

# Empirical Banking and Finance

## Tutorial 6

Konrad Adler

Institute for Financial Economics and Statistics  
University of Bonn

Summer 2020

# Tutorial 6

-

# This Lecture

## Tutorial 6 Solutions

# Data & Descriptives

## a) Data & Descriptives

- a) Have a look at the dataset and provide some descriptive statistics. For the next steps replace the largest and smallest 5% of the continuous variables in the dataset by missing values.

- Quarterly firm level data from 1994q1 - 2005q4

Table: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
networth	19253	656.331	3373.664	0	159568
diff_net_worth	19253	222.31	2252.225	-122698	48911
investment	18515	.062	.173	-1.361	21.13
macroq	16272	11.828	26.801	.556	916.172
cashflow	17597	.189	.732	-30.37	11.996
covenantbreach	19253	.151	.358	0	1
firstcovenantbreach8	19253	.007	.081	0	1
relativecovenantbreach8	1640	-1.69	4.29	-8	8

# Data & Descriptives

- a) Data & Descriptives (continued)
  - b) How many firm-quarter observations are firms breaching a covenant?
    - 15% (2902 firm-quarters out of 19253)
  - c) Compare the characteristics of firm-quarters breaching a covenant against the others. This is similar to Table IV in [Chava and Roberts \(2008\)](#).

Table:

<b>covenantbreach</b>	<b>diff_n h</b>	<b>invest t</b>	<b>macroq</b>	<b>cashflow</b>
0 Mean	143.10	0.06	8.37	0.17
0 Median	67.80	0.05	5.61	0.12
1 Mean	-12.15	0.05	7.92	0.14
1 Median	-8.46	0.04	5.17	0.10

# Regression Discontinuity Design

## b) Regression Discontinuity Design:

- a) We want to study the causal impact of a covenant breach on a firm's investment. Why is it not enough to just compare investment between the two groups of firms? Refer to what you have found in Question 1)c).
  - The problem is that the two groups of firms are not comparable (Pears vs Apples Problem).
  - Firms not breaching covenant are doing better as measured by the variables in Question 1). They have higher investment, macro Q and cash flow than firms breaching a covenant. (Could run a t-test of whether the differences are significant)
  - Even if they were similar in terms of observable variables (which they are not) it is likely that the two groups of firms differ in ways that are not observable.

# Regression Discontinuity Design

## b) Regression Discontinuity Design: (continued)

### b) How does RDD allow us to find the causal effect of a covenant breach on investment?

- The net worth covenant threshold is a discontinuity: when firms pass **below** the threshold their bank (bank syndicate) can in principle call back the loan
- Whenever firms are **above** the threshold they have relatively unrestricted access to the credit agreed in the contract
- RDD takes advantage of the fact that firms just below/just above the covenant threshold are very similar, except in their access to credit
- The assumptions required are discussed below

### c) Is this a sharp or a fuzzy design?

- This is a sharp design because when the firm passes the threshold the covenant is breached with probability 1.

# RDD Assumptions

## c) RDD Assumptions

- a) Using only 8 quarters before and 4 quarters after *firstcovenantbreach8* create a graph of average *inv*, *macroq* and *cashflow*.
- b) Assumption 1: For RDD to work, how should the control variables *macroq* and *cashflow* evolve around the time of the covenant breach? Do you think the assumption about the other control variables is satisfied when you look at the graph?
  - *Note*: Because of the time dimension of the problem this is hard to test and the suggested graph is probably not good enough.
  - A better idea might be to compare pairs of firms at certain levels of net worth: 1 firm has a threshold there, the other does not.
  - This is inconclusive



# RDD Assumptions

## c) RDD Assumptions (continued)

- c) Assumption 2: Create a histogram of *diff\_networth* excluding *diff\_networth* > 200. Describe what you observe and how this is a threat to RDD.
- Bunching of firms close to the threshold
  - Firms can probably manipulate their net worth to avoid breaching the covenant
  - This is bad news for RDD because this affects the composition of firms close to the threshold
  - They are no longer comparable: firms **above** the threshold can be there just because they manipulated their accounting or because they are “truly” at that level of net worth

# Regression 1

## d) Regression 1

- a) Run the following three regressions with *inv* as LHS variable and *covenantbreach* as the RHS variable of interest including year and firm FE. Cluster standard errors at the firm level.
- i)  $inv = covenantbreach + networkh$
  - ii)  $inv = covenantbreach + \sum_i^4 networkh^i$
  - iii)  $inv = covenantbreach \times \sum_i^4 diff\_networkh^i$ <sup>1</sup>
- b) Briefly discuss the assumptions of models i) to iii) concerning the relationship between *inv* and *networkh* and how the model below is relaxing the assumption.
- i) Linear relationship between *inv* and *networkh* + same above and below threshold
  - ii) Non-linear relationship between *inv* and *networkh* + same above and below threshold
  - iii) Non-linear relationship between *inv* and *networkh* + different above and below threshold + using the normalization

---

<sup>1</sup>This is an interaction term

# Regression 1

## d) Regression 1 (continued)

c) Compare the size and significance of the coefficient of interest across the three models.

- i) -0.0058\*\*\*
- ii) -0.00428\*\*
- iii) 0.00148
- Interpretation: change in investment at  $x_0$

d) How different are the coefficients to the *Bind* coefficients from Table V of [Chava and Roberts \(2008\)](#)?

- Note: [Chava and Roberts \(2008\)](#) include other controls, and current ratio covenants therefore the coefficients are not exactly comparable
- i) -0.0058\*\*\* vs Specification (1) -0.015\*\*\*
- ii) -0.00428\*\* vs Specification (7) -0.008\*\*\*
- iii) 0.00148
- Interpretation: change in investment at  $x_0$

## Regression 2

### e) Regression 2

- a) Compute the absolute distance in % of *networth* to the covenant threshold
- b) Re-run regressions i) and ii) of the previous question restricting the sample to only firm-quarters where the absolute distance is less than 15% of *networth*
  - i) -0.0055\*\*\*
  - ii) - 0.0053\*\*\*
  - iii) 0.0036
  - Mixed results: coefficients with specification i) and ii) are stable compared to the previous question. With iii) there are not a lot of degrees of freedom left
- c) What is the motivation for restricting the sample in this particular way?
- d) Compare the coefficients obtained using the restricted sample to the ones above and provide a short comment.

## Regression 2

### e) Regression 2 (continued)

- b) What is the motivation for restricting the sample in this particular way?
  - The key assumption that all other variables are similar is more likely to hold for a sample of firms who are close to the threshold
- c) Compare the coefficients obtained using the restricted sample to the ones above and provide a short comment.
  - See above, quite similar results

Chava, S. and Roberts, M. R. (2008). How does financing impact investment? the role of debt covenants. *The journal of finance*, 63(5):2085–2121.