











# O-RAN的資安威脅,以Near-RT RIC為例

CVE-2023-40997 & 40998

CVE-2023-41627

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# **Agenda**

- 5G/O-RAN Architecture
- Near-RT RIC & xApps
- What is RMR
- Three Vulnerabilities in Near-RT RIC
- How was it discovered




# **O-RAN Architecture**

SMO / Near-RT RIC / RAN



















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


# **Near-RT RIC & xApps**

How it works











## **Near-RT RIC Application**

**xApp**: An application designed to run on the Near-RT RIC. Such an application is likely to consist of one or more microservices and at the point of on-boarding will identify which data it consumes and which data it provides. The application is independent of the Near-RT RIC and may be provided by any third party. The E2 enables a direct association between the xApp and the RAN functionality [19].









## **Near-RT RIC Application**

- 6.2.7 Interface Termination
- 6.2.7.1 E2 Termination

This functionality enables termination of E2 interface with the following:

- Terminating SCTP connection from each E2 Node;←
- Routing messages from xApps through the SCTP connection to an E2 Node;←
- Decoding the payload of an incoming ASN.1 message enough to determine message type;
- Handling incoming E2 messages related to E2 connectivity;
- Receiving and responding to the E2 Setup Request from an E2 Node;
- Notifying xApps of the list of RAN functions supported by an E2 Node based on information derived from the E2 Setup and RIC Service Update procedures [3];
- Notifying the newly connected E2 Node of the list of accepted functions.



# What is RMR

Messaging infrastructure




## **Messaging Infrastructure**

- It supports registration/discovery/deletion of endpoints
- It provides the following APIs:
  - An API for sending messages to the messaging infrastructure.
  - An API for receiving messages from the messaging infrastructure.
- It supports multiple messaging modes, e.g., point-to-point mode (e.g., message exchange among endpoints), publish/subscribe mode (e.g., real-time data dispatching from E2 termination to multiple subscriber xApps).
- It provides message routing, namely according to the message routing information, messages can be dispatched to different endpoints.
- It supports message robustness to avoid data loss during a messaging infrastructure outage/restart or to release resources from the messaging infrastructure once a message is outdated.



### **RMR Work Process**





#### **RMR Table Format**

#### [ric-app/ts.git] / routes.txt

```
1 newrt|start
2 rte|20011|service-ricplt-a1mediator-rmr:10000
3 rte|30000|service-ricxapp-qp.ricxapp.svc.cluster.local:4562
4 rte|30004|service-ricxapp-ad-rmr:4560
5 newrt|end
```

#### [ric-app/qp.git] / tests / fixtures / local.rt

```
1 # static route table to direct messages sent by mock QP xApp
2 newrt|start
3 rte|30002|service-ricxapp-trafficxapp-rmr.ricxapp.svc.cluster.local:4560
4 newrt|end
```


"ric\_app\_qp"



# **Vulnerability in Near-RT RIC**

The first publicly disclosed CVE on O-RAN CVE-2023-40997 & 40998







### **O-RAN CVEs**

There are 11 CVE Records that match your search.


CVE-2023-40997

There are 22 eve records that match your search.	
Name	Description
CVE-2024-34048	O-RAN RIC I-Release e2mgr lacks array size checks in E2nodeConfigUpdateNotificationHandler.
CVE-2024-34047	O-RAN RIC I-Release e2mgr lacks array size checks in RicServiceUpdateHandler.
CVE-2024-34046	The O-RAN E2T I-Release Prometheus metric Increment function can crash in sctpThread.cpp for message.peerInfo->sctpParams->e2tCounters[IN_SUCC]
CVE-2024-34045	The O-RAN E2T I-Release Prometheus metric Increment function can crash in sctpThread.cpp for message.peerInfo->counters[IN_INITI][MSG_COUNTER][
CVE-2024-34044	The O-RAN E2T I-Release buildPrometheusList function can have a NULL pointer dereference because peerInfo can be NULL.
CVE-2024-34043	O-RAN RICAPP kpimon-go I-Release has a segmentation violation via a certain E2AP-PDU message.
CVE-2023-42358	An issue was discovered in O-RAN Software Community ric-plt-e2mgr in the G-Release environment, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (I
CVE-2023-41628	An issue in O-RAN Software Community E2 G-Release allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by incorrectly initiating the messaging procedure
CVE-2023-41627	O-RAN Software Community ric-plt-lib-rmr v4.9.0 does not validate the source of the routing tables it receives, potentially allowing attackers to send forge
CVE-2023-40998	Buffer Overflow vulnerability in O-RAN Software Community ric-plt-lib-rmr v.4.9.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the packet size

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in O-RAN Software Community ric-plt-lib-rmr v.4.9.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted packed




# **Negative Packet Size in RMR**





## **Negative Packet Size in RMR**






### **Negative Packet Size in RMR**

```
1298508/RMR [DBUG] ====== data callback top of loop bidx=0 msize=0 ipt=0 remain=2314
1298508/RMR [DBUG] need 9
1298508/RMR [DBUG] river->ipt 0
1298508/RMR [DBUG] extract msg len converted from net order to: 2314
1298508/RMR [DBUG] data callback setting msg size: 2314
1298508/RMR [DBUG] data callback enough in the buffer size=2314 need=2314 remain=2314 flgs=00
1298508/RMR [DBUG] ##### data callback finished
```





# **Incorrect RMR Format Parsing**






# **Incorrect RMR Format Parsing**

```
0x00007fcaba4c86c7 in buf2mbuf (ctx=0x23e4f30, raw msg=0x7fcaac001420 "\346\271", msg_size=263566, sender fd=18)
    at /w/workspace/ric-plt-lib-rmr-rt-cmake-packagecloud-stage-master/src/rmr/si/src/mt_call_si_static.c:96
warning: Source file is more recent than executable.
96
                                        if( (call id = (unsigned int) d1[D1 CALLID IDX]) == 0 ) {
t set, just queue
[Current thread is 1 (Thread 0x7fcab54ef700 (LWP 4038311))]
(gdb) bt
   0x00007fcaba4c86c7 in buf2mbuf (ctx=0x23e4f30, raw_msg=0x7fcaac001420 "\346\271", msg_size=263566, sender_fd=18)
    at /w/workspace/ric-plt-lib-rmr-rt-cmake-packagecloud-stage-master/src/rmr/si/src/mt call si static.c:96
#1 0x00007fcaba4c8bad in mt data cb (vctx=0x23e4f30, fd=18,
    buf=0x2405070 "tainer for the EPC connected deployment\001\001\001\001", buflen=6634)
    at /w/workspace/ric-plt-lib-rmr-rt-cmake-packagecloud-stage-master/src/rmr/si/src/mt call si static.c:269
#2 0x00007fcaba4ce3bf in SIwait (gptr=0x2404ea0)
    at /w/workspace/ric-plt-lib-rmr-rt-cmake-packagecloud-stage-master/src/rmr/si/src/si95/siwait.c:126
#3 0x00007fcaba4c8e38 in mt receive (vctx=0x23e4f30)
    at /w/workspace/ric-plt-lib-rmr-rt-cmake-packagecloud-stage-master/src/rmr/si/src/mt call si static.c:370
#4 0x00007fcab9f6f609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477
    0x00007fcabab53133 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95
```



# **Incorrect RMR Format Parsing**

```
1. Parse the packet and get the header
ref_tpbuf( mbuf, msg_size );
hdr = mbut->header;
                                  // call generated message; ignore call-id etc and queue
if( hdr->flags & HFL CALL MSG ) {
   queue_normal( ctx, mbuf );
} else {
   if( RMR_D1_LEN( hdr ) <= 0 ) {
                                                                         // no call-id data; just queue
       queue_normal( ctx, mbuf );
    } else {
                              2. Calculate memory address
       d1 = DATA1_ADDR( hdr );
       if( (call_id = (unsigned int) d1[D1_CALLID_IDX] == 0 ) {
           queue normal( ctx, mbuf );
                                           3. illegal access
       } else {
           chute = &ctx->chutes[call id];
           chute->mbuf = mbuf;
           sem post( &chute->barrier );
                                                     // the call function can vet xaction id in their own thread
```






# **Vulnerability in Near-RT RIC**

CVE-2023-41627




# **Route Table Spoofing**



# How was it discovered?


Parser & Fuzzer








### E2AP








#### xAPP collection information from E2 nodes via KPM E2SM

```
plmnID
sliceID
fiveQI
qFI
qCI
qCImax
qCImin
aRPmax
aRPmin
bitrateRange
layerMU-MIMO
sUM
distBinX
distBinY
distBinZ
preLabelOverride
startEndInd
min
max
avg
ssbIndex
nonGoB-BFmode-Index
mIMO-mode-Index
gBR
aMBR
isStat
isCatM
rSRP
rSRQ
ul-rSRP
cQI
fiveQI
qCI
Cell Global ID
```





UE ID



Thank You.

