IT security

Monday 11th February
Course day #1

Introduction to the course
Theme A (i)

Case: The NotPetya attack

Chapter 1 + parts of Chapter 2

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Plan for today

Welcome to the course ! (NJ)

The NotPetya case (NJ)

Chapter 1 (NCJ)

Chapter 2 (NJ)

Case revisited
- management aspects (NCJ)
- technical aspects (NJ)

IT security

Protection of IT infrastructure
- NotPetya attack (2017)
- Maersk lost 200-300 USD

Protection of privacy
- “Se og Hør” scandal (2016)

Four themes (A-D)

A. Computer security technology and principles (Part One in Stallings & Brown)
B. Software and system security (Part Two)
C. Management issues (Part Three)
D. Network security (Part Five)



Course themes

A. Computer security technology and principles (Part One in Stallings & Brown)	• cryptography, user auth., viruses, worms, ..
B. Software and system security (Part Two)	• design to prevent .. • .. buffer overflow attacks, IoT attacks
C. Management issues (Part Three)	• implement routines and standards (GRPR, ISO 27000) • risk analysis • human resources, social engineering, ..
D. Network security (Part Five)	• cases • credit card systems, mobile payment, ..

- "anatomi" of an attack
- bunch of techniques and principles

"Anatomi" of secure software

Implement guidelines!

In-depth analysis of actual designs

Ten consecutive Mondays

A. Computer security technology and principles (Part One in Stallings & Brown)	11th Feb 18th Feb 25th Feb
B. Software and system security (Part Two)	11th March (#5)
C. Management issues (Part Three)	4th March (#4) 18th March 25th March
D. Network security (Part Five)	1st April 8th April

Themes A-D covered
- in alphabetical order
- corresponding to Brown & Stallings

Except:
- course day #4 is “prematurely” about C

Course day 10
- topics defined later

Cases

A. Computer security technology and principles (Part One in Stallings & Brown)	11th Feb 18th Feb 25th Feb
B. Software and system security (Part Two)	11th March (#5)
C. Management issues (Part Three)	4th March (#4) 18th March 25th March
D. Network security (Part Five)	1st April 8th April

- NotPetya
- Petya ransomware
- The EU digital passport

Example course day: Monday 18th Feb

Theme A: Computer security technology and principles (ii)

Case:
- Petya attack

Teacher presentation

Two short student presentations (5-10 minutes per presentation)

Exercises

Two types of security - are they the same?

Goals & tools for *protection of infrastructure*

Goals & tools for *privacy*

Goals & tools that are shared

- confidentiality
- encryption

Exercise

1. Provide another example of a goal or tool.
2. What type of security is it? (privacy or protection of infrastructure or both?)



Exercise - answer

1. Provide another example of a goals or a tool.
- *passwords for user-authentication*

2. What type of security is it?
- *both types (most are)*



Stallings & Brown

Privacy is not prioritized
- privacy has seven pages
- section in “Legal and ethical aspects”

GDPR barely mentioned
- no mention of the most recent, most important version
- = the version passed by EP in 2016

Assets
- privacy focus suggests more focus on data than hw+sw (p29)

Elements of an authoritarian approach
- attacks are seen as “illegal”, “unauthorized” (eg., p31)
- what about privacy violations authored by government or management?



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The NotPetya case (NJ)

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Chapter 2 (NJ)

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Later today:
- *Exam*
- *written assignment*
- *oral exam*

Two student presentations on course day #2

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NotPetya: impact



Impact of NotPetya
June 22nd onwards

Ransom message appeared on screen
- “PC files encrypted”
- bitcoin address for ransom
- email adress for exchange of key

Shut down most computers in Maersk
- in Ukraine
- and spread to Maersk all over the world
- though not the computers onboard of ships

Infected also Maersk’s so-called domain controllers
- required to run Maersk’s internal network
- all 150 domain controllers in different countries
- except 1 machine in Ghana

Costs

Maersk's costs
- claimed loss of USD 200-300 mill

Costs for other companies
- FedEX: USD 400 mill (including TNT/Europe)
- Merck: USD 840 mill (a pharmaceutical company)
- companies world-wide: estimated at USD 10 bill (70 mia. DKR)

Impact on Ukraine
- shut down 10% of all computers

Maersk's reaction

During infection period
- people would try to disconnect PCs before/during infection

Crisis management and "Rebuilding" effort
- two-three weeks
- HQ in Maidenhead, UK
- 600 people

Rebuilding effort included
- installed new software on individual PCs (45.000)
- at total of 4.000 servers rebuilt
- used the domain controller in Ghana as a basis for copying data to new domain controllers
- rebuilt data about business
  - including containers' and ships' destinations
  - using data from the onboard computers?

Exercise

1) Discuss what assets were affected by NotPetya
- use the four categories suggested by Stallings & Brown (p29)
  - hardware
  - ..

2) Discuss NotPetya's type of attack and origin
- use the two types of attacks (p31)
- and the classicification into two types of origin (p31)

Exercise answers

1) Discuss what assets were affected by NotPetya
- use the four categories suggested by Stallings & Brown (p29)
  - hardware
  - ..

NotPetya affected all four categories of assets
- *it directly affected data*
- *indirectly it rendered hardware, software, and communication useless*
- *difficult to define distinctions between, eg. attack on sw/data*

2) Discuss NotPetya's type of attack and origin
- use the two types of attacks (p31)
- and the classicification into two types of origin (p31)

NotPetya was
- *active attack*
- *outside attack*

NotPetya vs Petya

"Payload"
- appeared similar to Petya
- ransomware attack from 2016

However, "Not Petya" was
- not identical to Petya
- merely destructive
  - no recovery
- 300 USD ransom
- a single bitcoin address
- a single email address

payload
- *impact on computer*

propulsion
- *method of propagation to (infection of) other computers*
- *exploits a sw vulnerability*