt natures; and the cauſes of things laſt are comprehended in primary beings. The middle genera too of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the gods, but participated by mortal natures. He therefore will not err who aſſerts that the mundane artificer eſtabliſhed the centres of the order of the univerſe in dæmons; ſince Diotima alſo aſſigns them this order, that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing ſupernal ſtreams, elevating all ſecondary natures to the gods, and giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium. We muſt not therefore aſſent to their doctrine, who ſay that dæmons are the ſouls of men that have changed the preſent life. For it is not proper to conſider a dæmoniacal nature *according to habitude* (κατα σχεσιν) as the ſame with a nature *eſſentially* dæmoniacal; nor to aſſert that the perpetual medium of all mundane natures conſiſts from a life converſant with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard ſubſiſts always the ſame, connecting the mundane wholes; but ſoul does not always thus retain its own order, as Socrates ſays in the Republic; ſince at different times it chooſes different lives. Nor do we praiſe thoſe who make certain of the gods to be dæmons, ſuch as the erratic gods, according to Amelius; but we are perſuaded by Plato, who calls the gods the rulers of the univerſe, but ſubjects to them the herds of dæmons; and we ſhall every where preſerve the doctrine of Diotima, who aſſigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal natures, to a dæmoniacal eſſence. Let this then be the conception reſpecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common.

[1] i. e. gods who immediately ſubſiſt above the mundane deities, and are therefore called ſuperceleſtial.

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with you. All this while, however, being but a ſpectator, I have been able tolerably well to obſerve and conſider your behaviour with regard to

"In the next place let us ſpeak concerning the dæmons which are allotted mankind. For of theſe dæmons, which as we have ſaid rank in the middle order, the firſt and higheſt are divine dæmons, and who often appear as gods, through their tranſcendent ſimilitude to the divinities. For, in ſhort, that which is firſt in every order preſerves the form of the nature prior to itſelf. Thus, the firſt intellect is a god, and the moſt antient of ſouls is intellectual: and hence of dæmons the higheſt genus, as being proximate to the gods, is uniform and divine. The next to theſe in order are thoſe dæmons who participate of an intellectual idiom, and preſide over the aſcent and deſcent of ſouls, and who unfold into light and deliver to all things the productions of the gods. The third are thoſe who diſtribute the productions of divine ſouls to ſecondary natures, and complete the bond of thoſe that receive defluxions from thence. The fourth are thoſe that tranſmit the efficacious powers of whole natures to things generated and corrupted, and who inſpire partial natures with life, order, reaſons, and the all-various perfect operations which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through this medium? For it is this ultimate middle nature which has dominion over corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The ſixth in order are thoſe that revolve about matter, connect the powers which deſcend from celeſtial to ſublunary matter, perpetually guard this matter, and defend the ſhadowy repreſentation of forms which it contains.

"Dæmons therefore, as Diotima alſo ſays, being many and all-various, the higheſt of them conjoin ſouls proceeding from their father, to their leading gods: for every god, as we have ſaid, is the leader in the firſt place of dæmons, and in the next of partial ſouls. For the Demiurgus diſſeminated theſe, as Timæus ſays, into the ſun and moon, and the other inſtruments of time. Theſe divine dæmons, therefore, are thoſe which are eſſentially allotted to ſouls, and conjoin them to their proper leaders: and every ſoul, though it revolves together with its leading deity, requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of the ſecond rank preſide over the aſcenſions and deſcenſions of ſouls; and from theſe the ſouls of the multitude derive their elections. For the moſt perfect ſouls, who are converſant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they chooſe a life conformable to their preſiding god, ſo they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence the Egyptian prieſt admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To ſouls therefore who live as thoſe that will ſhortly return to the intelligible world whence they came, the ſupernal is the ſame with the dæmon which attends them here; but to imperfect ſouls the eſſential is different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth.

"If theſe things then are rightly aſſerted, we muſt not aſſent to thoſe who make our rational ſoul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from man, as Diotima ſays, who places dæmons between gods and men, and as Socrates alſo evinces when he divides a dæmoniacal oppoſitely to the human nature: 'for,' ſays he, 'not a human but a dæmoniacal obſtacle

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to your admirers. And I find, that, though they have been numerous, and ſuch perſons too as [1] thought highly of themſelves, there is not one whom

detains me.' But man is a ſoul uſing the body as an inſtrument. A dæmon, therefore, is not the ſame with the rational ſoul.

"This alſo is evident from Plato in the Timæus, where he ſays that intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to eſſence is different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many inſtances that which proximately preſides, ſubſiſting in the order of a dæmon with reſpect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illuſtrious dæmon; and Plato, in the Timæus, calls thoſe gods who proximately preſide over, and orderly diſtribute the realms of generation, dæmons: 'for,' ſays he, 'to ſpeak concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the ability of human nature.' But a dæmon according to analogy is that which proximately preſides over any thing, though it ſhould be a god, or though it ſhould be ſome one of the natures poſterior to the gods. And the ſoul that through ſimilitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces energies more wonderful than thoſe which belong to human nature, and which ſuſpends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon κατα σχεσιν, according to habitude, i. e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls thoſe, dæmons, who have lived well, and who in conſequence of this are transferred to a better condition of being, and to more holy places. But an eſſential dæmon is neither called a dæmon through habitude to ſecondary natures, nor through an aſſimilation to ſomething different from itſelf; but is allotted this peculiarity from himſelf, and is defined by a certain ſummit, or flower of eſſence, (hyparxis,) by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. In ſhort, the rational ſoul is called in the Timæus the dæmon of the animal. But we inveſtigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal; that which governs the rational ſoul itſelf, and not its inſtrument; and that which leads the ſoul to its judges, after the diſſolution of the animal, as Socrates ſays in the Phædo. For, when the animal is no more, the dæmon which the ſoul was allotted while connected with the body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the ſoul poſſeſſes that dæmon while living in the body, which is ſaid to lead it to judgment after death, this dæmon muſt be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal alone. To which we may add, that, beginning from on high, it governs the whole of our compoſition.

"Nor again, diſmiſſing the rational ſoul, muſt it be ſaid that a dæmon is that which energizes in the ſoul: as, for inſtance, that in thoſe who live according to reaſon, reaſon is the dæmon; in thoſe that live according to anger, the iraſcible part; and in thoſe that live according

[1] Amongſt theſe was Anytus, who not long after became a bitter enemy to the great philoſopher. And probably this was one of the motives of his enmity, ſome ſuſpicion that Socrates had ſupplanted him in the favour and friendſhip of Alcibiades. For a ſuſpicion of this ſort always begets envy in little minds; and from envy always ſprings the moſt malicious hatred.—S.

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whom you have not driven away from you by your ſuperior[1] haughtineſs and imagined elevation. The reaſons of your being exalted ſo highly

according to deſire, the deſiderative part. Nor muſt it be ſaid that the nature which proximately preſides over that which energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as, for inſtance, that reaſon is the dæmon of the iraſcible, and anger of thoſe that live according to deſire. For, in the firſt place, to aſſert that dæmons are parts of our ſoul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppoſe the diviſion of Socrates in the Republic, who after gods and dæmons places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing in their poems heroes in no reſpect better than men, but ſubject to ſimilar paſſions. By this accuſation, therefore, it is plain that Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons, who are of a ſublimer order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the ſoul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things more excellent according to eſſence give completion to ſuch as are ſubordinate. And in the ſecond place, from this hypotheſis, mutations of lives would alſo introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life which is formed by right opinion, and this laſt into a ſcientific life. The dæmon therefore will vary according to theſe changes: for the energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, either this energizing part itſelf is a dæmon, or that part which has an arrangement prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the mutation of human life, and the ſame perſon will have many dæmons in one life; which is of all things the moſt impoſſible. For the ſoul never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the ſame dæmon which preſides over us till we are brought before the judges of our conduct, as alſo Socrates aſſerts in the Phædo.

"Again, thoſe who conſider a partial intellect, or that intellect which ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the ſame with the dæmon which is aſſigned to man, appear to me to confound the intellectual idiom with the dæmoniacal eſſence. For all dæmons ſubſiſt in the extent of ſouls, and rank as the next in order to divine ſouls; but the intellectual order is different from that of ſoul, and is neither allotted the ſame eſſence, nor power, nor energy.

"Further ſtill: this alſo may be ſaid, that ſouls enjoy intellect then only when they convert themſelves to it, receive its light, and conjoin their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the preſiding care of a dæmoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of thoſe gods that preſide over fate. It is likewiſe the dæmon that ſupplies and meaſures the illuminations from providence. And as ſouls, indeed, we are ſuſpended from intellect,

[1] Here is painted the moſt diſtinguiſhing feature in the character of Alcibiades. For Plutarch aſſures us, that the ſtrongeſt of his paſſions, though all of them were vehement, was a love of ſuperiority and pre-eminence in all things. And Ælian in Var. Hiſt. l. 4. c. 16. repreſents him as the pattern of arrogance; as if no perſon could ever in this quality exceed him.—S.

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highly in your own opinion, I am desirous of laying before you. They are these: You presume, that in no affair whatever you need assistance from

intellect, but as souls using the body we require the aid of a dæmon. Hence Plato, in the Phædrus, calls intellect the governor of the soul; but he every where calls a dæmon the inspector and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing pertaining to us, besides that of a dæmon. For intellect, as we have said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoëtic part. And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the dæmon alone moves, governs, and orderly disposes, all our affairs. For he gives perfection to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And thus much concerning our allotted dæmons.

"In the next place, with respect to the dæmon of Socrates, these three things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks as a dæmon, but also as a god: for in the course of this dialogue he clearly says, 'I have long been of opinion that *the god* did not as yet direct me to hold any conversation with you.'

"He calls the same power, therefore, a dæmon and a god. And in the Apology he more clearly evinces that this dæmon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered as ranking in a dæmoniacal nature. And this is what we before said, that the dæmons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and anagogic life, are divine, transcending the whole of a dæmoniacal genus, and being the first participants of the gods. For, as is a dæmon among gods, such also is a god among dæmons. But among the divinities the hyparxis is divine; but in dæmons, on the contrary, the idiom of their essence is dæmoniacal, but the analogy which they bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For, on account of their transcendency with respect to other dæmons, they frequently appear as gods. With great propriety, therefore, does Socrates call his dæmon a god: for he belonged to the first and highest dæmons. Hence Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the dæmon of Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice proceeding from his dæmon. For this is asserted by him in the Theætetus and in the Phædrus. And this voice is the signal from the dæmon, which he speaks of in the Theages: and again in the Phædrus, when he was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal from the dæmon. What, then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, and what was the voice through which he says the dæmon signified to him his will?

"In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoëtic power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon, who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential attention to more imperfect souls; and according to the energy of his dæmon, he received the light proceeding

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from any other party: for that what you have of your own, whether of outward advantages or inward accomplishments, is so great as to be all-sufficient.

proceeding from thence, neither in his dianoëtic part alone, nor in his doxastic[1] powers, but also in his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is moved by, the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice, therefore, did not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which was rather recognized by consciousness (συνεσθησις) than by sense: for such are the illuminations of good dæmons, and the gods.

"In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of Socrates: for it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. This also must again be referred to the Socratic life: for it is not a property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of the guardian of Socrates. We must say, therefore, that the beneficent and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude with respect to the communication of good, did not require the exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling than an exciting dæmon. For the unaptitude of auditors, which is for the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his unseasonable impulses.

"But further still, it may be said, that of dæmons, some are allotted a purifying and undefiled power; others a generative; others a perfective; and others a demiurgic power: and, in short, they are divided according to the characteristic peculiarities of the gods, and the powers under which they are arranged. Each, likewise, according to his hyparxis, incites the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears, therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures: and hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him.

[1] i. e. the powers belonging to *opinion*, or that part of the soul which knows *that* a thing is, but not *why* it is.

For,

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ſufficient. In the firſt place, you think yourſelf excelling in the handſomeneſs [1] of your perſon and in the fineneſs of your figure. And in this opinion it is evident to every one who has eyes that you are not miſtaken. In the next place, you dwell on theſe thoughts: that you are deſcended from families the moſt illuſtrious in the ſtate to which you belong [2]; that this ſtate is the greateſt of any in Greece; that you have friends here, and relations on your father's ſide, very numerous and very powerful, ready to aſſiſt you on every occaſion; and that your relations on your mother's ſide are not inferior to them, either in power or in number. But a greater ſtrength than from all theſe whom I have mentioned, taken together, you think that you derive from Pericles, the ſon of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian to yourſelf and to your brother: Pericles, who is able to do what he pleaſes; and that, not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece, and with many and great families abroad. To all theſe advantages I ſhall add the greatneſs of your eſtate; though, indeed, on this advantage you ſeem to value yourſelf leſs [3] than you do

For, what elſe is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? Indeed it appears to me, that, as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progreſſion into Titannic multitude and a deſertion of his royal throne, in like manner the dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of ſurvey, and reſtrained his aſſociation with the multitude. For the dæmon is analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates to Bacchus: for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this divinity."—T.

[1] That Alcibiades, ſays Proclus in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, was large and beautiful, is evident from his being called the general object of the love of all Greece; and is alſo evident from the ſaying of Antiſthenes, that if Achilles was not ſuch as Alcibiades, he was not truly beautiful; and from Hermæ being faſhioned according to his form. Ὅτι δὲ αυ μεγας ὁ Αλκιβιαδης εγενετο και καλλος, δηλοι μεν και το κοινον αυτον ερωμενον καλεισθαι της Ἑλλαδος ἁπασης· δηλοι δε ὁ Αντισθενης ειπων, ὡς ει μη τοιυτος ην ὁ Αχιλλευς, υκ αρα ην οντως καλος· δηλοι δε και το τυς Ἑρμας πλατεσσαι κατα το ειδος αὐτυ — Γ.

[2] For an account of the noble deſcent of Alcibiades, ſee Pauſan. lib. 1. Thucyd. lib. 6. Iſocrat. περι ζευγυς. Andocid. in Orat. 4tâ.—T.

[3] Hiſtory teſtifies that Alcibiades from his childhood paid but little attention to the acquiſition of wealth. Indeed, according to Plato, one of the greateſt arguments of being well born is a contempt of wealth; and hence, in the Republic, he makes this to be one of the elements of the philoſophic nature. For an aptitude to virtue is inconſiſtent with an attachment to riches. Indeed, ſince it is requiſite that a genuine lover of virtue ſhould deſpiſe the body, is it not much more neceſſary that he ſhould deſpiſe the goods of the body?

But,

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do on any other. Elevated as you are in your own mind on thefe accounts, you have looked down on your admirers: and they, confcious of their comparative meannefs, have bowed their heads, and have retired.

But, affuming a more elevated exordium, let us confider from what conceptions fouls become fo much attached to beauty and magnitude of body, to nobility, and power: for thefe are images extended to fouls of realities themfelves, which the intelligent defpife, but the ftupid embrace with avidity. We muft fay, therefore, that beauty and magnitude appear in the firft of the divine orders;—the former rendering all divine natures lovely, and defirable to fecondary beings; and the latter caufing them to tranfcend mundane wholes, and to be exempt from their proper progeny. For magnitude, according to Plato, confidered as a divine idea, is that caufe by which every where one thing tranfcends another. Of thofe two great principles likewife, *bound* and *infinity*, which are next in dignity and power to the ineffable principle of things, *bound* is the fource of beauty, and *infinity* of magnitude. Hence the alliance of beauty to the former, as being the form of forms, and as fwimming on the light of all intelligible forms; but of magnitude to the latter, from its incomprehenfibility, from its embracing all things and fubduing all things. From the firft principles, therefore, beauty and magnitude proceed through all the middle orders, as far as to the apparent world, which, according to Timæus, they perfectly render the greateft and the moft beautiful of fenfible gods. Souls therefore, according to their fpontaneous innate conceptions, pre-affume that thefe fhine forth in divine natures; and hence they admire beauty and magnitude in mortal bodies, as poffeffing a refemblance of their divine originals. However, through their ignorance of the true archetypes, they are detained by, and alone admire, the obfcure and fleeting imitations of real beauty and magnitude.

In the fecond place, with refpect to nobility, this alfo firft fubfifts in divine natures. For things which derive their fubfiftence from more elevated caufes tranfcend according to genus thofe which are generated in fecondary ranks. This is alfo evident from Homer, who makes Juno fay to Jupiter:

. . . . . thence is my race derived, whence thine:

and in confequence of this fhe wifhes to poffefs an equal dominion in the univerfe with Jupiter. According to this conception, you may alfo fay that in us the rational is more noble than the irrational foul, becaufe, according to Plato in the Timæus, the artificer of the univerfe gave fubfiftence to the former—but the junior gods, or thofe powers that prefide over the mundane fpheres, to the latter. Natural fucceffion is the image of this nobility; to which when fouls alone direct their attention, they become filled with vain conceptions, and are ignorant of what Plato afferts in the Theætetus, that it is by no means wonderful, in the infinity of time paft, if he who is able to enumerate five-and-twenty noble anceftors, fhould find, by afcending higher in antiquity, that thefe progenitors were defcended from as many flaves. But the ftable and perpetual alliance of fouls is fufpended from divine natures, about which they are diffeminated, and from divine powers under which they are arranged. For the attendants of more exalted deities are more noble, as likewife are thofe powers which are fufpended from greater divinities, according to an allotment in the univerfe.—T.

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This you are very ſenſible of: and therefore I well know that you wonder what I can have in my thoughts, or what hopes I can entertain, ſeeing that I quit you not, but continue my attachment to you ſtill, when your other admirers have all forſaken you.

ALC. This however, Socrates, perhaps you do not know, that you have been a little beforehand with me. For I really had it in my mind to addreſs you firſt, and to aſk you theſe very queſtions: What can poſſibly be your meaning, and with what views or expectations is it, that you continually preſs on me, and, wherever I am, are aſſiduous to be there yourſelf? for I do in truth wonder, what your buſineſs can be with me, and ſhould be very glad to be informed.

SOC. You will hear me then, 'tis to be ſuppoſed, with willingneſs and attention, if you really are deſirous, as you ſay you are, of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I ſpeak therefore as to a perſon diſpoſed to hear, and to ſtay till he has heard all.

ALC. I am entirely ſo diſpoſed: it is your part to ſpeak.

SOC. But obſerve this: you muſt not wonder, if, as I found it difficult to make a beginning, I ſhould find it no leſs difficult to make an end.

ALC. My good man, ſay all you have to ſay; for I ſhall not fail to attend to you.

SOC. I muſt ſay it then: and though it is a hard taſk for any man to addreſs the perſon whom he loves or admires, if that perſon be ſuperior to flattery, yet I muſt adventure boldly to ſpeak my mind. If, Alcibiades, I had obſerved you ſatisfied with thoſe advantages of yours, which I juſt now enumerated; if you had appeared to indulge the fancy of ſpending your whole life in the enjoyment of them; I perſuade myſelf, that my love and admiration of you would have long ſince left me. But that you entertain thoughts very different from ſuch as thoſe, I ſhall now ſhow, and ſhall lay your own mind open before yourſelf. By theſe means you will alſo plainly perceive, how conſtantly and cloſely my mind has attended to you. My opinion of you then is this: That, if any of the gods were to put this queſtion to you,—"Alcibiades!" were he to ſay, "whether do you chooſe to live in the poſſeſſion of all the things which are at preſent yours; or do you prefer immediate death, if you are not permitted ever to acquire things greater?" in this caſe, it appears to me that you would make death

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death your option. But what kind of expectations you live in, I ſhall now declare. You think, that, if you ſpeedily make your appearance before the Athenian people in aſſembly, (and this you purpoſe to do within a few days,) you ſhall be able to convince them, that you merit higher honours than were ever beſtowed on Pericles, or any other perſon in any age: and having convinced them of this, you think that you will arrive at the chief power in the ſtate; and if here at home, that you will then have the greateſt weight and influence abroad; and not only ſo with the reſt of the Grecian ſtates, but with the barbarian nations too, as many as inhabit the ſame continent with us. And further: if the deity whom I before ſpoke of, allowing you larger limits, were to ſay to you, that "you muſt be contented with being the maſter here in Europe; for that 'twill not be permitted you to paſs over into Aſia, nor to concern yourſelf with the adminiſtration of any affairs there;" it appears to me, that neither on theſe terms, thus limited, would you think life eligible; nor on any terms, indeed, that fell ſhort of filling, in a manner, the whole world with your renown, and of being every where lord and maſter. I believe you deem no man that ever lived, excepting Cyrus and Xerxes, worth the ſpeaking of. In fine, that you entertain ſuch hopes as I have mentioned, I know with certainty, and ſpeak not from mere conjecture. Now you, perhaps, conſcious of the truth of what I have ſpoken, might ſay, What is all this to the account you promiſed to give me, of the reaſons for which your attachment to me ſtill continues? I will tell you then, dear ſon of Clinias and Dinomache! That all theſe thoughts of yours ſhould ever come to an end, is impoſſible without my help,—ſo great power I think myſelf to have with regard to your affairs and to yourſelf too. For this reaſon, I have long been of opinion, that the god[1] did not as yet permit me to hold any converſation with you; and I waited for the time when he would give me leave. For, as you entertain hopes of proving to the people, that your value to them is equal to whatever they can give you; and as you expect that, having proved this point, you ſhall immediately obtain whatever power you deſire; in the ſame manner do I expect to have the greateſt power and influence over

[1] That is, the dæmon of Socrates. See the note at the beginning of the dialogue concerning dæmons.—T.

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you, when I ſhall have proved that I am valuable to you [1] more than any other thing is; and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any other perſon, is able to procure you the power you long for, except myſelf; with the aſſiſtance, however, of the god. So long therefore as you was yet too young, and before you had your mind filled with thoſe ſwelling hopes, I believe that the god would not permit me to have diſcourſe with you, becauſe you would not have regarded me, and I conſequently ſhould have diſcourſed in vain; but that he has now given me free leave, for that you would now hearken to me.

ALC. Much more unaccountable and abſurd do you appear to me now, Socrates, ſince you have begun to open yourſelf, than when you followed me every where without ſpeaking to me a word: and yet you had all the appearance of being a man of that ſort then. As to what you have ſaid, whether I entertain thoſe thoughts in my mind, or not, you, it ſeems, know with certainty: ſo that, were I to ſay I did not, the denial would not avail me, nor perſuade you to believe me. Admitting it then, and ſuppoſing that I indulge the hopes you mentioned ever ſo much, how they may be accompliſhed by means of you, and that without your help they never can, are you able to prove to me?

SOC. Do you aſk me, whether I am able to prove it to you in a long harangue, ſuch a one as you are accuſtomed to hear? I have no abilities in that way. But yet I ſhould be able, as I think, to prove to you, that thoſe pretenſions of mine are not vain, if you would be willing but to do me one ſmall piece of ſervice.

ALC. If that ſervice be not difficult to be done, I am willing.

SOC. Do you think it difficult, or not, to make anſwers to ſuch queſtions as are propoſed to you?

ALC. Not difficult.

SOC. Be ready then to anſwer.

ALC. Do you then propoſe your queſtions.

SOC. May I propoſe them, with a ſuppoſition that you have thoſe thoughts in your mind which I attribute to you?

[1] In the Greek text, as it is printed, the word σοι is here omitted, but ſeems neceſſary to be inſerted, and the paſſage to be read thus, ὅτι παντος μαλλον αξιος σοι ειμι, κ. τ. λ. ſo as to correſpond, as it ought, with theſe words in the preceding part of the ſentence, ὅτι αυτη παντος αξιος ει.—S.

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ALC. Be it ſo, if you chooſe it; that I may know what further you have to ſay.

SOC. Well then. You have it in your mind, as I ſaid, to appear in preſence of the Athenians within a ſhort time, with intention to harangue them and give them your advice. If therefore, when you are juſt ready to mount the roſtrum, I were to ſtop you, and to ſay thus, "Since the Athenians are here met in aſſembly, on purpoſe to deliberate on ſome of their affairs, what, I pray you, are to be the ſubjects of their deliberation, now that you riſe up to give them your counſel? Muſt not the ſubjects be ſuch as you are better acquainted with than they?" what anſwer would you make me?

ALC. I certainly ſhould anſwer, that the ſubjects were ſuch as I knew better than others who were preſent.

SOC. On thoſe ſubjects, then, which you happen to have knowledge in you are a good counſellor?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. Have you knowledge in thoſe things only which you have either learnt from others, or found out yourſelf?

ALC. What things other than thoſe is it poſſible that I ſhould have any knowledge in?

SOC. And is it poſſible that ever you ſhould have learnt, or have found out, any thing which you was not willing to learn, or to ſearch out by yourſelf?

ALC. It is not.

SOC. And was you ever at any time willing to learn, or did you ever at any time ſeek to know, any things in which you imagined yourſelf to be already knowing?

ALC. No, certainly.

SOC. In thoſe things which you now happen to know, was there once a time when you did not think yourſelf knowing?

ALC. That muſt have been.

SOC. Now, what the things are which you have learnt, I tolerably well know. But if you have been taught any thing without my knowledge, tell me what. To the beſt of my memory, you have been taught grammar, the gymnic exerciſes, and to play on ſtringed inſtruments of muſic:

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muſic: for on wind-inſtruments, beſides, you refuſed to learn [1]. This is the ſum total of all your knowledge; unleſs you have learnt any thing elſe in ſome place or other, which I have not diſcovered: and I think, that neither by day nor yet by night did you ever ſtir out of doors but I was acquainted with all your motions.

ALC. 'Tis true that I have not gone to any other maſters than to ſuch as taught the arts which you have mentioned.

SOC. Well then. When the Athenians are conſulting together about the grammar of their language, how to write or ſpeak it with propriety, at theſe times is it that you will riſe up to give them your advice?

ALC. By Jove, not I.

SOC. But is it then when they are in debate about ſtriking chords on the lyre?

ALC. By no means ſhould I make a ſpeech on ſuch a ſubject.

SOC. It cannot be on the ſubject of wreſtling neither: becauſe they never uſe to deliberate on this ſubject in their public aſſemblies.

ALC. Certainly not.

SOC. On what ſubject, then, of their conſultations is it that you intend the giving them your advice? It cannot be when building is the ſubject.

ALC. No, certainly.

SOC. Becauſe in this caſe a builder would give them better advice than you could.

ALC. True.

SOC. Nor yet is it when they conſult together concerning divination.

ALC. It is not.

SOC. For a diviner would in this caſe be a better counſellor than you.

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. And that, whether he was a tall or a ſhort man [2]; whether his perſon

[1] Alleging, that the performances on ſuch inſtruments were illiberal, and unbecoming to a gentleman; that they were ungraceful, and diſtorting to the face; and could not, like thoſe on ſtringed inſtruments, ſuch as the lyre, be accompanied by the voice of the performer. See Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades; and A. Gellius, lib. 15. c. 17.—S.

[2] Theſe external advantages of perſon and of birth, in any ſpeaker, always dazzle the eyes and imagination of the vulgar, and divert their attention, as well from the matter of the ſpeech as from the manner in which it is ſpoken. The moſt ignorant and barbarian nations too, in all

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perſon was handſome or deformed; and whether his family was noble or ignoble.

ALC. How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

SOC. For to give good advice in any caſe whatever, belongs, I ſuppoſe, only to a perſon ſkilled in the ſubject, and not to a fine gentleman.

ALC. Beyond all queſtion.

SOC. And whether the man who gives them his advice be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are conſulting about the health of the city; but they will always inquire after a phyſician only to conſult with.

ALC. They will be right in ſo doing.

SOC. Now, on what ſubject is it, when they are met in conſultation together, that you will do right in riſing up and giving them your counſel?

ALC. 'Tis when they are in conſultation, Socrates, about their own affairs.

SOC. About increaſing their navy, do you mean? what ſort of veſſels they ſhould provide, and in what manner they ſhould have them built?

ALC. I mean no ſuch thing, Socrates.

SOC. Becauſe you are ignorant, I preſume, in the art of ſhipbuilding. Is not this the reaſon? Or is there any other, why you would chooſe in ſuch a conſultation to ſit ſilent?

ALC. That is the only reaſon.

SOC. What affairs of their own then do you mean?

ALC. I mean, Socrates, when they are deliberating about the making war, or the making peace; or concerning any other affairs of ſtate.

SOC. Do you mean, when they are deliberating on theſe points, with whom 'tis proper for them to make peace, and with whom to engage in war, and in what way 'tis proper to carry on that war? Is this what you mean?

all ages, have always been obſerved to lay the greateſt ſtreſs on thoſe circumſtances, in chooſing a king, a leader in war, or magiſtrates and counſellors in time of peace. Alcibiades was now too young and unexperienced to judge of men by better ſtandards than thoſe uſed by the vulgar and the ignorant, or to know the ſuperior advantages of mental abilities and knowledge. The ſize of an underſtanding, the beauty of a ſoul, or the divine origin of the human mind, he had no more thought of, than he would have done had he been bred a plowboy, or born a Hottentot.—S.

ALC.

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ALC. It is.

SOC. And you will agree, that 'tis proper to make peace or war with thoſe people with whom 'tis beſt ſo to do?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And at that time when 'tis beſt?

ALC. By all means.

SOC. And to continue it ſo long as 'tis beſt to continue it?

ALC. To be ſure.

SOC. Now, ſuppoſe that the Athenians were deliberating about the exerciſe of wreſtling, with what ſort of perſons it is proper to come to cloſe quarters, and with whom to engage at arm's length, and in what way, would you give the beſt counſel in this caſe, or would a maſter of the exerciſes?

ALC. Such a maſter, certainly.

SOC. Can you tell me now, what end ſuch a maſter would have in his view, when he gave his counſel on theſe points, with whom it is proper to wreſtle cloſely, and with whom not ſo? at what times it is proper, and in what manner? My meaning is to aſk you theſe queſtions: Whether is it proper to wreſtle cloſely with thoſe perſons with whom it is beſt ſo to wreſtle, or is it not?

ALC. It is.

SOC. Whether as much alſo as is beſt?

ALC. As much.

SOC. Whether at thoſe times too when 'tis beſt?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. But further: Ought not a ſinger ſometimes, in ſinging, to touch his lute, and to move his feet?

ALC. He ought.

SOC. Ought he not to do ſo at thoſe times when 'tis beſt ſo to do?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And to continue the doing ſo as long as 'tis beſt to continue it?

ALC. I agree.

SOC. Well now. Since you agree with me that there is a beſt in both theſe actions, in fingering the lute whilſt ſinging, and in the exerciſe of cloſe wreſtling, by what name call you that which is the beſt in fingering the lute?

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lute? As that which is the beſt in wreſtling I call gymnaſtical, what name now do you give to that which is beſt done in that other action?

ALC. I do not apprehend your meaning.

SOC. Try to copy after the pattern which I ſhall now give you. Suppoſing, then, that I had been aſked this queſtion, "In wreſtling, how is that performed which is performed beſt?" I ſhould anſwer, 'Tis performed in every reſpect rightly. Now, in wreſtling, that performance is right which is according to the rules of art. Is it not?

ALC. It is.

SOC. And the art, in this caſe, is it not gymnaſtic?

ALC. Without diſpute.

SOC. I ſaid, that that which is the beſt in wreſtling is gymnaſtical.

ALC. You did.

SOC. And was it not well ſaid?

ALC. I think it was.

SOC. Come then. Do you in like manner (for it would not ill become you likewiſe to diſcourſe well) ſay, in the firſt place, What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the ſinging, and the moving at the ſame time, rightly all; the whole of this art, by what name is it called? Are you not yet able to tell?

ALC. Indeed I am not.

SOC. Try in this way then. What goddeſſes are thoſe who preſide over this art?

ALC. The muſes mean you, Socrates?

SOC. I do. Conſider now, what name is given to their art—a name derived from them.

ALC. I ſuppoſe you mean muſic.

SOC. The very thing. What then is that which is performed rightly, according to this art? Juſt as in the other caſe I told you, that whatever was performed rightly according to the rules of that other art, was gymnaſtical[1]; in this caſe now, after the ſame manner[2], whatever is

[1] That is, gymnaſtically performed, or a gymnaſtic performance. We have thus tranſlated the Greek in this place, on a ſuppoſition that the words ὅτι γυμναστικον ought to be here read, inſtead

is performed agreeably to the rules of this art, how do you ſay it muſt be performed ?

ALC. Muſically, I think.

SOC. You ſay well. Let us now proceed further; and tell me, what name you give to that which is beſt in making war ; and what name to that which is beſt in making peace: juſt as, in the former caſes, the beſt[3] in one of them you called the more muſical, in the other the more gymnaſtical. Try now in theſe caſes likewiſe to name that which is the beſt.

ALC. I find myſelf quite unable to tell what it is.

SOC. 'Tis a ſhame to you that you are ſo. For, ſuppoſe you were ſpeaking and giving your opinion concerning the ſuperiority of one kind of food to another, and ſhould ſay, that ſuch or ſuch a kind of food was the beſt at this ſeaſon, and ſuch or ſuch a quantity of it ; and ſuppoſe a man ſhould thereupon queſtion you thus, "What do you mean by the beſt, Alcibiades ?" on theſe ſubjects you would be able to give him an anſwer, and to tell him, that by the beſt you meant the moſt wholeſome ; and this you would ſay, notwithſtanding that you do not profeſs to be a phyſician. And yet, on a ſubject which you profeſs to have the knowledge of, and riſe up to give your judgment and advice on, as if you had this knowledge, are you not aſhamed, when you are queſtioned, as I think you are, on this very ſubject, to be unable to give an anſwer, and to tell what is that which is the beſt ? And muſt not this inability appear to others ſhameful in you ?

inſtead of *την γυμνασικην*. Let the learned reader judge, whether our ſuppoſition be well founded or not, after he has read a little further on in the original.—S.

[2] The ſameneſs of manner in theſe two caſes conſiſts in the ſimilitude between the two paronymies. For the paronymous terms, muſic, muſical, and muſically, exactly correſpond with thoſe of gym naſtic, gymnaſtical, and gymnaſtically.—S.

[3] This paſſage in the original, as printed ſeverally by Aldus, Walder, Henry Peters, and Henry Stephens, runs thus:—*ὥσπερ εκει εφ' ἑκαστῳ ελεγες τῳ αμεινονι, ὁτι μουσικωτερον· και επι τῳ ἑτερῳ, ὁτι γυμνασικωτερον*. But if we conjecture rightly, it ſhould be printed thus: *ὥσπερ εκει εφ' ἑκαστῳ ελεγες* TO AMEINON· 'ENI, *ὁ, τι μουσικωτερον· και επι τῳ ἑτερῳ, ὁ, τι γυμνασικωτερον*. Our conjecture is favoured by the Latin tranſlation, which Ficinus made from a MS. copy of Plato. Long ſince we wrote this, we have found the following emendation of this paſſage, made by Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, *ὥσπερ εκει εφ'* 'ETEPΩι *ελεγες* TO AMEINON, *ὁτι μουσικωτερον· κ. τ. λ.* And this way of reading the ſentence we ſhould prefer to our own conjecture, but that ours is quite agreeable to the tranſlation of Ficinus, followed herein by Dacier; and alſo that the error is thus more eaſily accounted for, and the alteration of the text leſs.—S.

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ALC. Certainly it muſt.

SOC. Conſider thoughtfully now, and tell me, What is the end or aim of that which is done beſt in the making or the continuing of peace, and likewiſe in the going to war with thoſe with whom it is proper?

ALC. Well, I do conſider; but cannot think of what it is.

SOC. Know you not, when we go to war, what it is which both the parties accuſe each other of during their military preparations, and what names they give to the cauſes of their quarrels?

ALC. I do. They accuſe each other of deceiving, or of offering violence, or of taking away ſome of their poſſeſſions.

SOC. But obſerve: How do they ſay they have been thus treated? Try to tell me what difference there is in the manner of this treatment they give to each other.

ALC. Do you mean, whether they thus treat each other juſtly or unjuſtly?

SOC. This is the very difference I mean.

ALC. Theſe different manners of ill treatment differ totally and entirely.

SOC. Well then. With whom would you counſel the Athenians to engage in war? whether with thoſe who treat them ill unjuſtly, or with thoſe who treat them as they deſerve?

ALC. A queſtion, this, of very ſerious import. For, if any man ſhould entertain a thought of the propriety of going to war with ſuch as act uprightly, he would not dare to own it.

SOC. Becauſe it is not lawful, I ſuppoſe, to engage in ſuch a war.

ALC. By no means is it ſo, neither ſeems it to be beautiful.

SOC. With a view therefore to theſe things [1], and to what is juſt, you will make your ſpeeches to the people.

[1] *Theſe things* evidently mean *the lawful* and *the beautiful*, mentioned immediately before. The ſentence in the original, as printed, is this; προς ταυτ' αρα και συ το δικαιον τυς λογυς ποιηση. In which the words και συ are undoubtedly tranſpoſed, and ſhould be read συ και. The tranſpoſition not being diſcovered by Stephens obliged him to change the word ταυτα into τυτο, as belonging to το δικαιον, and therefore made to agree with it. This alteration ſuppoſes νομιμον and καλον, *lawful* and *beautiful*, to be words merely ſynonymous with δικαιον, *juſt*, conſequently ſuperfluous, and introduced to no purpoſe. The tranſpoſition muſt have been more antient than any MS. of Plato now remaining; for it has corrupted not only the oldeſt editions, but the oldeſt tranſlations too; infecting of courſe all thoſe which came after.—S.

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ALC. There is a neceſſity for bringing my arguments from theſe topics.

SOC. That beſt then, concerning which I juſt now aſked you what it was,—the beſt on theſe ſubjects,—whether it is proper to go to war or not, with whom it is proper, and with whom not,—at what times it is proper, and when not,—does the beſt on theſe ſubjects appear to be any other thing than that which is the moſt agreeable to juſtice? or does it not?

ALC. It appears to be no other thing.

SOC. How is this, friend Alcibiades? Is it a ſecret to yourſelf, that you are ignorant in the ſcience of juſtice? or elſe, Is it a ſecret to me, that you have learnt it, and have gone to ſome maſter, who has taught you to diſtinguiſh between what is the moſt agreeable to juſtice, and what is the moſt repugnant to it? If this which I laſt mentioned be the caſe, who is this maſter? Tell me; that I too may go and learn of him, through your recommendation.

ALC. You banter, Socrates.

SOC. Not ſo; by the guardian-god of friendſhip to both of us, you and me, whoſe deity I would leaſt of all invoke for witneſs to a falſehood! If then you have any maſter who teaches you that ſcience, let me know who he is.

ALC. And what if I have not? Do you think that I could by no other means have attained the knowledge of what is juſt, and what is unjuſt?

SOC. I think that you would, if you had diſcovered it by yourſelf.

ALC. Are you then of opinion that I could not have diſcovered it by myſelf?

SOC. I am entirely of opinion that you might, if ever you had ſought for it.

ALC. Do you preſume, then, that I have never ſought for it?

SOC. I ſhould preſume that you had, if ever you had thought yourſelf ignorant of it.

ALC. Was there not then a time when I ſo thought [1]?

SOC.

[1] In the Greek, as printed, the words are theſe,—Βεται ικ ην ὁτε ικ ειχον ὑτω. We here ſuppoſe that the ικ immediately before ειχον ought to be omitted: and our ſuppoſition is favoured by Ficinus's

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Soc. Well ſaid. Can you tell me, then, at what time you did not imagine yourſelf to know what things are juſt, and what are unjuſt? For, come, let me aſk you: Was it laſt year, when you inquired into theſe ſubjects, and did not imagine yourſelf already knowing in them? or did you at that time think that you had ſuch knowledge? Anſwer truly now, that our argument may come to ſome concluſion.

Alc. Well then. I did at that time preſume myſelf to be knowing in thoſe ſubjects.

Soc. And in all the third year back from this preſent, in all the fourth too, and all the fifth, did you not preſume of yourſelf the ſame?

Alc. I did.

Soc. And earlier than the time I mentioned laſt, you was but a boy.

Alc. True.

Soc. And in your days of boyhood I am well aſſured that you thought yourſelf knowing in thoſe ſubjects.

Alc. How are you ſo ſure of that?

Soc. Often in the ſchools, when you was a boy, and in other places too whenever you was playing at dice, or was a party in any other play, I have heard you talking about what things were juſt or unjuſt—not as if you had any doubts on thoſe ſubjects, but very ſtrenuouſly and boldly pronouncing, that [1] ſuch or ſuch a one of your play-mates was a wicked boy, and a rogue, and was guilty of a piece of injuſtice. Is not all this true?

Alc. Well. But what elſe was I to do, when any of them injured me?

Soc. Right. But if you had happened to be ignorant of this very point,

Ficinus's tranſlation. But if this latter ἀν is to be retained, we ſhould render this ſentence into Engliſh thus: "Was there not a time when I had no ſuch knowledge?" as if Socrates had granted him to have ſuch knowledge at preſent. But the ſtate of mind which Socrates is here ſpeaking of, is that of a mind, beſides being ignorant, *conſcious* of its ignorance, and *not preſuming* itſelf to have knowledge.—S.

[1] In the Greek it would be better perhaps to read περὶ ὅτῳ τυχοι, than π. ο. τυχοις, as it is printed. We have in this, as well as in other places where we have made conjectural emendations of the text, tranſlated according to them. We ſhould not however give them a place among theſe notes, but for the ſake of accounting to ſuch of our readers as are learned, for the turn we have given to thoſe paſſages, different from that of the Greek text as it now ſtands, and from that of other tranſlations.—S.

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whether you was injured or not, would you ſay, "What in ſuch a caſe was I to do [1] ?"

ALC. But, by Jove, I was not ignorant of that point; for I clearly ſaw that I was injured.

SOC. You thought yourſelf, it ſeems, therefore, when you was a boy, knowing in the ſcience of what is juſt and what is unjuſt?

ALC. I did ſo; and knowing in it I was too.

SOC. At what time was it that you firſt diſcovered it? for certainly it was not at a time when you thought yourſelf knowing in it.

ALC. That, 'tis clear, could not be.

SOC. At what time then was it that you thought yourſelf ignorant in it? Conſider: but that time you will never find.

ALC. By Jove, Socrates, I am not able to tell when.

SOC. You did not acquire that knowledge, then, by any diſcovery of your own?

ALC. That does not at all appear to have been the caſe.

SOC. And beſides, you acknowledged but juſt before, that you did not acquire it by being taught. If then you neither diſcovered it of yourſelf, nor was taught it by any other perſon, how or whence have you this knowledge?

ALC. Well. But I was wrong in my anſwers, when I ſuppoſed that I had found out that knowledge by myſelf.

SOC. In what way then did you acquire it?

ALC. I learnt it, I preſume, in the ſame way in which others do.

SOC. We are now come round again to the ſame queſtion as before: From whom did you learn it? Inform me.

ALC. From the people.

SOC. To no good teachers have you recourſe for the origin of your knowledge, in referring it to the people.

ALC. Why ſo? Are not they capable of teaching?

SOC. Not ſo much as what movements are proper, and what improper, to make in a game at tables. And yet the knowledge of theſe

[1] We have here followed the text, as it is printed by Stephens, where we read λεγοις. The other editors give us λεγεις.—S.

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things is meaner and more inconſiderable, in my opinion, than the knowledge of what things are juſt, and what are unjuſt. Do not you think ſo too?

ALC. I do.

SOC. Incapable, therefore, as they are of teaching meaner things, can they teach things higher and of more importance?

ALC. I think they can. Nay, it is certain that they are capable of teaching many things of more importance than the movements in a game at tables.

SOC. What things do you mean?

ALC. Such as, for inſtance, to ſpeak the Greek language: for I myſelf learnt it from them. Nor could I name any other teacher of that language that I ever had; but muſt refer my being able to ſpeak it to thoſe very perſons who you ſay are no good teachers.

SOC. Well, my noble ſir: in this matter, indeed, the people are good teachers, and as ſuch may juſtly be recommended.

ALC. Why particularly in this?

SOC. Becauſe in this they poſſeſs all the requiſites neceſſary to every good teacher.

ALC. What requiſites do you mean?

SOC. Do you not know, that thoſe who are to teach any thing muſt in the firſt place have the knowledge of it themſelves? Muſt they not?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. And muſt not all thoſe who have the knowledge of any thing agree together on that ſubject, and not differ in their opinions of it?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. But where they differ among themſelves in their opinions, would you ſay that they have, all of them, knowledge in thoſe ſubjects?

ALC. Certainly not.

SOC. Of ſuch things, then, how can they be good teachers?

ALC. By no means can they.

SOC. Well now. Do the people ſeem to you to differ among themſelves about the meaning of the words ſtone and wood? Aſk whom you will, are they not all agreed in the ſame opinion? And when they are bid to take up a ſtone,

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ſtone, or a piece of wood, do they not all go to the ſame kind of things? And do they not all apprehend alike, what kind of things every other ſuch word ſignifies? For I preſume this is what you mean by knowledge of the Greek language: is it not?

ALC. It is.

SOC. Now, on theſe ſubjects, as we ſaid before, do not the people of our city agree among themſelves? And among the ſeveral cities of Greece is there any difference of opinion? Do the ſame words, in different places, ſignify different things?

ALC. They do not.

SOC. On theſe ſubjects, therefore, agreeably to our argument, the people ſhould be good teachers.

ALC. It is true.

SOC. If then we had a mind to have any perſon inſtructed in this matter, we ſhould do right in ſending him, for ſuch inſtruction, amongſt the multitude of the people?

ALC. Quite right.

SOC. But what if we had a mind to have that perſon taught, not only to know men from horſes by the different words denoting them in the Greek language, but, beſide this, to know what horſes are fit for the race, and what are unfit? is the multitude able to teach this alſo?

ALC. Certainly, not.

SOC. And you admit this to be a ſufficient proof of their ignorance in this matter, and of their inability to teach, that they agree not in their opinions on this head?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And what if we would have him learn, not only by what word in our language men are diſtinguiſhed from other things, but, further, to know what men are healthy and who are unhealthy? whether ſhould we deem the multitude to be the proper teachers for him?

ALC. By no means.

SOC. And it would be an evidence to you of their being bad teachers on this ſubject, if you ſaw them diſagreeing in their opinions?

ALC. It would.

SOC.

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Soc. And how is it now on the ſubject of juſtice? Do you find the multitude agreeing one with another, or even the ſame perſon always of the ſame mind, concerning either men or actions, who are the honeſt, or what is juſt?

Alc. Leſs than on any other ſubject, by Jove, Socrates, are they agreed with regard to this.

Soc. What? do you then think they differ on this ſubject more than upon any other?

Alc. By far do they.

Soc. You have never, I ſuppoſe, ſeen or heard of men, in any age, who contended for their ſeveral opinions concerning the wholeſome and the unwholeſome in food, with ſo much zeal as to fight and kill one another on that account?

Alc. Never.

Soc. But concerning juſt and unjuſt in actions, that their diſputes have carried them to ſuch extremities, I am ſure, if you have not ſeen, you have at leaſt heard from many reports, and particularly from thoſe of Homer; for you have heard both the Odyſſey and the Iliad read to you.

Alc. Thoroughly well, Socrates, am I verſed in both.

Soc. And is not the ſubject of both theſe poems the diverſity of opinions with regard to what is juſt and what is unjuſt?

Alc. It is.

Soc. And did not this diverſity of opinions produce fighting and ſlaughter between the Greeks and Trojans, and between Ulyſſes and the wooers of Penelope?

Alc. True.

Soc. And I believe that the deaths of thoſe Athenians, Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, who periſhed at Tanagra [1], and of thoſe who afterwards

[1] The firſt battle of Tanagra, in which the Lacedæmonians prevailed over the Athenians, was uncommonly fierce, and very many were ſlain, of the victorious army as well as of the vanquiſhed. For ſo we are expreſsly told by Thucydides, in lib. 1. § 108; by Plutarch, in the Life of Cymon; and by Diodorus Siculus, in lib. 11. ad ann. 3. Olympiad. 80. The next year, in a ſecond battle at the ſame place, the Athenians were ſucceſsful; and the gallantry of their behaviour in it was equal, ſays the hiſtorian laſt cited, to that of their exploits at Marathon and Platæa. But the *firſt* battle of Tanagra ſeems to be here meant, and not the *ſecond*, as Meſſieurs Le Fevre and Dacier imagined. For the purpoſe of Plato was to ſhow, not the valour exhibited, but the blood ſhed, in fighting about right and wrong:—S.

 died

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died at [1] Coronea, amongſt whom was Clinias your father, were not owing to differences on any other ſubject than this, what was juſt and what unjuſt.

ALC. You are in the right.

SOC. Shall we ſay then that theſe people had knowledge in that ſubject on which they differed with ſo much vehemence, as in ſupport of their different opinions to ſuffer from each other the utmoſt effects of hatred?

ALC. It appears they had not.

SOC. Do you not then refer to ſuch a ſort of teachers as you yourſelf acknowledge to be ignorant?

ALC. I do, it ſeems.

SOC. How therefore is it probable that you ſhould have the knowledge to diſcern what is juſt from what is unjuſt, when your account of them is ſo vague, and when you appear neither to have been taught that knowledge by any other perſon, nor to have found it out yourſelf?

ALC. According to what you ſay, 'tis not probable.

SOC. Are you ſenſible that what you ſaid laſt was not ſaid fairly, Alcibiades?

ALC. What was unfair?

SOC. Your aſſertion that I ſaid thoſe things of you which were ſaid.

ALC. What? did not you ſay that I had not the knowledge to diſcern what was juſt from what was unjuſt?

SOC. Not I, indeed.

ALC. Who was it then that ſaid ſo? was it I myſelf?

SOC. It was.

ALC. Make that appear.

SOC. You will ſee it in this way [2]. If I aſk you concerning one and two, which is the greater number, you will ſay that two is.

ALC. I ſhall.

[1] The battle of Coronea between the Athenians and the Bœotians, in the 2d year of the 83d Olympiad, was not leſs fierce than the firſt battle at Tanagra, and much more unfortunate to the Athenians; a great part of their army being ſlain, together with Tolmidas the commander of it in chief; and all who remained alive being taken priſoners; as we learn from Thucydides, in lib. 1. § 113; and from Diodorus, in lib. 12. ad ann. ſupradict.—S.

[2] In the way of arguing by induction; that is, by inferring ſome univerſal propoſition from many particular propoſitions acknowledged to be true, and comprehended in that univerſal.—S.

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Soc. How much greater is it?

Alc. Greater by one.

Soc. Now whether of us is it who ſays that two is a greater number or more than one by one?

Alc. It is I myſelf.

Soc. Did not I aſk the queſtion, and did not you give an anſwer to it?

Alc. True: it was ſo.

Soc. On this ſubject, then, who appears to have made any aſſertion? Do I, who only aſked a queſtion? or do you, who gave the anſwer?

Alc. I.

Soc. And if I aſk you how many letters compoſe the name of Socrates, and you tell me, which of us is it who declares how many?

Alc. I.

Soc. In a word, whenever any queſtion is aſked, and an anſwer to it is given, ſay, who is it that makes an aſſertion, the party that aſks the queſtion, or the party that gives the anſwer?

Alc. The party that gives the anſwer, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. Through the whole of our paſt diſcourſe was not I the party that aſked the queſtions?

Alc. You was.

Soc. And was not you the party that gave the anſwers?

Alc. I was.

Soc. Well then. Whether of us two made the aſſertions?

Alc. From what I have admitted, Socrates, I myſelf appear to have been that perſon.

Soc. In thoſe aſſertions was it not ſaid that Alcibiades, the fine ſon of Clinias, had not the knowledge to diſcern what was juſt and what was unjuſt, but imagined that he had; and that he was about going into the aſſembly to give the Athenians his counſel and advice upon ſubjects which he knew nothing of? Is not this true?

Alc. It appears ſo to be.

Soc. That which Euripides [1] ſays may therefore well be applied to the condition

[1] Monſ. Dacier in this place rightly refers us to the Hippolytus of the poet here cited. For in one of the ſcenes of that tragedy, Phædra, being aſhamed to confeſs to her old nurſe that

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condition you are now in, Alcibiades. You are in danger of being found to have heard all this which has been ſaid of you from yourſelf, and not from me. For, not I, but you, was the aſſertor of it; and you lay the blame of it on me without reaſon.

ALC. Indeed, Socrates, you are in the right.

SOC. Mad therefore is the undertaking, my good ſir, which you entertain thoughts of attempting, to teach others what you are ignorant of yourſelf from your having neglected to learn it.

ALC. I believe, Socrates, that the Athenians, as well as other Grecian ſtates, ſeldom deliberate in council about juſtice or injuſtice in any affair before them; becauſe theſe things they preſume obvious and plain to all men. Laying aſide therefore the conſideration of this point, they conſider which way it will be moſt for their intereſt to take. For I ſuppoſe that juſtice and intereſt are not the ſame thing; ſeeing that many have found it their intereſt to have done things the moſt unjuſt, and that others have gained no advantage from having acted with honeſty.

SOC. Well. Suppoſe intereſt to be a thing ever ſo different from juſtice, do you imagine now that you know what is a man's intereſt, and why this or that thing is ſo?

ALC. What ſhould hinder me, Socrates, from knowing it? unleſs you will make a doubt of this too, by aſking me, from whom I learned this knowledge, or how I diſcovered it myſelf.

SOC. How ſtrangely you deal with me in this[1]? If you ſay any thing wrong, when 'tis poſſible to prove it wrong by the ſame arguments uſed in

Hippolytus was the object of her love, and yet unwilling to conceal it from her, deſcribes him, without naming him, in terms ſo pointed, that the nurſe could not poſſibly miſtake the perſon. Upon which the nurſe aſking her if ſhe means Hippolytus, Phædra anſwers in verſe 352,

——————— σου ταδ', ουκ εμου, κλυεις,

This from yourſelf you hear, and not from me.—S.

[1] That is, in evading the proofs of your ignorance, and thus endeavouring to avoid the neceſſity of your confeſſing it.—In our tranſlation of this ſhort ſentence, we have ſuppoſed that it ought to be immediately followed by a mark of interogation, or rather by a mark of admiration; and ought not to be read as part of a longer ſentence, either interrogative, according to the verſion of Serranus, or aſſertive, according to that of Ficinus, and all the editions of the Greek original. The verſion of Cornarius is herein agreeable to that our ſuppoſition.—S.

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confuting what you before ſaid amiſs, you would have new matter introduced, and different arguments made uſe of, to prove you in the wrong again: as if the former proofs were worn out like old clothes, and you could no longer put them on, but one muſt bring you a freſh proof never uſed before. But without taking further notice of your evaſions, I ſhall repeat the ſame queſtion, and aſk you from what learning you came to know what was a man's intereſt, and who taught you this knowledge; and all the other queſtions aſked before I aſk you again, ſumming them up in one. It is evident now, that your anſwers will amount to the very ſame as they did before; and that you will not be able to ſhow by what means you attained the knowledge of what is advantageous to a man; or conducive to his good; either how you found it out yourſelf, or from whom you learned it. However, ſeeing that you are ſqueamiſh, and decline the taſting of the ſame arguments again, I wave the inquiry into this point, whether you have or not the knowledge of what is the intereſt of the Athenians. But this other point, whether the ſame actions are juſt and advantageous; or whether what 'tis juſt to do, differs from what 'tis a man's intereſt to do; why ſhould not you prove, by putting queſtions to me, in the ſame manner as I did to you? or, if you had rather, make a diſcourſe upon that ſubject wholly by yourſelf.

ALC. But I know not if I ſhould be able, Socrates, to make ſuch a diſcourſe to you.

SOC. Why, my good friend, ſuppoſe me to be the aſſembly and the people. And, were you addreſſing your diſcourſe to them, it would be proper for you to perſuade every ſingle man of them. Would it not?

ALC. It would.

SOC. Does it not belong, then, to the ſame perſon to be able to perſuade one ſingle man by himſelf, and to perſuade many men aſſembled together, in ſpeaking on any ſubject with which he is well acquainted? as, for inſtance, a teacher of grammar is equally well able to perſuade one man and many men, when letters are the ſubject of his diſcourſe.

ALC. True.

SOC. And when numbers are the ſubject, would not the ſame perſon, who perſuades many, perſuade one as well?

ALC. He would.

SOC.

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Soc. And muſt not this perſon be one who is well acquainted with numbers? muſt he not be an arithmetician?

Alc. Moſt certainly.

Soc. And would not you alſo, in ſpeaking on any ſubjects, if you are able to perſuade many of the truth of what you ſay, be able to perſuade a ſingle one?

Alc. 'Tis probable that I ſhould.

Soc. But theſe ſubjects it is plain muſt be ſuch as you are well acquainted with.

Alc. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Is there any other difference, then, between a ſpeaker in the aſſembly of the people and a ſpeaker in ſuch converſation as this of ours, than merely ſo much as this—the former endeavours to perſuade a collection of many men—the latter to perſuade men one by one?

Alc. There appears to be no other.

Soc. Come then. Since it apparently belongs to the ſame perſon to perſuade a multitude and to perſuade a ſingle man, practiſe your ſkill on me, and undertake to prove to me that in ſome caſes that which is juſt is not a man's intereſt.

Alc. You are very ſaucy, Socrates.

Soc. And I am now going to be ſo ſaucy as to convince you of the truth of a poſition quite contrary to that which you decline the proving of to me.

Alc. Begin then.

Soc. Do you but anſwer to the queſtions which I ſhall put to you.

Alc. Not ſo: but do you yourſelf ſay plainly what you have to ſay.

Soc. Why ſo? Would you not chooſe to be entirely well perſuaded of the truth of it, if it be true?

Alc. By all means, certainly.

Soc. And would you not, if you yourſelf were to aſſert it, have the moſt entire perſuaſion of its truth?

Alc. I think ſo.

Soc. Anſwer then to my queſtions: and if you do not hear from your own mouth, that to act juſtly is to act for one's own advantage, believe no other perſon who aſſerts that poſition.

Alc.

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ALC. I ſhall not: and I conſent to anſwer your queſtions. For no harm I think will come to me that way.

SOC. You think as if you had the ſpirit of divination. Tell me, then: Do you ſay that ſome juſt actions are advantageous to the man who performs them, and that ſome are not ſo?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And do you ſay alſo, that ſome juſt actions are beautiful, and that ſome are not ſo?

ALC. What mean you by this queſtion?

SOC. Whether did you ever think that a man acted baſely and yet juſtly at the ſame time?

ALC. I never thought ſo.

SOC. You think then that all actions which are juſt are alſo beautiful?

ALC. I do.

SOC. But what, as to actions which are beautiful? Whether do you think that all of theſe are good to the performer, or that ſome of them are ſo, and ſome not ſo?

ALC. For my part, Socrates, I think that ſome beautiful actions are evil to the performer of them.

SOC. And that ſome baſe actions are good to the performer?

ALC. I do.

SOC. Do you mean ſuch actions as theſe?—Many men by aiding in battle ſome friend or near relation have been wounded mortally; whilſt others, by withholding their aid when they ought to have given it, have come off ſafe and ſound.

ALC. A juſt inſtance of what I mean.

SOC. That aid then of theirs you call beautiful with reſpect to their endeavouring to ſave thoſe whom they ought to defend. Now ſuch an action proceeds from fortitude, does it not?

ALC. It does.

SOC. But evil you call it alſo with reſpect to the wounds and death which it procured them, do you not?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And are not fortitude and death two different things?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC.

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Soc. To aid a friend, therefore[1], is not both beautiful and evil in the ſame reſpect?

Alc. It appears that 'tis not.

Soc. Conſider now whether it be not good in the ſame reſpect in which it is beautiful; as in this particular which we mentioned. For, with reſpect to fortitude, you agreed with me that 'twas beautiful and handſome to give ſuch aid. This very thing then, fortitude, conſider whether it be a good or an evil. And conſider it in this way;—which kind of things would you chooſe to have your own, whether good things or evil things?

Alc. Good things.

Soc. And would you not chooſe the beſt things too?

Alc. Moſt of all things.

Soc. And would you not chooſe to part with them leaſt of all?

Alc. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What ſay you then of fortitude? at what price would you chooſe to part with it?

Alc. I would not accept of life, not I, to live a coward.

Soc. You think, then, that cowardice is evil in the utmoſt degree?

Alc. That do I.

Soc. On a par, as it ſeems, with death.

Alc. It is ſo.

Soc. Are not life and fortitude the moſt of all things oppoſite to death and cowardice?

Alc. They are.

Soc. And would you chooſe to have thoſe moſt of all things, and theſe leaſt of all things?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Is it becauſe you deem thoſe the beſt of all things, and theſe the worſt?

Alc. For this very reaſon.

Soc. Viewing then the giving of aid in battle to ſuch as are dear to us in that light in which it appears beautiful—viewing it with regard to the

[1] This is a concluſive aſſertion; and not, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, a queſtion. Both of the Baſil editions have it right.—S.

practice

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practice of that virtue which you acknowledge to be one of the beſt of things, you gave it the epithet of beautiful?

ALC. It appears I did ſo.

SOC. But with regard to its operating evil, the evil of death, you gave it the epithet of evil?

ALC. True.

SOC. Is it not then juſt and right to denominate every action thus? If, with regard to the evil which it operates, you call it evil, ought it not, with regard to the good which it operates, to be alſo called good?

ALC. I think it ought.

SOC. In the ſame reſpect, then, in which it is good, is it not beautiful? and in the ſame reſpect in which it is evil, is it not baſe?

ALC. It is.

SOC. In ſaying, then, that the aiding of our friends in battle is an action beautiful indeed, but that yet 'tis evil, you ſay exactly the ſame thing as if you [1] called it an action, good indeed, but yet evil.

ALC. I think you are in the right, Socrates.

SOC. Nothing therefore which is beautiful, ſo far as it is beautiful, is evil; nor is any thing which is baſe, ſo far as it is baſe, good.

ALC. Evidently it is not.

SOC. Further now conſider it in this way:—whoever acts beautifully, does he not act well too?

ALC. He does.

SOC. And thoſe who act well, are they not happy?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. And are they not happy by being poſſeſſed of good things?

ALC. Moſt certainly,

SOC. And are they not poſſeſſed of theſe good things by acting well and beautifully?

ALC. They are.

SOC. To act well, therefore, is in the rank of good things?

ALC. Beyond a doubt.

[1] In tranſlating this ſentence, we have ſuppoſed that the right reading here is προσειπον, and not, as it is printed, προειπον.—S.

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Soc. And is not acting well a beautiful thing alſo?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Again therefore we have found, that one and the ſame thing is both beautiful and good?

Alc. We have.

Soc. Whatever then we ſhould find to be a beautiful thing [1], we ſhall find it to be a good thing too, according to this reaſoning?

Alc. It muſt be ſo.

Soc. And what? are good things advantageous? or are they not?

Alc. They are.

Soc. Do you remember, now, what we agreed in concerning things which are juſt?

Alc. I imagine that you mean this,—that thoſe perſons who do things which are juſt muſt of neceſſity do things which at the ſame time are beautiful.

Soc. And did we not agree in this too,—that thoſe who do things which are beautiful do things which are alſo good?

Alc. We did.

Soc. And good things, you ſay, are advantageous?

Alc. True.

Soc. Things therefore which are juſt, O Alcibiades! are things which are advantageous.

Alc. It ſeems they are.

Soc. Well now; are not you the perſon who aſſerts theſe things? and am not I the queſtioner concerning them?

Alc. So it appears.

Soc. Whoever then riſes up to ſpeak in any council, whether it be of Athenians or Peparethians, imagining that he diſcerns what is juſt and

[1] It appears from the tranſlations made by Ficinus and Cornarius, that the Greek of this ſentence, in the manuſcripts from which they tranſlated, was written thus:—Ὅ, τι αν αρα εὑρωμεν καλον, και αγαθον εὑρησομεν κ. τ. λ. And we hope it will hereafter be ſo printed. For the abſurdity of this ſentence in the tranſlation by Serranus, was evidently occaſioned by his following the printed editions, and his regarding more the language of Cicero than the reaſoning or philoſophy of Plato.—S.

what

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what is unjuſt, if he ſhould ſay that he knows juſtice to be ſometimes evil and detrimental, would you not laugh at his pretenſions to knowledge? ſince you yourſelf are found to be the very perſon who aſſerts that the ſame things are both juſt and advantageous?

ALC. Now, by the Gods, Socrates, for my part, I know not what to ſay to it; but am quite like a man diſtracted. For ſometimes I am of one opinion, juſt while you are putting your queſtions to me, and preſently after am of another.

SOC. Are you ignorant now, my friend, what condition you are in?

ALC. Entirely ignorant.

SOC. Do you imagine, then, that if any perſon were to aſk you, how many eyes you had, whether two or three,—or how many hands, whether two or four,—or any other ſuch queſtion,—you would ſometimes anſwer one thing, and at other times another? or would you always give the ſame anſwer?

ALC. I confeſs that I am now doubtful of myſelf; but I do believe that I ſhould always give the ſame anſwer.

SOC. And is not your knowledge of the ſubject the cauſe of that conſiſtency there would be in your anſwers?

ALC. I believe it is.

SOC. When therefore you give contrary anſwers to one and the ſame queſtion, without chooſing to prevaricate, 'tis evident that you have no knowledge of the ſubject.

ALC. Probably ſo.

SOC. Now you ſay that, to queſtions concerning things juſt or unjuſt, beautiful or baſe, good or evil, advantageous or otherwiſe, you ſhould anſwer ſometimes one thing and ſometimes another. Is it not then evident, that your ignorance in theſe ſubjects is the cauſe of this inconſiſtency of yours?

ALC. It appears ſo to me myſelf.

SOC. Is not this then the true ſtate of the caſe? On every ſubject which a man has not the knowledge of, muſt not his ſoul be wavering in her opinions?

ALC. Moſt undoubtedly.

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Soc. Well now. Do you know by what means you may mount up to heaven?

Alc. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. Is your opinion doubtful and wavering on this ſubject?

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. Do you know the reaſon why it is not? or ſhall I tell it you?

Alc. Do you tell me.

Soc. 'Tis this, my friend: it is becauſe you neither know nor imagine that you know the way up to heaven.

Alc. How is that the reaſon? Explain yourſelf.

Soc. Let you and I conſider it together. Concerning any affairs which you are ignorant of, and are at the ſame time convinced that you are ſo, do you waver in your opinions? For inſtance, in the affair of dreſſing meats and making ſauces, you are, I preſume, well acquainted with your ignorance [1].

Alc. Perfectly well.

Soc. Do you form any opinions then yourſelf on theſe affairs of cookery, and waver in thoſe opinions? or do you leave thoſe matters to ſuch as are ſkilled in them?

Alc. I do as you mentioned laſt.

Soc. And what if you were in a ſhip under ſail, would you form any opinion, whether the rudder ought to be turned toward the ſhip or from it, and be unſettled in that opinion for want of knowledge in the affair? or would you leave it to the pilot, and not trouble yourſelf about it?

Alc. To the pilot I ſhould leave it.

Soc. Concerning affairs then which you are ignorant of, and are no ſtranger to your own ignorance in thoſe reſpects, you are not wavering in your opinions?

Alc. I believe I am not.

Soc. Do you perceive [2] that errors, committed in the doing of any

[1] This ſentence is aſſertive, and not, as it has hitherto been always printed, interrogative.—S.

[2] In ſuppoſing this ſentence to be interrogative, we have followed the two Baſil editions and Ficinus's tranſlation, as Le Fevre has alſo done. But Dacier choſe to follow the other editions and tranſlations, in making it a concluſive aſſertion.—S.

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thing, are all to be ascribed to this kind of ignorance in a man,—his imagining that he knows what he knows not?

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC. Whenever we undertake to act in any affair, it is only when we imagine we know what to do.

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And such as have no opinion of their own knowledge in the affair resign it up to others to act for them.

ALC. How should they do otherwise?

SOC. Ignorant persons of this kind live therefore without committing errors, because they give up the management of those affairs in which they are ignorant into the hands of others.

ALC. True.

SOC. What kind of persons, then, are those who err and act amiss? for certainly they are not such as know how to act.

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than of that kind who are ignorant, but imagine themselves knowing?

ALC. None other than these.

SOC. This kind of ignorance, therefore, is the cause of wrong doings, and is the only kind which is culpable.

ALC. Very true.

SOC. And where it concerns things of greatest moment, is it not in these cases the most of any mischievous and shameful?

ALC. By far the most so [1].

SOC. Well then. Can you name any things of greater moment than those which are honest, and beautiful, and good, and advantageous?

ALC. Certainly none.

SOC. Is it not on these subjects that you acknowledge yourself to waver in your opinions?

ALC. It is.

[1] In the printed original we here read πολλῃ γε. But we have made no scruple of adopting the marginal reading of Harry Stephens, πολυ γε.—S.

Soc.

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Soc. And, if you are thus wavering, is it not evident from our paſt concluſions, not only that you are ignorant in ſubjects of the greateſt moment, but that amidſt this ignorance you imagine that you know them?

Alc. I fear it is ſo.

Soc. Fie upon it, Alcibiades! What a condition then are you in! a condition which I am loth to name: but however, ſince we are alone, it muſt be ſpoken out. You are involved, my good ſir, in that kind of ignorance which is the moſt ſhameful, according to the reſult of our joint reaſoning, and according to your own confeſſion. From this kind of ignorance it is, that you are eager to engage in politics before you have learnt the elements of that ſcience. Indeed, you are not the only perſon in this ſad condition; for in the ſame ſtate of ignorance are the numerous managers of our civil affairs, all of them, except perhaps Pericles, your guardian, and a few more.

Alc. And, Socrates, to confirm this opinion of yours, Pericles is ſaid to have become wiſe, not ſpontaneouſly or of himſelf: on the contrary, 'tis reported of him that he had had the advantage of enjoying the converſation of many wiſe men, particularly of Pythoclides and Anaxagoras [1]: and even at this time, old as he is, he is intimate with Damon for this very purpoſe.

Soc. But what? have you ever ſeen a man who was wiſe in any art whatever, and yet was unable to make another man wiſe in the ſame art?

[1] The character of Anaxagoras, or rather that of his philoſophy, is well known to be this: That he applied himſelf chiefly, as all of the Ionic ſect did, to the ſtudy of aſtronomy, and of the elements of outward nature. Pythoclides and Damon, both of them, were ſuch as the old Sophiſts in polymathy and extenſive learning; but neither of them aſſumed the character of Sophiſt. Indeed, they were ſo far from making a public diſplay of their general knowledge, like the Sophiſts, that, on the contrary, they endeavoured to conceal it under the maſk of ſome other character, profeſſing only ſkill in muſic. We learn this, ſo far as relates to Damon, from Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles; and with regard to Pythoclides, we are told the ſame by Plato himſelf in his Protagoras. But further, Ariſtotle, as cited by Plutarch, relates, in ſome of thoſe works of his which are moſt unfortunately loſt, that Pericles in fact became accompliſhed in muſic by ſtudying it under Pythoclides. And Plutarch tells us, on his own authority, that Damon was the director and inſtructor of Pericles in politics, and that he was baniſhed from Athens by the people, ὡς μεγαλοπραγμων και φιλοτυραννος, *as a perſon who buſied himſelf in great affairs*, meaning thoſe relating to the conſtitution of the ſtate, *and as a friend to tyranny*, meaning the arbitrary power of a ſingle perſon.—S.

as,

as, for inſtance, the maſter who taught you grammar was himſelf wiſe in that art; and in the ſame art he made you wiſe; as he alſo made every other perſon whom he undertook to teach. Did he not?

ALC. He did.

SOC. And you, who have learnt from him that kind of wiſdom, would not you be able to teach it to another perſon?

ALC. Certainly I ſhould.

SOC. And is not the ſame thing true of a muſic-maſter and of a maſter in the exerciſes?

ALC. Perfectly ſo.

SOC. For this undoubtedly is a fair proof of the knowledge of ſuch as are knowing in any ſubject whatever, their being able to produce their ſcholars, and to ſhow theſe to be knowing in the ſame.

ALC. I think ſo too.

SOC. Well then. Can you name to me any one whom Pericles has made a wiſe man? his own ſons has he? to begin with them.

ALC. But what if the ſons of Pericles were ſilly fellows, Socrates?

SOC. Clinias then, your brother?

ALC. Why ſhould you mention Clinias, a man out of his ſenſes?

SOC. Since Clinias then is out of his ſenſes, and ſince the ſons of Pericles were ſilly fellows, to what defect in your diſpoſition ſhall we impute the little care taken by Pericles to improve you?

ALC. I preſume that I myſelf am in the fault, that of not giving due attention to him.

SOC. But name any perſon elſe, an Athenian or a foreigner, either a ſlave or a free man, who is indebted to the inſtructions of Pericles for becoming wiſer than he was: as I can name to you thoſe, who from the leſſons of Zeno[1] have improved in wiſdom,—Pythodorus[2] the ſon

[1] Zeno the Eleatic is here meant, the diſciple of Parmenides.—For an account of the wiſdom meant in the latter part of this ſentence, ſee the Parmenides, and the introduction to it.—T.

[2] This is the ſame Pythodorus at whoſe houſe Plato lays the ſcene of his dialogue named Parmenides.—S.

of

of Isolochus, and Callias[1] the son of Calliades; each of whom, at the price of a hundred minæ[2], paid to Zeno, became eminent for wisdom.

ALC. Now, by Jupiter, I cannot.

SOC. Very well. What then do you think of doing about yourself? whether to rest satisfied in the condition which you are now in, or to apply yourself to some means of improvement?

ALC. Concerning this, Socrates, I would consult with you. For I apprehend what you have said, and admit the truth of it. Those who have the administration of the state, except a few of them, seem indeed to me too not to have had a proper education.

SOC. Well; and what conclusion do you draw from thence?

ALC. This,—that if they, through their education, were well qualified to govern, a man who should undertake to enter the lists in contest with them, ought to come to the engagement duly prepared by discipline and exercise, as in other combats. But now, seeing that such persons as these, raw and undisciplined as they are, have attained to the management of state-affairs, what need is there for a man to exercise himself in such matters, or to give himself the trouble of acquiring knowledge in them? For I well know, that by dint of natural abilities I shall excel them by far, and get above them.

SOC. Fie upon it, my fine young gentleman! What a declaration is this which you have made! how unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages you are possessed of!

ALC. I should be glad, Socrates, to know why you think it unworthy of me, and in what respect.

SOC. You offer an affront, not only to the regard which I have for you, but to the opinion too which you have of yourself.

ALC. How so?

SOC. In that you think of entering the lists to contend with these men here at Athens.

[1] This Callias had the command of the army sent by the Athenians for the recovery of Potidæa; but he was slain in the first battle, before that city. See Thucydides, lib. 1. and Diodorus, lib. 12.—S.

[2] In English money, 322l. 18s. 4d. the very same price at which Protagoras and Gorgias valued their sophistical instructions in polymathy and false oratory.—S.

ALC.

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ALC. Whom then am I to contend with?

SOC. Does this queſtion become a man to aſk who thinks his mind to be great and elevated [1]?

ALC. How do you mean? Is it not with theſe very perſons that I am to ſtand in competition?

SOC. Let me aſk you this queſtion;—Whether, if you had any thoughts of commanding a ſhip of war, would you deem it ſufficient for you to excel the mariners who were to be under your command, in the ſkill belonging to a commander? or, preſuming yourſelf qualified with this due præ-excellence, would you direct your eye to thoſe only whom you are in fact to combat againſt,—and not, as you now do, to ſuch as are to combat together with you? For to theſe men certainly [2] you ought to be ſo much ſuperior, that they ſhould never be your aſſociates in competition againſt any, but your inferior aſſiſtants in combating againſt the enemy;—if you really think of exhibiting any noble exploits worthy of yourſelf and of your country.

ALC. And ſuch a thought I aſſure you that I entertain.

SOC. Is it then at all worthy of you, to be contented with being a better man than your fellow-ſoldiers [3],—and not to have your eye directed toward the leaders of thoſe whom you have to ſtruggle with, ſtudying how [4] to become a better man than they, and employing yourſelf in exerciſes which are proper with a view to them [5]?

[1] Aldus erroneouſly printed this ſentence in the Greek original without a mark of interrogation; and in this error he was blindly followed by Stephens. The Baſil editions, however, both of them, are here rightly printed, in agreement with the tranſlations by Ficinus and Cornarius, and as the ſenſe evidently requires.—S.

[2] Here again the two Baſil editions are right in giving us δή που; where Aldus and Stephens have been ſo regardleſs of the ſenſe as to print δεῖ που.—S.

[3] In the Greek, as printed, we here read στρατιωτων; but perhaps we ought to read συστρατιωτων, that the word may correſpond with that juſt before, to which it alludes, συναγωνιστας.—S.

[4] In the Greek editions ὁποτε: but we ſuppoſe the right reading to be ὁπως.—S.

[5] All the Latin tranſlators rightly preſume this ſentence to be interrogative: though in all the editions of the Greek it is careleſsly made aſſertive.—The ſecret meaning of Socrates in what he here ſays, agreeably to the tenor of all his philoſophy, we apprehend to be this;—that we ought not to ſet before us the characters of any particular men, who are all of them full of imperfections like ourſelves, for the ſtandards of our moral conduct; but ſhould have conſtantly in our view, ſo as to copy after, the ideal and perfect patterns of moral excellence.—S.

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ALC. What perſons do you mean, Socrates?

SOC. Do you not know, that our city is every now and then at war with the Lacedæmonians, and with the Great [1] King?

ALC. True.

SOC. If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this city, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have the kings of Sparta and of Perſia to contend againſt?

ALC. I ſuſpect that you are in the right.

SOC. And yet you, my good ſir, on the contrary, are [2] to fix your view on Midias, a feeder of quails [3], and on other ſuch perſons, who undertake

[1] The kings of Perſia were ſo called by the Grecians, from the time that Cyrus, heir to the then ſmall kingdom of Perſia, having ſucceeded to the kingdom of Media by the death of his uncle without iſſue, conquered Aſſyria, ſubdued Aſia Minor, and acquired the dominion of all thoſe countries which conſtitute the now large monarchy of Perſia.—S.

[2] We entirely agree in opinion with Monſ. Le Fevre, that this is purely ironical, and therefore not interrogative.—S.

[3] The Grecian quails, being *μαχιμοι* or fighting-birds, were fitly trained and fed, for the purpoſe of *ορτυγομαχια*, *fighting one with another*, by ſuch ſort of perſons as took delight in ſuch ſort of ſports. The manner of them was this: Matches being made, and wagers laid by thoſe gentlemen quail-feeders, who were themſelves owners of the birds, a circle was drawn in the quail-pit, or gaming-room, within which circle were ſet the combatant-birds: and in the battle, to which they were provoked by their wiſe maſters, whichever bird drove his antagoniſt beyond the circle was held to be the conqueror.—Another Grecian ſport with the poor quails, a ſport ſtill more boyiſh than the *ορτυγομαχια*, was the *ορτυγοκοπια*, in which the hardineſs of thoſe birds was tried by the *στυφοκομπια*, the fillip of a man's finger on their heads; and ſometimes by plucking from it a feather: the birds that endured theſe trials without flinching or retiring out of the circle, won the wager for their cruel maſters.—See Meurſius de Ludis Græcorum, pag. 45. Julius Pollux, lib. 9. cap. 7. and Suidas in vocibus *ορτυγοκοπια*, and *στυφοκομπος*.—Midias, here mentioned by Plato, was ſo much addicted to theſe ſports, that in the comedy of Ariſtophanes, named *Ορνιθες*, the ambaſſador to Athens from the aërial city of the birds reports to them on his return, that ſeveral of the leading men at Athens had taken the names of different birds, and amongſt them Midias that of quail.—Socrates therefore, in the paſſage now before us, ridicules Alcibiades, who affected the ſame taſte for theſe quail matches, for thus emulating Midias, and ſetting up him for a pattern of his imitation.—The Romans, who copied after the Grecians in all their vices and follies more exactly than they did in their arts, ſciences, and wiſdom, were ſo fond of quail-fighting, that the wiſe and good Marcus Antoninus, ſenſible how much it was beneath his dignity as a man, an emperor, and a philoſopher, acknowledges himſelf obliged to Diognetus the painter for diſſuading him in his youth from giving into this faſhionable folly. Lib. 1. § 6.—This note is intended chiefly for the benefit of our countrymen the Noble *Cockers*.—S.

to

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to manage affairs of ſtate, ſtill wearing the badge [1] of ſlavery (as the women [2] would term it) in their ſouls, through their ignorance of the Muſes; and not having yet thrown it off, but retaining their old ſentiments, and manners ſtill barbarian, are come to flatter the people, not to govern them. Ought you now to emulate theſe men whom I am ſpeaking of, and diſregard yourſelf? Ought you to neglect the acquiring of all ſuch knowledge, as only is acquired through learning, when you have ſo great a combat to ſuſtain? Or ought you to omit the exerciſing yourſelf in all ſuch actions as are well performed only through practice? Should you not be furniſhed with all the qualifications requiſite for the government of the ſtate before you undertake to govern it?

ALC. Indeed, Socrates, I believe you are in the right: but however, I imagine the commanders of the Spartan armies, and the Perſian monarch, to be juſt ſuch men as the others whom you have mentioned.

SOC. But, my very good ſir, conſider this imagination of yours, what evils attend on it.

ALC. In what reſpects?

SOC. In the firſt place, What opinion concerning your antagoniſts do you think would engage you to take moſt care about yourſelf? whether the opinion of their being formidable, or the contrary?

[1] In the Greek, ανδραποδωδη τριχα, *ſlaviſh hair*. It was the diſtinguiſhing badge of ſlavery in men, amongſt the Grecians and the Romans, the wearing their own hair on their heads. When they had their freedom given them by their maſters, their heads were ſhaven, and they wore from that time a cap, or narrow-brimmed hat, thence called the cap of liberty. For this point, ſee αντι παντων Theodor. Marcilius in his Commentary on Perſius, ſat. 5. v. 82.—S.

[2] This ſeems to be perfectly well illuſtrated by Olympiodorus, (whoſe comment on this dialogue is extant in MS. abroad,) in the following paſſage, cited by Iſ. Caſaubon in his commentary on Perſius, ſat. 5. v. 116. Παροιμια εστι γυναικων επι των ελευθερουμενων δουλων και επιμενοντων εν τη δουλοπρεπειαι, (not δουλειαι, as it is abſurdly printed,) ὁτι εχεις την ανδραποδωδη τριχα εν τη κεφαλη, τουτ' εστιν, ετι την δουλικην ἑξιν (printed τριχα, which is explaining *idem per idem*) εχεις. "The women had a ſaying, which they uſed to ſlaves made free, but ſtill retaining the manners which belonged to ſlaves,—'You wear your ſlaviſh hair on your head ſtill:' that is, You ſtill retain your ſlaviſh habits."—This proverbial ſaying was it ſeems, by the Athenian ladies, the authors of it, applied alſo to men whom they ſaw ill-bred and illiterate.—The application of it was afterwards extended further to a mobile multitude, gathered together and governed by their paſſions: for ſo we learn from Suidas, in phraſi ανδραποδωδη τριχα.—See Eraſmi Adagia, pag. 426. and the Greek Proverbs collected by Schottus, with his ſcholia thereon, pag. 357.—S.

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ALC. The opinion without doubt of their being formidable.

SOC. And do you think it would do you any harm to take care about yourſelf?

ALC. None at all; but on the contrary great good.

SOC. The want of this great good, then, is one of the evils which attend on that imagination?

ALC. It is true.

SOC. Conſider if there be not probably another too; and that is the falſity of it.

ALC. How do you prove that?

SOC. Whether is it probable that perſons, the moſt excellent in their natural diſpoſitions [1], are to be found amongſt thoſe who deſcend from anceſtors the nobleſt [2]? or is it not?

ALC. Undoubtedly it is.

[1] We are aſtoniſhed to find φησεις here printed in all the editions of Plato. The ſenſe evidently requires us to read φυσεις: and it appears alſo from the Latin tranſlation made by Ficinus, and from that alſo by Cornarius, that they read φυσεις in the manuſcripts from which they made their tranſlations.—Had Le Fevre been aware of this, he would have ſpared himſelf the trouble of writing a long note to prove that hereditary monarchs and great lords are not always the beſt of men.—Socrates here is not aſking who probably are the beſt men, (for this would be to anticipate the concluſion of his reaſoning, in the very beginning of it,) but, who probably have the beſt natural diſpoſitions.—S.

[2] With this agrees the opinion of Ariſtotle in his Politics, lib. 3. cap. 8. Βελτιους εικος τους εκ βελτιονων· ευγενεια γαρ εστιν αρετη γενους. It is likely that from the beſt anceſtors ſhould ſpring the beſt men. For to be well-born is to be of a good or virtuous family, (that is, nobility is family-virtue.) The reaſonableneſs of this opinion the great maſter of all lyric poetry proves by analogy from brute animals in theſe verſes of the 4th ode of his 4th book:

Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.
Eſt in juvencis, eſt in equis patrum
Virtus; nec imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquilæ columbam:

Brave men are offſprings of the brave and good.
Heifers and horſes ſtill retain
The virtue of their ſires: in vain
May one expect to find a timorous brood,
Such as the weak unwarlike dove,
Sprung from an eagle fierce, the daring bird of Jove.—S.

SOC.

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Soc. And is it not probable that ſuch as have excellent diſpoſitions from nature, if they meet with a ſuitable education, ſhould become accompliſhed in virtue?

Alc. Of neceſſity they muſt.

Soc. Let us conſider now, in comparing their advantages with our own, whether the kings of Sparta and of Perſia ſeem to be deſcended from meaner anceſtors than we are. Know we not that thoſe are deſcendants of Hercules, and theſe of Achæmenes? that the begetting of Hercules is attributed to Jupiter [1], and the anceſtry of Achæmenes to Perſeus the ſon of Jupiter?

Alc. And the family which I am of, O Socrates! deſcends from Euryſaces; and the deſcent of Euryſaces was from Jupiter.

Soc. And the family which I am of, my noble Alcibiades! deſcends from Dædalus; and the deſcent of Dædalus was from Vulcan, the ſon of Jupiter. But the pedigree of thoſe with whom we ſet ourſelves in compariſon, beginning from the perſons who now reign, exhibits a race of kings, all of them ſons of kings, in a direct line quite up to Jupiter; thoſe whom I firſt mentioned, kings of Argos and Lacedæmon; the others, kings of Perſia perpetually, and often of all Aſia [2], as they are at preſent: whereas we are but private men, ourſelves and our fathers. If you then were to boaſt of your anceſtors, and pompouſly ſay that Salamis was the hereditary dominion of Euryſaces, or, to aſcend higher in your anceſtry, that Æacus governed in his native country Ægina [3], can you imagine how ridiculous you would appear in the eyes of Artaxerxes [4], the ſon of Xerxes?

[1] The Greek, as printed, is in this place evidently deficient. For, immediately after the words τῷ δὲ Ἡρακλέους τε γένος, that the words εἰς τὸν Δία are dropt, and ought to be reſtored, there needs no proof to any who are at all acquainted with the antient fables of the Greeks. They well know that Hercules was never ſuppoſed to be deſcended from Perſeus, as he is here made to be in the printed Greek text.—S.

[2] Meaning the Leſſer Aſia, now called Natolia.—S.

[3] Salamis and Ægina being but ſmall iſlands in the Saronic bay, oppoſite to Attica.—Æacus had Ægina in ſovereignty by inheritance from his mother. How it came not to deſcend to Euryſaces from his great-grandfather Æacus, and how his grandfather Telamon came to be lord of Salamis, may be accounted for eaſily from what we read in the Metamorphoſes of Antoninus Liberalis, cap. 38.—S.

[4] Artaxerxes, at the ſuppoſed time of this dialogue, was the reigning king of Perſia.—S.

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Consider besides, whether we may not be found inferior to those great men, not only in the pride of ancestry, but also in the care taken of our birth and breeding. Are you not sensible of the singular advantages which attend the progeny of the Spartan kings in this respect, that their wives have a guard of state appointed for them by the Ephori [1]; to the end that no king of theirs may be the issue of stolen embraces, or have for his real father any other man than a descendant of Hercules [2]? And as to the Persian king, so greatly is he our superior with regard to this point, that none of his subjects entertain the least suspicion of his having any other father than the king his predecessor. The consort therefore of the king of Persia is under no restraint but that of her own dread of the evil consequences, should she dishonour the king's bed. Further, when the king's eldest son, the heir apparent to the crown, is born, all the king's subjects in the city of his residence keep that day an original feast-day: and from thenceforward the anniversary of that day is celebrated with sacrifices and feasts by all Asia. But when we came first into the world, alas, Alcibiades! *our very neighbours*, as the comic poet [3] says, *little knew what happened.* After this the child is

[1] These were the supreme judicial magistrates in Lacedæmon: they were also the guardians and protectors of the laws, the kingdom, and the common weal.—S.

[2] This Lacedæmonian law, or custom, is not, so far as we can find, recorded by any other antient writer. And such of the moderns as treat of Grecian antiquities, wherever they mention it, only cite the passage of Plato now before us. But how careful the Ephori were, not to suffer any person to sit on either of their regal thrones, who was not descended in the male line from either Eurysthenes or his brother Procles, their first kings of the race of Hercules, we may conjecture from two remarkable instances; one of them recorded by Herodotus, the other by Plutarch, and both of them by Pausanias in Laconicis.—The first is the case of Demaratus, the son of Aristo, who was barred of his hereditary right to the crown, because his mother Timea was delivered of him seven months after her marriage with king Aristo: for it was thence concluded by the Ephori, that he was begotten by his mother's former husband, who had parted from her about seven months before the birth of her son.—The other case is that of Leotychidas, who was by the Ephori excluded from the succession to the crown, because king Agis, his nominal and legal father, had been absent from the queen his consort more than ten months before she was brought to bed.—It must, however, be acknowledged, that other concurring circumstances were not wanting to induce a reasonable suspicion of the queen's unfaithfulness to the king's bed in each of these cases.—S.

[3] We are no less in the dark as to the name of this poet than we are to the verse of his here alluded to.—Mons. Le Fevre, in a note to his translation of this passage, refers to Plutarch's Life of Phocion, where Demades tells his son, at whose marriage kings and great lords assisted, that when he

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is brought up, not by ſome inſignificant nurſe, but by the beſt [1] eunuchs about the king's perſon. And theſe have it in their charge to take care of the royal infant in every reſpect, but eſpecially to contrive the means of his becoming as handſome as poſſible in his perſon, by ſo faſhioning his pliant limbs, and giving ſuch a direction to their growth, that they may be ſtraight: and for executing this office well they are highly honoured. When the young princes have attained the age of ſeven years, they are provided with horſes and with riding-maſters, and are initiated in the exerciſe of hunting. At fourteen years of age they are put into the hands of thoſe who are called the royal preceptors. And theſe are choſen out from ſuch as are deemed the moſt excellent of the Perſians, men of mature age, four in number; excelling ſeverally in wiſdom, juſtice, temperance, and fortitude. By the firſt of theſe they are taught the magic [2] of Zoroaſter

he himſelf was married, not a ſoul among the neighbours knew any thing of the matter. And out of this paſſage in Plutarch, where neither verſe nor poet is cited, the ingenious critic has made a verſe, to which he ſuppoſes that Plato here alludes.—S.

[1] That eunuchs were highly valued at the court of Perſia, and purchaſed at a great price, we learn from Herodotus, in lib. 6. where he aſſigns this reaſon for it, the reputation of their fidelity in all things committed to their truſt. See other reaſons in Rycaut's Preſent State of the Ottoman Empire, b. 1. ch. 9. and in L'Eſprit des Loix, l. 15. c. 18.—S.

[2] The following account of magic, by Proclus, originally formed, as it appears to me, a part of the Commentary written by him on the preſent paſſage. For the MS. Commentary of Proclus, which is at preſent extant on this Dialogue, does not extend to more than a third part of it; and this Diſſertation on Magic, which is only extant in Latin, was publiſhed by Ficinus, the tranſlator, immediately after his Excerpta from this Commentary. So that it ſeems highly probable that the manuſcript from which Ficinus tranſlated his Excerpta, was much more perfect than that which is now extant, in conſequence of containing this account of the magic of the antients.

"In the ſame manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which is apparent in ſenſible forms, to that which is divine; ſo the antient prieſts, when they conſidered that there was a certain alliance and ſympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifeſt to occult powers, and diſcovered that all things ſubſiſt in all, they fabricated a ſacred ſcience from this mutual ſympathy and ſimilarity. Thus they recognized things ſupreme in ſuch as are ſubordinate, and the ſubordinate in the ſupreme: in the celeſtial regions, terrene properties ſubſiſting in a cauſal and celeſtial manner; and in earth celeſtial properties, but according to a terrene condition. For how ſhall we account for thoſe plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the ſun, moving in correſpondence with the revolution of its orb; but ſelenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity with her motion? It is becauſe all things

pray,

after [1] the ſon of Oromazes [2], by which magic is meant the worſhip of the Gods: and the ſame perſon inſtructs them likewiſe in the art of government. He

pray, and compoſe hymns to the leaders of their reſpective orders; but ſome intellectually, and others rationally; ſome in a natural, and others after a ſenſible manner. Hence the ſun-flower, as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance towards the ſun; ſo that, if any one could hear the pulſation made by its circuit in the air, he would perceive ſomething compoſed by a ſound of this kind, in honour of its king, ſuch as a plant is capable of framing. Hence we may behold the ſun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene quality; but in the celeſtial regions, all plants, and ſtones, and animals, poſſeſſing an intellectual life according to a celeſtial nature. Now the antients, having contemplated this mutual ſympathy of things, applied for occult purpoſes both celeſtial and terrene natures, by means of which through a certain ſimilitude they deduced divine virtues into this inferior abode. For indeed ſimilitude itſelf is a ſufficient cauſe of binding things together in union and conſent. Thus, if a piece of paper is heated, and afterwards placed near a lamp, though it does not touch the fire, the paper will be ſuddenly inflamed, and the flame will deſcend from the ſuperior to the inferior parts. This heated paper we may compare to a certain relation of inferiors to ſuperiors; and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune uſe of things according to time, place, and matter. But the proceſſion of fire into the paper aptly repreſents the preſence of divine light, to that nature which is capable of its reception. Laſtly, the inflammation of the paper may be compared to the deification of mortals, and to the illumination of material natures, which are afterwards carried upwards like the enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine ſeed.

"Again, the lotus before the riſing of the ſun folds its leaves into itſelf, but gradually expands them on its riſing: unfolding them in proportion to the ſun's aſcent to the zenith; but as gradually contracting them as that luminary deſcends to the weſt. Hence this plant, by the expanſion and contraction of its leaves, appears no leſs to honour the ſun than men by the geſture of their eye-lids and the motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of ſupernal light is not only viſible in plants, which poſſeſs but a veſtige of life, but likewiſe in particular ſtones. Thus the ſun-ſtone, by its golden rays, imitates thoſe of the ſun; but the ſtone

[1] Who Zoroaſter was, and in what age he lived, is totally uncertain. A great variety of different opinions on theſe points is found amongſt learned writers; the probability of any one of which opinions above the reſt, it is an idle ſtudy we think to ſearch for; ſo long as it remains doubtful whether any one man exiſted who was diſtinguiſhed by that name from other men addicted to the ſame ſtudies. For the learned in the eaſtern languages tell us that the name Zoroaſter ſignifies an obſerver of the ſtars. We have therefore no occaſion to be puzzled with uncertainties, when we read of different men living in different ages, and different countries of the eaſt, all of them called by the ſame name Zoroaſter, if the name was general, and given to every man famous for his knowledge in aſtronomy.—S.

[2] This was the name given by the Perſians to the ſupreme being, the ſole author of all good to all.—S.

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He who excels in the ſcience of juſtice teaches them to follow truth in every part of their conduct throughout life. The perſon who excels in temperance enures the young prince not to be governed by ſenſual pleaſure of any kind, that he may acquire the habits of a free man, and of a real king;

ſtone called the eye of heaven, or of the ſun, has a figure ſimilar to the pupil of an eye, and a ray ſhines from the middle of the pupil. Thus too the lunar ſtone, which has a figure ſimilar to the moon when horned, by a certain change of itſelf, follows the lunar motion. Laſtly, the ſtone called helioſelenus, i. e. of the ſun and moon, imitates after a manner the congreſs of thoſe luminaries, which it images by its colour. So that all things are full of divine natures; terreſtrial natures receiving the plenitude of ſuch as are celeſtial, but celeſtial of ſuperceleſtial eſſences*; while every order of things proceeds gradually in a beautiful deſcent from the higheſt to the loweſt. For whatever is collected into one above the order of things, is afterwards dilated in deſcending, various ſouls being diſtributed under their various ruling divinities.

"In the next place, there are many ſolar animals, ſuch as lions and cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain ſolar divinity; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to ſuperiors in the ſame order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power. Hence, they report that a cock is very much feared, and as it were reverenced, by a lion; the reaſon of which we cannot aſſign from matter or ſenſe, but from the contemplation alone of a ſupernal order: for thus we ſhall find that the preſence of the ſolar virtue accords more with a cock than a lion. This will be evident from conſidering that the cock, as it were, with certain hymns, applauds and calls to the riſing ſun, when he bends his courſe to us from the antipodes; and that ſolar angels ſometimes appear in forms of this kind, who, though they are without ſhape, yet preſent themſelves to us who are connected with ſhape, in ſome ſenſible form. Sometimes too, there are dæmons with a leonine front, who, when a cock is placed before them, unleſs they are of a ſolar order, ſuddenly diſappear; and this, becauſe thoſe natures which have an inferior rank in the ſame order, always reverence their ſuperiors: juſt as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are accuſtomed, from the very view, to be fearful of perpetrating any thing baſe.

"In fine, ſome things turn round correſpondent to the revolutions of the ſun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others after a manner imitate the ſolar rays, as the palm and the date; ſome the fiery nature of the ſun, as the laurel; and others a different property. For, indeed, we may perceive the properties which are collected in the ſun every where diſtributed to ſubſequent natures conſtituted in a ſolar order; that is, to angels, dæmons, ſouls, animals, plants, and ſtones. Hence, the authors of the antient prieſthood diſcovered from things apparent the worſhip of ſuperior powers, while they mingled ſome things and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, becauſe they ſaw that ſome ſimple ſubſtances poſſeſſed a divine property (though not taken ſingly) ſufficient to call down that particular power, of which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things together, they at-

* By ſuperceleſtial eſſences, underſtand natures which are not connected with a body.

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king; by governing firſt all his own appetites, inſtead of being their ſlave. And the fourth, he who excels in fortitude forms his royal pupil to be fearleſs and intrepid; for that his mind, under the power of fear, would be a ſlave. But, Alcibiades, for your preceptor Pericles appointed one of his domeſtics, too old to be fit for any other ſervice, Zopyrus of Thrace. I would recount to you the other articles of the breeding and inſtruction

tracted upon us a ſupernal influx; and by the compoſition of one thing from many, they produced an aſſimilation to that one which is above many; and compoſed ſtatues from the mixtures of various ſubſtances conſpiring in ſympathy and conſent. Beſides this, they collected compoſite odours, by a divine art, into one, comprehending a multitude of powers, and ſymbolizing with the unity of a divine eſſence; conſidering, that diviſion debilitates each of theſe, but that mingling them together, reſtores them to the idea of their exemplar.

"But ſometimes one herb, or one ſtone, is ſufficient to a divine operation. Thus, a thiſtle is ſufficient to procure the ſudden appearance of ſome ſuperior power; but a laurel, raceinum, or a thorny kind of ſprig, the land and ſea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jaſper, operate as a ſafeguard. The heart of a mole is ſubſervient to divination, but ſulphur and marine water to purification. Hence, the antient prieſts, by the mutual relation and ſympathy of things to one another, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy and antipathy; purifying, when it was requiſite, with ſulphur and bitumen, and ſprinkling with marine water. For ſulphur purifies from the ſharpneſs of its odour; but marine water on account of its fiery portion. Beſides this, in the worſhip of the Gods, they offered animals, and other ſubſtances congruous to their nature; and received, in the firſt place, the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural ſubſtances and operations; and by theſe natural ſubſtance they convoked into their preſence thoſe powers to which they approached. Afterwards, they proceeded from dæmons to the powers and energies of the Gods; partly, indeed, from dæmoniacal inſtruction, but partly by thei own induſtry, interpreting convenient ſymbols, and aſcending to a proper intelligence of the Gods. And laſtly, laying aſide natural ſubſtances and their operations, they received themſelves into the communion and fellowſhip of the Gods."

Should it be objected by thoſe who diſbelieve in the exiſtence of magic, that plants, animals, and ſtones, no longer poſſeſs thoſe wonderful ſympathetic powers which are mentioned by Proclus in the above extract, the ſame anſwer muſt be given as to the objectors to the antient oracles, and is as follows:—As in the realms of generation, or in other words, the ſublunary region, wholes, viz. the ſpheres of the different elements, remain perpetually according to nature; but their parts are ſometimes according, and ſometimes contrary, to nature; this muſt be true of the parts of the earth. When thoſe circulations, therefore, take place, during which the parts of the earth ſubſiſt according to nature, and which are juſtly called, by Plato, fertile periods, the powers of plants, animals, and ſtones, magically ſympathize with ſuperior natures; but during thoſe circulations in which the parts of the earth ſubſiſt contrary to nature, as at preſent, and which Plato calls barren periods, thoſe powers no longer poſſeſs a magic ſympathy, and conſequently are no longer capable of producing magical operations.—T.

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given to your antagonists, if the narration would not be too long; and besides this, the articles already mentioned are sufficient indications of those others which they infer and draw along with them. But your birth, Alcibiades, your breeding and institution, or any other circumstances attending you, scarce any one of the Athenians is at all solicitous about, unless there be some man who happens to have an especial regard for you. Further; if you would consider the treasures of the Persian kings, the sumptuous furniture of their palaces and tables, their wardrobes of apparel, the long trains of their garments, and the fragrancy of their unguents, their numerous retinue of attendants, and the rest of their magnificence, in comparing all this with what you have of the same kind yourself, you would evidently perceive how much you fall short of them, and would be ashamed at the comparison. If, on the other hand, you would consider the Lacedæmonians, their sobriety and modesty, how simple their way of living, and how easily they are satisfied, their magnanimity and observance of order, their manly endurance of pain and love of labour, their emulation to excel, and their love of honour, you would think yourself a child to them in all these excellencies. Besides this, if you make riches any part of your consideration, and in this respect imagine yourself a person of consequence, let us not pass over this point neither unexamined; if by any means you can be made sensible in what rank you stand. If you choose then to consider the Lacedæmonians with regard to wealth, you will find that what we have here in Attica falls far short of theirs. For the lands which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, are such as that no person here would dispute their superiority in this respect, whether he considers the quantity or the value of those lands, the number of their other slaves, besides such as the Helotes [1], or the number of their horses, and other cattle in the pasture-

[1] The Helotes, properly so called, were descended from the antient inhabitants of Helos, a maritime town in Laconia, near the mouth of the river Eurotas, under the dominion of Menelaus at the time of the Trojan war. It was afterwards besieged and taken by the Heraclidæ, and their Dorian army, who had before conquered all the rest of Laconia. The Helotes were thus made captives to their conquerors, by whom they were condemned, they and their posterity for ever, to till the lands of these Dorians (then become proprietors of the territory of Laconia) as their vassals, and in lieu of the produce to pay a certain and fixed rent to their

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paſture-grounds of Meſſenia. But, ſetting aſide all this, you will find that, as to gold and ſilver, there is not ſo much amongſt all the Grecians as there is amongſt the Lacedæmonians in private hands. For gold and ſilver have now for many generations been flowing into them from all parts of Greece, and often too from foreign countries; but there is no reflux any way [1]. That therefore which the fox ſaid to the lion in a fable of Æſop's, may juſtly

lords and maſters; not unlike to tenants in villenage under the feudal laws in after ages. To the like hard conditions did theſe Lacedæmonians, long afterward, ſubject their own kindred and neighbours of Meſſenia, at the end of many long ſtruggles between them; on the Lacedæmonian ſide, for the conqueſt of a country better than their own; on the other ſide for the preſervation of their lands and liberties. The Meſſenians, being thus reduced to the ſame ſtate of vaſſalage with the Helotes, were often comprehended under this latter name; as appears from Pauſanias, in lib. 3, p. 201 ed. Hanov. as alſo appears from Thucydides, in lib. 1, p. 101. The ſcholiaſt to this great hiſtorian informs us further, that the Lacedæmonians δια το αει διαφορης ειναι ειλωταις, (for ſo this laſt word ought to be read, and not αλληλοις, as it is abſurdly printed,) becauſe of the hatred which they always bore to the Helotes, were uſed to call their ſlaves by that name, in the way of contemptuouſneſs and contumely. But Plato in the paſſage now before us, uſes more accuracy: for meaning to include all the vaſſals, by whoſe labour in the lands much wealth accrued to the Lacedæmonians, he calls them, not ειλωτας, Helotes, but ειλωτικους, ſuch as the Helotes. Juſt as Pauſanias, in lib. 4, p. 259, means by το ειλωτικον, ſuch a vaſſal-ſtate as that of the Helotes. Plato, by other ſlaves, means ſuch as were acquired by purchaſe, or by conqueſt unconditional, them and their offſpring; and of theſe, ſuch as were not employed in domeſtic ſervices, but were ſet to work in agriculture and other country-labour: for Socrates is here ſpeaking only of the value of the Lacedæmonian eſtates in land ariſing from ſuch labour.—S.

[1] The Lacedæmonians were abundantly ſupplied with all the neceſſaries of life from their own lands; and being by their laws reſtrained from all ſplendour and magnificence, from all delicacy and luxury, as well in their houſes and the furniture of them, as in their apparel and the proviſions of their tables, they could have no occaſion to purchaſe for their own uſe any foreign trinkets or commodities. Indeed ſumptuary laws were almoſt unneceſſary in their commonwealth, through the force and effect of another law, by which they were prohibited not only from uſing any coined money, whether of gold, ſilver, or copper, in their home-traffic, but even from having any ſuch uſeleſs treaſure in their houſes. The only money permitted to paſs current amongſt them was of their own making; it conſiſted in pieces of iron, of a conoidical form, ſo peculiarly tempered as to be of no other uſe. Theſe pieces, therefore, having no real value, and a nominal value no where but in Laconia, would not be taken by any foreigners in exchange for merchandiſe. On the other hand, all the corn and cattle produced or bred in the fertile fields and fine paſtures of Meſſenia, all the copper and iron dug out of the rich mountains of Laconia, and manufactured by the great number of thoſe Helotes who

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juſtly be applied to them; the footſteps of money coming into Lacedæmon are eaſy to be diſcovered, as being all turned towards it; but the tracks of money going out of it are no where to be diſcerned [1]. Thus it may eaſily be conceived, that of all the Grecians the richeſt in gold and ſilver are the Lacedæmonians, and that of all the Lacedæmonians the richeſt is their king. For of ſuch comings-in a larger ſhare, and oftener, is received by kings [2] than by other men. And beſides this [3], the taxes paid by the Lacedæmonians to their kings bring them in a large revenue. But whatever wealth the Lacedæmonians have, though great if compared with that of any other Grecians, yet in compariſon with the riches of the Perſians, and eſpecially of their king, 'tis nothing. For I once heard a man of credit, who had been at the capital city of Perſia, ſay, that in going up to it, he travelled almoſt a day's journey through a large and fertile territory, which the inhabitants of it called the Queen's Girdle [4]; that there was another extenſive tract of land called the Queen's Veil; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the reſt of the queen's apparel [5]; each of thoſe countries having its name from that part of the apparel which the revenue of it furniſhed. So that, were any perſon to tell the queen-mother, Amaſtris, the conſort formerly of Xerxes, that the ſon of Dinomache had it in his head to lead an army againſt

who lived in the city of Sparta, and laboured not for their own profit, but for that of their maſters,——all this, except the little wanted at home, was ſold abroad and paid for in gold and ſilver: which money was by the owners either depoſited in the temple at Delphi, or intruſted to the cuſtody of their neighbours, the Arcadians; (ſee Athenæus, lib. 6. p. 233.) beſides much of it, perhaps, buried under ground; (as ſilver is ſaid to be at Pekin, and gold under the Stadt-houſe at Amſterdam) or concealed in ſecret places; an inſtance of which kind we have in the ſtory of Gylippus, told by Plutarch in his Life of Lyſander.—S.

[1] The fox's anſwer to the lion, in the well known fable to which this paſſage alludes, is cited by Horace, in Epiſt. 1. lib. 1.—S.

[2] Only meaning here the revenue ariſing from their demeſne-lands; more of which in quantity and better in quality, kings have than other men.—S.

[3] That is, beſides the profit ariſing from their demeſne-lands.—S.

[4] See the Leſſer Hippias.—S.

[5] The ſame cuſtom was in antient Ægypt. For we read in Herodotus, lib. 2. p. 123, edit. Gronov., that the city of Anthylla, that is, the revenue of the crown ariſing from the taxes impoſed on it, was aſſigned and ſet apart for the ſupplying of the queen-conſort with ſhoes and ſlippers.—S.

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her ſon ;—and were ſhe told at the ſame time that Dinomache's whole attire might be worth perhaps fifty minæ [1] ; ſuppoſing it to be of the moſt coſtly kind [2] ; and that this ſon of hers had land in the diſtrict of Erchia [3], containing not ſo much as three hundred acres [4] ;—ſhe I ſuppoſe would wonder in what kind of things this Alcibiades could place ſo much confidence as to think of contending with Artaxerxes. And I imagine that ſhe would ſay, it is impoſſible that this man ſhould undertake ſuch an affair with any other confidence than what he places in the prudence and ſkill which he is maſter of : for that the Grecians have nothing elſe worthy of account. Becauſe if ſhe was to hear further, that this ſame Alcibiades in the firſt place had not completed the twentieth year of his age ; in the next place that he was utterly uninſtructed ; and beſides this, that, when a friend of his adviſed him firſt to acquire the knowledge, the prudence, and the habits, neceſſary for the execution of his deſigns, before he offered to attack the king, he refuſed to hearken to this advice, and ſaid, that even in his preſent condition he was prepared ſufficiently ;—I believe ſhe would be aſtoniſhed, and would aſk, What kind of a thing it could be then in which the youth put his confidence ? Upon this, were we to tell her,—In his handſome and fine perſon, in his birth and family, in his riches, and in the natural faculties of his mind,—ſhe would think us, Alcibiades, out of our ſenſes, when ſhe reflected on all the advantages which her ſon enjoyed of the ſame kinds. No leſs do I imagine that Lampido [5], daughter of Leotychidas, wife of Archidamus, and mother of Agis, who, all of them in their turns, ſucceeded to the crown of Sparta, ſhe too would wonder, in reflecting on their greatneſs, were ſhe told, that you had taken it into your head to make war againſt her ſon, ſo ill inſtructed as you are. And now do you not think it ſhameful, if the wives of our

[1] Equal to 161l. 9s. 2d. Engliſh money.—S.

[2] *Meaning the moſt coſtly among ſuch as were worn by Grecian women.—S.*

[3] See Meurſius in his Reliqua Attica, cap. 5.—S.

[4] Πλεθρα. A Greek πλεθρον contained 10,000 ſquare feet: an Engliſh acre contains 4,840 ſquare feet. So that the land-eſtate of Alcibiades, near Erchia, contained about 619 Engliſh acres.—S.

[5] This princeſs is called Lampidro in the editions we have of Plutarch, probably from an antient error in the manuſcripts, as Meurſius in his treatiſe de Regno Laconico rightly ſeems to judge. By Herodotus ſhe is called Lampito, lib. 6. p. 354, ed. Gronovii.—S.

enemies

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enemies conſider more prudently for us than we do for ourſelves, what ſort of perſons we ought to be before we venture to attack ſuch enemies? Hearken therefore, my good ſir, to the advice which I give you, in agreement with the Delphic inſcription, KNOW THYSELF: ſince your antagoniſts are to be, not thoſe whom you imagine, but theſe whom I have told you of: and theſe you never can excel in any other point than ſkill and application; in which articles if you are found deficient, you will fail of that reputation and renown, as well with Grecians as Barbarians, which I think you long for with more ardour than any other man does for whatever is the object of his wiſhes.

ALC. Can you teach me then, O Socrates, what ſort of application I ought to uſe? for you ſeem to be entirely right in all which you have ſpoken.

SOC. Something I have indeed to ſay upon that ſubject. But let us enter into a joint conſultation, you and I, about the means of becoming, both of us, better men. For when I ſay, there is a neceſſity for inſtruction, I mean it of myſelf as well as of you: ſince only one difference there is between you and me.

ALC. What is that?

SOC. He who is my guardian is better and wiſer than Pericles, who is yours.

ALC. And who is yours, O Socrates?

SOC. A GOD, O Alcibiades! he who permitted me not before this day to enter into any diſcourſe with you: he it is, on whoſe dictates to me I rely, when I am bold to ſay, that you will acquire the renown you long for, by no other means than through me.

ALC. You are in jeſt, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps ſo: but I ſpeak the truth however in good earneſt when I ſay that we ſtand in need of inſtruction, or rather, that all men want it; but that you and I have very eſpecial need of it.

ALC. In ſaying that I have need of it, you are not miſtaken.

SOC. Neither am I, in ſaying that I myſelf have.

ALC. What then muſt we do?

SOC. We muſt not deſpair, nor give ourſelves up to indolence, my friend.

ALC.

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ALC. By no means, Socrates, does it become us ſo to do.

SOC. Indeed it does not. We muſt therefore conſider of the affair, you and I together. Now then anſwer to my queſtions. We profeſs to be deſirous of becoming as excellent as poſſible: do we not?

ALC. We do.

SOC. In what kind of excellence?

ALC. In that certainly which belongs to men of merit.

SOC. Of merit in what reſpect?

ALC. In the management of buſineſs and affairs, undoubtedly.

SOC. But what buſineſs do you mean? The buſineſs of a jockey?

ALC. Clearly not.

SOC. For then we ſhould go for inſtruction to thoſe who underſtand the management of horſes.

ALC. Certainly we ſhould.

SOC. Do you then mean of a mariner?

ALC. I do not.

SOC. For in that caſe we ſhould apply to thoſe who underſtand navigation.

ALC. Certainly ſo.

SOC. But what buſineſs or affairs then? and by what ſort of men are theſe affairs managed?

ALC. I mean ſuch affairs as are managed by men of honour and merit amongſt the Athenians.

SOC. Men of honour and merit do you call ſuch as have underſtanding, or ſuch as are void of underſtanding?

ALC. Such as have underſtanding.

SOC. In whatever buſineſs a man has underſtanding, in that has he not merit?

ALC. He has.

SOC. And in whatever buſineſs he is void of underſtanding, is he not in that void of merit?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. Whether hath a ſhoemaker underſtanding in the buſineſs of making ſhoes?

ALC. He certainly has.

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Soc. In this respect therefore he has merit.

Alc. He has.

Soc. Well; but is not a shoemaker void of understanding in the business of making clothes?

Alc. No doubt of it.

Soc. In this respect therefore he is void of merit.

Alc. He is so.

Soc. The same man therefore, according to this account, is at the same time void of merit and possessed of merit.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Would you say, then, that men possessed of merit are at the same time void of merit?

Alc. That cannot be.

Soc. What kind of men then do you mean by the men of merit?

Alc. I mean such as have abilities to govern at Athens.

Soc. Not to govern horses, I presume.

Alc. No, certainly.

Soc. But to govern men.

Alc. That is my meaning.

Soc. But what men do you mean? Men who are sick?

Alc. I do not mean these.

Soc. Men then who are going a voyage?

Alc. I mean not such men.

Soc. Men then who are gathering the harvest?

Alc. Nor such neither.

Soc. But men who do nothing do you mean? or men who do something?

Alc. Men who do something.

Soc. Who do what? try if you can make me sensible of your precise meaning.

Alc. Well then. I mean men who have commerce one with another [1];

[1] In the Greek, συμβαλλοντων εαυτοις. But we apprehend that the pronoun εαυτοις can never follow the verb συμβαλλω, (in connection with it,) in any sense ever given to that verb. Presuming therefore that the right reading is συμβαλλοντων αλληλοις we have translated agreeably to this presumption. In confirmation of which we find within a few lines after, συμβαλλοντων προς αλληλους.—S.

and make uſe of one another's aid and aſſiſtance in that kind of life which we lead in cities.

Soc. You ſpeak then of ſuch as have abilities to govern men, who make uſe of other men to aid and aſſiſt them.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you mean the governing of men who make uſe of mariners in the rowing of galleys, and give them the proper orders?

Alc. I mean no ſuch thing.

Soc. For ability to govern ſuch men belongs to the commander of a galley.

Alc. True.

Soc. Do you then mean the governing of men who are muſicians, and lead the ſong to other men, making uſe of chorus-ſingers and dancers?

Alc. I mean not this neither.

Soc. For this ſkill belongs to the maſter of the whole choir.

Alc. Right.

Soc. In ſpeaking then of ability to govern men who make uſe of other men, what kind of uſe do you mean? or in what way?

Alc. Fellow-citizens, I mean, partakers of the ſame polity, and engaged in mutual commerce for mutual help and benefit. I ſpeak of ability to govern theſe.

Soc. What art then is that which gives this ability? as if I were to aſk you, on the ſubject juſt now mentioned—the knowing how to govern men embarked in the ſame voyage—What art is it that gives this knowledge?

Alc. The art of commanding ſhips.

Soc. And what ſcience is that which gives the power of governing thoſe others whom we mentioned,—thoſe who have parts in the ſame ſong?

Alc. That which belongs, as juſt now you ſaid, to the maſter of the whole choir.

Soc. And by what name do you call that ſcience which gives ability to govern thoſe who partake of the ſame polity?

Alc. Prudence I call it for my part, Socrates.

Soc. What? do you think then that want of prudence is proper for the commander of a ſhip?

Alc.

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ALC. Certainly not ſo.

SOC. But rather that prudence is.

ALC. I think it is, ſo far as it regards the ſafety of thoſe who are ſailing in the ſhip.

SOC. It is well ſaid: and that other ſcience, that which you call prudence, what end does that regard?

ALC. The good government and ſafety of the commonwealth.

SOC. And what is it which the commonwealth enjoys when it is governed beſt and preſerved in ſafety? and what is it from which it is then preſerved? as, if you were to aſk me this queſtion, What is it which the body enjoys when it is beſt taken care of, and preſerved in ſafety? and from what is it then preſerved? I would ſay that then it enjoys health, and is preſerved from diſeaſe. Are not you of the ſame opinion?

ALC. I am.

SOC. And, if you were to aſk me further, What do the eyes enjoy when the beſt care is taken of them? and from what are they then preſerved? I would anſwer in like manner as before, that they enjoyed their ſight, and were preſerved from blindneſs. So likewiſe of the ears; when they are preſerved from deafneſs, and have their hearing perfect, they are then in their beſt condition, and are taken the beſt care of.

ALC. Right.

SOC. Well, now; what does the commonwealth enjoy, and from what is it preſerved, when 'tis in its beſt condition, has the beſt care taken of it, and is beſt preſerved?

ALC. It ſeems to me, Socrates, that the members of it then enjoy mutual amity, and are preſerved from enmity and factions.

SOC. By amity do you mean their being of the ſame mind, or of different minds?

ALC. Their being of the ſame mind.

SOC. Now through what ſcience is it that different civil ſtates are of the ſame mind concerning numbers?

ALC. Through the ſcience of arithmetic.

SOC. Well; and is it not through that very ſcience that private perſons are of the ſame mind one with another?

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ALC. It is.

SOC. And that any perſon too, by himſelf, continues always in the ſame mind, is it not through his poſſeſſing that ſcience?

ALC. It is.

SOC. And through what ſcience is it that a ſingle individual is always of the ſame mind concerning a ſpan and a cubit, whether of the two is the greater meaſure? is it not through the ſcience of menſuration?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. And is it not ſo too between different private perſons and civil ſtates?

ALC. It is.

SOC. And how concerning weights? does not the ſame hold true in this caſe?

ALC. I agree it does.

SOC. But now the ſameneſs of mind which you ſpeak of, what is that? What is the ſubject-matter of it? and through what ſcience is it procured? I aſk you likewiſe whether the ſame ſcience which procures it for the public procures it no leſs for private perſons; and whether it operates that effect in a man conſidered by himſelf as well as between one man and another.

ALC. Probably it does.

SOC. What ſcience or art then is it? Do not labour for an anſwer, but ſpeak readily what you think.

ALC. I think it to be ſuch an amity and ſameneſs of mind, that which we are ſpeaking of, as there is between a father and a mother in loving their child, and as there is between brother and brother, and between man and wife.

SOC. Do you then think it poſſible, Alcibiades, for a man to be of the ſame mind with his wife on the ſubject of weaving, when he is ignorant and ſhe is knowing in the art?

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Nor ought he neither. For 'tis a piece of knowledge belonging only to women.

ALC. Certainly.

SOC.

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Soc. Well; and can a woman be of the ſame mind with her huſband on the ſubject of fighting in battle among the infantry, when ſhe has never learnt the art?

Alc. Certainly ſhe cannot.

Soc. For the knowledge of this you would perhaps ſay belonged only to men.

Alc. I ſhould ſo.

Soc. Some pieces of knowledge, therefore, properly belong to women; others to men according to your account.

Alc. No doubt can be made of it.

Soc. On thoſe ſubjects therefore which are not common to both the ſexes there is no ſameneſs of mind, between huſbands and their wives.

Alc. There is not any.

Soc. Neither then is there any friendſhip; if friendſhip conſiſt in ſameneſs of mind.

Alc. It appears there is not.

Soc. So far therefore as women are attentive to their own buſineſs they are not beloved by their huſbands.

Alc. It ſeems they are not.

Soc. Neither are men beloved by their wives,—ſo far as their minds are engaged in their own buſineſs.

Alc. It ſeems they are not.

Soc. Neither then do citizens live well [1] together in cities, when each of them minds only his own buſineſs.

Alc. Nay, Socrates; for my part I imagine that they do,—ſo far as they are thus employed.

Soc. How ſay you? What, without friendſhip between them, by means of which we ſaid that civil ſtates were in a happy condition, and without which we ſaid they could not flouriſh?

[1] In all the editions of Plato, we here read ſimply ομονοουσι. In all the MSS. therefore, from which the firſt of them were printed, and in thoſe alſo which Ficinus and Cornarius tranſlated, there ſeems to have been an omiſſion of the word ευ. We think it an omiſſion becauſe the ſame word is inſerted in the very next ſentence of Socrates, which the reaſoning requires to correſpond with this. Serranus alone, in his tranſlation, appears to have ſeen the neceſſity of its being here reſtored.—S.

Alc.

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ALC. But it ſeems to me that friendſhip is on this very account produced between them, becauſe every one gives his whole attention to his own buſineſs.

SOC. It did not ſeem ſo to you juſt now. But how do you explain at preſent what you ſaid,—that friendſhip was produced by ſameneſs of mind? Whether is it poſſible that fellow-citizens can be all of the ſame mind on ſubjects in which ſome of them are knowing, and others ignorant?

ALC. It is not poſſible.

SOC. And do they do their duty, and act as they ought, or not, when each of them attends to his own buſineſs?

ALC. As they ought, undoubtedly.

SOC. When the citizens then of any city act as they ought, and all of them do their duty, is not friendſhip produced between them?

ALC. It muſt be ſo I think, Socrates.

SOC. What kind of friendſhip, or ſameneſs of mind, do you then mean, in the procuring of which you ſay that wiſdom and prudence are requiſite to make us men of virtue and merit? For I can neither learn from you what it is, nor what objects it regards. But ſometimes it ſeems to regard the ſame objects, and ſometimes not, according to your account of it.

ALC. Now by the Gods, Socrates, I know not what I mean, myſelf. But am in danger of appearing to have been, of a long time, in a ſhameful ſtate of mind, without being ſenſible of it.

SOC. Now therefore you ought to take courage. For if fifty years of your life had elapſed before you had diſcovered the real ſtate of your mind, an application of it to the care of yourſelf would have been a difficult taſk for you. But you are now at the very time of life in which ſuch a diſcovery ſhould be made, to be of any advantage to you.

ALC. What then am I to do, Socrates, now that I am made ſenſible of my condition?

SOC. Only to anſwer to the queſtions I ſhall put to you, Alcibiades. And if you will ſo do, you and I, by the favour of God, if any credit may be given to a prophecy of mine, ſhall both of us be the better for it.

ALC. Your prophecy ſhall be accompliſhed, as far as the accompliſhment depends on my anſwering to your queſtions.

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Soc. Come on then. What is it to take care of oneſelf? That we may not falſely imagine, as we often do, that we are taking care of ourſelves, and know not that all the while we are otherwiſe employed. And when is it that a man is taking that care? Whether when he is taking care of what appertains to him, is he then taking care of himſelf?

Alc. For my part I muſt own I think ſo.

Soc. And when is it, think you, that a man is taking care of his feet? whether is it then when he is taking care of the things appertaining to his feet?

Soc. I do not apprehend your meaning.

Soc. Do you acknowledge ſomething to be appertaining to the hand,—a ring, for inſtance? Or [1] does it appertain to any other part of the human body than a finger?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. And does not a ſhoe appertain to the foot in like manner?

Alc. It does.

Soc. Whether then at the time of our taking care of our ſhoes are we taking care immediately of our feet?

Alc. I do not quite apprehend you, Socrates.

Soc. Do you acknowledge that whatever be the ſubject of our care, a right care of it may be taken?

Alc. I do.

Soc. I aſk you then, whether you think that a man takes a right care of whatever is the ſubject of his care, when he improves it and makes it better?

Alc. I anſwer Yes.

Soc. What art now is that by which our ſhoes are improved and made better?

Alc. The ſhoemaker's art.

Soc. By the ſhoemaker's art therefore it is that we take a right care of our ſhoes.

Alc. True.

[1] If, in the Greek, we here inſert the particle ἢ or, there will be no occaſion to ſeparate theſe two queſtions of Socrates, ſo as to inſert between them an affirmative anſwer of Alcibiades to the firſt queſtion; as Ficinus does in his tranſlation.—S.

Soc.

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Soc. And is it alſo by the ſhoemaker's art that we take a right care of our feet? or is it by that art by which we improve our feet and make them better?

Alc. It is by this art.

Soc. And do we not improve and make better our feet by the ſame art by which we improve and make better the reſt of our body?

Alc. I believe we do.

Soc. And is not this the gymnaſtic art?

Alc. Undoubtedly.

Soc. By the gymnaſtic art therefore we take care of the foot, and by the ſhoemaker's art we take care of what is appertinent to the foot.

Alc. Exactly ſo.

Soc. And in like manner by the gymnaſtic art we take care of our hands, and by the art of engraving rings we take care of what is appertinent to the hand.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. By the gymnaſtic art alſo we take care of our bodies; but 'tis by the weaver's art and ſome others that we take care of things appertinent to the body.

Alc. I agree with you entirely.

Soc. By one kind of knowledge therefore we take care of things themſelves, and by a different kind of knowledge we take care of things only appertinent to thoſe things which are the principal.

Alc. It appears ſo.

Soc. You are not therefore taking care of yourſelf when you are taking care only of the appertinences to yourſelf.

Alc. At that time 'tis very true I am not.

Soc. For one and the ſame art, it ſeems, doth not take care of a thing itſelf, and of the appertinences to that thing beſides.

Alc. It appears to be not the ſame art.

Soc. Now then, by what kind of art might we take care of ourſelves?

Alc. I have nothing to anſwer to this queſtion.

Soc. So much, however, we are agreed in, that it is not an art by which we improve or better any thing which is ours; but an art by which we improve and better our very ſelves.

Alc.

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ALC. I acknowledge it.

SOC. Could we ever know what art would improve or amend a ſhoe, if we knew not what a ſhoe was?

ALC. Impoſſible.

SOC. Neither could we know what art would make better rings for the finger, if ignorant what a ring for the finger was.

ALC. True.

SOC. Well; and can we ever know what art would improve or make a man's ſelf better, ſo long as we are ignorant of what we ourſelves are?

ALC. Impoſſible.

SOC. Let me aſk you, then, whether it happens to be an eaſy thing to know oneſelf; and whether he was ſome perſon of mean attainments in knowledge, he who put up this inſcription in the temple at Pytho [1]: or is it a piece of knowledge difficult to be attained, and not obvious to every one?

ALC. To me, Socrates, it has often ſeemed eaſy and obvious to every one, and often too, at other times, a thing of the greateſt difficulty.

SOC. But whether in itſelf it be an eaſy thing or not, with reſpect to us, Alcibiades, the ſtate of the caſe is this;—had we attained to that piece of knowledge, we ſhould perhaps know what it is to take care of ourſelves; but never can we know this ſo long as we remain ignorant of that.

ALC. Theſe are truths which I acknowledge.

SOC. Come then. By what means might it be found what is the very ſelf of every thing? for ſo we might perhaps find what we ourſelves are: but ſo long as we continue in the dark as to that point, it will be no way poſſible to know ourſelves.

ALC. You are certainly in the right.

[1] Pytho was another name for the city of Delphi, as we learn from Pauſanias: a name more antient than the name Delphi, and on that very account retained by Homer and Apollonius of Rhodes. The paſſages to which we here refer may be ſeen cited together by Cellarius, in Geog. vol. 1. p. 721, edit. Cantab. An air of antiquity in the diction is obſerved by the beſt critics to be one of the ſources of the ſublime in epic poetry. And Plato treads every where in the ſteps of Homer while he is ſearching out all the ſources of ſublimity in ſtyle, to maintain throughout his writings the dignity of true philoſophy, and, at the ſame time, to preſerve its ſimplicity, and unadulterated beauty.

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Soc. Attend now, I conjure you in the name of Jupiter: With whom is it that you are at this present time discoursing? Is it not[1] with me?

Alc. It is.

Soc. And am not I discoursing with you?

Alc. You are.

Soc. It is Socrates then who is discoursing and arguing.

Alc. Quite true.

Soc. And Alcibiades is attentive to his arguments.

Alc. He is.

Soc. Is it not by reason that Socrates thus argues in discourse?

Alc. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And is not to argue in discourse the same thing as to reason?

Alc. Quite the same.

Soc. But is not the person who uses a thing, different from the thing which he uses?

Alc. How do you mean?

Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts his leather with the sheers, and the paring knife, and other tools.

Alc. Well; he does so.

Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts the leather and uses those tools in cutting it, different from the tools which he uses?

Alc. Without doubt.

Soc. Are not, in like manner, the instruments on which a musician plays, different things from the musician himself?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. It was in this sense that just now I asked you whether you thought that, in all cases, the person who used a thing was different from the thing which he used.

Alc. I think he is.

Soc. Now then, to resume the instance of the shoemaker; what say we? does he cut the leather with his tools only, or also with his hands?

[1] In the Greek we here read,——αλλῳ τινι η εμοι; Is it with any other person than with me? But the answer of Alcibiades being in the affirmative is sufficient to show this reading to be wrong. It may be rectified by this small alteration; αλλοτι η εμοι; Whether is it not with me?

Alc.

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ALC. With his hands alſo.

SOC. He therefore uſes alſo theſe.

ALC. He does.

SOC. And does he not uſe his eyes alſo when he is cutting the leather?

ALC. He does.

SOC. And we are agreed, that the perſon who makes uſe of any things is different from the things which he makes uſe of.

ALC. We are.

SOC. The ſhoemaker then, and the muſician, are different from the hands and eyes with which they perform their operations.

ALC. It is apparent.

SOC. And does not a man uſe alſo his whole body?

ALC. Moſt certainly.

SOC. Now the uſer is different from the thing uſed.

ALC. True.

SOC. A man therefore is a being different from his body.

ALC. It ſeems ſo.

SOC. What ſort of being then is man?

ALC. I know not.

SOC. But you know that man is ſome being who makes uſe of the body.

ALC. True.

SOC. Does any being make uſe of the body other than the ſoul?

ALC. None other.

SOC. And does it not ſo do by governing the body?

ALC. It does.

SOC. Further. I ſuppoſe that no man would ever think otherwiſe than this.

ALC. Than what?

SOC. That a man himſelf was one of theſe three things.

ALC. What three things?

SOC. Soul, or body, or a compound of them both, conſtituting one whole.

ALC. What beſides could be imagined?

SOC. Now we agreed that the being which governs the body is the man.

ALC. We did.

SOC. What being then is the man? Doth the body itſelf govern itſelf?

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ALC. By no means.

SOC. For the body we ſaid was governed.

ALC. True.

SOC. The body then cannot be that being which we are in ſearch of.

ALC. It ſeems not.

SOC. But whether does the compound being govern the body? and whether is this the man?

ALC. Perhaps it is.

SOC. Leaſt of any of the three can this be ſo. For of two parties, one of which is the party governed, there is no poſſibility that both of them ſhould govern jointly.

ALC. Right.

SOC. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of ſoul and body together, is the man, it remains, I think, either that a man's ſelf is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it muſt be concluded that the man is no other thing than ſoul.

ALC. Clearly ſo.

SOC. Needs it then to be proved to you ſtill more clearly, that the ſoul [1] is the very man?

ALC. It needs not, by Jupiter: for the proofs already brought ſeem to me ſufficient.

SOC. If it be proved tolerably well, though not accurately, 'tis ſufficient for us. For we ſhall then perhaps, and not before, have an accurate knowledge of man's ſelf, when we ſhall have diſcovered what we juſt now paſſed by as a matter which required much conſideration.

[1] Simplicius rightly underſtands Plato here to mean the rational ſoul. For the arguments produced in this part of the Dialogue, to ſhow that the ſoul is a man's proper ſelf, regard the rational ſoul only. This ſoul alone uſes ſpeech, as the inſtrument by which it makes known to others its mind and will. This alone uſes argumentative ſpeech, as an inſtrument to teach art and ſcience, to correct error, to confute falſehood, and demonſtrate truth. This alone uſes the organical parts of the body, eſpecially the hands and eyes, as inſtruments by which it operates in all the performances of the manual arts. This alone employs the whole body in its ſervice, as the inſtrument of its will and pleaſure; and is the ſole governing and leading power in man, whether it govern well or ill, and whether it lead in the right way, or in the wrong; for the reſt of the man muſt obey and follow. It governs well, and leads aright, through knowledge of itſelf; if this knowledge infer the knowledge of what is juſt, fair, and good, and if the knowledge of theſe things be the ſcience of rational, right, and good government.—S.

ALC.

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ALC. What is that?

SOC. That of which was ſaid ſome ſuch thing as this,—that in the firſt place we ſhould conſider what is ſelf itſelf: whereas, inſtead of this, we have been conſidering what is the proper ſelf of every man. And this indeed for our purpoſe will perhaps ſuffice. For we could by no means ever ſay that any thing was more peculiarly and properly oneſelf, than is the ſoul.

ALC. Certainly, we could not.

SOC. May we not then fairly thus determine,—that we are converſing one with another, by means of reaſon, you and I, ſoul with ſoul?

ALC. Quite fairly.

SOC. This therefore was our meaning when we ſaid a little before, that Socrates diſcourſed with Alcibiades, making uſe of reaſon: we meant, it ſeems, that he directed his words and arguments, not to your outward perſon, but to Alcibiades himſelf, that is to the ſoul.

ALC. It ſeems ſo to me too.

SOC. He therefore enjoins a man to recogniſe the ſoul, he who gives him this injunction,—to know himſelf.

ALC. That is probably his meaning.

SOC. Whoever then has a knowledge only of his body [1], has indeed attained the knowledge of what is his, but not the knowledge of himſelf.

ALC. Juſt ſo.

SOC. None therefore of the phyſicians, ſo far as he is only a phyſician,

[1] The Greek of this paſſage, in all the editions of Plato, is abſurdly printed thus, ὁστις αρα των του σωματος γιγνωσκει, τα αυτου, αλλ' ουχ' αυτον, εγνωκεν. The firſt member of which ſentence being ungrammatical, Stephens, in the margin of his edition, ſuppoſes may be rectified, either by inſerting the word τι before των, or by changing the των into τα. In either of theſe ways indeed the grammatical conſtruction is amended, but not the ſenſe: for thus repreſented, (and thus repreſented it is by the Latin verſions of Cornarius and Serranus,) it is inconſiſtent with the reaſoning, which requires that the body itſelf ſhould be intended, and not τα (or τι των) του σωματος, the garments, and other external things, or any of them, which are only appertinent to the body. Le Fevre and Dacier ſeem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly therefore rendered it into French by theſe words—*ſon corps*. They were led thus aright by Ficinus, who, in tranſlating this part of the ſentence, uſes only the word *corpus*. Perhaps in the manuſcript from which he tranſlated, he found the right reading, which we conjecture to be this, ὁστις αρα το αυτου σωμα γιγνωσκει, το αυτου, αλλ' ουχ' αυτον, εγνωκεν.—S.

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knows himſelf: neither does any maſter of the exerciſes, ſo far as he is ſuch a maſter and nothing more.

ALC. It ſeems they do not.

SOC. Far from knowing themſelves then are huſbandmen, and other artificers or workmen. For ſuch men as theſe are ignorant it ſeems of the things which are theirs, and knowing only in ſubjects ſtill more remote, the mere appertinences to thoſe things which are theirs, ſo far as their ſeveral arts lead them. For they are acquainted only with things appertinent to the body, to the culture and ſervice of which body theſe things adminiſter.

ALC. What you ſay is true.

SOC. If therefore wiſdom conſiſt in the knowledge of oneſelf, none of theſe artificers are wiſe men by their ſkill in their reſpective arts.

ALC. I think they are not.

SOC. On this account it is that theſe arts ſeem mechanical and mean, and not the learning fit for a man of a virtuous merit.

ALC. Entirely true.

SOC. To return to our ſubject whoever then employs his care in the ſervice of his body, takes care indeed of what is his, but not of himſelf.

ALC. There is danger of its being found ſo.

SOC. And whoever is attentive to the improvement of his wealth, is not taking care either of himſelf or of what is his, but of things ſtill more remote, the mere appertinances to what is his [1].

ALC. It ſeems ſo to me too.

SOC. The man therefore who is intent on getting money, is ſo far not acting for his own advantage.

ALC. Rightly concluded.

SOC. It follows alſo, that whoever was an admirer of the outward perſon of Alcibiades, did not admire Alcibiades, but ſomething which belongs to Alcibiades.

ALC. You ſay what is true.

SOC. But whoever is your admirer is the admirer of your ſoul.

[1] The two preceding notes are referable to this paſſage alſo, where, in the Greek, as printed, the like omiſſion is made of the article τα before των ἑαυτου.—S.

ALC.

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ALC. It appears to follow of neceſſity from our reaſoning.

SOC. And hence it is, that the admirer of your outward perſon, when the flower of it is all fallen, departs and forſakes you.

ALC. So it appears.

SOC. But the admirer of a ſoul departs not, ſo long as that ſoul goes on to improve itſelf.

ALC. Probably ſo.

SOC. I am he then who forſakes you not, but abides by you, when the flower of youth having left you [1], the reſt of your followers have left you and are gone.

ALC. It is kindly done of you, Socrates: and never do you forſake me.

SOC. Exert all your endeavours then to be as excellent a man as poſſible.

ALC. I will do my beſt.

SOC. For the ſtate of your caſe is this:—Alcibiades, the ſon of Clinias, never it ſeems had any admirer, neither has he now, beſides one only, and therefore to be cheriſhed, this Socrates here, the ſon of Sophroniſcus and Phænarete.

ALC. 'Tis true.

SOC. Did you not ſay that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accoſted you; for that you had it in your mind to addreſs me firſt; as you wanted to aſk me, why of all your admirers I was the only one who forſook you not?

ALC. I did ſay ſo: and that was the very caſe.

SOC. This then was the reaſon: 'twas becauſe I was the only perſon who admired you; the others admired that which is yours. That which is yours has already dropt its flower; and the ſpring-ſeaſon of it is paſt: whereas you yourſelf are but beginning to flouriſh. If therefore the Athenian populace corrupt you not, and make you leſs fair, I never ſhall forſake you. But this is what I chiefly fear, that you may come to admire and court the populace, and be corrupted by them, and we ſhould loſe you: ſince many of the Athenians, men of virtuous merit too, have been thus

[1] In the Greek, ληγοντος του σωματος, where the word ανθους ſeems neceſſary to be ſupplied. The ſame metaphor is uſed a few lines further on.—S.

corrupted

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corrupted before now. For the people of magnanimous Erectheus has an outward perſon fair and engaging to behold. But we ought to ſtrip it of all its ſhowy dreſs, and view it naked. Uſe therefore the caution which I give you.

ALC. What caution?

SOC. In the firſt place, my friend, exerciſe yourſelf; and acquire the knowledge of thoſe things which are neceſſary to be learnt by every man who engages in political affairs: but engage not in them until you are thus exerciſed and thus inſtructed: that you may come to them prepared with an antidote, and ſuffer no harm from the poiſon of the populace.

ALC. What you ſay, Socrates, to me ſeems right. But explain, if you can, more clearly, how or in what way we ſhould take care of ourſelves.

SOC. Is not this then ſufficiently clear to us from what has been already ſaid? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed on. Indeed before that point was ſettled we feared leſt we ſhould miſtake it, and imagine that we were taking care of ourſelves, when the object of our care all the while was ſome other thing.

ALC. This is true.

SOC. Upon that it was concluded by both of us that we ought to take care of the ſoul, and that to this we ſhould direct all our attention and regard.

ALC. It was evident.

SOC. And that the care of our bodies and our poſſeſſions ſhould be delivered over to others.

ALC. We could not doubt it.

SOC. In what way then may we attain to know the ſoul itſelf with the greateſt clearneſs? For, when we know this, it ſeems we ſhall know ourſelves. Now, in the name of the Gods, whether are we not ignorant of the right meaning of that Delphic inſcription juſt now mentioned?

ALC. What meaning? What have you in your thoughts, O Socrates! when you aſk this queſtion?

SOC. I will tell you what I ſuſpect that this inſcription means, and what particular thing it adviſes us to do. For a juſt reſemblance of it is, I think, not to be found wherever one pleaſes; but in one only thing, the ſight.

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC.

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Soc. Consider it jointly now with me. Were a man to address himself to the outward human eye, as if it were some other man; and were he to give it this counsel "See yourself;" what particular thing should we suppose that he advised the eye to do? Should we not suppose that 'twas to look at such a thing, as that the eye, by looking at it, might see itself?

Alc. Certainly we should.

Soc. What kind of thing then do we think of, by looking at which we see the thing at which we look, and at the same time see ourselves?

Alc. 'Tis evident, O Socrates, that for this purpose we must look at mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Soc. You are right. And has not the eye itself, with which we see, something of the same kind belonging to it?

Alc. Most certainly it has.

Soc. You have observed, then, that the face of the person who looks in the eye of another person, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror? And we therefore call this the pupil, because it exhibits the image of that person who looks in it.

Alc. What you say is true.

Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking in the most excellent part of it, in that with which it sees, may thus see itself?

Alc. Apparently so.

Soc. But if the eye look at any other part of the man, or at any thing whatever, except what this part of the eye happens to be like, it will not see itself.

Alc. It is true.

Soc. If therefore the eye would see itself, it must look in an eye, and in that place of the eye, too, where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; and the virtue of the eye is sight.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Whether then is it not true, my friend Alcibiades, that the soul[1], if she would know herself, must look at soul, and especially at that place

[1] That is, the whole rational soul.—T.

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in the ſoul in which wiſdom[1], the virtue of the ſoul, is ingenerated; and alſo at whatever elſe this virtue of the ſoul reſembles?

ALC. To me, O Socrates, it ſeems true.

SOC. Do we know of any place in the ſoul more divine than that which is the ſeat of knowledge and intelligence?

ALC. We do not.

SOC. This therefore in the ſoul reſembles the divine nature. And a man, looking at this, and recognizing all that which is divine[2], and God and wiſdom, would thus gain the moſt knowledge of himſelf.

ALC.

[1] According to Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, the being which is wiſe deſires to be full of knowledge, and does not ſeek nor inveſtigate, but poſſeſſes the intelligible, or, in other words, the proper object of intellectual viſion. But according to Socrates, in the Republic, wiſdom is generative of truth and intellect: and from the Theætetus it appears to be that which gives perfection to things imperfect, and calls forth the latent intellections of the ſoul. From hence, it is evident that wiſdom, according to Plato, is full of real being and truth, is generative of intellectual truth, and is perfective according to energy of intellectual natures. In this place, therefore, Plato, with great propriety, and conſiſtently with the above definition, calls wiſdom the virtue of the ſoul. For the different virtues are the ſources of different perfection to the ſoul, and wiſdom, the higheſt virtue, is the perfection of our ſupreme part, intellect.—T.

[2] Proclus on Plato's Theology, lib. 1. cap. 3, p. 7. beautifully obſerves as follows on this paſſage: "Socrates, in the Alcibiades, rightly obſerves that the ſoul entering into herſelf will behold all other things, and deity itſelf. For, verging to her own union, and to the centre of all life, laying aſide multitude, and the variety of the all manifold powers which ſhe contains, ſhe aſcends to the higheſt watch-tower of beings. And as, in the moſt holy of myſteries[3], they ſay that the myſtics at firſt meet with the multiform and many-ſhaped genera[4], which are hurled forth before the gods, but on entering the interior parts of the temple, unmoved, and guarded by the myſtic rites, they genuinely receive in their boſom divine illumination, and diveſted of their garments, as they ſay, participate of a divine nature; the ſame mode, as it appears to me, takes place in the ſpeculation of wholes[5]. For the ſoul, when looking at things poſterior to herſelf, beholds only the ſhadows and images of beings; but when ſhe turns to herſelf, ſhe evolves her own eſſence, and the reaſons which ſhe contains. And at firſt, indeed,

[3] Viz. in the Eleuſinian myſteries; for thus he elſewhere denominates theſe myſteries.

[4] Meaning evil dæmons; for the aſſuming a variety of ſhapes is one of the characteriſtics of ſuch dæmons.

[5] By the term *wholes*, in the Platonic philoſophy, every incorporeal order of being, and every mundane ſphere, are ſignified.

ſhe

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ALC. It is apparent.

SOC. And to know oneſelf, we acknowledge to be wiſdom.

ALC. By all means.

[[1] SOC. Shall we not ſay, therefore, that as mirrors are clearer, purer, and more ſplendid than that which is analogous to a mirror in the eye, in like manner God is purer and more ſplendid than that which is beſt in our ſoul?

ALC. It is likely, Socrates.

SOC. Looking therefore at God, we ſhould make uſe of him as the moſt beautiful mirror, and among human concerns we ſhould look at the virtue of the ſoul; and thus, by ſo doing, ſhall we not eſpecially ſee and know our very ſelves?

ALC. Yes.]

SOC. If then we are not wiſe, but are ignorant of ourſelves, can we know what our good is, and what our evil?

ALC. How is it poſſible that we ſhould, Socrates?

SOC. For perhaps it appears impoſſible for a man who knows not Alcibiades himſelf, to know any thing which relates to Alcibiades, as having that relation.

ALC. Impoſſible it is, by Jupiter.

ſhe only, as it were, beholds herſelf; but when ſhe penetrates more profoundly in the knowledge of herſelf, ſhe finds in herſelf both intellect and the orders of beings. But when ſhe proceeds into her interior receſſes, and into the adytum, as it were, of the ſoul, ſhe perceives, with her eyes nearly cloſed, the genus of the gods, and the unities of beings. For all things reſide in us according to the peculiarity of ſoul; and through this we are naturally capable of knowing all things, by exciting the powers and the images of wholes which we contain."—T.

[1] The words within the brackets are from Stobæus, Serm. 21. p. 183., from whom it appears that they ought to be inſerted in this place, though this omiſſion has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato. The original is as follows: Αρ' ὥσπερ κατοπτρα σαφεστερα εστι του εν τῳ οφθαλμῳ ενοπτρου και καθαρωτερα τε και λαμπροτερα, ὀυτω και ὁ Θεος του εν τῃ ἡμετερᾳ ψυχῃ βελτιστου, καθαρωτερον τε, και λαμπροτερον τυγχανει ων; Εοικε γε ω Σωκρατες. Εις τον Θεον αρα βλεποντες εκεινῳ καλλιστῳ ενοπτρῳ χρωμεθ' αν, και των ανθρωπινων εις την ψυχης αρετην, και ὀυτως αν μαλιστα ουκ ἰδοιμεν και γιγνωσκοιμεν ἡμας αυτους; Ναι. The intelligent reader needs not, I truſt, be told, that, without this uncommonly beautiful paſſage, the dialogue is defective in its moſt eſſential part.—T.

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Soc. Neither then can any thing which is our own, be known by us to be our own, any other way than through the knowledge of ourſelves.

Alc. How ſhould we?

Soc. And if we know not that which is ours, neither can we know any of the appertinences to what is ours.

Alc. It appears we cannot.

Soc. We therefore were not at all right in admitting, as we did juſt now, that certain perſons there were, who knew not themſelves, but who knew what belonged to them, and was theirs. Neither can ſuch as know not themſelves know the appertinences to what is theirs. For it ſeems, that 'tis the province of one and the ſame perſon, and is from one and the ſame ſcience, to know himſelf, to know the things which are his, and to know the appertinences to thoſe things.

Alc. I believe it will be found ſo.

Soc. And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himſelf and is his own, muſt be likewiſe ignorant of what belongs to other men and is theirs.

Alc. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And if he is ignorant of what belongs to other men, will he not be ignorant alſo of what belongs to the public, and to other civil ſtates?

Alc. He muſt be ſo.

Soc. Such a man, therefore, cannot be a politician.

Alc. Certainly he cannot.

Soc. Neither will he be fit to manage a family.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor will he have any certain knowledge of any thing which he is doing.

Alc. He will not.

Soc. And will not the man who knows not what he is doing, do amiſs?

Alc. Certainly ſo.

Soc. And doing amiſs, will he not act ill, both as a private perſon, and as a member of the public?

Alc. No doubt of it.

Soc. And the man who acts ill, is he not in a bad condition?

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ALC. A very bad one.

SOC. And in what condition will they be who have an intereſt in his conduct?

ALC. In a very bad one they too.

SOC. It is not poſſible therefore that any man ſhould be happy if he be not wiſe and good.

ALC. It is not poſſible.

SOC. Thoſe then who are bad men are in a bad condition.

ALC. A very bad one indeed.

SOC. Not even by riches therefore is a man delivered out of a miſerable condition; nor by any other thing than wiſdom and virtue.

ALC. Apparently ſo.

SOC. Fortifications therefore, and ſhipping, and harbours, will be of no avail to the happineſs of any civil ſtates; neither will the multitude of their people, nor the extent of their territories; if they want virtue.

ALC. Of none at all.

SOC. If then you would manage the affairs of the city well and rightly, you muſt impart virtue to the citizens.

ALC. Beyond queſtion.

SOC. But can a man impart to others that which he has not himſelf?

ALC. How ſhould he?

SOC. You yourſelf therefore in the firſt place ſhould acquire virtue, as ſhould alſo every other man who has any thoughts of governing, and managing, not himſelf only, and his own private affairs, but the people alſo, and the affairs of the public.

ALC. True.

SOC. Not arbitrary power therefore, nor command, ought you to procure, neither for yourſelf nor for the city, but juſtice and prudence.

ALC. It is evident.

SOC. For, if ye act juſtly and prudently, your own conduct, and that of the city too, will be pleaſing unto God.

ALC. 'Tis highly probable.

SOC. And ye will thus act, by looking, as we ſaid before, at that which is divine and ſplendid.

ALC.

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ALC. Evidently ſo.

SOC. And, further, by directing your ſight hither, ye will behold and know what is your own good.

ALC. True.

SOC. Will ye not then act both rightly and well?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And acting thus I will inſure happineſs both to yourſelf and to the city.

ALC. You will be a ſafe inſurer.

SOC. But acting unjuſtly, as looking to that which is without God, and dark, 'tis highly probable that ye will perform actions ſimilar to what ye behold, actions dark and atheiſtical, as being ignorant of yourſelves.

ALC. In all probability that would be the caſe.

SOC. For, O my friend Alcibiades! if a man have the power of doing what he pleaſes, and at the ſame time want intellect, what will be the probable conſequence of ſuch arbitrary power, to himſelf, if he is a private perſon, and to the ſtate alſo, if he governs it? As in the caſe of a bodily diſeaſe, if the ſick perſon, without having medical knowledge, had the power of doing what he pleaſed, and if he tyrannized ſo as that no perſon would dare to reprove him, what would be the conſequence? Would it not be, in all probability, the deſtruction of his body?

ALC. It would indeed.

SOC. And in the affair of a ſea voyage, if a man, void of the knowledge and ſkill belonging to a ſea commander, had the power of acting and directing in the veſſel as he thought proper, do you conceive what would be the conſequence, both to himſelf and to the companions of his voyage?

ALC. I do; that they would all be loſt.

SOC. Is it otherwiſe then in the adminiſtration of the ſtate, or in any offices of command or power? If virtue be wanting in the perſons who are appointed to them, will not the conſequence be an evil and deſtructive conduct?

ALC. It muſt.

SOC. Arbitrary power, then, my noble Alcibiades! is not the thing which you are to aim at procuring,—neither for yourſelf, nor yet for the

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commonwealth; but virtue, if you mean either your own private happineſs or that of the public.

ALC. True.

SOC. And before one acquires virtue, it is better to be under good government than it is to govern,—better not only for a child, but for a man.

ALC. Evidently ſo.

SOC. Is not that which is better, more beautiful alſo?

ALC. It is.

SOC. And is not that which is more beautiful, more becoming[1]?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. It becomes a bad man therefore to be a ſlave: for it is better for him ſo to be.

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. Vice therefore is a thing ſervile, and becoming only to the condition of a ſlave.

ALC. Clearly.

SOC. And virtue is a thing liberal, and becoming to a gentleman.

ALC. It is.

SOC. Ought we not, my friend, to ſhun every thing which is ſervile, and becoming only to a ſlave?

ALC. The moſt of all things, O Socrates!

SOC. Are you ſenſible of the preſent ſtate of your own mind? Do you find it liberal, and ſuch as becomes a gentleman, or not?

ALC. I think I am very fully ſenſible of what it is.

SOC. Do you know then, by what means you may eſcape from that condition in which you are now,—not to name what it is, when it happens to be the caſe of a man of honour?

ALC. I do.

SOC. By what?

ALC. Through you, Socrates, if you pleaſe.

SOC. That is not well ſaid, Alcibiades!

ALC. What ought I then to ſay?

SOC. You ought to ſay, If God pleaſes.

[1] See the Greater Hippias.—S.

ALC.

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ALC. I adopt thoſe words then for my own. And I ſhall add to them theſe further;—that we ſhall be in danger, Socrates, of changing parts,—I of aſſuming yours,—and you of bearing mine. For it is not poſſible for me to avoid the following you every where from this day forward, with as much aſſiduity as if I was your guardian,—and you my pupil.

SOC. My friendſhip then for you, noble Alcibiades! may be compared juſtly to a ſtork; if, having hatched in your heart, and there cheriſhed, a winged love, it is afterwards to be by this love, in return, cheriſhed and ſupported.

ALC. And this you will find to be the very caſe: for I ſhall begin from henceforward to cultivate the ſcience of juſtice.

SOC. I wiſh you may perſevere. But I am terribly afraid for you: not that I in the leaſt diſtruſt the goodneſs of your diſpoſition; but perceiving the torrent of the times, I fear you may be borne away with it, in ſpite of your own reſiſtance, and of my endeavours in your aid.

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