

# Guest-Based System Call Introspection with Extended Berkeley Packet Filter

by

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# Abstract

Soon

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## Nomenclature

<b>VM</b>	Virtual Machine
<b>KVM</b>	Kernel-based Virtual Machine
<b>OS</b>	Operating System
<b>VMI</b>	Virtual Machine Introspection
<b>CPU</b>	Central Processing Unit
<b>AMD</b>	Advanced Micro Devices
<b>AMD-V</b>	Advanced Micro Devices Virtualization
<b>VT-x</b>	Intel Virtualization Extension
<b>VMX</b>	Virtual Machine Extensions, analogous to VT-x
<b>MSR</b>	Model Specific Register
<b>VMM</b>	Virtual Machine Monitor, analogous to a hypervisor
<b>EFER</b>	Extended Feature Enable Register
<b>eBPF</b>	Extended Berkeley Packet Filter
<b>VMI</b>	Virtual Machine Introspection
<b>API</b>	Application Programming Interface
<b>IDS</b>	Intrusion Detection System
<b>JIT</b>	Just-in-time
<b>MMU</b>	Memory Management Unit
<b>QEMU</b>	Quick Emulator
<b>GPF</b>	General Protection Fault
<b>IEEE</b>	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
<b>GDB</b>	GNU Debugger
<b>NMI</b>	Non-maskable Interrupt
<b>TCG</b>	Tiny Code Generator
<b>BCC</b>	BPF Compiler Collection
<b>SMAP</b>	Supervisor Mode Access Prevention
<b>KPTI</b>	Kernel page-table isolation <sub>ix</sub>
<b>HCI</b>	Human Computer Interaction
<b>IPS</b>	Intrusion Prevention System

# Introduction

Cloud computing is a modern method for delivering computing power, storage services, databases, networking, analytics, artificial intelligence, and software applications over the internet (the cloud). Organizations of every type, size, and industry are using the cloud for a wide variety of use cases, such as data backup, disaster recovery, email, virtual desktops, software development, testing, big data analytics, and web applications [3]. For example, healthcare companies use the cloud to store patient records in databases [3]. Financial service companies use the cloud for real-time fraud detection and prevention to save client assets [3]. And finally, video game companies use the cloud to deliver online video game services to millions of players around the world.

The existence of cloud computing can be attributed to virtualization. Virtualization is a technology that makes it possible for multiple different operating systems (OSs) to run concurrently, and in an isolated environment on the same hardware. Virtualization makes use of a machine's hardware to support the software that creates and manages virtual machines (VMs). A VM is a virtual environment that provides the functionality of a physical computer by using its own virtual central processing unit (VCPU), memory, network interface, and storage. The software that creates and manages VMs is formally called a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM). The virtualization marketplace is comprised of four notable hypervisors, which are: (1) VMWare, (2) Xen, (3) Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM), and (4) Hyper-V. The operating system running a hypervisor is called the host OS, while the VM that uses the hypervisor's resources is called the guest OS.

While virtualization technology can be sourced back to the 1970s, it wasn't widely adopted until the early 2000s due to hardware limitations [21]. The fundamental rea-

son for introducing a hypervisor layer on a modern machine is that without one, only one operating system would be able to run at a given time. This constraint often led to wasted resources, as a single OS infrequently utilized the full capacity of modern hardware. More specifically, the computing capacity of a modern CPU is so large, that under most workloads, it is difficult for a single OS to efficiently use all of its resources at a given time. Hypervisors address this constraint by allowing all of a system's resources to be utilized by distributing them over several VMs. This allows users to switch between one machine, many operating systems, and multiple applications at their discretion.

## 1.1 The Problem

Due to exposure to the Internet, VMs represent a first point-of-target for attackers who want to gain access into the virtualization environment [25]. A VM that is exposed to the Internet is changing constantly due to the large amount of data coming from the Internet and into the VM [22]. Apart from the Internet, another problem is the simple fact that modern day computer systems run dozens, if not hundreds of processes that each contain a remarkable amount of complexity and functionality [22]. The required capabilities and complexity of both computer processes and the overall system has led to a reduction in their reliability and security [22]. For instance, new vulnerabilities are discovered almost every day on major computer platforms. When these vulnerabilities are addressed with software updates, it is not uncommon for new vulnerabilities to be discovered soon after [22]. As such, the role of a VM is highly security critical and its priority should be to maintain confidentiality, integrity, authorization, availability, and accountability throughout its life cycle [23]. The successful exploitation of a VM can result in a complete breach of isolation between clients, resulting in the failure to meet one or more of the aforementioned goals of computer security. For example, the successful exploitation of a VM can result in the loss of availability of client services due to denial-of-service attacks, non-public information becoming accessible to unauthorized parties, data, software or hardware being altered by unauthorized parties, and the successful repudiation of a malicious action committed by a principal [23]. For these reasons, effective methodologies for monitoring VMs is required.

## 1.2 Addressing the Problem

In this thesis, we present Frail, a KVM hypervisor and Intel Virtualization Extension (VT-x) exclusive hypervisor-based virtual machine introspection (VMI) system that enhances the capabilities of Nitro, a related VMI system. In computing, VMI is a technique for monitoring and sometimes responding to the runtime state of a virtual machine [17]. Frail is a VMI that (1) traces KVM guest system calls and their corresponding processes, (2) monitors malicious anomalies, and (3) responds to those malicious anomalies from the hypervisor level. Our framework is implemented using a combination of existing software and our own software. Firstly, it utilizes a custom Linux kernel and KVM module, as well as Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) to safely extract both KVM guest system calls and the corresponding process that requested the system call. Secondly, it uses Dr. Somayaji’s pH [22] implementation of sequences of system calls to detect malicious anomalies. Lastly, we respond to observed malicious anomalies by either terminating the VM that is running the malicious process or terminating the guest process that is responsible for the observed malicious anomaly. The tracing, monitoring, and responding is done in real-time without hindering usability of the guest. To our knowledge, Frail is the second KVM hypervisor-based VMI system that is intended to support the monitoring of all three system call mechanisms provided by the Intel x86 architecture, and has been proven to work for Linux 64-bit systems. Likewise, to our knowledge, it is the first KVM hypervisor-based VMI system that utilizes sequences of system calls to monitor malicious anomalies.

## 1.3 Research Questions

In this thesis, we consider six research questions, and answer them individually throughout Chapter Three of this thesis:

**Research Question 1:** KVM is formally defined as a type 1 hypervisor by its creators RedHat. As a result, guest instructions that are defined by the CPU are sent directly to the CPU. System calls (SYSCALL, SYSRET, SYSENTER) are an example of in-

struction that Intel x86 CPUs define. Can we change the route of system calls so that they are trapped and emulated at the hypervisor level instead of being sent directly to the CPU for execution?

**Research Question 2:** Can we effectively retrieve KVM guest system calls and the process that requested the system call from the guest by bridging the semantic gap of the KVM hypervisor?

**Research Question 3:** Can we make use of KVM guest system calls and sequences of system calls to successfully detect malicious anomalies in real-time with a high success rate, and without hindering the usability of the guest?

**Research Question 4:** What extensions to the Linux tracepoints API would be required for eBPF to successfully trace KVM guest system calls and the process that requested the system call?

**Research Question 5:** Can we effectively terminate an anomalous guest process or the VM by bridging the semantic gap of the KVM hypervisor?

**Research Question 6:** Can we deploy our hypervisor-based VMI system without hindering the confidentiality, integrity, authorization, availability, and accountability of both the host and guest?

## 1.4 Motivation

As computer systems become more complex, it becomes more difficult to determine exactly what they are doing at any given time. Modern computers run dozens, if not hundreds of processes at once, the vast majority of which run silently in the background [9]. This begs the question: who should take the initiative to protect a virtualized computer system? We could place all the responsibility in the hands of the client for the safety of their virtualized environment. However, this is not a practical idea because users often have a very limited notion of what exactly is happening on their systems,

especially beyond that which they can see on their screens [9]. With the advent of personal computers, computers were no longer designed solely for experts. As a consequence, the goal of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) practitioners shifted to making all computer interaction simple and efficient for users of all skill levels by reducing the amount of physical and mental effort required by users when using computers. Fundamentally, this was done by filling the semantic gap of low level computer behaviour. As a result, this left users with no way of knowing whether their system is misbehaving at any given time [9]. If users are not good candidates for adequately monitoring VMs for malicious anomalies, the better option is to program computer systems to watch over themselves through the hypervisor. Current Linux computer systems do not have a native mechanism for detecting and responding to malicious anomalies within KVM VMs. For these reason, we have turned to hypervisor-based VMI to provide the necessary tools to trace, monitor and respond to malicious anomalies found within KVM VMs. What follows is a comprehensive explanation into our reasoning (motivation) for designing our VMI in the manner that we did.

#### **1.4.1 Why Design a New VMI?**

The topic of securing virtual machines (VMs) dates back to 2003, when Tal Garfinkel and Mendel Rosenblum proposed VMI as a hypervisor-level intrusion detection system (IDS) that integrated the benefits of both network-based and host-based IDS [13] [22]. Since then, widespread research and development of VMs has led to an abundance in VMI systems, some more practical than others, but all for the purpose of monitoring VMs. What follows is a discussion as to why we believe it is necessary to design and implement yet another VMI system, despite the fact that many already exist.

At the time of writing this thesis, to our knowledge, there is one relevant and related KVM VMI named Nitro. More specifically, Nitro is a VMI for system call tracing and monitoring, which was intended, implemented, and proven to support Windows, Linux, 32-bit, and 64-bit environments [19]. The problem with Nitro is that it is now over 11 years old, and its official codebase has not been updated in over 6 years. For this reason, it is no longer compatible with any Linux 32-bit and 64-bit environments, and is not compatible with newer Windows desktop versions. In fact, at the time of writing



this thesis, Nitro only supports Windows XP x64 and Windows 7 x64, which makes it ineffective for use on newer computer systems. Also, it is impractical to use it on supported OSs for two reasons. Firstly, Windows XP and Windows 7 are discontinued OSs, which means that security updates and technical support are no longer available. Secondly, Windows XP is over 21 years old and as of July 2021, it consists of only 0.59% of the marketshare of worldwide Windows desktop versions running [14]. Similarly, Windows 7 is 13 years old, and consists of only 16.06% of the same marketshare. [14].

There is a fundamental problem with the state of many existing VMI's like Nitro: when the codebase of either an OS or the kernel changes, VMI's are unable to solve the problem for which they were originally designed to solve: to trace and monitor VMs that are running Windows, Linux, 32-bit, and 64-bit environments [25]. The primary reason for this problem is that VMIs were designed in such a way that compromised compatibility and adaptability with subsequent versions of the OSs with which they were originally intended, implemented, and proven to be compatible with. To solve the problem of incapability, we seek to design a spiritual successor to Nitro that is intended to provide a VMI without sacrificing compatibility with subsequent versions of the Linux kernel.

#### 1.4.2 Why Design a Hypervisor-Based VMI System?

A VMI system can either be placed in each VM that requires monitoring (guest-based VMI), or it can be placed on the hypervisor level outside of every VM (hypervisor-based VMI). In this subsection, we justify our motivations for designing and implementing a hypervisor-based VMI by analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of both types of VMI systems. We begin by discussing the four key advantages of hypervisor-based VMI's: isolation, inspection, interposition, and deployability [18].

In our context, isolation refers to the property that hypervisor-based VMIs are tamper-resistant from its VMs. Tamper resistant in our context, is the property that VMs are unable to commit unauthorized access or alteration of any component of a VMI system (i.e. code, stored data, and more). If we assume that a hypervisor is free of vulnerabilities, then both the hypervisor and hypervisor-based VMI system is considered isolated from every guest VM. The implication above holds true because hypervisor-

based VMIs run at a higher privilege level than guests. [13]. Therefore, if a hypervisor is free of vulnerabilities, then guest VMs will not have a way of attacking the hypervisor or hypervisor-based VMI system. Guest-based VMIs are unable to maintain the property of isolation because they are deployed in the guest VM, and are thus by default vulnerable to being altered by the VMs that are being looked after by the VMI system. When the property of isolation holds for a hypervisor-based VMI, there exists two key advantages:

Firstly, if a hypervisor is managing a set of VMs, it is possible for a subset of those VMs to be considered untrusted due to a successful attack from within their confined environment. If a hypervisor-based VMI holds the property of isolation, then both the hypervisor-based VMI system and hypervisor will be immune from attacks that originate in the guest, even if the VMI is actively monitoring a guest that is under attack [13].

Secondly, due to the isolation of hypervisor-based VMI's from the guest, the VMI only needs to trust the underlying hypervisor instead of the entire Linux kernel. In contrast, if a VMI was deployed in a guest, then the entire guest kernel would need to be trusted. Having to trust only the hypervisor is advantageous because the KVM hypervisor has less than one twelfth the number of lines of code than the Linux kernel; this smaller attack surface leads to fewer vulnerabilities in hypervisor-based VMI's [1].

Inspection refers to the property that allows the VMI to examine the entire state of the guest while continuing to be isolated [18]. Hypervisor-based VMI's run one layer below all the guests, and on the same layer of the hypervisor. For this reason, the VMI is capable of efficiently having a complete view of all guest OS states (CPU registers, memory, and more) [13]. A VMI isolated from the VM also offers the advantage for a constant and consistent view of the system state, even if a VM is in a paused state. In contrast, a guest-based VMI system would stop executing when a VM enters a paused state.

Interposition is the ability to inject operations into a running VM based on certain conditions. Due to the close proximity of a hypervisor and a hypervisor-based VMI,

the VMI is capable of modifying any of the states of the guest and interfering with every activity of the guest. With respect to our VMI, interposition makes it easy to respond to observed malicious anomalies by terminating the guest process or VM that is responsible for the malicious anomaly [13].

Deployability of a VMI refers to the ease with which it can be taken from development to deployment onto a system. Deployability can be measured in terms of the number of discrete steps required to deploy a VMI system to the production environment. To deploy hypervisor-based VMI at the hypervisor layer, no guest has to be modified to accomodate for the VMI's deployment. For example, we do not have to make a new user for any guest VM, nor do have to install the VMI software or its dependencies in any of the guest VMs. Instead, we only need to install the VMI and its dependencies on the host once. Subsequently, we may execute our VMI on the host without disrupting any services in the host or guest.

Although guest-based VMI systems have been successful, they are more susceptible to two types of threats: (1) privilege escalation, and (2) tampering [18].

As previously mentioned, guest-based VMI systems are not isolated because they are executing on the same privilege level as the VM(s) that they are protecting [2]. As a result, malicious software (malware), such as kernel rootkits can be used to conduct privilege escalation. Privilege escalation is the act of exploiting a bug or a design flaw in an operating system or software application to gain elevated access to resources that are normally protected from an application or user. The result is that an application or user has more privileges than intended by the application developer or system administrator. After a successful privilege escalation, attackers can carry out unauthorised actions. For instance, they can access VMI resources that would normally be restricted to them. If an attacker successfully escalates their privilege in the guest, the following scenarios are possible:

- An attacker can tamper with the tracing software that collects system call information and/or process information that requested the system call.

- As our VMI depends on hooking specific kernel functions, attackers can modify the relevant symbols within the symbol table with a simple kernel module. In other words, they could hook their own function in place of our hooked function, which would allow them to bypass our VMI properties.
- Attackers can tamper with our IDS software that handles sequences of system calls, which is the tool that monitors for anomalous system calls. In this scenario, attackers can prevent anomalous system calls from being declared.
- The Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) software that responds to anomalous processes can be tampered with. Currently, our security policy consists of either terminating the VM or the anomalous process. Attackers can tamper our security policy so that the process that requested the anomalous system call is never terminated or the VM is never shut down.
- The log files that contain information about anomalous system calls, process information, and normal behavior can be tampered with by overwriting or appending them with false data.

In all the cases above, as long as a successful attack results in the VMI to continue its execution (e.g., no crashes), the VMI system can be made to generate a false pretense to mislead security experts that a VM process is not malicious when it actually is.

Guest-based VMI's have two unique advantages: (1) rich abstractions, and (2) speed.

Because the user space fills the semantic gap by providing interfaces to extract OS level information, guest-based VMI's are able to trivially intercept system calls and process information. For example, we can use critical kernel variables and functions to trace system call and process information by using kprobes. Even simpler, we can use third party Linux tools like strace to extract system calls to inspect their sequences. We can also trivially develop IDS and IPS systems that terminates an anomalous process by directly calling the lib C exit system call wrapper, and shutting down a VM using bash commands.

All the elements of a guest-based VMI can be executed faster than a hypervisor-based VMI because tracing system calls, monitoring for anomalies, and responding to anomalies do not require trapping to the hypervisor. Trapping to a hypervisor is very costly to the performance of a VM so much so that a single VM-exit can cause several microseconds or longer latency [20], depending on what is done during the VM-exit. One of the most effective ways to optimize a VMs performance is to reduce the number of VM-Exits. Traps and VM-exits are discussed in the "Background" chapter.

The security advantages (isolation, inspection, interposition, and deployability) provided by hypervisor-based VMI systems are more important than rich abstractions and speed that guest-based VMI's provide because our fundamental priority is to maintain the goals of computer security (confidentiality, integrity, authorization, availability, and accountability) throughout the life cycle of a VM. For that reason, we believe the advantages of hypervisor-based VMI systems outweigh the advantages of guest-based VMI systems. As a result, we have chosen to design and implement a hypervisor-based VMI system.

### **1.4.3 Why use eBPF for Tracing?**

As previously mentioned, most organizations today use cloud-computing environments and virtualization technology. In fact, Linux-based clouds are the most popular cloud environments among organizations, and thus have become the target of cyber attacks launched by sophisticated malware [16]. As a result, security experts, and knowledgeable users are required to monitor systems with the intent of maintaining the goals of computer security. The demand for monitoring Linux systems has led to the creation of many tracers like perf, LTTng, SystemTap, DTrace, BPF, eBPF, ktap, strace, ftrace, and more. As a result, when designing our VMI, we had the opportunity to choose from many tracing softwares. What follows is an explanation of why we selected eBPF to trace KVM guest VM system calls and the corresponding process that requested the system call.

Historically, due to the kernel's privileged ability to oversee and control the entire system, the kernel has been an ideal place to implement observability and security software.

One approach that many VMI designers and developers have taken to observe a VM is to extend the capabilities of the kernel or hypervisor by modifying its source code. However, this can lead to a plethora of security concerns, as running custom code in the kernel is dangerous and error prone. For example, if you make a logical or syntactical error in a user space application, it could crash the corresponding user space process. Likewise, if there exists a logical or syntactical error in kernel space code, the entire system could crash. Finally, if you make an error in an open source hypervisor code like KVM, all the running guest VM's could crash. Recall, the purpose of a VMI is to debug or conduct forensic analysis on a VM [17]. If the implementation of the VMI system hinders that purpose, it very quickly becomes an ineffective VMI system. To limit the amount of Linux kernel modifications and kernel module insertions required to implement our VMI, we chose to use eBPF to trace KVM guest system calls and the corresponding process that requested the system call. This is due to two reasons: (1) eBPF applications are not permitted to modify the kernel, and (2) eBPF is a native kernel technology that lets programs run without needing to add additional modules or modify the kernel source code.

The benefits of eBPF go well beyond just traceability. eBPF also runs with guaranteed safety with the help of a kernel space verifier that checks all submitted eBPF bytecode before its insertion into the eBPF VM [9]. For example, the eBPF verifier analyzes the program, and makes sure it conforms to a number of safety requirements, such as program termination, memory safety, and read-only access to kernel data structures [9]. For this reason, eBPF programs are far less likely to adversely impact a live production system compared to other methods of tracing (e.g. modifying mainline Linux kernel code and/or inserting a kernel module).

Superior performance is also an advantage of eBPF, which can be attributed to several factors. On supported architectures, eBPF bytecode is compiled into machine code using a just-in-time (JIT) compiler. This saves both memory and reduces the amount of time it takes to insert an eBPF program into the Linux kernel. Additionally, speed and memory are both saved because eBPF runs in kernel space and is able to communicate with the user space via both predefined and custom Linux kernel tracepoints (see Section 2.8). As a result, the number of traps required between the user space and

kernel space is greatly diminished (see Section 2.2.3).

Trust and support in eBPF has found its way into the infrastructure software layer of data centers that hold the data of millions of clients. For instance, eBPF is already being used in production at large datacenters by Facebook, Netflix, Google, and other companies to monitor server workloads for security and performance regressions [6]. Facebook has released its eBPF-based load balancer named Katran, which has now been powering Facebook data centers for several years. eBPF has also found its way into companies like Capital One and Adobe, who both leverage eBPF via the Cilium project to drive their networking, security, and observability needs in cloud environments. eBPF has even matured to the point that Google has decided to bring eBPF to its Kubernetes products GKE and Anthos as the new networking, security, and observability layer. The trust in eBPF by big companies has incentivized us, and was a factor into our decision to make our VMI utilize eBPF for tracing.

#### 1.4.4 Why Utilize System Calls for Introspection?

One of the design decisions that are considered when implementing a hypervisor-based VMI system is by asking the following question: What Linux system event can be traced and monitored to identify the presence of a malicious anomaly within a system, with a high success rate and a low false positive/negative rate? Existing research in both VMI systems like Nitro, and IDT systems like pH have answered the foregoing question by successfully utilizing guest system call as their target event from the hypervisor level, and proving its effectiveness with respect to performance and functionality. As a result, we have chosen to utilize system calls events in our VMI system. We will discuss Nitro in the subsequent section, and pH in section 2.9.

### 1.5 Related Work

In this section, we write about Nitro, a hardware-based VMI system that utilizes guest system calls for the purpose of monitoring and analyzing the state of a virtual machine. Nitro is the first VMI system that supports all three system call instructions (SYSCALL,

SYSRET, SYSENTER) provided by the Intel x86 architecture, and has once proven to work for Windows, Linux, 32-bit, and 64-bit guests. However, as previously mentioned, Nitro in its current state only works for Windows XP x64 and Windows 7 x64 due to a lack of codebase updates from the authors. What follows is an explanation of how Nitro solves the problem of tracing KVM VM system calls and processes from the hypervisor level.

### **1.5.1 Properties of Nitro**

#### **VMI Mechanisms for Tracing System Calls From The Host**

When Nitro was implemented, trapping to the hypervisor on the event of a system call was not supported on Intel IA-32 (i.e. x86) and Intel 64 (formerly EM64T) architectures. As a result, Nitro found a way to indirectly trap to the hypervisor in the event of a system call. Nitro does this by forcing system interrupts (e.g. page faults, general protection faults (GPF), etc) for which trapping is supported by the Intel Virtualization Extensions (VT-x). Since there are three system call mechanisms defined by the x86 architecture, and because they are quite different in their nature, a unique trapping mechanism was designed for each.

#### **How Nitro Empowers Anomaly Detection**

Nitro's implementation allows for tracing KVM guest system calls From the host. However, Nitro does not monitor for anomalous systems, nor does it respond to anomalous system calls. Instead, Nitro expects external applications to utilize Nitro's system call tracing capabilities to perform the monitoring and responding of anomalous system calls. Different applications for system call monitoring want a varying amounts of information. In some cases an application may want only a simple sequence of system call numbers, while other application may require detailed information including register values, stack-based arguments, and return values from a small subset of system calls. As Nitro cannot foresee every need of applications that conduct system call monitoring and responding, Nitro does not deliver a fixed set of data per system call. Instead, it allows the user to define flexible rules to control the data collection during system call



tracing. Based on the user specification, Nitro will then extract the system call number. It is always important to be able to determine which process produced a system call. Therefore, Nitro will also extract the process identifier. With these capabilities, Nitro can be used effectively in a variety of applications, such as machine learning approaches to malware detection, honeypot monitoring, as well as sandboxing environments.

## 1.6 Contributions & Improvements On Related Work

To summarize, our contributions are as follows:

- Nitro’s implementation only allows tracing of system calls of KVM VMs that are created with QEMU. Our VMI provides the ability to trace every KVM guest system call and their corresponding guest process no matter how the KVM VM was created.
- Nitro uses Rekall, a memory forensics framework, and LibVMI to retrieve process information from KVM VMs. Rekall is now discontinued and thus is not longer maintained. Our VMI uses our own implementation to retrieve KVM guest process information by reading the `%rdi` register everytime an `exec` family system call is executed on the KVM guest VM. This way, we don’t have to rely on third party software to retrieve process information.
- We extend the Linux kernel tracepoint API in the host OS to define two new events: (1) KVM guest system calls and (2) guest processes that requested a system call. The API extension allows eBPF programs to instrument these two events.
- Nitro is not capable of monitoring and responding to anomalous KVM guest system calls. With our prototype, we provide the ability to monitor and respond to anomalous KVM guest system calls by triggering the hypervisor to satisfy a variety of security policies. More specifically, our monitoring of anomalous system calls will be done in real time with pH. And our VMI’s response system will be able to

effectively delay or terminate an anomalous KVM guest process. Essentially, we are including an intrusion prevention system (IPS) into our VMI.

## 1.7 Thesis Organization

The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows:

- Chapter 2: We present detailed a background information on VMI systems, virtualization, system calls, the Linux kernel, the Linux tracepoint API, and eBPF.
- Chapter 3: We take a look at the design of our VMI.
- Chapter 4: We take a look at the implementation of our VMI.
- Chapter 5: We hypothesize the result of our VMI based on our design and implementation.
- Chapter 6: We explore our plan of action for the second term.

# Background

This chapter presents technical background information required to understand this thesis and discusses related work from the perspective of industry and academia.

Section 2.1 provides the different definitions of hypervisors. Section 2.2 explains the Intel Virtualization Extension (VT-x), which we utilize in our VMI prototype. Section 2.3 explains how the KVM hypervisor works. Section 2.4 explains the relationship between Quick Emulator (QEMU) and KVM. Section 2.5 comprehensively explains how a system call works in Linux systems. Section 2.6 provides the definition of a VMI.

## 2.1 Overview of Hypervisors

As previously mentioned, a hypervisor is software that allows virtual machines to be created and ran on a machine. Hypervisors can be divided into two types: (1) type 1 and (2) type 2, depending on where they are located on the machine.

### 2.1.1 Type 1 Hypervisor

Type 1 hypervisors run directly on physical hardware to create, control, and manage VMs and do not require the host OS. Type 1 hypervisors are also called native or bare-metal hypervisors. The first hypervisors, which IBM developed in the 1960s were native hypervisors [15]. Examples of type 1 hypervisors include, but are not limited to Xen, KVM, VMware ESX, Microsoft Hyper-V [1].

### 2.1.2 Type 2 Hypervisor

Type 2 hypervisors (also called hosted hypervisors) are installed on top of the actual operating system (Windows, Linux, MacOS), just like how computer programs install themselves onto OSs. In other words, a type 2 hypervisor runs as a process on the host OS. Type 2 hypervisors abstract guest operating systems from the host operating system by introducing a third software layer above the hardware, as shown in figure 2.1. Examples of type 2 hypervisors include but are not limited to VMware Workstation, VirtualBox, and QEMU [1].




Figure 2.1: Mental Model of Type 1 & Type 2 Hypervisor

### 2.1.3 Problems With Type 1 & Type 2 Hypervisor Classifications

Although the definitions of type 1 and type 2 hypervisors are widely accepted, there are gray areas where the distinction between the two remain unclear. For instance, KVM is implemented and deployed using two Linux kernel modules that effectively convert the host operating system into a type-1 hypervisor according to its creator RedHat

[12]. At the same time, KVM can be categorized as a type 2 hypervisor because the host OS is still fully functional and KVM VM's are standard Linux processes that are competing with other Linux processes for CPU time given by the Linux Kernel's native CPU scheduler [21].

Due to disagreements and vagueness in the classification of some hypervisors, a new type of classification was defined with the intent to clarify the ambiguity that definitions of type 1 and type 2 causes [2]. With the new definitions, hypervisors can be classified into two types: (1) native hypervisors and (2) emulation hypervisors [2].

#### **2.1.4 Native Hypervisor**

Native hypervisors are hypervisors that push VM guest instructions directly to the physical machines CPU using virtualization extensions like Intel VT-x. We write about Intel VT-x in a subsequent section [2]. Examples of Native hypervisors include but are not limited to Xen, KVM, VMware ESX, and Microsoft HyperV.

#### **2.1.5 Emulation Hypervisor**

Emulation hypervisors are hypervisors that emulate every VM guest instruction using software virtualization [2]. Emulated guest instructions are very easy to trace because all the guest VM instructions are trapped to the hypervisor. Examples of emulation hypervisors include but are not limited to QEMU, Bochs, and early versions of VMware-Workstation and VirtualBox [2].

## **2.2 x86-64 Intel Central Processing Unit**

### **2.2.1 Exceptions**

Exceptions are type of signals sent from a hardware device or user space process. to the CPU, telling it to immediately stop whatever it is currently doing either due to an abnormal, unprecedented, or deliberate event that occurred during the execution of a

program. When a user space process causes an exception, the control is transitioned from user mode (ring 3) to kernel mode (ring 0). When this happens, the values of all the CPU registers of the process that caused the exception will be saved to memory, so that the process can be loaded again in the future. After this, the kernel will attempt to determine the cause of the exception. Once the kernel identifies the cause of the exception, it will call the appropriate kernel space exception handler function to handle the exception. Every type of exception is assigned a unique integer called a vector [34]. When an exception occurs, the vector determines which function handler to invoke to handle the exception. If an exception is successfully handled, the CPU registers of the process that caused the exception will be restored, the process will be transitioned to user mode (ring 3), and execution will be transferred back to the user space process. It is worth noting that all of the previously mentioned steps are dependent on the CPU scheduler. For example, even if an exception is handled successfully, the CPU may choose to resume another user space process first before it resumes the one that caused the exception.

Exceptions can be divided into three categories: (1) faults, (2) traps, and (3) aborts. The goal of the background section is to solely provide information that will aid in understanding the design and implementation of our VMI. Faults and traps are the only exceptions that are utilized by our VMI. Therefore, we will not go into detail about aborts.

### 2.2.2 Faults

According to standards developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a fault is an error in a computer program's step, process, or data [8]. There exists many types of faults, which are each executed for different reasons. However, we will only introduce the Invalid Opcode (`#UD`) exception due to its relevance to our thesis. A `#UD` exception, also called an undefined instruction is a fault that is generated when an instruction that is sent to a CPU is undefined (not supported) by the CPU. Some faults can be corrected (with kernel function handlers) such that the program that caused the fault may continue as if nothing happened. However, if a fault, such as a `#UD` exception cannot be handled successfully by a relevant kernel function handler, then the computer will halt, and will in some cases require a reboot.

### 2.2.3 Traps

A trap is a type of exception that is solely triggered by a user space process. When the OS detects a trap, it pauses the user process, and executes the relevant trap handler inside the kernel. There exists different types of traps, which are each executed for different reasons. However, we will only introduce the single stepping trap. Single stepping is a mechanism that the Intel x86 CPU architecture provides. Its purpose is to generate a trap after executing an instruction. As long as single stepping is enabled, every instruction will trap to kernel space. Any program can activate single stepping by using an existing 3rd party software like GNU Debugger (GDB). When single stepping is enabled, there is no need to put a breakpoint/trap to a specific line of code, because every instruction will cause a trap.




Figure 2.2: Life Cycle of an Exception

#### 2.2.4 Instructions

In this subsection, we discuss briefly and in a high level what CPU instructions are with the intent to aid in understanding the design of our VML.

An instruction is a collection of bits that instruct the CPU to perform a specific operation. According to the Combined Volume Set of Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, an instruction is divided into six portions: (1) legacy prefixes, (2) opcode, (3) ModR/M, (4) SIB, (5) Displacement, and (6) Immediate. The legacy prefix is a 1-4 byte field that is used optionally, so we will not discuss it further. The opcode (2), also known as the operation code, is a 1-3 byte field that uniquely specifies and represents what operation should be performed by the CPU. Intel x86\_64 CPUs define many operations like SYSCALL, SYSENTER, and SYSRET, which have an opcode of 0x0F05, 0x0F34, and 0x0F07, respectively. Depending on the execution mode you are in, either the SYSCALL, SYSENTER, or SYSRET operation will be processed by the CPU when a process executes a system call. Informally, (3), (4), and (5) indicate the addresses. Addresses include operands/data that the opcode is dependent on to execute. The operands are stored in registers from which data is taken or to which data is deposited. There are two ways an operand can appear in a register. Firstly, an operand can be stored in the register. This is known as direct operand. (2)



Or, the address of the operand can be stored in the register. This is called an indirect operand.




Figure 2.3: High Level Illustration of Instruction Format

### 2.2.5 Registers

x86-64 has 14 general-purpose registers and 4 special-purpose registers. We will only introduce the `%rip` and `%rdi` registers.

#### 2.2.6 `%rip` Register

`%rip` is a special register that holds the memory address of the next instruction to execute. `%rip` is an example of an indirect operand.

#### 2.2.7 `%rdi` Register

when we call a function, we have to choose some registers to hold the function arguments. `%rdi` is a general-purpose register that holds the data of the first argument given to a function. For example, if you called the `execve` system call, then `%rdi` would point to the filename.

#### 2.2.8 `%cr3` Register & Page Table Management

In Linux, each process has its own page table in the kernel. Having a separate page

table for each process is necessary for process isolation as they should not be allowed to access other processes memory. In linux there are 4 levels of page tables: (1) Page Global Directory (PGD), Page Upper Directory (PUD), Page Middle Directory (PMD), and Page Table Entry directory (PTE). Each process has an associated struct `mm_struct` which describes its general memory state including a pointer to its PGD page, which gives us the means to traverse the four page tables (starting with PGD). On x86-64, each time the kernel's CPU scheduler switches to a process, the process's PGD is written to the `cr3` register.

### 2.2.9 Protection Rings

Before we explore the hypervisor further, we must introduce protection rings (also known as privilege modes, but not to be confused with CPU modes), which is a mechanism that Intel CPUs implement to aid in fault protection. Prior to the implementation of protection rings, all the elements of a process executed in the same space. This arrangement meant that when any process generated a fault, it had the ability to affect other processes that were running normally (that did not generate a fault). For example, a process that generated a fault would crash itself, but would also cause a perfectly running process to crash with it [24]. Due to these problems, protection rings were introduced to provide the OS with a hierarchical layer for protecting the integrity and availability of both user space and kernel space processes. With protection rings, an OS's kernel can deal with faults by terminating only the process that caused the fault.

By creating a conceptual model for protection rings, one can better understand them. Therefore, we describe protection rings as a hierarchical system that consists of four layers: Ring 0, Ring 1, Ring 2, and Ring 3. Next, we describe how portions of the OS are separated into each of these four rings.

First, the OS and all of its processes, functions, user applications, etc., are appointed to a specific ring. This ring is the only place where these processes are permitted to execute. If a process in one ring needs another process or resources from another ring, it must conform to the following directive:

Communication between each ring are strictly controlled. Each layer only works with

the layer above/below it. As an example, Ring 3 can only communicate with Ring 2. Ring 2 can communicate with Ring 1 and Ring 3, but not Ring 0.

Ring 0 is where the operating system kernel resides and runs. This ring has the highest level of privileges. The kernel resides in ring 0 because it is responsible for providing services for all other parts of the OS. This level of permission is referred to as kernel, privileged, and/or supervisor mode. In this mode, privileged instructions are executed and protected areas of memory may be accessed [24].

Linux kernel Ring 1 is typically where other OS components that are not in the kernel run. This ring also runs in privileged mode. Ring 2 is where software-like device drivers run. Currently, ring 1 and 2 are usually unused by most OSes for four reasons: (1) Intel x86 is the only notable architecture that supports ring 1 and ring 2, (2) paging doesn't differentiate between rings 1, 2 and 3, (3) the introduction of Intel VT-x stopped hypervisors from running in Rings 1 and 2, and (4) rings 1 and ring 2 were initially designed to separate privileged drivers from actual kernel code but quickly abandoned because it's more work than it's worth.

Ring 3 is where user applications and programs run. This ring has the least amount of privileges and permissions, and is said to run in user mode. In user mode, the executing code has no ability to directly access hardware or reference memory. Code running in user mode must delegate to system APIs to access hardware or memory. Due to the protection afforded by this sort of isolation, crashes in user mode are always recoverable. Most of the code running on your computer will execute in user mode. As such, when certain user space process instructions require processes or resources from more privileged rings, the user application will issue a system call to the next ring in order to obtain the appropriate service.

The segmentation that protection rings creates, allows for process isolation, and helps ensure that one process does not adversely affect another. For example, if one process crashes due to a fault, protection rings prevents another unrelated process from crashing.




Figure 2.4: Illustration of the Intel x86 Protection Ring

### 2.2.10 Execution Modes

The x86 has been extended in many ways throughout its history, remaining mostly backwards compatible while adding execution modes and large extensions to the instruction set. A modern x86 processor can operate in one of four major modes: 16-bit real mode, 16-bit protected mode, 32-bit protected mode, and 64-bit long mode.

### 2.2.11 Model Specific Register (MSR)

A Model specific register (not to be confused with machine state register) is a control register first introduced by Intel for testing new experimental CPU features. For example during the time of Intel i386 CPUs, Intel implemented two model specific registers (TR6 and TR7) for testing translation Look-aside buffer, which is memory cache used for speeding up the conversions of virtual memory to physical memory. Intel warned that these control registers were unique to the design of i386 CPUs, and may not be present in future processors. The TR6 and TR7 control registers would be kept in

the subsequent i486 CPUs. However, by the time i586 ("Pentium") was released, the TR6 and TR7 MSRs were removed. As a result, software that was dependent on these control registers would no longer be able to execute on Intel Pentium series CPUs. At first there were only about a dozen of these MSRs (Model-Specific Registers), but lately their number is well over 200. Some MSRs have evidently proven to be sufficiently satisfactory and worth having due to their proven usability for debugging, program execution tracing, computer performance monitoring, and toggling of certain CPU features [30]. As a result, the Intel manual states that many MSRs have carried over from one generation of IA-32 processors to the next and to Intel 64 processors. A subset of MSRs and associated bit fields, are now deemed as permanent fixtures of the defined i386 architecture. For historical reasons (beginning with the Pentium 4 processor), these "architectural MSRs" were given the prefix "IA32\_". One such MSR is the IA32 Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER). The proven usefulness of the EFER MSR has made Intel classify this MSR as architectural model-specific registers and has committed to their inclusion in future product lines.

Each MSR is a 64-bit wide data structure and can be uniquely identified by a 32-bit integer. For example, the IA32\_EFER MSR can be uniquely identified by the 32-bit integer 0xC0000080. It is possible for a subset of the 64-bit wide MSR data structure to be reserved, so that it cannot be modified by a user. Non-reserved bits can be set or unset by using Intel's provided WRMSR instruction. Finally, any bit (reserved and non-reserved) of an MSR can be read by Intel's provided RDMSR instruction. Each MSR that is accessed by the RDMSR and WRMSR group of instructions must be accessed by using the 32-bit unique integer identifier. The table below (Table 2.1) provides information about each of the bits of the IA32\_EFER MSR data structure. It is worth mentioning that the SCE label (bit 0) is by far the most interesting bit of this particular MSR. This is because bit 0 is able to enable and disable the syscall instruction. This bit is also interesting because it can be modified by any user who has privileges to execute the WRMSR instruction. For example, if the bit 0 is set to a value of 0, then the SYSCALL instruction will be undefined by the CPU. Therefore, every attempt to execute the SYSCALL instruction by a machine will result in an invalid OP CODE (#UD) exception (as previously discussed in the exception subsection). If bit 0 is set to 1, then the SYSCALL instruction will be defined by the CPU. By default

(unless manipulated by a user), bit 0 of the IA32\_EFER MSR has bit 0 set to 1. That is why system calls are able to execute perfectly fine on our machines.

For our understanding our thesis, it is very important that we mention that according to Chapter 35 of Volume 3 of the Intel Architectures SW Developer's Guide, MSRs hold three properties. Firstly, MSRs with a scope of "thread" are separate for each logical processor and can only be accessed by the specific logical processor.

MSRs with a scope of "core" are separate for each core, so they can be accessed by any logical processor (thread context) running on that core. MSRs with a scope of "package" are global to the package, so access from any core or thread context in that package will access the same register.

Table 2.1: IA32\_EFER MSR (0xC0000080)

Bits(s)	Label	Description
0	SCE	System Call Extensions
1-7	0	Reserved
8	LME	Long Mode Enable
9	0	Reserved
10	LMA	Long Mode Active
11	NXE	No-Execute Enable
12	SVME	Secure Virtual Machine Enable
13	LMSLE	Long Mode Segment Limit Enable
14	FFXSR	Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR
15	TCE	Translation Cache Extension
16-63	0	Reserved




Figure 2.5: Representation of the IA32\_EFER MSR (0xC0000080)

### 2.2.12 Supervisor Mode Access Prevention

Programmers tend to put a lot of thought into how the kernel can be protected from user-space processes. The security of the system as a whole depends on that protection. For example, page tables provides supervisor mode flag, and if set, user space can't access it. Before Meltdown, the kernel's memory was always mapped, so user-space code could conceivably read and modify it. But the page table supervisor mode protections flag disallowed that access; any attempt by user space to examine or modify the kernel's part of the address space will result in a segmentation violation (SIGSEGV) signal. After Meltdown, increased isolation was done with the kernel page-table isolation (KPTI). With this, the kernel is never mapped into user space. Just like protecting kernel space from user space, there is also value in protecting user space from the kernel. For instance, without protecting user space from kernel space, the kernel space has read and write access to user space memory mappings. This has led to the development of several security exploits, including privilege escalation exploits, which operate by causing the kernel to access user-space memory when it did not intend to. For this reason, Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) was introduced in Intel CPUs, and was supported by Linux beginning in kernel version 3.7. SMAP support was also added to KVM in 2014. Both host and guest OSs have SMAP enabled by default for processors which support the feature. Intel's SMAP implementation defined a new SMAP bit in the CR4 control register (bit 21). When that bit is set, any attempt to access user space memory while running in kernel mode will lead to a fault. Of course, there are times when the kernel needs to access user space memory. In these instances, Intel has defined a separate "AC" flag that controls the SMAP feature. If the AC flag is set,

SMAP protection is in force. Otherwise access to user-space memory is allowed. Two new instructions (STAC and CLAC) are provided to manipulate that flag relatively quickly. STAC is used to enable SNAP, and CLAC is used to disable SMAP. For example, when the kernel space wants to access user space data using the the Linux Kernel API functions like `get_user()` or `copy_from_user()`, then SMAP is disabled using CLAC.

## 2.3 Intel Virtualization Extension (VT-X)

Intel Virtualization Extension (VT-X), also known as Intel VMX (Virtual Machine Extensions) is a set of CPU extensions that drives modern virtualization applications like KVM on Intel CPUs. Intel VT-x was released on November 13, 2005 on two models of Pentium 4 (Model 662 and 672) as the first Intel processors to support VT-x [24]. As of 2015, almost all newer server, desktop and mobile Intel processors support VT-x [24]. To maintain consistency throughout this thesis, we will only use the abbreviation "Intel VMX" or "VMX".

### 2.3.1 Overview

Intel VMX can be viewed as a function that switches processing from a VM to the hypervisor upon detection of a sensitive instruction by the physical CPU [11]. If a guest VM is able to execute sensitive instructions on a guest system without any intervention by the host, it will cause serious problems for both the hypervisor and guest VM [11]. Therefore, it is necessary for the physical CPU to detect that the execution of a sensitive instruction is beginning and to direct the hypervisor to execute that instruction on behalf of the guest VM. However, x86 CPUs were not originally designed with the need for virtualization in mind, so there exist sensitive instructions that the CPU cannot detect when a guest VM executes them []. As a result, the hypervisor is unable to execute such instructions on behalf of the guest system. Intel VT-x was developed in response to this problem [11].

Fundamentally, VMX technology introduces two new operating modes in the Intel CPU: the root mode and the non-root mode. Root mode is intended for the hypervisor



running on the host, and non-root mode is intended for each of the VMs of the hypervisor running in the guest. The term "root mode" is analogous to "Ring -1", which is used to conceptualize root mode as a new protection layer of the protection ring. However, it is worth noting that in reality of the CPU's protection rings, "ring -1" is non-existent. The Intel CPU ring privileges only consist of layers in the set  $\{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ . Root mode and non-root mode makes use of traditional execution modes (i.e., real mode, long mode, and protected mode). As such, a VM (running in non-root mode) can make use of any of these execution modes. Root mode and non-root mode also makes use of traditional protection modes. The creation of root mode and non-root mode allows the CPU and user to maintain the distinction between guest user applications and guest kernel applications automatically, essentially creating a directly comparable ring protection model (as the host OS) for each guest VM. As a result, the main purpose and motivation of introducing root mode and non-root mode is to place limitations to the actions performed by the guest OSs, and also isolate running guest OSs from its hypervisor. Whenever a guest OS instruction tries to execute an instruction that would either violate the isolation of the hypervisor, or that must be emulated via host software, the hardware can initiate a trap, and switch to the hypervisor to handle the trap. This is very similar to the intentions of introducing a protection ring as explained in the "protection ring" section. As a result, a guest OS (running in non-root mode) can run in any privilege level without being able to impact or compromise the hypervisor hosting the VM.




Figure 2.6: Illustration of VMX Root & Non-Root Mode in Relation to Intel Protection Rings.

### 2.3.2 Novel Instruction Set

VMX adds 13 new instructions, which can be used to interact and manipulate the CPU virtualization features. The 13 new instruction can be divided into three categories. Firstly, a subset of new instructions were created for interacting and manipulating the VMCS from root mode (hypervisor level). These include the VMXON, VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMCLEAR, VMREAD, VMWRITE, VMLAUNCH, VMRESUME, and VMXOFF instructions. Secondly, another subset of the new instructions were created for use by the the guest VM (non-root mode). These include the VMCALL, and VM-

FUNC instructions. Lastly, there are 2 instructions that are used for manipulating translation lookaside buffer. These include the INVEPT and INVVPID instructions. Translation lookaside buffer is not relevant to this thesis. Therefore, we will not explain the INVEPT and INVVPID instructions.

## **VMXON**

Before this instruction is executed, there is no concept of root vs non-root modes, and the physical CPU operates as if there was no virtualisation. VMXON must be executed in order to enter virtualisation. Immediately after VMXON, the CPU is placed into root mode.

## **VMLAUNCH**

Creates an instance of a VM and enters non-root mode. We will explain what we mean by “instance of VM” in a short while, when covering VMCS. For now think of it as a particular VM created inside of KVM.

## **VMPTRLD**

A VMCS is loaded with the VMPTRLD instruction, which loads and activates a VMCS, and requires a 64-bit memory address as its operand in the same format as VMXON/VMCLEAR [25].

## **VMPTRST**

Stores the current VMCS pointer into a memory address

## **VMCLEAR**

When a pointer to an active VMCS is given as operand, the VMCS becomes non-active. [5]

## **VMREAD**

Reads a specified field from the VMCS and stores it into a specified destination operand. [27]

## **VMWRITE**

Writes content to a specified field in a VMCS. [28]

## **VMCALL**

This instruction allows a guest VM (non-root mode) to make a call for service to the hypervisor. This is similar to a system call, but instead for interaction between the guest VM and hypervisor. [29]

## **VMRESUME**

Enters non-root mode for an existing VM instance.

## **VMFUNC**

This instruction allows the guest VM (non-root mode) to invoke a VM function, which is processor functionality enabled and configured by software in VMX root operation. No VM exit occurs.

## **VMXOFF**

This instruction is the converse of VMXON. In other words, VMXOFF exits virtualisation.

### **2.3.3 The Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS)**

Additionally, a concept of the Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) is introduced. The VMCS is a structure that is responsible for state-management, communication and configuration between the hypervisor and the guest VM. It contains all the information needed to manage the guest VM. A hypervisor maintains  $N$  virtual central processing units (VCPUS), where  $N$  is the product of the number of VMs running on the hypervisor and the number of VCPUs running on each VM. In other words, there exists one VMCS for each VCPU of each virtual machine. However, only one VMCS is present

on the physical processor at a time.

A VMCS can be manipulated by the new instructions VMCLEAR, VMPTRLD, VMREAD, and VMWRITE. For example, the VMPTRLD instruction is used to load the address of a VMCS, and VMPTRST is used to store this address to a specified address in memory. As there can exist many VMCS instances, but only one active one at one time, the VMPTRLD instruction is used on the address of a particular VMCS to mark it active. Then, when VMRESUME is executed, the non-root mode VM uses that active VMCS instance to know which particular VM and vCPU it is executing as. The particular VMCS remains active until the VMCLEAR instruction is executed with the address of the running VMCS. The VMCS can be accessed and modified through the new instructions VMREAD and VMWRITE. All of the new VMX instructions above require root 0, so they can only be executed from the kernel space.

More formally, a VMCS is a contiguous array of fields that is grouped into six different sections: (1) host state, (2) guest state, (3) control, (4) VM entry control, (5) VM exit control, and (6) VM-exit information.

- Host state: The state of the physical processor is loaded into this group during a VM-exit.
- Guest state: The state of the VCPU is loaded from here during a VM-entry and stored back here during a VM-exit.
- Control: Determines and specifies which instructions are allowed and which ones are not allowed during non-root mode. Instructions that are defined as not allowed, will result in a VM exit to the hypervisor (root mode);
- VM-entry control: These fields governs and defines the basic operations that should be done upon VM-entry. For example, what MSRs should be loaded on VM-entry.
- VM-exit control: VM-exit control fields governs and defines the basic operations

that must be done upon a VM-exit. For example, it defines what MSRs need to be saved upon VM-exit.

- VM-exit Information: Provides the hypervisor with additional information as to why a VM-exit took place. This field of the VMCS can be especially useful for debugging purposes.

### 2.3.4 VM-Exit

VM-exits is considered to be a trap that transfers control from the guest VM (non-root mode) back to the hypervisor (root mode). For a VM-exit to be successful, the given steps must take place. Firstly, the state of the running VCPU that caused the VM-exit must be saved in the "guest state" section of the VMCS. This includes information about guest MSRs. Second, information about the reason for the VM-exit must be written into the "VM-Exit Information" section of the VMCS. These should all take place before the execution is handed over to the hypervisor. When execution is given to the hypervisor, the hypervisor will handle the instruction that the guest OS could not execute by using a handler function. The handler function that is used by the hypervisor is solely dependent on the reason for the VM-exit, which is expressed in the "VM-Exit Information". For example, if a undefined instruction (#UD exception) caused a VM-exit, then the hypervisor will use the following handler function to emulate the instruction that the guest VM could not execute:

---

```
int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu){
    static const char kvm_emulate_prefix[] = { __KVM_EMULATE_PREFIX };
    int emul_type = EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD;
    char sig~\cite{10.1007/978-3-642-25141-2_7}; /* ud2; .ascii "kvm" */
    struct x86_exception e;
    if (unlikely(!kvm_can_emulate_insn(vcpu, emul_type, NULL, 0)))
        return 1;
    if (force_emulation_prefix &&
```

```

    kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu),
        sig, sizeof(sig), &e) == 0 &&
    memcmp(sig, kvm_emulate_prefix, sizeof(sig)) == 0) {
    kvm_rip_write(vcpu, kvm_rip_read(vcpu) + sizeof(sig));
    emul_type = EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED;
}
return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type);
}

```

---

Listing 2.1: /arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6959 — Linux kernel V5.18.8

Next, the changes that the hypervisor made to the state of the guest VM will be saved to the guest state section of the VMCS, so that the guest VM can continue running as if it successfully executed the instruction that caused the VM-exit. Finally, a VM-entry will occur using the VMRESUME instruction.

Certain VM-exits occur unconditionally. For example, when a VM attempts to execute an instruction that is prohibited in the guest VM (non-root mode), the VCPU immediately traps to the hypervisor (root mode). Another example of a unconditional VM-exit is if MSRs were manipulated (with the help of the Intel defined WRMSR instruction) such that an instruction was made undefined. VM-exits can also occur conditionally (e.g., based on control bits in the VMCS). For example, the hypervisor can set a bit in a specific field of the control section of the VMCS such that whenever a VM guest VCPU encounters a RDMSR instruction, a VM-exit to the hypervisor is performed. The following is a list of instructions that could cause VM-exits in VMX non-root operation depending on the setting of the "VM-execution control" section of the VMCS:

Table 2.2: Instructions that could cause conditional VM-exits as defined by the VM-exit control section of the VMCS

Instruction
CLTS
ENCLS
HLT
IN
INS/INSB/INSW/INSD
OUT
OUTS/OUTSB/OUTSW/OUTSD
INVLPG
INVPCID
LGDT
LIDT
LLDT
LTR
SGDT
SIDT
SLDT
STR
LMSW
MONITOR
MOV from CR3/CR8
MOV to CR0/1/3/4/8
MOV DR
Continued on next page



Table 2.2 – Continued From Previous Page

<b>Instruction</b>
MWAIT
PAUSE
RDMSR
WRMSR
RDPMC
RDRAND
RDSEED
RDTSC
RDTSRCP
RSM
VMREAD
VMWRITE
WBINVD
XRSTORS
XSAVES

Currently, there are 69 different VM-exit codes (characterized by their exit reason) specified by the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual.

Table 2.3: Intel VMX Defined VM-Exits

<b>VM-Exit Code</b>	<b>Corresponding Name</b>
0	Exception or NMI
1	External interrupt
Continued on next page	

Table 2.3 – Continued From Previous Page

VM-Exit Code	Corresponding Name
2	Triple fault
3	INIT signal
4	Start-up IPI
5	I/O SMI
6	Other SMI
7	Interrupt window
8	NMI window
9	Task switch
10	CPUID
11	GETSEC
12	HLT
13	INVD
14	INVLPG
15	RDPMC
16	RDTSC
17	RSM
18	VMCALL
19	VMCLEAR
20	VMLAUNCH
21	VMPTRLD
22	VMPTRST
23	VMREAD
24	VMRESUME
25	VMWRITE
26	VMXOFF
27	VMXON
28	CR access
29	MOV DR
30	I/O Instruction
31	RDMSR
Continued on next page	

Table 2.3 – Continued From Previous Page

VM-Exit Code	Corresponding Name
32	WRMSR
33	VM-entry failure 1
34	VM-entry failure 2
36	MWAIT
37	Monitor trap flag
39	MONITOR
40	PAUSE
41	VM-entry failure 3
43	TPR below threshold
44	APIC access
45	Virtualized EOI
46	GDTR or IDTR
47	LDTR or TR
48	EPT violation
49	EPT misconfig
50	INVEPT
51	RDTSMP
52	VMX timer expired
53	INVVPID
54	WBINVD/WBNOINVD
55	XSETBV
56	APIC write
57	RDRAND
58	INVPCID
59	VMFUNC
60	ENCLS
61	RDSEED
62	Page-mod. log full
63	XSAVES
64	XRSTORS
Continued on next page	

Table 2.3 – Continued From Previous Page

VM-Exit Code	Corresponding Name
66	SPP-related event
67	UMWAIT
68	TPAUSE
69	LOADIWKEY

To synthesise all the information above about VM-exits, we will explain the cycle of a VM-exit with respect to an example in which an undefined instruction causes a VM-exit with exit code 0 (exception or NMI). As previously mentioned, an undefined instruction, also called an illegal opcode is a fault that is generated due to an instruction to a CPU that is not supported by the CPU either due to the instruction being undefined by the CPU designer, or because a user manipulated the relevant CPU MSR(s) in order to make the instruction undefined by the CPU.

For this example, we assume that virtualization is turned off. For that reason we begin by making the the physical CPU execute the VMXON instruction to start virtualisation and put itself into VMX root mode. In Figure 2.5, this is illustrated by (1). Next, the hypervisor executes a VMLAUNCH instruction in order to pass execution to the guest VM (non-root mode). We do not use the VMRESUME instruction because we are assuming that the guest VM was not previously running (as we just used the VMXON instruction to enable virtualization). In Figure 2.4, the guest VM starting is illustrated by (2). The VM instance runs its own code as if running natively until it attempts to execute an instruction that is either undefined or defined to result in a VM-exit by the control section of the VMCS. In both cases, it will result in a VM-exit. However, it is worth mentioning that in our example, the guest ran an undefined instruction and not an instruction that was governed by the VMCS to result in a VM-exit. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5 by (3). The hypervisor will consult the "VM-exit information" section of the VMCS to look into why the cause of the VM-exit. Based on the information provided by the "VM-exit Information" section of the VMCS, the hypervisor will take appropriate action by using a handler relevant to the exit reason.




Figure 2.7: Life Cycle of a VM-Exit on invalid opcode

### 2.3.5 VM-Entry

VM-entry transfers control from the hypervisor (VMX root mode) back to the guest VM (VMX non-root mode). Software can enter VMX non-root operation using either of the VM-entry instructions VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME. For example, if the guest VCPU is not yet running (due to a prior VMCLEAR instruction), then it will use VMLAUNCH. In the case of a VM-exit, it will use VMRESUME [31]. Before a VM-entry can commence, the hypervisor executes dozens of checks to ensure that the state of the VMCS is correctly configured such that the subsequent VM-exit can be supported, and and the guest conforms to IA-32 and Intel 64 architectures [11].

To help understand the purpose and relevance of VM-entry within the life cycle of a hypervisor with guest VMs, we will explain the cycle of a VM-entry as illustrated in Figure 2.6. In this example, we assume that the virtualization is not enabled. Thus, we execute the VMXON instruction and enter into the hypervisor (VMX root mode). Next, we execute VMLAUNCH (VM-entry) to start the guest VM.




Figure 2.8: Life Cycle of a VM-Entry

Now that we have introduced the background information of VMX, we can give an overview of the life cycle of a hypervisor. First, a program executing in ring 0 needs to execute the VMXON instruction to enable virtualization and enter into VMX root mode. At this point, the program is considered a hypervisor. This is illustrated in figure 2.7 with (1). Second, the hypervisor sets up a valid VMCS with the appropriate control bits set. Third, the hypervisor can launch a VM with the VMLAUNCH (VM-Entry) instruction, which transfers execution to the VM for the first time. If the VM-Entry was successful, the hypervisor will now wait for the guest to trigger a VM-exit. If the VM-entry failed, then the VMLAUNCH instruction would return an error, and control would remain within the hypervisor. Assuming that the VM-entry succeeded, and the guest ran an instruction that was prohibited, the guest will trigger a VM-exit, causing the hypervisor to regain control. This is illustrated by (3). Fourth, the hypervisor transfers execution control back to the VM by executing the VMRESUME instruction (4), and we effectively go back to step (3). Alternatively, the hypervisor can also stop the VM and disable VMX by executing VMXOFF, as shown by (4).




Figure 2.9: Successful Hypervisor Life Cycle Under Intel VMX

## 2.4 System Calls

As previously mentioned, modern computers are divided into two modes: user mode (ring 3) and root mode (ring 0). Computer application such as Microsoft Teams resides in user space (ring 3), while the underlying code that runs the operating system exists in kernel space (ring 0). By design, user space processes cannot directly interact with the kernel space. Instead, the operating system provides an API for user space processes to interact with the kernel, when it is in need of its services. This API is known as system calls. x86 CPUs define hundreds of system calls, which the operating system utilizes. Each system call has a vector that uniquely maps it. For instance, in the x86\_64 architecture, the `mmap` system call corresponds to vector 9, and the `brk` system call corresponds to vector 12. The system call vector is used to find the desired kernel function for the request.

There are three types of system call instructions defined by x86 CPUs: (1) `SYSCALL`, (2) `SYSRET`, and (3) `SYSENTER`. The `SYSCALL` instruction is used when the system is in long mode.

## 2.5 The Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) Hypervisor & QEMU

Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) is an open-source hypervisor implemented as two Linux kernel modules. The first KVM kernel module inserted into the Linux kernel is

called `kvm.ko`, and is architecture independent [7]. The second KVM kernel module is architecture dependent [7]. Therefore, if the machine's physical CPU is Intel based, `kvm-intel.ko` will be inserted into the Linux kernel. If the machine's physical CPU is AMD based, then `kvm-amd.ko` will be inserted [7]. The insertion of the two kernel modules transforms the Linux kernel into a hypervisor. KVM was merged into the mainline open-source Linux kernel in version 2.6.20, which was released on February 5, 2007. Since its inception into the Linux kernel, Linux kernel developers have helped extend the functionality of KVM [11]. This section begins by explaining how KVM works and describes its internal and external components. KVM requires a CPU with hardware virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT-x or AMD-V. Our discussion will assume that KVM is utilizing Intel VMX virtualization extension.

KVM is structured as a Linux character device file. The kernel module creates a character device named `"/dev/kvm"`, which can be used as an API to interact or manipulate with KVM VMs. In order to access this API, one must make use of the `ioctl` (input/output control) system call. The `ioctl` system call takes a file descriptor and a request as arguments. The file descriptor is returned to a user upon opening the character device file `/dev/kvm`. The KVM API provides users with dozens of `ioctl` requests that can be used to interact or manipulate a KVM VM. Some of the relevant ones include `KVM_CREATE_VM`, which creates a new guest VM, `KVM_RUN`, which is a wrapper to the `VMLAUNCH` VMX instruction, `KVM_GET_MSR`, which returns a value for a specific MSR, and `KVM_SET_MSR`, which can be used to set a value of a specific MSR. User space VM management tools like `libvirt` and `virt manager` make use of the KVM API to manage KVM VMs.

The KVM kernel module cannot, by itself, create a VM. To do so, it must use QEMU, a host user space binary called `qemu-system-x86_64`. As QEMU is a host user space process, it utilizes the `/dev/kvm` character device file API to request the KVM kernel module to execute KVM functions. For example, QEMU is used to create a VM by using the `KVM_CREATE_VM` `ioctl` call. There is one QEMU process for each guest VM. So, if there are  $N$  guest VMs running, then there will be  $N$  QEMU processes running on the host's user space. QEMU is a multi-threaded program, and one virtual CPU (VCPU) of a KVM guest VM corresponds to one QEMU thread. Therefore,



the cycles illustrated in Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 are performed in units of threads. QEMU threads are treated like ordinary user processes from the viewpoint of the Linux kernel. Scheduling for the thread corresponding to a virtual CPU of the guest system. Scheduling is governed by the Linux kernel scheduler in the same way as other process threads. Unlike the KVM hypervisor, QEMU is a hardware emulator, which is capable of executing CPU instructions that are both defined and undefined by the physical CPU of your machine. QEMU is useful when the physical CPU cannot handle an instruction generated by a KVM guest VM. QEMU is able to achieve hardware emulation by using Tiny Code Generator (TCG), which is a Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler that transforms a instruction written for a given processor to another one. Therefore, KVM lets a program like QEMU safely execute instructions that resulted in a VM-exit directly on the host CPU if and only if the instruction executed by the guest VM is supported by the host CPU. If the instruction executed by the guest VM (that resulted in a VM-exit) is not supported by the host CPU, then QEMU will use the TCG to translate and execute instructions if and only if TCG is enabled. If TCG is not enabled, then QEMU cannot emulate an instruction. To aid in the understanding of the life cycle of a KVM VM, we present and explain an example (Figure 2.9) to show how QEMU and KVM would handle an arbitrary instruction X that results in a VM-exit.




Figure 2.10: Decision on Whether QEMU use TCG or CPU for Executing an Arbitrary Instruction X.

First, a character device file named `/dev/kvm` is created by KVM (1). This allows QEMU to utilize this character device file to make requests to the KVM kernel module. In our case, a user requested to begin execution of a specific guest VM. Thus, QEMU will make an `ioctl()` with argument `KVM_RUN` to instruct the KVM kernel module to start up the guest VM (2). Internally, KVM will perform a `VMXON`. Afterwards, KVM will begin executing the guest VM by calling `VMLAUNCH` (3). The KVM guest VM will now run until it requires help from the hypervisor to execute an instruction. In our example, the guest VM attempts to execute an arbitrary instruction X (4). However, it is unable to. Therefore, a `VM-exit` is performed (5), and KVM identifies the reason for the exit by using the `VM-exit` information section of the `VMCS`. After the `VM-exit`, control is transferred to the relevant QEMU thread to decide whether the instruction X is supported by the machine's CPU. If instruction X is supported by the machine's CPU, then it will execute it on there (7). Otherwise, TCG will be used to emulate the instruction (7). Upon completion of the execution of instruction X, QEMU will once again make an `ioctl()` system call and request the KVM to continue guest processing. In other words, the execution flow will return to step 1. This flow is repeated during the execution of a KVM guest VM until the `VMXOFF` instruction is executed.

We must now consider the case in which TCG was disabled either implicitly (due to QEMU default settings) or explicitly by the user. If TCG was disabled, then QEMU will not be able to emulate the instruction that resulted in a VM-exit, and was not capable of executing on the machine's CPU. In the case of TCG being disabled, the Linux kernel provides a number of functions that is able to emulate a non exhaustive amount of Intel x86 instructions. For example, here is the KVM function that emulates one of the three existing system call instructions provided by Intel x86.

---

```
static int em_syscall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt){
    const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
    struct desc_struct cs, ss;
    u64 msr_data;
    u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
    u64 efer = 0;

    /* syscall is not available in real mode */
    if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
        ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
        return emulate_ud(ctxt);

    if (!(em_syscall_is_enabled(ctxt)))
        return emulate_ud(ctxt);

    ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
    if (!(efer & EFER_SCE))
        return emulate_ud(ctxt);

    setup_syscalls_segments(&cs, &ss);
    ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
    msr_data >>= 32;
    cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data & 0xfffc);
    ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 8);

    if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
```

```

        cs.d = 0;
        cs.l = 1;
    }
    ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
    ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);

    *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = ctxt->_eip;
    if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_R11) = ctxt->eflags;

        ops->get_msr(ctxt,
                     ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ?
                     MSR_LSTAR : MSR_CSTAR, &msr_data);
        ctxt->_eip = msr_data;

        ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, &msr_data);
        ctxt->eflags &= ~msr_data;
        ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
#endif
    } else {
        /* legacy mode */
        ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
        ctxt->_eip = (u32)msr_data;

        ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_VM | X86_EFLAGS_IF);
    }

    ctxt->tf = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF) != 0;
    return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}

```

---

Listing 2.2: /arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2712 — Linux kernel V5.18.8

How does KVM know when to call `em_syscall` when the CPU cannot execute it, and when TCG is disabled? The answer is that KVM will fetch and decode the instruction that was provided by the guest VM by reading the "VM-exit information" section of

the VMCS. Afterwards, KVM will call an appropriate index of an opcode matrix. The index of the opcode matrix will then call `em_syscall`. The following snippet is a portion of the opcode matrix/table:

---

```
static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
    N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_syscall),
        .
        .
        .
    N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N
};
```

---

Listing 2.3: `/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2712` — Linux kernel V5.18.8

From observing the code snippet above, we can see that if the KVM guest VM executes a `syscall`, and it results in a VM-exit code 0 (Exception or NMI) that cannot be handled by both the CPU and TCG, then the opcode matrix will call `em_syscall` and transfer execution back to the guest with a `VMRESUME` instruction. An example of TCG being disabled, and the `SYSCALL` instruction being undefined by the machines CPU is illustrated in figure 2.10.




Figure 2.11: Partial KVM Life Cycle if TCG is Disabled

The worse case senario of any KVM VM is if an instruction is all three senarios are true in the event that a KVM guest VM attempted to execute an instruction that resulted in a VM-exit:

- The instruction cannot be executed on the machines physical CPU.
- The instruction cannot be executed using TCG due to it being disabled.
- The KVM hypervisor does not support the emulation of the instruction.

If any KVM guest VM comes across this senario, then the VM will halt forever, and must be restarted.

## 2.6 Virtual Machine Introspection

Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a term created by Garfinkel and Rosenblum in 2003 [10]. VMI describes the method of monitoring and analyzing the state of a virtual machine from either the hypervisor level or the guest VM all without affecting its

functionality. However, due to the existence of hypervisors, VMI is now almost always implemented as an out-of-VM monitoring system [4]. Also, out-of-vm based monitors have been widely adopted because they run at higher privilege level and are isolated from the guest VMs that they monitor and can trap all the guest OS events as they are one layer below the guest OS. VMI allows us to take advantage of both the machine's hardware and the VMM to inspect any guest VM. The VMM is able to be manipulated in ways that result in important guest VM events being trapped to the hypervisor. This ability to do this with a hypervisor is valuable for virtual machine introspection as it allows us to trap important actions a guest VM may execute, and inspect the guest's state at exactly that moment.

## 2.7 eBPF

### 2.7.1 Overview

eBPF is a native Linux kernel space program that allows user space programs to trace kernel space events without modifying the Linux kernel. eBPF was motivated by the need for better Linux tracing tools. It was inspired by dtrace, which is a tracing tool available for Solaris and BSD operating systems. Unlike Solaris and BSD, Linux did not have a software tool to provide an overview of the running systems. It was limited to specific 3rd party frameworks that utilized system calls, library calls, and kernel modules to gather information. Although Linux kernel modules are useful, they also pose a significant risk to the system because they run in kernel space. Linux kernel modules could cause the kernel to crash. In addition to having a wide range of security flaws, modules have a high overhead maintenance cost because updating the kernel could break the module. Building on the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF), which is a software tool for capturing, monitoring, and filtering network traffic in the BSD kernel, a team began to extend the BPF backend to provide a similar set of features as dtrace. eBPF was first released in limited capacity in 2014 with Linux 3.18, and the full software released in Linux 4.4 and above.

### 2.7.2 How Does eBPF Work?

There are two ways to write eBPF programs: (1) you can inject eBPF bytecode directly into the kernel, or (2) use one of the many frontend APIs to convert a higher level language into eBPF bytecode. For example, BPF Compiler Collection (BCC) is an front end API for eBPF that allows several high level languages including Python, Go, and C++ to write eBPF programs in C to generate eBPF bytecode and submit it to the kernel. Before the bytecode is loaded into the kernel, the eBPF program must pass a certain set of requirement. This involves executing the eBPF program to a verifier to perform a series of checks. The verifier will traverse the potential paths the eBPF program may take when executed in the kernel, making sure the program does indeed run to completion without an infinite loop that would cause a kernel lockup. Other checks the verifier does include checking for valid register states, making sure the eBPF program size has a maximum of 4096 assembly instructions to guarantee that the program will terminate within a bounded amount of time, and verifies that no out of bounds memory accesses are possible. If all these checks pass, the eBPF program is then sent to a JIT compiler that translates the eBPF bytecode into the machine specific instruction set to optimize execution speed of the program. This makes eBPF programs run as efficiently as natively compiled kernel code or as code loaded as a kernel module. Afterwards, the eBPF program is loaded into the kernel, it listens for kernel events that the eBPF program specified to observe. Kernel events are an action or occurrence that is defined by either the Linux kernel Tracepoint API, a user defined user space event (uprobe) or a user defined kernel space event (kprobe). When these hooks are triggered, the eBPF program will capture it and transfer it to user space, allowing us to simply observe the data or manipulate it. The transferring of event data from kernel space to user space is done by a mechanism named eBPF maps. Maps can take the form of many different data structures depending on the user's needs. The ability to place hooks into almost any function with the Linux kernel Tracepoint API, uprobe, or kprobe is one of the many aspects that makes eBPF so useful. For example, a user can hook a kernel system call function, so that it can be traced every time the the system call is executed. What follows is an extensive explantion to the Linux Kernel Tracepoint API. We do not further explain uprobes or kprobes because they are not utilized in our VMI.






Figure 2.12: Illustration of eBPF Life Cycle

## 2.8 The Linux Kernel Tracepoint API

### 2.8.1 Overview

A Tracepoint is a marker (a piece of code) that can be hooked to certain areas of the Linux kernel source to allow for tracing kernel events at runtime and without stopping the execution of the kernel. Tracepoints are used by a number of tools for kernel debugging and performance problem diagnosis like eBPF. Although using tracepoints is ideal when possible, they have a few caveats; in particular, a limited number of tracepoints are defined by the kernel, and they do not cover an exhaustive list of kernel functionality. The official kernel code base consists of thousands of predefined events. A small proper subset of these predefined events are KVM related. Whether that number will grow significantly is a matter of debate within the official team of Linux kernel developers community. However, as the Linux kernel is open-source, it is trivial to extend the tracepoint API to hook kernel functions in order to trace kernel events of interest.

### 2.8.2 Identifying Traceable Kernel Subsystems

Assuming that you have not extending the Linux kernel tracepoint API, the directories within `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events` represent the kernel subsystems that are available for tracing. On Linux kernel version 5.18.8, there are 124 subsystems that are traceable by the API, which consist of the following:

---

Table 2.4: Traceable Kernel Subsystems

alarmtimer	gvt	kvm	mmc
clk	i2c	mmap	oom
enable	io_uring	netlink	ras
ftrace	jbd2	pwm	sched
hwmon	mei	rseq	syscalls
iomap	neigh	swiotlb	v 412
iwlwifi_msg	power	irq_vectors	xen
mce	resctrl	tlb	cfg80211
msr	sock	x86_frb	dma_fence
page_pool	thp	bpf_trace	filemap
regmap	workqueue	devfreq	header_page
skb	block	fib6	interconnect
thermal	cros_ec	bpf_trace	iwlwifi_data
vsyscall	ext4	hda_intel	mac80211
asoc	hda	intel_iommu	module
compaction	i915	irq_vectors	page_isolation
error_report	irq	kvmmmu	raw_syscalls
gpio	kmem	mmap_lock	scsi
hyperv	migrate	nmi	task
iommu	net	qdisc	vb2

iwlwifi_ucose	printk	rtc	xhci-hcd
mdio	rpm	sync_trace	cgroup
napi	spi	udp	drm
percpu	timer	xdp	fs_dax
regulator	writeback	bridge	huge_memory
smbus	bpf_test_run	devlink	iocost
thermal_power_allocator	dev	filelock	iwlwifi_io
wbt	fib	header_event	mac80211_msg
avc	hda_controller	intel-sst	mptcp
cpuhp	initcall	iwlwifi	pagemap
exceptions	irq_matrix	libata	rcu
signal	tcp	vmscan	

---

### 2.8.3 Identifying Tracepoint Events

Each subsystem consists of multiple kernel events that can be traced. For example, `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kvm` consists of all the KVM events that are traceable.

### 2.8.4 Tracepoint Format File

Each event has a format file that provides a user with arguments that can be traced from kernel space to user space eBPF programs. For example, the format file for KVM exits can be found in `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kvm_exit/format`, and are shown in Listing 2.4. These arguments come from the mainline kernel space KVM function `_vmx_handle_exit`. These arguments are passed to the kernel space tracepoint function. When tracing the `kvm_exit` event, the information that these arguments contain is what is stored and sent back to the user space via the eBPF map data structure. In

Listing 2.4, we can see per one execution of the `__vmx_handle_exit` function, some of the information the `kvm_exit` tracepoint holds is `exit_reason` (exit code), the `rip` register of that particular instruction, and the `vcpu` number.

---

```

name: kvm_exit
ID: 2059
format:
    field:unsigned short common_type; offset:0; size:2; signed:0;
    field:unsigned char common_flags; offset:2; size:1; signed:0;
    field:unsigned char common_preempt_count; offset:3; size:1; signed:0;
    field:int common_pid; offset:4; size:4; signed:1;

    field:unsigned int exit_reason; offset:8; size:4; signed:0;
    field:unsigned long guest_rip; offset:16; size:8; signed:0;
    field:u32 isa; offset:24; size:4; signed:0;
    field:u64 info1; offset:32; size:8; signed:0;
    field:u64 info2; offset:40; size:8; signed:0;
    field:u32 intr_info; offset:48; size:4; signed:0;
    field:u32 error_code; offset:52; size:4; signed:0;
    field:unsigned int vcpu_id; offset:56; size:4; signed:0;

```

---

Listing 2.4: Format File for the `kvm_exit` Linux Kernel Tracepoint Event — Linux kernel V5.18.8

### 2.8.5 Tracepoint Definition

Tracepoints are defined in header files under `include/trace/events`. Each tracepoint definition consists of a description of the following:

#### TP\_PROTO

The `TP_PROTO` is the function prototype of the function that is calling the tracepoint. For example, if talking about the `kvm_exit` event, the `TP_PROTO` would be `TP_PROTO(unsigned int exit_reason, unsigned long guest_rip)`, and would be called from the `__vmx_handle_exit` function for each `kvm_exit` a VM makes.

## **TP\_ARGS**

TP\_ARGS corresponds to the parameter names, which are the same as the ones given to TP\_PROTO.

## **TP\_STRUCT\_entry**

TP\_STRUCT\_entry corresponds to the fields which are assigned when the tracepoint is triggered. For example, in the case of `kvm_exits`, these are the fields included in the format file in Listing 2.4 above.

## **TP\_fast\_assign**

TP\_fast\_assign statements consist of the kernel variables that instantiate the fields found in the format file in Listing 2.4 above.

## **TP\_printk**

TP\_printk is responsible for using those field values to display a relevant tracing message to programs like eBPF.

## **2.9 Intrusion Detecion Prevention System**

### **2.9.1 Overview**

With respect to our thesis, intrusion detection is the process of monitoring events occurring in a computer system and analyzing them for anomalies, which are violations or imminent threats of violation of our defined computer security policies. There are two types of intrusion detecetion systems: IDS and IDPS. An IDS is software that automates the intrusion detection process by implicitly monitoring a computer for malicious activity. An IDPS is a software that automates the intrusion detection process, and also reponds to the malicious activity by attempting to stop it from continuing. In this

section, we will only write about IDPS. IDPS software use two notable methodologies to detect anomalies: signature-based, and anomaly-based.

### **2.9.2 Signature-Based Detection**

A signature is a pattern that corresponds to a known attack. Signature-based detection is the process of comparing signatures (of known attacks) against events of a computer system to identify possible attacks. Signature-based detection is very effective at detecting known attacks but largely ineffective at detecting unknown attacks. For example, if there is no signature for an arbitrary attack X, then the IDS will not be able to identify and respond to the arbitrary attack X.

### **2.9.3 Anomaly-Based Detection**

Anomaly-based detection is the process of comparing definitions of what activity is considered normal against computer events to identify significant changes. An IDPS using anomaly-based detection has profiles that represent the normal behavior of activities for users. The profiles are developed by monitoring the characteristics of typical activity over a period of time. For example, a given profile Y for a host system might hold normal sequences of system calls of a given program K. The IDPS then uses this normal profile to compare the characteristics of future running instances of program K. If there is a strong deviation between the normal profile and the new running instance of program K, then the IDPS will detect program K as malicious and respond to it by perhaps stopping the process. Unlike signature-based detection, the major benefit of anomaly-based detection is that they can be effective at detecting unknown attacks. For example, suppose that a computer becomes infected with a new type of malware. The malware could request a large number of unique system calls that deviate from the a normal profile. Even though it is a new malware, an anomaly-based detection can still respond to it as long as it deviates from a normal profile. A disadvantage of a anomaly-based detection is that building profiles that distinguish normal behavior from anomalous behavior is very challenging because computing activity is complex and always changing. For example, if a particular program K runs a completely normal activity M that performs large amounts of system calls only once a month, the activity

may not have been observed during the training period of a normal profile. Therefore, when the normal activity M occurs, it is likely that the IDPS will consider it malicious because it significantly deviates from the existing normal profile. For that reason, program K will terminate, causing normal behavior to fall victim to the IDPS.

#### **2.9.4 Process Homeostatis**

## Designing Frail

In this section, we introduce the design of our KVM and Intel VT-x exclusive hypervisor-based VMI system called *Frail*. More specifically, we discuss the design of the four notable components that make up our VMI Frail. Firstly, (1) we explain how our VMI intends to make it possible to trace every system call from any running KVM guest VM. Secondly, we explain how our VMI intends to be able to trace the guest processes that asked for services to the guest kernel by via system calls. Thirdly, we explain our design decisions on how we can integrate Somayaji’s pH implementation with our VMI in order to monitor the system calls for anomalies. Lastly, we explain our design decisions as we intend to respond to anomalous system calls found by pH.

### 3.1 Tracing KVM VM System Calls

With virtualization support like VMX on modern CPUs, a majority of KVM guest instructions run directly on the CPU without requiring intervention by the hypervisor (see Section 2.1.4). A small proper subset of KVM guest instructions require VM-exits, and are either sent to the CPU for execution, or require emulation either by KVM or TCG (see section 2.5). By default, every system call instruction (SYSCALL, SYSRET, and SYSENTER) that is executed in a KVM VM is defined by modern Intel x86 CPUs, and do not require a VM-exit. Therefore, it runs directly from VMX non-root to the CPU (see Section 2.2.6). For this reason, it is not trivial for hypervisor-based VMI systems to trace KVM guest system calls. This is related to our first research question (see Section 1.3). What follows is our design decisions for how we successfully trace KVM guest system calls from VMX root.



### 3.1.1 Trapping System Calls from VMX Non-Root to VMX Root

Our design for tracing KVM VM system calls is based on trapping and emulating instructions. In this subsection, we will discuss our methods for trapping every system call instruction (SYSCALL, SYSENTER, and SYSRET) in the KVM guest such that it results in a VM-exit to the hypervisor (VMX root). We do this by unsetting bit 0 of the IA32\_EFER MSR using the WRMSR instruction. How do we know this works? Recall from section 2.2.6 that the IA32\_EFER MSR is capable of making the SYSCALL instruction undefined by the CPU if bit 0 is unset. Moreover, according to the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, when bit 0 of the IA32\_EFER MSR is unset, then every SYSCALL instruction will result in a #UD exception. Recall from section 2.2.2 that a #UD exception is a fault that traps execution to root mode. In the case of a VM, a #UD exception that occurs in VMX non-root will result in a trap such that execution is transferred to VMX root, so that the #UD exception can be handled by the KVM hypervisor. In the next subsection, we explain how the trapped system call instructions are handled so that the guest VM can continue running normally after a VM-entry.

### 3.1.2 Emulating SYSCALL, SYSRET, SYSENTER

Once a SYSCALL, SYSENTER, and SYSRET instruction results in a trap to VMX root due to a #UD exception, we have two choices to handle it. (1) We can utilize QEMU’s TCG capabilities to emulate the instructions and VM-entry back into the KVM VM. (2) We can utilize KVM’s emulation capabilities (see Section 2.5) to emulate the instruction and then resume execution of the VM with a VM-entry. We chose to do the latter because emulating instructions via TCG is slower than emulating via KVM’s predefined emulation functions. However, one issue arises: the KVM’s emulation functionality does not implement emulation for the SYSRET instruction. Thus, we have implemented our function that emulates this instruction, which can be viewed in Figure xxx. After implementing this function, we added it to the opcode table so that every #UD exception caused by a SYSRET instruction is handled by calling our new function.

### 3.1.3 Ensuring Every System Call Instruction is Trapped

Recall from section 2.2.6 that MSRs with a scope of "thread" are separate for each logical processor and can only be accessed by the specific logical processor. The IA32\_EFER MSR has a scope of "thread" according to the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual. This means that each VCPU of a KVM VM has its own IA32\_EFER MSR. For that reason, to trace every KVM guest system call of a particular KVM VM, we unset bit 0 of the IA32\_EFER MSR for every VCPU that exists on the KVM VM. We do this step for every KVM VM that exists.

How do we know that a VM-exit was caused by a system call instruction, and not something else? In our design two checks are done to verify that a VM-exit was caused by a system call instruction. Recall that every `#UD` exception causes a VM-exit with code 0. Therefore, we filter out VM-exits to include only VM-exits with code 0. However, system call instructions are not the only instructions that result in a code 0 VM-exit. A code 0 VM-exit occurs when an NMI was delivered to the CPU. An NMI can be either a `#UD` exception, `#BR` exception, `#BP` exception, or `#OF` exception. Also, a `#UD` exception is not exclusively caused by an undefined system call instruction. It can be caused by any undefined instruction to a CPU. Therefore, our second check consists of checking the `%rip` instruction pointer. Recall that the instruction pointer `%rip` points to the next instruction (opcode) to execute. Therefore, we check if the first two bytes of the value that `%rip` points to is equal to `SYSCALL` (0x0F05), `SYSENTER` (0x0F05), or `SYSRET` (0x0F07). With these two checks, we can guarantee that the instructions that we trace are only x86 defined system call instructions. This approach allows a VMI system to introspect guest system call events in the ideal way: the guest VM can stay running throughout introspection.

### 3.1.4 Extending Linux Kernel Tracepoint API

After trapping every KVM VM system call to VMX root, we will need a way to trace the system calls from ring 3 of VMX root. For that reason, we extend the Linux kernel tracepoint API by creating a new tracepoint that gets called whenever a KVM VM system call occurs. As eBPF programs can utilize the Linux kernel tracepoint API, we

can use it to trace these system calls from the user space. Figure 3.1 illustrates this interaction.




Figure 3.1: Illustration of Tracing KVM VM System Call

### 3.2 Tracing KVM VM Processes

Unlike VM system calls, we cannot cause a VM-exit to retrieve process information. For this reason, we must resort to a new and less trivial way to retrieve process information.

When a Linux process is executed on an x86 CPU, the CR3 register is loaded with the physical address of that process's page global directory (PGD). This is necessary so the CPU can perform translations from virtual memory address to physical memory addresses. Since every process needs its own PGD, the value in the CR3 register will be unique for each scheduled process in the system. This is very convenient for VMI because it means we don't need to constantly scan the guest kernel's memory to keep track of which process is being executed. For example, we can create a hashtable in which our keys are given by the CR3 register, and the values as a system call caused by the process corresponding to CR3. Due to the guaranteed uniqueness of the CR3 physical memory address, multiple keys will not end up with the same hashcode, thus,

a collision will never occur. The uniqueness of CR3s help with storing processes and their corresponding system calls. However, simply tracking changes of the CR3 register doesn't give us much insight into guest processes due to the semantic gap between the VM and hypervisor. In order to bridge this gap, we need to map every address that is loaded into the CR3 register to the name of the process (the binary). In order to get the process name, we track the exec family of system calls. Why do we do this? Because to create a new process, an exec type system call must be used. The first argument of every exec type system call requires the filename of the process. If we want to get the filename that was passed as an argument to exec, then we must read the %rdi register from the hypervisor level, which will store the virtual address of the 1st argument given to the exec function. We can then use KVM's builtin function `kvm_read_guest_virt` to read the virtual address given by %rdi to grant us the filename. During this process, we are accessing KVM VM user space data from the hypervisor. KVM has SMAP enabled by default, so you would think that reading VM user space data from the hypervisor would result in a fault. However, `kvm_read_guest_virt` uses `copy_from_user` to get its data. However, as explained in section 2.2.11, `copy_from_user` temporarily disables SMAP. For of this, we are able to successfully retrieve guest VM process information directly from the KVM hypervisor.

Similar to system calls, after setting up the logic to access the KVM guest process names from the hypervisor, we need to let the host user space (VMX root ring 3) access it. Therefore, we extend the Linux kernel tracepoint API again by creating two new tracepoints. The first tracepoint will send all instances of the value that CR3 to to user space. The second tracepoint will send all instances of the value that points to %rdi to user space. Again, as eBPF programs can utilize the Linux kernel tracepoint API, we can use it to trace these process identifiers from the user space.




Figure 3.2: Illustration of Tracing KVM Guest Processes

### 3.3 Monitoring Sequence of System Calls

#### 3.3.1 Overview

The method we present here performs anomaly intrusion detection. We build up a profile of normal behavior for a program of interest, treating deviations from this profile as anomalies. There are two stages to the anomaly detection: In the first stage we build up profiles or databases of normal behavior (this is analogous to the training phase for a learning system); in the second stage we use these databases to monitor process behavior for significant deviations from normal (analogous to the test phase). Recall that we have chosen to define normal in terms of short sequences of system calls. In the interests of simplicity, we ignore the parameters passed to the system calls, and look only at their temporal orderings. This definition of normal behavior ignores many other important aspects of process behavior, such as timing information, instruction sequences between system calls, and interactions with other processes. Certain intrusions may only be detectable by examining these other aspects of process behavior, and so we may need to consider them later. Our philosophy is to see how far we can go with

the simplest possible assumption.

### 3.3.2 Profiling Normal Behavior

The algorithm used to build the normal databases is extremely simple. We scan traces of system calls generated by a particular program, and build up a database of all unique sequences of a given length,  $k$ , that occurred during the trace. Each program of interest has a different database, which is specific to a particular architecture, software version and configuration, local administrative policies, and usage patterns. Once a stable database is constructed for a given program, the database can be used to monitor the ongoing behavior of the processes invoked by that program. This method is complicated by the fact that in UNIX a program can invoke more than one process. Processes are created via the fork system call or its virtual variant vfork. The essential difference between the two is that a fork creates a new process which is an instance of the same program (i.e. a copy), whereas a vfork replaces the existing process with a new one, without changing the process ID. We trace forks individually and include their traces as part of normal, but we do not yet trace virtual forks because a virtual fork executes a new program. In the future, we will switch databases dynamically to follow the virtual fork. Given the large variability in how individual systems are currently configured, patched, and used, we conjecture that individual databases will provide a unique definition of normal for most systems. We believe that such uniqueness, and the resulting diversity of

systems, is an important feature of the immune system, increasing the robustness of populations to infectious diseases [20]. The immune system of each individual is vulnerable to different pathogens, greatly limiting the spread of a disease across a population. Traditionally, computer systems have been biased towards increased uniformity because of the advantages offered, such as portability and maintainability. However, all the advantages of uniformity become potential weaknesses when errors can be exploited by an attacker. Once a method is discovered for penetrating the security of one computer, all computers with the same configuration become similarly vulnerable. The construction of the normal database is best illustrated with an example. Suppose we observe the following trace of system calls (excluding parameters):

open, read, mmap, mmap, open, read, mmap We slide a window of size  $k$  across the trace, recording each unique sequence of length  $k$  that is encountered. For example, if  $k = 3$ , then we get the unique sequences: open, read, mmap read, mmap, mmap mmap, mmap, open mmap, open, read

For efficiency, these sequences are currently stored as trees, with each tree rooted at a particular system call. The set of trees corresponding to our example is given in Figure 1.

## 3.4 Responding to Anomalous Behavior

When our sequences of system calls algorithm detects a malicious process, we either terminate the malicious process, or the VM that is running the malicious process. In our user space interface, we will provide the option for users to choose from one of these two responses when the VMI detects a malicious anomaly.

### 3.4.1 Terminating Malicious Virtual Machine

Terminating a VM that is running a malicious process is trivial because both our VMI and the VMs are running on VMX root processes. For this reason, we can simply use the kill system call to terminate a KVM VM.

### 3.4.2 Terminating Malicious Process

Terminating a guest process from the hypervisor is not as trivial as terminating a VM. Like much of the complexities of our VMI, this is also due to the semantic gap. When a malicious process makes a system call, we will replace the system call with the exit system call before VM-entry to the VM. We do this by writing to the %rax register. More specifically, we replace the system call number that %rax points to with the value 60, which corresponds to the exit system call in Intel x86-64 CPUs. Recall that the exit system call is used to terminate the calling process. Due to the semantic gap, the KVM hypervisor does not have access to the PID of the process that requested the system call. However, unlike the kill system call, the exit system call does not require a pid as argument. It only requires a status code of type int as argument. Therefore, we will also have to write the %rdi register to point to an int variable. By doing this, we can effectively end any process that our sequences of system call algorithm detected as malicious. After terminating the process, the %cr3 value that corresponds to the process will be removed from our database of known KVM VM processes. An advantage to using the exit system call to terminate a process is that exit does not terminate children processes. This allows us our VMI to continue to monitor a child process of the process that was anomalous. This is advantageous because a process that is anomalous does not mean their child will also be anomalous.



## **Implementation of Frail VMI**

### **4.1 User Space Component**

The user space component is implemented using Python and C. The interface provides the user the option to trace KVM guest system calls from specific VCPUs based on their PID. When a user selects preferred PID, the VMI will begin to trace system calls and processes only from those VCPUs.

### **4.2 Kernel Space Component**

The Kernel space component simply consists of a modified Linux kernel, modified KVM and extended Tracepoint API.

### **4.3 Extending the Linux Kernel Tracepoint API**

### **4.4 Tracing Processess**

### **4.5 Proof of Tracability of all KVM Guest System Calls**

## **Future Work (Winter 2022)**

### **5.1 Implementing Sequences of System Calls**

Due to time limitations during the Fall 2022 semester, we were not able to implement the monitoring of malicious system calls using pH's implementation of sequences of system calls. We will bring the next term by implementing this key feature into our VMI. This is related to our third research question as mentioned in Section 1.3.

### **5.2 Responding to Anomalies**

### **5.3 Measuring Frail's Performance**

After our implementation is complete, we will conduct performance tests of KVM VM with and without our VMI enabled.

### **5.4 Discuss the shortcomings of our VMI System**

### **5.5 Discuss Future Work (Beyond Winter 2022)**

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