


# Secure Vault全面提升Matter 物聯網設備安全性

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# Agenda

- Matter Overview and Update
- Matter Secure Commissioning
- Matter Security Requirements
- Matter Secure Manufacturing
- Secure Vault and Summary



# **Smart Home Dilemma – Connected Lock Example**



O Zigbee O Z-Wave O Bluetooth O Wi-Fi

### Smart Home Dilemma

- Multiple Ecosystems available
- Devices often tied to one Ecosystem
- Requires different products, apps and hubs

### Manufacturers

- Manufacturers are forced to pick ecosystem(s)
- Need to ship multiple SKUs for connectivity standards
- Need to learn different IoT technologies and ecosystems

### Retailers

- Leads to duplicate products on the shelf
- Difficult to provide expert advice to consumer questions
- High return rates due to interoperability or incompatibility

### Consumers

- Purchasing confusion
- Hard to mix and match the products they want
- Difficult to change Ecosystems



## **Matter's Vision**

### Consumers


- More consistent set up experience
- Multi –Admin works across & with multiple ecosystems

## **Developers**

- Develop once / deploy everywhere
- Community of support

### Retailers

- Simplified purchasing experience
- Minimized returns




**Simplicity** 

Easy to purchase and use



Reliability

Consistent and responsive local connectivity



**Interoperability** 

Devices from multiple brands work natively together




**Security** 

Robust and streamlined for developers and users




# **Matter High Level Components**



- Common application layer + data model
  - Interoperability, simplified setup & control
- IP-based
  - Convergence layer across all compatible networks
- Secure
  - Requires certificates and device attestation
- Open-source development approach
  - Based on market-proven technologies
- Common Protocol across device and mobile
  - IP interface enables direct cloud connectivity as well
- Low overhead
  - MCU-class compute, <192KB RAM,</li>
     <1MB Flash</li>

# **Matter Network Topology**





- Native support for Wi-Fi and Thread
- Bluetooth LE is used as the commissioning channel
- Thread devices connect to other IP networks through border routers
- Bridges can link to other protocols like Zigbee and Z-Wave

# **Matter Device Types (November 2023)**

### **Certifiable Today**

Category	Device Types	
Lights	On/Off, Dimmable Color	
Actuators	On/Off Plug, Dimmable Plug, Pump	
Heating/Cooling Unit	Air Conditioners, Mini-splits, Thermostats, Air Purifiers, Fan	
Switches	On/Off, Dimmer, Color Dimmer	
Sensors	Contact, Light, Occupancy, Temperature, Pressure Flow, Humidity, On/Off, Air Quality, Smoke & CO Alarm	
Access Control	Door Locks, Window Shades	
Controllers, Bridges	Gateways, Access Points, Smart Assistants, Border Routers, Mobile Phones	
Video Players	TVs, Streaming Devices	
Appliances	Laundry Washer, Refrigerator, Room AC, Temperature Controlled Cabinet, Dishwasher	
Robotic	Robot Vacuum Cleaner	

### **Future**

Category	Device Types
Energy Management	EV, EVSE, Isolation switches, Meters
Network Infrastructure	Access Points
Additional Appliances	Dryer
Monitoring	Cameras
Presence Detection	Ambient Sensors

New to Matter 1.2




# **Industry Adoption**



- Matter 1.0 Launched on October 4, 2022
  - Matter 1.1 Released May 2023
  - Matter 1.2 Released October 2023
  - Matter 1.3 Targeted April 2024
  - Matter 1.4 Targeted October 2024
- As of October 16, 2023, there are 1386 certified devices across 23 device types
- One of the fastest standards adoptions by manufacturers ever
- Major ecosystems have all rolled out device support for both Thread and Wi-Fi


# Silicon Labs Matter Roadmap



# **Matter Secure** Commissioning

# **Device Attestation and Device Certificates**

- Every device has a unique certificate that is signed by the manufacturer
- The hierarchy allows for a 3-level tier
- No single root CA across all devices
- During commissioning the device is challenged to prove possession of associated private key
- Certificates can be validated against the Distributed Compliance Ledger to verify device certification status




# **Commissioning - Establishing Initial Security**



# **Commissioning - Installing Matter Fabric Security Credentials**

5 Device Attestation




Check manufacturer certificate and device compliance

Install
Operational
Security



Install a commissioner root certificate, an operational certificate for device, and an ACL with list of administrators.








Convey Wi-Fi or
Thread network
credentials using
Network Commissioning
Cluster




# **Commissioning - Final Steps**

8 Join Network




Device attaches to Wi-Fi or Thread network



Discover Device on IP network



Controller discovers device using DNS and establishes a CASE session using newly configured security material.



Inform Device
Commissioning is
complete
Performs any other
application configuration





# **Matter Security** Requirements

# Matter Security as Specified by CSA



### **MANUFACTURING**

Matter devices must be injected with a unique DAC certificate/ private key, Onboarding Payload (QR code delivered), Certification Declaration (CD), and other static/ dynamic data during manufacturing. (SHALL)



### **COMMISSIONING**

DAC with VID/PID must be checked against the DCL and CD verified to ensure only authentic and certified Matter devices are commissioned. (SHALL)



### **DEVICE COMMUNICATION**

Communication between Matter devices must be secured and encrypted using cryptographic keys and PBKDF. (SHALL)



### **SOFTWARE UPDATES**

Devices must support OTA firmware updates to allow vulnerabilities to be patched (SHALL)

### **OTHER SECURITY SPECIFICATIONS**

- Authentication and encryption keys must be generated by a "Deterministic Random Bit Generator" Seeded by NIST 800-90B TRNG
   (SHALL)
- Debug interfaces and access to secure boot trust anchors should be disabled to only allow authorized access (fusing) (SHOULD)
- DACs and operational private key confidentiality should be protected from remote attacks (SHOULD)
- Vendors should have a public policy & mechanism to identify and rectify security vulnerabilities in a timely manner (SHOULD)
- The software should be encrypted at rest to prevent unauthorized access to core IP (MAY)
- Some devices should be protected against physical attacks to prevent tampering, side-channel, or debug glitching attacks. (MAY)






# **Matter Compliant Security Solution**

- Secure Vault Mid or High supports all Matter security functionalities now (Shall) and future (Should, May)
- Uncrackable keys are generated by the True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
- For DAC, secure boot, secure debug, OTA, software image and communication encryption
- The Crypto Engine assists with special algorithms like SPAKE2+ and CASE with side channel protection
- Secure key storage at PSA/SESIP Level 2 (Mid) and Level 3 (High):
  - Private keys are stored with a TEE/TZ (SV Mid), or PUF Wrapped (SV High)
- Secure Matter Identities (DACs) securely programmed at our factory
- Secure Boot with RTSL ensures code running on the device is trusted.
- Secure OTA firmware updates in conjunction with Secure Boot prevents the installation of malicious software and allows for vulnerability patching
- Glitch Mitigated Secure Debug Lock/Unlock only allow authorized access with security tokens that can be revoked
- Anti-Tamper protects from physical attacks (SV High)

RTSL – Root of Trust and Secure Loader TEE – Trusted Execution Environment TZ – TrustZone SV – Secure Vault



**PSIRT Monitors & Rectifies Security Vulnerabilities** 

# **Matter Secure** Manufacturing

# **Secure Programming for Matter - Process Summary**

### What Needs to Happen Before Secure Programming

Certify the Product for Matter with CSA

 Get Certification Declaration (CD) Generate Secure Boot and Debug Key Pairs (HSM)

Acquire DACs

Sign Code + Bootloader with a Private Key

- Store Private Keys in HSM
- Deliver DACs and Private Keys securely to CM or silicon vendor
- Deliver CD and Factory Data to CM or silicon vendor



- Code
- Certification

  Declaration from CSA



- Secure Boot/Secure Debug Private/Public Key Pairs
- DACs





- Signed Code + Bootloader
- DACs

### Programming.... Secure?



### **Secret Keys**

- Secure Boot & Debug Public Keys written to OTP Memory
- Custom Keys
- OTA Decrypt Key



### **Security**

- Lock Flash Pages
- Enable Secure Boot/Secure Debug (OTP)
- · Set Default Tamper



### **Matter Provisioning**

- Official Product DAC
- Other Factory Data
- Certification Declaration
- Onboarding Payload



### Flashing


- Customer Application
- Bootloader



HSM - Hardware Security Module




# **CPMS** for Matter is Secure Provisioning – Alpha Program Launching June 1<sup>st</sup>!



- Available for EFRMG24A/B 15.4 Thread parts and coming soon for Si915/917 Wi-Fi parts
- Easy to use web user interface
- Receive 10 samples within 4-6 weeks for \$500 flat fee (free for Alpha customers)
- Matter Security Credential Injection:
  - DAC and PAI
  - Certification Declaration
  - Onboarding Payload
  - Secure Boot and Debug Public Keys
  - OTA Decryption Key
- Secure Debug Locked
- Secure Boot Enable
- Tamper Options Set
- Anti-rollback Set
- Bootloader pre-flashed for protection of Software IP
- Application Flashed

# **Secure Vault and Summary**

# **IoT Attack Vectors are Shifting from Remote to Local**




# Secure Vault™ Support in BG24 and MG24


Base	Mid	High	Feature
✓	✓	✓	True Random Number Generator
<b>✓</b>	✓	✓	True Random Number Generator  Crypto Engine
✓	✓	<b>√</b>	Secure Application Boot
_	HSE	HSE	Secure Engine
_	✓	✓	Secure Boot with RTSL
_	✓	✓	Secure Debug with Lock/Unlock
_	✓	✓	DPA Countermeasures
_	_	✓	Anti-Tamper
_	_	✓	Secure Attestation
_	_	✓	Secure Key Management
_	_	✓	Advanced Crypto
	EFR32BG24 EFR32MG24		



# **Cryptography Engine**



# **Secure Engine Subsystem**



# All cryptographic functions use a dedicated crypto-coprocessor

- Random number generation
- Symmetric encryption/decryption
- Hashing
- Keypair generation
- Key storage
- Signing / Verifying signatures

### Limited accessibility to crypto-coprocessor

- Via a Host mailbox interface
- Debug pins (with Debug Challenge Interface, or DCI)

# **Crypto-coprocessor is not customer programmable**

(but can be securely updated)

### **Crypto-coprocessor benefits**

- Increases security: access to crypto functions is tightly controlled, supports key isolation, supports Secure Boot
- Frees the Host Processor for other tasks





## **Secure Boot**

### LOCAL & REMOTE ATTACK VECTOR



**Secure Engine MCU** 

**Application MCU** 



Immutable memory, check secure engine bootloader code (SEB), can update SEB code Check second stage bootloader code (SSB), can update SSB code Check application code, can update application code

Execute trusted application code against immutable memory and through full chain of trust

### Vulnerabilities

- Replacing code with 'look-alike code' makes a product appear normal.
   Hackers use it to copy/re-direct data to alternate servers.
- Secure Boot with RTSL (Root-of-Trust & Secure Loader)
  - Use and execute only trusted application code against immutable memory and through a full chain of trust

# **DPA Countermeasures**


### LOCAL ATTACK VECTOR



A Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack requires hands-on access to the device.



Monitoring electromagnetic radiation and fluctuations in power consumption during crypto operations may reveal security keys and other data.



### Vulnerabilities


 Observing subtle signal differences during given internal operations can provide insight into cryptographic functions

### DPA Countermeasures

 Countermeasures add masks and random timings to internal operations and distorts DPA snooping

# **Anti-Tamper**

### LOCAL ATTACK VECTOR



### Vulnerabilities


- Tamper attacks come from single or multiple vectors.
- Common attacks include voltage glitching, magnetic interference and forced temperature adjustment

# Tamper detection and rapid response

 Anti-tamper requires both an attack detection and suitable rapid response which may include key deletion.

# **Secure Key Management**

LOCAL & REMOTE ATTACK VECTOR



### Vulnerabilities

 When an attacker learns how to extract keys or content from a device, they use the same attack vector to attack other devices

### Secure Key Management

- A Physically Unclonable Function creates a secret, random, & unique key, from individual device imperfections
- The PUF-key encrypts all keys in the secure key storage. It is generated at startup and is not stored in flash

# **Secure Vault™** – Formally Recognized by Industry Leaders



### ARM PSA Level 2 and 3

- First SoC to achieve Level 3 certification
- Assures a proven hardware root of trust

### SESIP Level 3

- First SoC to achieve a SESIP Level 3 certification
- Common Criteria Lite

### ISA/IEC 62443

- Maximum level of security for a silicon product
- Independent Security Evaluation by Riscure
  - Comprehensive analysis report from Riscure can be shared with customers under NDA

# **Summary**

# \* matter



- Matter raises the bar on security to a new level beyond simply guaranteeing the communication pipe is secure... now the end device must be proven to be authentic
- The Matter Node Security will likely raise over time... as threats evolve the SHOULDs will become SHALLs
- Creating Secure Identities and injecting them securely in your manufacturing process is not trivial and can be costly
- Silicon Labs has the hardware, software, and services to get your secure
   Matter products to market quickly and cost effectively



# APAC Tech Talks: Wireless Technology Training

















# Thank you!

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