


Don't fear the unlabelled: safe deep semi-supervised learning via simple debiasing



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Motivation for Semi-supervised learning.

- Unlabelled data are cheap: $\{(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_{n_l}, y_{n_l})\}$
- Labelled data can be hard to get: $\{x_{n_l+1}, \dots, x_{n_l+n_u}\}$

Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) i.e. y being missing is independent of x .

The complete case

$$\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{CC}(\theta) = \frac{1}{n_l} \sum_{i=1}^{n_l} L(\theta; x_i, y_i) \quad (1)$$

→ Under MCAR unbiased \Rightarrow learning theory + asymptotic statistics.


Safeness: A SSL algorithm is safe if it has theoretical guarantees that are similar to or stronger than the complete case baseline.

Including unlabelled data

$$\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{SSL}(\theta) = \frac{1}{n_l} \sum_{i=1}^{n_l} L(\theta; x_i, y_i) + \frac{\lambda}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n H(\theta; x_i) \quad (2)$$

- Entropy minimization: $H(\theta; x_i) = -\sum f_\theta(x)_k \log(f_\theta(x)_k)$.
- Consistency based: $H(\theta; x_i) = \text{Div}(f_\theta(x), f_\theta(\text{pert}(x)))$.
- Pseudo-label: $H(\theta; x_i) = -\begin{cases} \log(\max f_\theta(x)_k) & \text{if } \max f_\theta(x)_k > \tau \\ 0 & \text{elsewhere.} \end{cases}$

SSL failure on a toy example



- No **safeness** guarantees even under strong assumptions (domain-specific data augmentations; manifold, low-density or cluster assumption).
- **Biased** risk estimator \Rightarrow learning theory does not hold.
- No asymptotic **consistency** \Rightarrow fail even with an infinite amount of labelled data points

DeSSL: unbiased under MCAR

$$\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{DeSSL}(\theta) = \frac{1}{n_l} \sum_{i=1}^{n_l} L(\theta; x_i, y_i) + \frac{\lambda}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n H(\theta; x_i) - \frac{\lambda}{n_l} \sum_{i=1}^{n_l} H(\theta; x_i) \quad (3)$$

Is $\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{DeSSL}(\theta)$ an accurate risk estimate?

Theorem 1 The function $\lambda \mapsto \mathbb{V}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{DeSSL}(\theta)|r)$ reaches its minimum for:

$$\lambda_{opt} = \frac{\text{Cov}(L(\theta; x, y), H(\theta; x))}{\mathbb{V}(H(\theta; x))} \quad (4)$$

and

$$\mathbb{V}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{DeSSL}(\theta))|_{\lambda_{opt}} = \left(1 - \frac{n_u}{n} \rho_{L,H}^2\right) \mathbb{V}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{CC}(\theta)) \leq \mathbb{V}(\hat{\mathcal{R}}_{CC}(\theta)). \quad (5)$$

But wait! There is more:

Calibration If the original loss is a proper scoring rule, then DeSSL is also a proper scoring rule.

Consistency Under usual regularity conditions of M-estimators for both L and H , $\hat{\theta} = \arg \min \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{DeSSL}$ is asymptotically consistent with respect to n .

Generalisation error bounds If L and H are bounded, DeSSL benefits of generalisation error bounds based on the Rademacher complexity.

Asymptotic normality Under usual conditions on L , H and the risk $\mathcal{R}(\theta)$, DeSSL is asymptotically normal. Its asymptotic variance can be optimised in λ and is smaller than the complete case's variance at its optimum.


Interpretation of DeSSL

- Debiasing of the SSL risk loss
- Control variates (variance reduction techniques)
- Lagrangian of the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\theta} \quad & \hat{\mathcal{R}}_{CC}(\theta) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n H(\theta; x_i) = \frac{1}{n_l} \sum_{i=1}^{n_l} H(\theta; x_i) \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

- Regularization of the model's confidence on the labelled
- Debiasing with the labelled is optimal regarding the variance

Pseudo-label on CIFAR-10 ($n_l = 4000$)



Fixmatch on CIFAR-10 ($n_l = 4000$)

| | Complete Case | Fixmatch | DeFixmatch |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Accuracy | 87.27 ± 0.25 | 93.87 ± 0.13 | 95.44 ± 0.10 |
| Worst class accuracy | 70.08 ± 0.93 | 82.25 ± 2.27 | 87.16 ± 0.46 |
| Cross-entropy | 0.60 ± 0.01 | 0.27 ± 0.01 | 0.20 ± 0.01 |

Disparate effect of SSL ($n_l = 4000$)

| | Complete Case | Fixmatch | DeFixmatch | | |
|------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|
| | Accuracy | Accuracy | \mathcal{BR} | Accuracy | \mathcal{BR} |
| airplane | 86.94 | 95.94 | 0.88 | 96.62 | 0.94 |
| automobile | 95.26 | 97.54 | 0.68 | 98.22 | 0.89 |
| bird | 80.46 | 90.80 | 0.68 | 92.64 | 0.80 |
| cat | 70.08 | 82.50 | 0.56 | 87.16 | 0.78 |
| deer | 88.88 | 95.86 | 0.78 | 97.26 | 0.94 |
| dog | 79.66 | 87.16 | 0.53 | 90.98 | 0.81 |
| frog | 93.12 | 97.84 | 0.80 | 98.62 | 0.94 |
| horse | 90.96 | 96.94 | 0.83 | 97.64 | 0.92 |
| ship | 94.12 | 97.26 | 0.67 | 98.06 | 0.84 |
| truck | 93.18 | 96.82 | 0.84 | 97.20 | 0.93 |

Benefit ratio, \mathcal{BR} = the impact of SSL on a class

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