- let $\alpha(\kappa, n, \rho, \Delta) = 1 - (1 - p(\kappa))^{(1-\rho)n}$. That is, α is the probability that *some* honest player succeeds in mining a block in a round;

- let $\beta(\kappa, n, \rho, \Delta) = \rho n p(\kappa)$. That is β is the expected number blocks that an attacker can mine in a round.

- let $\gamma(\kappa, n, \rho, \Delta) = \frac{\alpha}{1+\Delta\alpha}$. γ is a "discounted" version of α which takes into account the fact that messages sent by honest parties can be delayed by Δ rounds and this may lead to honest players "redoing work"; γ corresponds to their "effective" mining power.