

The security philosophy

Threats targeting the hybrid & cloud identity platform



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How to use this document

Why this document?

This document is provided as a companion of the video lessons. Additional information is included here which would not fit the video format or would exaggeratedly lengthen the videos. As you are watching the videos, the instructor will point you to additional content in this document.

Structure

The structure of this slide deck follows the structure of the lessons. One slide deck is provided for each module. The slide deck has the same structure (naming of chapters and sections) as the associated video so that you can quickly jump to the slides of the lesson you are currently watching.

Foreword

This deck contains some design artefacts which all have their importance...

Abbr.

This sticky note icon is used to introduce the **abbreviation** of a concept or a technical word. Once the abbreviation has been introduced, the full version is no longer mentioned.

You will also find a list of all abbreviations at the end of the deck.



We were all young once. A section with this icon will tell you the **history** you might have missed by not working with the technology for the last 20 years.

Just because you are new does not mean you do not have to know how we got here!



Professor Useful will introduce some **tricky technical details** which might not seem relevant at first but could end up being really useful if you want to dig deeper in the technology.

This frame contains...

- Takeaways so important that we framed them

How to know the slide level

This deck contains 3 different content levels:

1. Regular level, the common slide
2. Advanced level, a slide with this indicator at the top left 
3. Additional content, all hidden slides


Sequence

1

The security
philosophy



Learning Objectives



Identify important concepts to follow when working on projects to enhance the security of an environment

Agenda

-
-
-
-
- 1. AD and Azure AD: perfect targets
- 2. Defense in depth
- 3. The initial breach
- 4. The attacker's perspective
- 5. Introduction to the phases of an attack

Chapter

2.1.1

AD and Azure AD: perfect targets

- 🎯 Explain why identity platforms are targets



Is AD or AAD really the target?

AD/AAD is targeted but not for what it is, but for what it gives access to

AD or AAD is not the initial breach

The user' device is the battlefield

- And by extension, the identities on these devices are the targets


Initial breaches can have various forms

- 0-day
- Phishing
- Password discovery attacks




Identities have power over...

(Azure) Active Directory Service



Means of control over AD


Domain Controller Host





Credentials / Roles



Security Dependencies




Directory Data



(Azure) Active Directory Service

Gain control of the Domain Controller host

Domain Controller Host



- If you have physical access to a DC
 - Or its hard drive
 - Or its backup
- If you have physical access to the virtual platform of a virtual DC
 - Or are an admin of this platform

Then you control the environment!

Gain control of the privileged identities


Credentials / Roles



- If you found the password of an admin account, you can control the platform
- If you stole the credentials of a privileged account, then you can control the platform

Gain control of security dependencies


Security Dependencies



- If you have agents running on DCs, whoever owns these agents - owns the DCs
 - Backup agents
 - Monitoring agents
 - Threat detection agents
 - Software deployment agents
 - ...
- If integrated applications have privileges in AD, then the admins of those applications own AD

Gain control through directory data

Directory Data




- Incorrect and permissive delegations will allow new control paths
 - Incorrect Group Policy permissions
 - Incorrect OU permissions
 - Incorrect privileges on applications
- When permissions are given to non-privileged accounts, they become unsuspected privileged accounts

Install from Media


IFM

- Feature that allows promotion of new domain controllers from pre-seeded set of files
- Created to speed up promotion time in high latency environments
- IFM contains the database and SYSVOL
- IFM are as sensitive as a domain controllers' backups
- You need to monitor if IFM are being created on your domain controllers

Is your Azure AD platform safe by default?



AD DS



AAD

- Azure AD Connect Sync
- AD FS
- PTA agent

🔒 Your cloud environment is as safe as your on-premises environment

Chapter

2.1.2

Defense strategy

- 🎯 Describe the concept of defense in depth



What's the plan?

1. Assume breach
2. Defense in depth

Assume breach

You don't know what you don't know


- ? An attacker might have gotten into the system in the past
- ? An attacker may currently be in the system
- ? We can't expect to protect our environment against attack techniques which do not exist yet

Defense in depth

- You want to make it...
 - 💪 Harder
 - ⌚ Longer
 - 🔊 Louder

... for the attacker
- You want to be an unattractive target

Attack services are cheap



Threat Environment and Trends


← → ⌂ ⌂ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/ciso-workshop/the-ciso-workshop-videos#threat-envir... ⌂ ⌂ A[¶]

Threat Environment and Trends

Filter by title


- Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Workshop Training
- The CISO Workshop
- CISO Workshop videos**
- > Archive

Both the threat environment and the technical estates we operate are complex and constantly changing. Security must keep up with business and technology transformation, especially as we see ransomware and "as a service" models impacting business.




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
Disrupt the attack timeline



Disrupt Attackers



Disrupt Attackers



A layered approach to Security

- **Physical Security**


Physical building security and controlling access to computing hardware within the data center is the first line of defense.

- **Identity & Access**

Control access to infrastructure, change control
Use single sign-on and multi-factor authentication
Audit events and changes

- **Perimeter**

Use distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) protection to filter large-scale attacks before they can cause a denial of service for end users
Use perimeter firewalls to identify and alert on malicious attacks against your network



A layered approach to Security

■ Networking

Limit communication between resources through segmentation and access controls

Deny by default


Restrict inbound internet access and limit outbound where appropriate

Implement secure connectivity to on-premises networks

■ Compute

Secure access to virtual machines

Implement endpoint protection and keep systems patched and current



A layered approach to Security

In almost all cases, attackers are after data!

- Application

- Ensure applications are secure and free of vulnerabilities

- Store sensitive application secrets in a secure storage medium

- Make security a design requirement for all application development


- Data

- Stored in a database

- Stored on disk inside virtual machines

- Stored on a SaaS application such as Office 365

- Stored in cloud storage



Chapter

2.1.3


The initial breach

- 🎯 Explain the concept of the initial breach




All begins with the initial breach

The identity is the new perimeter



Real life examples



Real life examples

- Supply chain attacks

The goal is to access source codes, build processes, or update mechanisms by infecting legitimate apps to distribute malware.

Advanced Persistent Threats

APT

- IT's a cyber attack where the attacker gains and maintains unauthorized access to the target environment
 - Remains undetected for a significant period
- The attacker will monitor, recognize and relay information and sensitive data.
 - The intention of an APT is often to exfiltrate or steal data
- Use two primary methods of persistence
 - Compromised endpoints and compromised credentials.

Chapter

2.1.4

The attacker's perspective

- 🎯 Describe an attacker's perspective



Think like an attacker



Which nodes contain harvestable privileged credentials?

Which nodes can attacker access using these credentials?

What is the cost of reaching a node?

Bloodhound

- Open-source tool used by attackers to visualize control paths leading to identified targets using a Graph database (Neo4j)
 - Ideally to domain admin accounts
- It shows control path for both AD DS and Azure AD
- The collection tool is called Sharpound
 - But you can also inject data collected by other tools



Defensive teams should also use it!


Stormspotter

- Open-source tool developed by Microsoft Security Teams to visualize control paths of Azure objects using a graph database (neo4j)
- It shows control path for Azure resources
- The collection tool is called Stormcollector

Defensive teams should also use it!



Thinking Like an Attacker



Chapter


2.1.5

Introduction to the phases of an attack


- 🎯 Describe the different phases of an attack



Attacks generic phases



Attack Kill Chain model



1. **External reconnaissance:** Attempts to locate potential penetration point to map and understand the layout and structure of victim's environment.
2. **Compromise machine/Initial foothold:** Gains access to victim's network.
3. **Initial internal reconnaissance:** Works on "mapping" the internal network layout and identifying "interesting" areas.
4. **Low privileges "Lateral movement" cycle:** Begins to move across devices in the network to "improve position" to reach privileged credentials.
5. **Domain admin credentials:** Gains access to privileged credentials by moving "enough" to get to a machine where these credentials exist.
6. **Domain persist:** they want, whenever and however within the environment.
7. **High privileges "Lateral movement" cycle:** Uses previously compromised privileged credentials to move towards the area that includes the asset of interest to the attacker.
8. **Asset access:** Accesses high-value assets.
9. **Exfiltration:** Transfers the collected information outside of the victims' network
10. **Persistence:** Gains full control of the domain and the ability to do whatever used for the attackers goals.

What is MITRE ATT&CK?

- Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
- Designed to document common Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)
- Provides matrices of known adversary techniques cataloged by tactics, techniques, and sub-techniques
- Can document detections and behaviors from security products and map to MITRE ATT&CK
- Assists in identifying and prioritizing gaps in security detection and protection

MITRE phases

1. Reconnaissance
2. Resource Development
3. Initial Access
4. Execution
5. Persistence
6. Privilege Escalation
7. Defense Evasion
8. Credential Access
9. Discovery
10. Lateral Movement
11. Collection
12. Command and Control
13. Exfiltration
14. Impact

Tactics and Techniques

Tactics

| Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Drive-by Compromise | AppleScript | .bash_profile and .bashrc | Access Token Manipulation | Access Token Manipulation | Account Manipulation | Account Discovery | AppleScript | Audio Capture | Commonly Used Port | Automated Exfiltration | Account Access Removal |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | CMSTP | Accessibility Features | Accessibility Features | Binary Padding | Bash History | Application Window Discovery | Application Deployment Software | Automated Collection | Communication Through Removable Media | Data Compressed | Data Destruction |
| External Remote Services | Command-Line Interface | Account Manipulation | AppCert DLLs | BITS Jobs | Brute Force | Browser Bookmark Discovery | Clipboard Data | Clipboard Data | Connection Proxy | Data Encrypted | Data Encrypted for Impact |
| Hardware Additions | Compiled HTML File | AppCert DLLs | AppInit DLLs | Bypass User Account Control | Credential Dumping | Component Object Model and Distributed COM Discovery | Component Object Model and Distributed COM | Custom Command and Control Protocol | Data Transfer Size Limits | Defacement | |
| Replication Through Removable Media | Component Object Model and Distributed COM | AppInit DLLs | Application Shimming | Clear Command History | Credentials from Web Browsers | Domain Trust Discovery | Exploitation of Remote Services | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Disk Content Wipe | |
| Spearphishing Attachment | Control Panel Items | Authentication Package | Bypass User Account Control | CMSTP | Credentials in Files | File and Directory Discovery | Data from Local System | Data from Network Shared Drive | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Disk Structure Wipe | |
| Spearphishing Link | Dynamic Data Exchange | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Code Signing | Credentials in Registry | Network Service Scanning | Internal Spearphishing | Data from Local System | Data from Network Shared Drive | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Endpoint Denial of Service | |
| Spearphishing via Service | Execution through API | BITS Jobs | Dylib Hijacking | Compile After Delivery | Network Share Discovery | Logon Scripts | Data from Local System | Data from Network Shared Drive | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Firmware Corruption | |
| Supply Chain Compromise | Execution through Module Load | Boottik | Elevated Execution with Prompt | Compiled HTML File | Exploitation for Credential Access | Network Sniffing | Data from Local System | Data from Network Shared Drive | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Inhibit System Recovery | |
| Trusted Relationship | Browser Extensions | Emond | Component Firmware | Forced Authentication | >Password Policy Discovery | Pass the Hash | Data from Local System | Data from Network Shared Drive | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Network Denial of Service | |
| Valid Accounts | Change Default File Association | Change Default File Association | Component Object Model Hijacking | Hooking | Remote Desktop Protocol | Pass the Ticket | Data from Local System | Data from Network Shared Drive | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Resource Hijacking | |
| | Exploitation for Client Execution | Component Firmware | Extra Window Memory Injection | Input Capture | Email Collection | Data Staged | Data from Local System | Domain Fronting | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Scheduled Transfer | |
| | Graphical User Interface | Component Object Model Hijacking | File System Permissions Weakness | Input Prompt | Input Capture | Domain Generation Algorithms | Data from Local System | Domain Generation Algorithms | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Runtime Data Manipulation | |
| | InstallUtil | Create Account | DCShadow | Kerberoasting | Man in the Browser | Input Capture | Data from Local System | Man in the Browser | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Service Stop | |
| | Launchctl | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Hooking | Keychain | Peripheral Device Discovery | Fallback Channels | Data from Local System | Peripheral Device Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | System Shutdown/Reboot | |
| | Local Job Scheduling | Dylib Hijacking | Image File Execution Options Injection | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay | Replication Through Removable Media | Multi-hop Proxy | Data from Local System | Replication Through Removable Media | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Stored Data Manipulation | |
| | LSASS Driver | Emond | Disabling Security Tools | Network Sniffing | Screen Capture | Multi-Stage Channels | Data from Local System | Screen Capture | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | Transmitted Data Manipulation | |
| | Msihta | External Remote Services | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Network Sniffing | Video Capture | Shared Webroot | Data from Local System | Video Capture | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | PowerShell | File System Permissions Weakness | New Service | >Password Filter DLL | SSH Hijacking | Multi-band Communication | Data from Local System | SSH Hijacking | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Regsvcs/Regasm | Parent PID Spoofing | DLL Side-Loading | Private Keys | Taint Shared Content | Multilayer Encryption | Data from Local System | Taint Shared Content | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Regsvr32 | Hidden Files and Directories | Path Interception | Security Memory | Third-party Software | Port Knocking | Data from Local System | Third-party Software | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Rundll32 | Hooks | Plist Modification | Steal Web Session Cookie | Windows Admin Shares | Remote Access Tools | Data from Local System | Windows Admin Shares | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Scheduled Task | Hypervisor | Port Monitors | Two-Factor Authentication Interception | Windows Remote Management | Remote File Copy | Data from Local System | Windows Remote Management | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Scripting | Image File Execution Options Injection | PowerShell Profile | System Information Discovery | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Data from Local System | System Information Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Service Execution | Kernel Modules and Extensions | Process Injection | System Network Configuration Discovery | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol | Data from Local System | System Network Configuration Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Launch Agent | Scheduled Task | System Network Connections Discovery | Uncommonly Used Port | Uncommonly Used Port | Data from Local System | System Network Connections Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Signed Script Proxy Execution | Launch Daemon | Service Registry Permissions Weakness | System Owner/User Discovery | Web Service | Web Service | Data from Local System | System Owner/User Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Source | Launch Daemon | Setuid and Setgid | System Service Discovery | | | Data from Local System | System Service Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Space after Filename | Launchctl | SID-History Injection | System Time Discovery | | | Data from Local System | System Time Discovery | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Third-party Software | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition | Startup Items | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | | | Data from Local System | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Custom Cryptographic Protocol | | |
| | Trap | Local Job Scheduling | Sudo | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | Trusted Developer Utilities | Login Item | Hidden Users | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | User Execution | Logon Scripts | Hidden Window | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | Windows Management Instrumentation | LSASS Driver | HISTCONTROL | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | Windows Remote Management | Modify Existing Service | Indicator Blocking | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | XSL Script Processing | Netsh Helper DLL | Indicator Removal from Tools | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | New Service | Indicator Removal on Host | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Office Application Startup | Indirect Command Execution | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Path Interception | Install Root Certificate | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Plist Modification | InstallUtil | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Port Knocking | Launchctl | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Port Monitors | LC_MAIN Hijacking | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | PowerShell Profile | Masquerading | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Rc.common | Modify Registry | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Re-opened Applications | Msihta | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Redundant Access | Network Share Connection Removal | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | NTFS File Attributes | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Scheduled Task | Obfuscated Files or Information | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Screensaver | Parent PID Spoofing | | | | Data from Local System | | | | |
| | | Security Support Provider | | | | | | | | | |

Techniques


- Tactics** - High Level Objectives
- Techniques** – attack method used

Why use MITRE ATT&CK?

- Determine the effectiveness of cybersecurity capabilities in preventing, detecting and responding to events
- Identify gaps in security coverage
- Build a common language and approach across all tools and services
- Build defensive controls roadmap
- Provide evidence for cost effective mitigations
- Facilitate cybersecurity conversations

I want Money – Story of a Ransomware

Emotet/Ryuk Ransomware campaign



Detections by Microsoft

SIEM


SOAR

- We highly recommend deploying **Security Information and Event Management /Security Automation and Automated Response** and deploying an eXtended Detection and Response solution
- Microsoft offers solutions in this space
- Focus on Microsoft Defender for Identity

XDR

Microsoft Defender for Identity

MDI



Behavioral
Analytics




Detection for known
attacks and issues



Microsoft Defender
for Identity

- Monitor your domain controllers and AD FS servers
- A platform to **identify** advanced security attacks **before** they cause damage

Microsoft Defender for Identity Architecture





List of abbreviations

AD DS – Active Directory Domain Services

AAD – Azure Active Directory

SCCM – System Center Configuration Manager

SCOM – System Center Operation Manager

IFM – Install From Media

XDR – eXtended Detection and Response

SIEM - Security information and event management

SOAR - Security orchestration automated response

MDI – Microsoft Defender for Identity