Ir v vs. Comp.

has a beautiful theory ("true NPV") behind it. It lentifies for you exactly what matters (the expected iture cash flows) and how differently timed cash ows matter in different ways (through the discount ate). The theory even gives you the exact relationship etween various estimated inputs and your final neasures (the present value formula). To the extent nat you can reach the ideals of the theory—finding ood expected cash flow and discount rate estimates ou know that your valuation is accurate! Disadvantage: First, your input estimates—especially our expected cash flow estimates—can be far off om the truth. Second, there is no objective standard or your estimates, and a third party cannot verify

omp. Its main disadvantage is that it is much more addenominators can take on negative values. oc: You have to make two important judgment calls. irst, what is a good comparable firm? Second, what hould you use as the appropriate valuation attribute? et one advantage of comparable is that the inputs can the value of equity today or in the future. e more objective and more verifiable than those for IPV. analysts rarely agree on what firms are ppropriate comparable and what attribute fits best. uch disagreement can create different subjective stimates, too, and thereby void the objectivity dvantage.

D/TA is not a good measure of leverage. TA includes D and NFL, numerator should include it as well. liggest determinant of market-based leverage ratio hange: The debt part seldom change year to year ompared to equity. It only changed drastically when suing or retiring a debt. Thus, the biggest eterminant of market-based leverage ratio changes is auity.

legative book value of equity: Theoretically, negative hareholder equity means the stockholders owe money tut realistically, common stockholders are protected om such a liability by the corporate structure of ublicly traded companies. When shareholder equity is Financial distress costs usually favor equity over debt egative, it's often due to the accounting methods used as a cheaper financing vehicle. ) deal with accumulated losses in previous years. onvertible debt like debt when OTM, equity ITM. When target is undervalued, combined firm add value. istead of using average P/E, 1, Ignore non positive E. , Use median. 3, Average E/P. 4, P/E = (sum P)/(sum behalf of the overall firm but on behalf of equity can

o take care of long-term accruals in the conversion om net income into cash flows, undo the ne capital expense. Do not use depreciation or mortization figures from the income statement to ndo the accounting adjustments for capital expenses. hese figures are incomplete. You must use the epreciation figures from the cash-flow statement. eading both net income and depreciation off the ncome statement is not only wrong, but also a ommon mistake. To take care of short-term accruals 1 the conversion from net income into cash flows. ndo the smoothing—subtract changes in net working financing, even if this is not value-maximizing. apital. (Equivalently, you can add decreases in net orking capital.)

roject cash flows (CF) are due to financial creditors nd shareholders together and are computed as roject Cash Flow = Cash Flow from Operating ctivity+Cash Flow from Investing Activity+(Net) iterest Expense

quity cash flows (CF) are available only to levered quity (i.e., the company's shareholders): Equity Cash low = Project Cash Flow

Net Issuance of Debt – Interest Expense alance sheet stock numbers are often inaccurate as neasures of true values. This applies especially to the ook value of equity. In turn, it applies, to a lesser xtent, to the book value of assets. The most reliable

ngures on the balance sneet are often cash and shortterm instrument assets and financial-debt liability

It is the law of one price that ultimately gives you a value estimate. In theory, companies with the same correct attributes should have the same value. In practice, companies with similar relevant attributes should have similar values.

All else equal, the price-earnings ratio is higher for firms with more future enings more future earnings growth

Unlike market betas and costs of capital, priceearnings ratios cannot be value-weighted and averaged. Mergers can change P/E ratios even if they do not create value.

Ratios intrinsically never make sense when

The basis of optimal capital structure theory is the insight that entrepreneurs want to maximize the value of the firm in an upfront sale today, and not necessarily

The Modigliani-Miller propositions state that in a perfect world, the value of a firm is independent of how it is financed. Instead, it is the underlying projects that determine the value of the firm.

$$w_{Equity} \cdot \mathsf{E}(r_{Equity}) + w_{Debt} \cdot \mathsf{E}(r_{Debt}) \cdot (1-\tau)$$
  
The adjusted present value (APV) formula computes an "as-if-all-equity-financed" PV (i.e., after

orporate income tax) and then adds back the tax subsidy:

APV = Value as if Firm is 100% Equity-Financed and Fully Taxed

f the project lasts for only one period (and omitting tedious and obvious time subscripts), this

$$APV Today = \frac{\mathsf{E}(\mathsf{FutureC})}{1 + \mathsf{E}(\mathsf{r}_{\mathsf{Firm}})} + \frac{\frac{\mathsf{Tax Shield}}{\mathsf{Interest Payment}}}{1 + \mathsf{E}(\tau \cdot \mathsf{r}_{\mathsf{Debt}} \cdot \mathsf{Debt})}$$

$$1 + \mathsf{E}(\mathsf{r}_{\mathsf{Debt}})$$

The  $1 + \mathsf{E}(\mathsf{r}_{\mathsf{Debt}})$  cost of capital in the second term may or may not be correct. However, because he second term is small, it rarely makes much difference whether you discount with E(rFirr or E(r<sub>Debt</sub>).

prporate and personal taxes that can be avoided provide cash that the owners can keep educing the total taxes ultimately collected by Uncle Sam (now and in the future) a ither the corporate or the personal level can increase the value of the firm to its owners

Ex-post reluctance to take the right projects (such as making additional maintenance investments) can favor equity over debt as the cheaper financing vehicle. Expost reluctance to liquidate by managers not acting on favor equity over debt as the cheaper financing vehicle. Ex-post reluctance to liquidate by managers not acting on behalf of the overall firm but on behalf of agent's own interests. Thus, conflict occurs between moothing—add back the depreciation and subtract outhernselves can favor debt over equity as the cheaper financing vehicle. Debt can force them to liquidate which can be a good move ex-ante.

Competitive product-market environments could favor either equity or debt.

The need to control free cash flow and agency problems favors debt over equity as the cheaper financing vehicle.

Uncontrolled free cash flow and agency concerns can nean that firms end up having more equity than debt

- The firm later undertakes riskier projects.
- The firm adds more debt of equal or higher priority.

reditors demand higher interest rates if they fear such expropriation. Thus, it is in the nterest of the owners to assure creditors that they will not do so. The prime mechanic o allay bondholder fears are

- Loan covenants
- Reputation

The presence of inside information concerns (investors fearing the worst) favors debt over equity as the cheaper financing vehicle.

Transaction cost considerations could favor either debt or equity. Behavioral considerations could favor either

Capital structure can have dramatic value influences for firms that are (a) considering drastic changes in

ineir capitai structure (e.g., as in a private ouyout); (o) close to financial distress; and (c) very highly levered. (For example, many banks routinely operate with liabilities-to-assets ratios above 90%. Any mishap can be catastrophic.)

Naïve APV or WACC use can give the distorted impression that the firm's cost of capital always decreases with leverage. It is important that you adjust the cost-of-capital terms in the formula to take into account all the other capital-structure benefits and costs, too.

Interaction effects can make it difficult to adjust capital structure optimally in the future. Future adjustment costs can favor a more flexible capital structure (more equity and financial slack) today.

	EBIT	+\$35	+\$10
$\sim$	Depreciation	+\$25	+\$50
_"	(–)Capital Expenditures	+(-\$75)	+(-\$75)
+ )	(+)Corporate Income Tax	-(+\$14)	-(+\$2)
= ,	Cash Flow, Project, After Tax	-\$29	-\$17
	Net Income	+\$21	+\$3
+	Depreciation	+\$25	+\$50
+"_	(–)Capital Expenditures	+(-\$75)	+(-\$75)
+	Interest Expense	+\$0	+\$5
=	Cash Flow, <mark>Project</mark> , After Tax	-\$29	-\$17
	EBIT		+\$35
+	Depreciation		+\$25
+"	(–)Capital Expenditures		+(-\$75)
_	Corporate Income Tax		-\$14
=	Cash Flow, Project	1	-\$29
$+^{\times}$	Net Debt Issue		+\$50
ĘO	Interest Expense		\$0
=	Cash Flow, Levered Equity Ownership		+\$21
	Net Income	13	+\$21
4	Depreciation		+\$25
ι_,,	(–)Capital Expenditures		+(-\$75)
+	Net Debt Issue		+\$50
	<del></del>	-0 <sup>y</sup>	-
=	Cash Flow, Levered Equity Ownership		+\$21
Δ σe	ncy problem: This conflict aris	es when s	enarate

Agency problem: This conflict arises when separate parties in a business relationship, such as a corporation's managers and shareholders, or principals and agents, have disparate interests. Agents, working as employees, are assumed and obligated to serve the principal's best interests. Problems occur when the agent begins serving different interests, such as the the interests of principals and agents when each party has different motivations, or incentives exist that place the two parties at odds with each other.

Earnings after Interest before Taxes ( = Net Income + Tax ) Interest Expense

- Corporate Income Tax
- Net Operating Profit
- Changes in Deferred Taxes
- Depreciation
- Gross Cash Flow
- Capital Expenditures
- Changes in Working Capital (e.g. payables )
- Investment in Goodwill
- Miscellanious Increases in Other Assets
- Free Cash Flow from Operations
- Acquisition and Divestitures
- Short-Term Investments
- Miscellaneous Investing
- Project Firm Cash Flow to Debt + Equity
- Net Issuance of Debt
- Interest Expense
- Project Firm Cash Flow to Equity