Economics of Human Capital

Static model of educational choice

Philipp Eisenhauer

Housekeeping

Lecture plan

- Static model of educational choices
- OpenSourceEconomics
- grmpy
- Estimating Marginal Returns to Education (Carneiro, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2011)

Course program

- economics of human capital
- econometrics of human capital
- research seminar



Introduction

Figure: Motivation

American Economic Review NN (Newbor 2011) - 2754-2781

Estimating Marginal Returns to Education®

By Pedro Carneiro, James J. Heckman, and Edward J. Vytlace.

Estimating marginal returns to policies is a central task of economic cost-benefit analysis. A comparison between marginal benefits and anagital costs determines the optimal size of a social programs. For example, to evaluate the optimality of a policy that promotes expansion in college attendance, analysis need to estimate the return to college for the marginal student and compare it to the marginal cost of the

This is a relatively simple task (i) if the effect of the policy is the same for everycue (conditional on observed variables) or (ii) if the effect of the policy series across individuals given observed variables to upstess either do not know their idiosyncrais returns to the policy, or if they issue them, they do not act on them. In those cases, individuals do not choose their schooling based on their realized idiosyncatic individual returns, and thus the marginal and average or, post returns to schooling arch be sure.³⁸

Under these conditions, the mean marginal return to college can be estimated using conventional methods applied to the following Minorr equation:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta S + \varepsilon$$
,

where Y is the log wage, S is a dummy variable indicating college attendance, β is the return to schooling (which may vary sarring genoms), and ϵ is a residual. The standard problem of selection bias (S correlated with ϵ) may be present, but this problem can be solved by a variety of conventional methods (instrumental variables (IV), regression discontinuity, and elsection models).

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authors and not necessarily those of these funders.

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See Hockman and Vythad (2007b).

Carneiro & al. (2011)

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2001 LAWRENCE R. KLEIN LECTURE
ESTIMATING DISTRIBUTIONS OF TREATMENT EFFECTS
WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
AND MEASUREMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY
DAY COLLEGE CHOICES.

By $\;$ Pedbo Carneiro, Karsten T. Hansen, and James J. Heckman I

Department of Economics, University of Chicago; Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University; Department of Economics, University of Chicago and The American Bar Foundation

This article uses factor models to identify and estimate the distributions of content factorial. We carised LEARLE, frameworks to a format tentance efforts extent, carbon factorial pass account for unabserved conditioning variables. Using them models, we can identify all palests and place transmiss of the League models, we can identify all palests and place transmiss of the league that the league of the league transmiss of the league transmissor of the league transmiss of the league transmiss of the leagu

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Carneiro & al. (2003)

J. Heckman (2008) defines three policy evaluation tasks:

- Evaluating the impact of historical interventions on outcomes including their impact in terms of wellbeing of the treated and the society at large.
- Forecasting the impact of historical interventions implemented in one environment in other environments, including their impact in terms of well-being.
- Forecasting the impacts of interventions never historically experienced to various environments, including their impact on well-being.

Econometrics of policy evaluation

- ▶ is important
- is complicated
- is multifaceted

Numerous applications

- labor economics
- development economics
- industrial economics
- health economics

Numerous effects

- conventional average effects
- policy-relevant average effects
- marginal effects
- distributional effects
- effects on distributions

Numerous estimation strategies

- instrumental variables
- (quasi-)experimental methods
- matching

Model

Generalized Roy model

Potential Outcomes

$$Y_1 = \mu_1(X) + U_1$$
 $C = \mu_C(Z) + U_C$

$$Y_0 = \mu_0(X) + U_0$$

Observed Outcomes

$$Y = DY_1 + (1 - D)Y_0$$
 $S = Y_1 - Y_0 - C$

Choice

Cost

$$S=Y_1-Y_0-C$$

$$D=\mathsf{I}[S>0]$$

Individual Heterogeneity


Individual-specific Benefit of Treatment

$$Y_1 - Y_0 = (\mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X)) + (U_1 - U_0)$$

Sources of Heterogeneity

- Difference in observables
- Difference in unobservables
 - Uncertainty
 - Private information

Figure: Distribution of benefits



Observed outcome

$$Y_i = Y_{0i} + D_i(Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}) = \begin{cases} Y_{1i} & \text{if } D_i = 1 \\ Y_{0i} & \text{if } D_i = 0 \end{cases}$$

Econometric problems

- ► **Evaluation problem**, we only observe an individual in either the treated or untreated state.
- ➤ **Selection problem**, individuals that select into treatment differ from those that do not.

Essential Heterogeneity

Definition: Individuals select their treatment status based on gains unobservable by the econometrician. More formally,

$$Y_1 - Y_0 \not\perp\!\!\!\perp D | X = x.$$

⇒ consequences for the choice of the estimation strategy

Objects of interest

Useful Notation

$$P(X, Z) = Pr(D = 1 | X, Z) = F_V(\mu_D(X, Z))$$

 $U_D = F_V(V)$

Figure: First-stage unobservable




Figure: Support





Figure: Distribution of benefits



Figure: Conditional expectation and essential heterogeneity



Conventional Average Treatment Effects

Conventional Average Treatment Effects

$$B^{ATE} = E[Y_1 - Y_0]$$

 $B^{TT} = E[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1]$
 $B^{TUT} = E[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 0]$

⇒ correspond to *extreme* policy alternatives

Selection Problem

$$\begin{split} E[Y \mid D = 1] - E[Y \mid D = 0] &= \underbrace{E[Y_1 - Y_0]}_{B^{ATE}} \\ &+ \underbrace{E[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1] - E[Y_1 - Y_0]}_{\text{Sorting Gain}} \\ &+ \underbrace{E[Y_0 \mid D = 1] - E[Y_0 \mid D = 0]}_{\text{Selection Bias}} \end{split}$$

$$E[Y \mid D = 1] - E[Y \mid D = 0] = \underbrace{E[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1]}_{B^{TT}} + \underbrace{E[Y_0 \mid D = 1] - E[Y_0 \mid D = 0]}_{\text{Selection Bias}}$$

⇒ the bias depends on the parameter of interest

Figure: Distribution of effects with essential heterogeneity





Figure: Distribution of effects without essential heterogeneity



Policy-Relevant Average Treatment Effects

Observed Outcomes

$$Y_B = D_B Y_1 + (1 - D_B) Y_0$$

 $Y_A = D_A Y_1 + (1 - D_A) Y_0$

Effect of Policy

$$B^{PRTE} = \frac{1}{E[D_A] - E[D_B]} (E[Y_A] - E[Y_B])$$

Marginal Effect of Treatment

Marginal Benefit of Treatment

$$B^{MTE}(x, u_D) = E[Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x, U_D = u_D]$$

Intuition: Mean gross return to treatment for persons at quantile u_D of the first-stage unobservable V or a willingness to pay for individuals at the margin of indifference.

Figure: Margin of indifference





Figure: B^{MTE} and essential heterogeneity



Effects of treatment as weighted averages Parameter Δ_j , can be written as a weighted average of the $B^{MTE}(x, u_D)$.

$$\Delta_j(x) = \int_0^1 B^{MTE}(x, u_D) \omega^j(x, u_D) du_D,$$

where the weights $\omega^{j}(x,u_{D})$ are specific to parameter j and integrate to one.


Weights

$$\omega^{ATE}(x, u_D) = 1$$

$$\omega^{TT}(x, u_D) = \frac{1 - F_{P|X=X}(u_D)}{E[P \mid X = X]}$$

$$\omega^{TUT}(x, u_D) = \frac{F_{P|X=X}(u_D)}{E[1 - P \mid X = X]}$$

Figure: Effects of treatment as weighted averages



Local Average Treatment Effect


Local Average Treatment Effect

- Local Average Treatment Effect: Average effect for those induced to change treatment because of a change in the instrument.
 - ⇒ instrument-dependent parameter
- Marginal Treatment Effect: Average effect for those individuals with a given unobserved desire to receive treatment.
 - ⇒ deep economic parameter

$$B^{LATE} = \frac{E[Y \mid Z = z] - E[Y \mid Z = z']}{P(z) - P(z')}$$

$$B^{LATE}(x, u_D, u_{D'}) = \frac{1}{u_D - u_{D'}} \int_{u_D}^{u_{D'}} B^{MTE}(x, u) du,$$

Figure: Local average treatment effect



Distributions of Effects

Distributions of Effects

- marginal distribution of benefits
- joint distribution of potential outcomes
- joint distribution of benefits and surplus

Figure: Distribution of benefits



Figure: Distribution of potential outcomes





Figure: Distribution of benefits and surplus



Conclusion

Appendix

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