

다형성 바이러스 분석 방법

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I . 바이러스 개요

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1. 바이러스 정의

□악성코드 정의

- ✓ The Malware (for "malicious software") is any **program or file** that is **harmful to a computer user**.

Thus, malware includes computer Viruses, Worms, Trojan horses, and also SpyWare, programming that gathers information about a computer user without permission. [영문 Terms]

□바이러스 정의

- ✓ We define a computer 'virus' as a program can **'infect'** other programs by **modifying them** to include a possibly **evolved copy of itself**. [Fred Cohen 1984]

2. 바이러스 분류

바이러스 분류

기 준	세 부 내 용
감염 대상	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ 부트바이러스 (부트 섹터 감염, Brain, Monkey, Anti-CMOS)■ 파일 바이러스 (COM, EXE 실행파일 감염, 예루살렘, Sunday, Scorpion, Crow)■ 부트/파일 바이러스 (부트섹터, 파일 모두 감염, Invader(1990), 안락사(Euthanasia))■ 매크로 바이러스 (XM/Laroux)
운영 체제	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ DOS 바이러스 (Brain, 예루살렘, 미켈란 젤로 등등)■ Window 바이러스 (NE 계열 바이러스, PE 계열 바이러스)■ Unix 바이러스■ 기타
감염 위치	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ 기생형 바이러스 (Parasitic Virus)■ 겹쳐쓰기형 바이러스 (Overwriting Virus)■ 산란형 바이러스 (Spawning)■ 연결형 바이러스 (linking Virus)
동작 원리	<ul style="list-style-type: none">■ 상주형 바이러스 (Resident Virus)■ 비상주형 바이러스 (Non-Resident Virus)

3. 바이러스 발전 단계

제 1세대 (Primitive)

- 단순한 구조, 분석 용이
- Stoned Virus, Jerusalem Virus

제 2세대 (Encryption)

- 암호화 기법 사용
- Cascade Virus, Slow Virus

제 3세대 (Stealth)


- 은폐 기법 사용
- Joshi Virus, Wanderer Virus

제 4세대 (Armour)

- 분석 방해 (Polymorphic, EPO 기법)
- Whale Virus


4. 감염 기법 (1/4)

Entry Point를 수정하는 방법




4. 감염 기법 (2/4)

Entry Point 부분의 코드를 수정하는 방법



4. 감염 기법 (3/4)

EPO (Entry Point Obscuring) 기법



4. 감염 기법 (4/4)

EPO (Entry Point Obscuring) 기법

[감염전 코드]

```
////////////////////////////////////  
// 원본 코드  
////////////////////////////////////  
0040681A . FF15 E4114000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[&USER32.CreateWindow]  
00406820 . ^E9 45D3FFFF JMP msn6.00403B6A  
00406825 > -FF25 EC114000 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[&USER32.DefWindowProc]  
0040682B > FF75 08 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]  
0040682E . FF15 4C104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[&KERNEL32.DeleteFile]
```

[감염후 코드]

```
////////////////////////////////////  
// 바이러스에 의해 수정된 코드  
////////////////////////////////////  
0040681A . FF15 E4114000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[&USER32.CreateWindow]  
00406820 . ^E9 45D3FFFF JMP msn6.00403B6A  
00406825 > -E9 E09A0100 JMP msn6.0042030A  
0040682A . 00 DB 00  
0040682B > FF75 08 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]  
0040682E . FF15 4C104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[&KERNEL32.DeleteFile]
```

Ⅱ. 바이러스 분석

1. 사전 지식
2. 분석 과정
3. 진단법

1.사전 지식(1/14)

분석 도구

• 기본 툴

- Frhed HexaEditor, UltraEdit
- Process Explorer
- PEID, LordPE
- Dependency Walker

• 모니터링 툴

- FileMon
- RegMon
- TcpViewer, NetStat
- Analyzer, Etherreal

• 디버깅 / 디어셈블 툴

- Dos Debugger
- OllyDbg
- IDA Pro
- WinDbg
- SoftICE

운영체제 / 통신

• 운영체제

- Process / Thread, DLL
- 가상메모리 / Memory Mapping
- 드라이버, 서비스 프로세스
- Kernel/Synchronization Object
- Structured Exception Handling

• 통신

- TCP / UDP 프로토콜
- 통신 프로그램 구조
- Socket API

분석 기본 지식

• StartUp Code

• 실행 파일 구조 (EXE, NE, PE)

• 실행 압축

• DLL Injection 기법

• Stealth 기법

• Windows File Protection

1.사전 지식(2/14)

StartUp Code

[메인 덤셀 프로그램]

```
int Add(int a, int b) { return a+b; }
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    int nResult, nNum1 = 1, nNum2 = 2;
    nResult = Add(nNum1, nNum2);

    printf("%d + %d = %d", nNum1, nNum2, nResult);

    return 0;
}
```

```
CALL Add.00401005
ADD ESP,8
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C],EAX
MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
PUSH EDX
MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
PUSH EAX
MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
PUSH ECX
PUSH OFFSET Add.??_C@_0N@PEGD@
CALL Add.printf
ADD ESP,10
```

<%d>
<%d>
<%d>
format = "%d + %d = %d"
printf

[StartUp Code]

```
CALL Add._ioint
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[&KERNEL32. GetCommandLineA
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[_acmdln],EAX
CALL Add.__crtGetEnvironmentSt
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[_aenvptr],EA
CALL Add._setargv
CALL Add._setenvp
CALL Add._cinit
MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[_environ
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[_initenv],E
MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[_environ
PUSH EDX
MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[__argv]
PUSH EAX
MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[__argc]
PUSH ECX
CALL Add.0040100A
ADD ESP,0C
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C],EAX
MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
PUSH EDX
CALL Add.exit
```

status
exit

1.사전 지식(3/14)

실행파일 구조

	pFile	Data	Description	
Test.dll				0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
IMAGE_DOS_HEADER	000000F0	010B	Magic	0000h: 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 ; MZ?.....
MS-DOS Stub Program	000000F2	06	Major Linker Version	0010h: B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; ?.....@...
IMAGE_NT_HEADERS	000000F3	00	Minor Linker Version	0020h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
Signature	000000F4	00003000	Size of Code	0030h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D8 00 00 00 ;
IMAGE_FILE_HEADER	000000F8	00003000	Size of Initialized Data	0040h: 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68 ; ..?..??L?T?
IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER	000000FC	00000000	Size of Uninitialized Data	0050h: 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F ; is program
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .text	00000100	00001109	Address of Entry Point	0060h: 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 ; t be run in
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rdata	00000104	00001000	Base of Code	0070h: 6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; mode....\$. ..
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .data	00000108	00004000	Base of Data	0080h: 8E 17 EC CC CA 76 82 9F CA 76 82 9F CA 76 82 9F ; ?덱?쿡?쿡??
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .reloc	0000010C	10000000	Image Base	0090h: 22 69 88 9F DC 76 82 9F 49 6A 8C 9F C3 76 82 9F ; "i덱?쿡Ij덱
SECTION .text	00000110	00001000	Section Alignment	00a0h: CA 76 83 9F FB 76 82 9F A8 69 91 9F C9 76 82 9F ; ?덱?쿡덱덱?
SECTION .rdata	00000114	00001000	File Alignment	00b0h: 22 69 89 9F C9 76 82 9F 22 69 86 9F CB 76 82 9F ; "i덱?쿡"i덱
IMPORT Address Table	00000118	0004	Major O/S Version	00c0h: 52 69 63 68 CA 76 82 9F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; Rich?쿡....
IMPORT Directory Table	0000011A	0000	Minor O/S Version	00d0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4C 01 04 00 ;PE.
IMPORT Name Table	0000011C	0000	Major Image Version	00e0h: C7 3C 38 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 0E 21 ; ?8E.....
IMPORT Hints/Names & DLL Names	0000011E	0000	Minor Image Version	00f0h: 0B 01 06 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;0...0.
IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY	00000120	0004	Major Subsystem Version	0100h: 09 11 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 10 ;@.
EXPORT Address Table	00000122	0000	Minor Subsystem Version	0110h: 00 10 00 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
EXPORT Name Pointer Table	00000124	00000000	Win32 Version Value	0120h: 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 00 00 00 10 00 00 ;p.
EXPORT Ordinal Table	00000128	00007000	Size of Image	0130h: 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 ;
EXPORT Names	0000012C	00001000	Size of Headers	0140h: 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 ;
SECTION .data	00000130	00000000	Checksum	0150h: E0 47 00 00 5B 00 00 00 0C 44 00 00 28 00 00 00 ; ?..[....D.
SECTION .reloc	00000134	0002	Subsystem	0160h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
				0170h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 00 00 A4 03 00 00 ;
				0180h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
				0190h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
				01a0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
				01b0h: 00 40 00 00 B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ; .@..?.....
				01c0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;
				01d0h: 2E 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 D6 2A 00 00 10 00 00 00 ; .text...?..

1.사전 지식(4/14)

실행파일 구조 (Import Directory Table)

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00000158	0000548C	RVA	IMPORT Table
0000015C	0000003C	Size	

[Import Directory Table]

pFile	Data	Description	Value
0000548C	0000556C	Import Name Table RVA	
00005490	00000000	Time Date Stamp	
00005494	00000000	Forwarder Chain	
00005498	00005594	Name RVA	Test.dll
0000549C	000050A4	Import Address Table RVA	

[Import Name Table]

0000556C	00005578	Hint/Name RVA	0001 SubInteger
00005570	00005586	Hint/Name RVA	0000 AddInteger
00005574	00000000	End of Imports	Test.dll

[Import Hints / Names]

pFile	Raw Data	Value
00005578	01 00 53 75 62 49 6E 74 65 67 65 72 00 00	..SubInteger....
00005588	41 64 64 49 6E 74 65 67 65 72 00 00 54 65 73 74	AddInteger..Test
00005598	2E 64 6C 6C 00 00 CA 00 47 65 74 43 6F 6D 6D 61	.dll....GetComma
000055A8	6E 64 4C 69 6E 65 41 00 74 01 47 65 74 56 65 72	ndLineA.t.GetVer
000055B8	73 69 6F 6E 00 00 7D 00 45 78 69 74 50 72 6F 63	sion...}.ExitProc
000055C8	65 73 73 00 9E 02 54 65 72 6D 69 6E 61 74 65 50	ess...TerminateP

1.사전 지식(5/14)

실행파일 구조 (Export Directory Table)

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00000150	000047E0	RVA	EXPORT Table
00000154	0000005B	Size	

pFile	Data	Description	Value
000047E0	00000000	Characteristics	
000047E4	45383CC7	Time Date Stamp	2006/10/20 03:04:39 UTC
000047E8	0000	Major Version	
000047EA	0000	Minor Version	
000047EC	0000481C	Name RVA	Test.dll
000047F0	00000001	Ordinal Base	
000047F4	00000002	Number of Functions	
000047F8	00000002	Number of Names	
000047FC	00004808	Address Table RVA	
00004800	00004810	Name Pointer Table RVA	
00004804	00004818	Ordinal Table RVA	

[Export Directory Table]

[Export Address Table]

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00004808	00001010	Function RVA	0001 AddInteger
0000480C	00001020	Function RVA	0002 SubInteger

[Export Name Table]

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00004810	00004825	Function Name RVA	0001 AddInteger
00004814	00004830	Function Name RVA	0002 SubInteger

1.사전 지식(6/14)

실행 압축 (분석지연, AV 진단우회, 다양한 변형 제작)

[실행압축 종류]

실행압축 비율				
No	실행압축 종류	샘플수	비율	누적비율
1	UPX	1070	19.48%	19.48%
2	FSG	764	13.91%	33.39%
3	PE_Patch	747	13.60%	47.00%
4	PECompact	315	5.74%	52.73%
5	PecBundle	296	5.39%	58.12%
6	PE_Patch,PECompact	296	5.39%	63.51%
7	ASPack	239	4.35%	67.86%
8	UPack	232	4.22%	72.09%
9	MEW	222	4.04%	76.13%
10	NSPack	182	3.31%	79.44%
11	MewBundle	156	2.84%	82.28%
12	Morphine	118	2.15%	84.43%
13	PE_Patch,Morphine	114	2.08%	86.51%
14	Petite	104	1.89%	88.40%
15	Armadillo	48	0.87%	89.28%
16	Molebox	37	0.67%	89.95%
17	Obsidium	37	0.67%	90.62%
18	PESpin	36	0.66%	91.28%
19	PE-Crypt,Sue	33	0.60%	91.88%
20	PE_Patch,Sue	30	0.55%	92.43%

실행압축 비율				
No	실행압축 종류	샘플수	비율	누적비율
21	Polyene	25	0.46%	0.46%
22	NTPacker	24	0.44%	0.89%
23	Yoda	22	0.40%	1.29%
24	Expressor	19	0.35%	1.64%
25	s0m	17	0.31%	1.95%
26	Packman	17	0.31%	2.26%
27	PE_Patch,Upolyx	15	0.27%	2.53%
28	UltraProtect	14	0.25%	2.79%
29	PE_Patch,UltraProtect	14	0.25%	3.04%
30	PE-Crypt,AntiDeb	13	0.24%	3.28%
31	PE_Patch,Stolen	13	0.24%	3.51%
32	PEBundle	12	0.22%	3.73%
33	ASProtect	11	0.20%	3.93%
34	PE-Crypt,Stone	11	0.20%	4.13%
35	PE_Patch,DotFix	10	0.18%	4.32%
36	NSAnti	10	0.18%	4.50%
37	PE_Patch,NSAnti	10	0.18%	4.68%
38	PE-Pack	9	0.16%	4.84%
39	PE-Diminisher	9	0.16%	5.01%
40	PE-Crypt,PFD	9	0.16%	5.17%

1.사전 지식(7/14)

실행 압축 (OEP)

[실행압축 이전 OEP]

0040101F	90	NOP
00401020	\$ 55	PUSH EBP
00401021	. 8BEC	MOV EBP,ESP
00401023	. 6A FF	PUSH -1
00401025	. 68 A0404000	PUSH MsgTest.004040A0
0040102A	. 68 541B4000	PUSH MsgTest.00401B54
0040102F	. 64:A1 00000000	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[0]
00401035	. 50	PUSH EAX
00401036	. 64:8925 000000	MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0],ESP
0040103D	. 83EC 58	SUB ESP,58
00401040	. 53	PUSH EBX
00401041	. 56	PUSH ESI
00401042	. 57	PUSH EDI
00401043	. 8965 E8	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18],ESP
00401046	. FF15 14404000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetVersion
0040104C	. 33D2	XOR EDX,EDX
0040104E	. 8AD4	MOV DL,AH

00407E10	\$ 60	PUSHAD
00407E11	. BE 00604000	MOV ESI,UpX125Te.00406000
00407E16	. 8DBE 00B0FFFF	LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+FFFFB000]
00407E1C	. 57	PUSH EDI
00407E1D	. 83CD FF	OR EBP,FFFFFFFF
00407E20	. EB 10	JMP SHORT UpX125Te.00407E32
00407E22	90	NOP
00407E23	90	NOP
00407E24	90	NOP
00407E25	90	NOP
00407E26	90	NOP
00407E27	90	NOP
00407E28	> 8A06	MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00407E2A	. 46	INC ESI
00407E2B	. 8807	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI],AL
00407E2D	. 47	INC EDI
00407E2E	> 01DB	ADD EBX,EBX
00407E30	. 75 07	JNZ SHORT UpX125Te.00407E39

[실행압축 이후 OEP]

1.사전 지식(8/14)

DLL Injection 기법 1

□ 레지스트리 등록 기법

- user32.dll 를 사용하는 프로그램에 Injection (NT 계열)
- user32.dll 이 다른 프로세스에 attach 될때 레지스트리에 등록된 dll를 로드하여 attach 시켜줌

```
[HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Windows]  
"ApplInit_DLLs"="d:\Work\Test\Debug\Test.dll"
```

□ Windows Message Hook 기법

- 정상적인 DLL Injection 기법(정상 프로그램에서 주로 사용되며, Win9x/NT 계열)
- SetWindowsHookEx, UnhookWindowsHookEx API 사용

```
HHOOK SetWindowsHookEx(  
    int idHook,          // type of hook to install  
    HOOKPROC lpfn,       // address of hook procedure  
    HINSTANCE hMod,      // handle to application instance  
    DWORD dwThreadId     // identity of thread to install hook for  
);  
  
BOOL UnhookWindowsHookEx(  
    HHOOK hhk           // handle to hook procedure to remove  
);
```

1.사전 지식(9/14)

DLL Injection 기법 2

□ DLL Forwarding 기법 (Proxy DLL)

- 원본 DLL의 이름을 변경한후, Hooking DLL를 원본 DLL 과 동일한 이름으로 변경
- Hooking DLL에서는 원본 DLL의 함수를 Export 해야 하며, 원하는 동작후에 원본 함수를 호출해야 함

원본 : ws2_32.dll → ws2_32_org.dll
Hook : hook.dll → ws2_32.dll

□ Remote Thread 기법

- 타 프로세스에 Thread를 생성하는 API 이용 (NT 계열)
- DLL Injection을 사용하는 최근 악성코드의 대부분이 이 기법 사용
- CreateRemoteThread, WriteProcessMemory API 사용

```
HANDLE CreateRemoteThread(  
    HANDLE hProcess,           // handle to process to create thread in  
    LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, // pointer to security attributes  
    DWORD dwStackSize,        // initial thread stack size, in bytes  
    LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress, // pointer to thread function  
    LPVOID lpParameter,       // argument for new thread  
    DWORD dwCreationFlags,    // creation flags  
    LPDWORD lpThreadId        // pointer to returned thread identifier  
);
```

```

; - Dll Injection core 루틴

```

```
; kernel32.VirtualAllocEx
```

```
; pBytesWritten = 0095F9E0
; BytesToWrite = 2E (46.)
; Buffer = 003E0000
; Address = EA0000
; hProcess = 00000090 (window)
; kernel32.WriteProcessMemory
```

```

003E0000 83 EC FC 90 90 E8 57 D9 F9 76 E8 80 4A F9 76 43  32Wreja32.dll...
003E0010 3A 5C 57 49 4E 44 4F 57 53 5C 53 79 73 74 65 6D  :W\WINDOWS\System
003E0020 33 32 5C 72 65 6A 61 33 32 2E 64 6C 6C 00 00 00  32Wreja32.dll...

003E0000 83EC FC      SUB ESP,-4
003E0003 90          NOP
003E0004 90          NOP
003E0005 E8 57D9F976 CALL 7737D961      ; EA000A + 76F9D957 = 77E3D961 ==> Kernel32!LoadLibraryA
003E000A E8 804AF976 CALL 77374A8F      ; EA000F + 76F94A80 = 77E34A8F ==> Kernel32!ExitThread

```

```
; dwCreationFlag = 0
; lpParameter = EA000F
; lpStartAddress = EA0000
; dwStackSize = 0;
; lpThreadAttributes = 0
; hProcess = 90
; kernel32.CreateRemoteThread
```

1.사전 지식(11/14)

❑ Stealth 기법

- ✓ 사용자가 악성코드의 설치/ 감염 여부를 확인 못하도록 함
- ✓ 악성 코드 진단 회피

고전적 기법

- 유사한 파일명, 파일크기 변경, 파일명 숨김 등등
- 도스/BIOS 인터럽트 후킹
 - 인터럽트 벡터를 수정하여 메모리에 상주한 바이러스 코드 호출

최신 기법

- IRP(I/O Request Packet) Hooking
- DKOM(Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)

1.사전 지식(12/14)


Stealth 기법 (SSDT 후킹)

```
mov     eax, ds:ZwQueryDirectoryFile
mov     ecx, [eax+1]                ; ecx = ZwQueryDirectoryFile의 index
mov     edx, ds:KeServiceDescriptorTable
mov     eax, [edx]
mov     ecx, [eax+ecx*4]            ; ecx = ZwQueryDirectoryFile의 함수 주소
mov     dword_13000, ecx           ; ZwQueryDirectoryFile 함수 주소 백업
mov     edx, ds:ZwQuerySystemInformation
mov     eax, [edx+1]               ; eax = ZwQuerySystemInformation 의 index
mov     ecx, ds:KeServiceDescriptorTable
mov     edx, [ecx]
mov     eax, [edx+eax*4]           ; eax = ZwQuerySystemInformation의 함수 주소
mov     dword_13000, eax           ; ZwQuerySystemInformation의 함수 주소 백업
cli
mov     eax, cr0
and     eax, 0FFFEFFFFh
mov     cr0, eax
mov     ecx, ds:ZwQueryDirectoryFile
mov     edx, [ecx+1]               ; edx = ZwQueryDirectoryFile의 index
mov     eax, ds:KeServiceDescriptorTable
mov     ecx, [eax]
mov     dword ptr [ecx+edx*4], offset sub_11CC6 ; ZwQueryDirectoryFile 함수 hooking
mov     edx, ds:ZwQuerySystemInformation
mov     eax, [edx+1]               ; eax = ZwQuerySystemInformation 의 index
mov     ecx, ds:KeServiceDescriptorTable
mov     edx, [ecx]
mov     dword ptr [edx+eax*4], offset sub_11ECF ; ZwQuerySystemInformation 함수 hooking
mov     eax, cr0
or      eax, 100000h
mov     cr0, eax
sti
```

1. 사전 지식(13/14)

❑ WFP (Windows File Protection)

- ✓ A mechanism that protects system files from being modified or deleted
- ✓ 시스템 안정성 (Stability) 확보
- ✓ 시스템 무결성 (Integrity) 확보
- ✓ DLL HELL 문제 해결




1.사전 지식(14/14)

WFP (Windows File Protection) 무력화 기법

- ❑ Closing Directory Change Notification Handle
- ❑ Terminating SFC Watcher Thread via undocumented SFC API
- ❑ Disable WFP for 1 minute
- ❑ Disable WFP Permanently via patches and undocumented registry value
- ❑ Disable WFP Permanently for specific files via patching the protected file list

2. 분석 과정(1/2)

기초 분석(외형 분석, 증상 분석, 자료 분석) → 상세분석



2. 분석 과정(2/2)

바이러스 분석 과정

1. 기본 외형 분석
2. 샘플 셋 생성 및 기본 증상 확인
3. 바이러스의 감염 유형 파악(전위형, 후위형)
4. 디버깅을 통한 바이러스의 전반적인 기능 확인
[감염 대상, 감염 조건, 감염 기법 등등]
5. 호스트 프로그램 실행 부분 분석
6. 바이러스 특징 분석 [일반, 암호화, 다형성 등등]
7. 진단명 명명
8. 진단 문자열 추출
9. 치료 데이터 작성 및 검증 작업

3. 진단법 (1/3)

바이러스 진단법

1. Signature 기반 진단법

- 진단 위치 (Entry Point / 프로그램의 전체 크기)
- Signature (특정 영역 / 특정 코드)
- 특정 위치 진단법 (by Ahnlab)

2. Non-Signature 기반 진단법

- 전용진단 함수 제작
선행조건 검사
악성코드 각각의 특징을 검사

3. 행위 기반 진단법

- 악성코드 행위에 대한 진단
파일 이름, 인젝션, 파일 Drop, 통신 포트 오픈 등등

3.진단법 (2/3)

Signature 기반 진단법

2820	e1 e1 83 e7	8e a5 52 44	b2 c5 68 a6	4e a0 4d ba	áá.ç.₩RD²Åh N M°	[특정 영역 Signature]
2830	01 86 00 f4	68 21 cd ba	1e f3 93 e2	4f c2 a5 60	...ôh!Í°.ó.âOÂ₩`	
2840	77 ec 03 32	f1 47 18 7d	e4 73 dc ab	92 73 1b f8	wì.2ñG.)àsÜ«'s.ø	
2850	95 55 36 ed	86 f4 08 ef	02 96 1f 50	be 62 59 3c	.U6í.ó.i...P³4bY<	
2860	dc 54 14 69	b1 ef 27 91	f7 fc 1b ee	cd 67 b8 98	ûT.i±i'÷ü.îíç,.	
2870	7b ea c9 b2	fe 8e 2f 78	65 f4 41 6b	61 a2 d4 52	{êÉ²þ./xeôAkaçÔR	
2880	00 7d 04 58	e7 a3 de 59	56 4e bf a9	a7 6c 9f 49	.).Xç£BYVN¿@Sl.I	
2890	80 89 2a 0f	b6 89 2d e7	83 c0 b3 a3	1b 97 c1 d1	..*.¶.-ç.À²z..ÁÑ	
28a0	39 72 05 64	2d 57 be f2	dd 80 a7 72	e3 d6 75 de	9r.d-₩³dòÝ.SrãÖuB	
28b0	9d 49 b7 73	75 14 60 37	20 e7 19 f3	70 37 b1 df	.I·su.`7 ç.óp7±ß	
28c0	fc 11 6e 0f	42 b8 5e f9	7c 0f 60 0d	33 ad 14 28	û.n.B,^ù .`.3-.(
28d0	15 be 2c 3b	d5 5c 1d c7	1c e3 bf 04	0c 3b 9b da	.³,;Ö\ç.ãç...;ú	
28e0	b7 88 5b a4	de b2 70 4a	b4 34 44 df	8c 15 cd 90	·.[*E²pJ'4Dß..í.	
28f0	01 55 ff 4d	6f b2 91 4f	c4 af 9d e3	9b 37 01 25	.UyMo²`OÄ¯.ã.7.8	
2900	3b 88 96 fb	cc ce 87 7f	ce e9 02 7a	85 ec c9 b2	;..ûîî..îé.z.ìÉ²	

[특정 OP 코드]

B000:FEB9	07	POP ES	; ES=FFFF
B000:FEBA	8BDA	MOV BX,DX	; BX=DX=0321
B000:FEBB	BA 64FB	MOV DX,FB64	; DX=FB64
B000:FEBF	C707 50B4	MOV WORD PTR [BX],B450	; [0000:0321] = B450
B000:FEC3	C74702 19CD	MOV WORD PTR [BX+02],CD19	; [0000:0323] = CD19
B000:FEC8	C74704 CC58	MOV WORD PTR [BX+04],58CC	; [0000:0325] = 58CC
B000:FECD	E8 0B00	CALL FEDB	;
B000:FED0	BF 02FC	MOV DI,FC02	
B000:FED3	BB 1603	MOV BX,0316	
B000:FED6	2E	CS:	
B000:FED7	C415	LES DX,[DI]	; ES= C000, DX=0DFE
B000:FED9	EB 04	JMP FEDF	

3. 진단법 (3/3)

Non-Signature 기반 진단법

[전용 진단 함수]

```
void ScanFile(char *szFileName, BOOL bSaveDecodedFile)
{
    ...

    // Before Decoding
    if (IsInfectedByGoldBug(buf, dwToRead) == TRUE)
        ExitFunc(szFileName, "infected by GoldBug !")

    DecodeBuf(buf, dwToRead, (WORD) dwFileSize);

    // After Decoding
    if (IsInfectedByGoldBug(buf, dwToRead) == TRUE)
        ExitFunc(szFileName, "infected by GoldBug !")

    ...
}
```

```
void DecodeBuf(BYTE *pBuf, int nMaxIndex, WORD wKey)
{
    BYTE loKey = LOBYTE(wKey);
    BYTE hiKey = HIBYTE(wKey);

    // 1'th Decoding
    int nStartIndex = 0xC;
    pBuf[nStartIndex] = pBuf[nStartIndex] ^ loKey;
    nStartIndex++;
    for (int i=nStartIndex; i<nMaxIndex; i++)
        pBuf[i] = pBuf[i] ^ loKey ^ hiKey;

    // 2'th Decoding
    BYTE byTemp = 0;
    for (i=0; i<nMaxIndex; i++)
    {
        byTemp = byTemp + pBuf[i];
        byTemp++;

        int nDestIndex = 0x1C + i;
        if (nDestIndex == nMaxIndex)
            break;

        pBuf[nDestIndex] = pBuf[nDestIndex] ^ byTemp;
    }
}
```

Ⅲ. 다형성 바이러스

1. 다형성 바이러스 개요
2. 변형 기법
3. 다형성 바이러스 진단

1. 다형성 바이러스 개요 (1/6)

암호화 바이러스

1. 암호화 Key


- 동일한 Decryption 루틴
- 가변 Key 값

2. Decoding Buffer

- Overwritting
- Stack Memory
- Allocated Memory

3. 암호화 기법

- Linear / Non-Linear
- Multiple Layer
- RDA




[illegible]

암호화 바이러스

[illegible]

1.다형성 바이러스 개요 (3/6)

Polymorphic Virus



1.다형성 바이러스 개요 (4/6)

Polymorphic Virus

[MtE]

```
2299:0100 E9FF0F ... JMP 1102

2299:1102 52 PUSH DX
2299:1103 51 PUSH CX
2299:1104 50 PUSH AX
2299:1105 56 PUSH SI
2299:1106 55 PUSH BP
2299:1107 53 PUSH BX
2299:1108 B80294 MOV AX,9402
2299:110B BA1BAB MOV DX,AB1B
2299:110E F7E2 MUL DX
2299:1110 96 XCHG SI,AX
2299:1111 36 SS:
2299:1112 8B84001F MOV AX,[SI+1F00]
2299:1116 BAEDC0 MOV DX,C0ED
2299:1119 F7E2 MUL DX
2299:111B 36 SS:
2299:111C 8784001F XCHG AX,[SI+1F00]
2299:1120 8BEE MOV BP,SI
2299:1122 81C5BE1A ADD BP,1ABE
2299:1126 8BDD MOV BX,BP
2299:1128 81EBBC1A SUB BX,1ABC
2299:112C 8BF3 MOV SI,BX
2299:112E 75E1 JNZ 1111
```

```
2299:0100 E9FF0F ... JMP 1102

2299:1102 57 PUSH DI
2299:1103 53 PUSH BX

2299:1109 B85244 MOV AX,4452
2299:110C BAF1A3 MOV DX,A3F1
2299:110F F7E2 MUL DX
2299:1111 BAD392 MOV DX,92D3
2299:1114 F7E2 MUL DX
2299:1116 95 XCHG BP,AX
2299:1117 B8AA84 MOV AX,84AA
2299:111A F7ED IMUL BP
2299:111C B107 MOV CL,07

2299:1125 D3C8 ROR AX,CL52
2299:1127 96 XCHG SI,AX
2299:1128 8B86261F MOV AX,[BP+1F26]
2299:112C BA319F MOV DX,9F31


2299:112F F7E2 MUL DX
2299:1135 8786261F XCHG AX,[BP+1F26]
2299:113E 2BEB SUB BP,BX

2299:114F 2BF7 SUB SI,DI
2299:1151 8BEE MOV BP,SI
2299:1153 75C2 JNZ 1117
```


1.다형성 바이러스 개요 (5/6)

Metamorphic Virus

Polymorphic Virus



Metamorphic Virus



1.다형성 바이러스 개요 (6/6)

Metamorphic Virus

[ZMIST]

Notepad.vxe (Zmist 감염)

```
004010EC MOV ESI,EAX
004010EE MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]
004010F0 TEST AL,AL
004010F2 JE NOTEPAD.00401488

004010F8 PUSH EBX ; EP of Virus
004010F9 POP DWORD PTR DS:[40F974]
004010FF RCR EBX,CL
00401101 BSWAP EBX
00401103 PUSH NOTEPAD.0040F42C
00401108 POP EBX
00401109 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX],EAX
0040110B INC EBX
0040110C BSR EAX,EDX
0040110F TEST EAX,DC78A946
00401115 MOV EAX,EDX
00401117 PUSH EDX
00401118 MOV DH,86
0040111A MOV BL,27
0040111C MOV EAX,7FA1FA7C
00401122 JMP SHORT NOTEPAD.00401125
00401124 DB C8
00401125 BSF EAX,EDX
00401128 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4188FC],0
00401132 SUB EAX,B9E80D21
00401137 IMUL EBX,EDX,9DD477E5
```

ACCSTAT.vxe (Zmist 감염)

```
004025DC JNZ SHORT ACCSTAT.004025E1
004025DE MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+10],EDI
004025E1 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[40D088],EDI
004025E7 JMP ACCSTAT.004029C1

004025EC PUSH ECX ; EP of Virus
004025ED XCHG ECX,ECX
004025EF XADD CL,CH
004025F2 TEST ECX,74FE3615
004025F8 PUSH EBX
004025F9 AND BL,DH
004025FB IMUL EBX,EDI
004025FE SUB BH,CH
00402600 PUSH EAX
00402601 BTS EAX,4F
00402605 XADD EAX,EBX
00402608 LEA ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[41D458]
0040260E BT EBX,EAX
00402611 MOV AH,41
00402614 BSWAP EAX
00402616 PUSH ESI
00402617 XCHG AL,AL
00402619 POP DWORD PTR DS:[ECX]
0040261B LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[6F512E7B]
00402621 DEC BL
00402623 TEST CL,CH
```

2. 변형 기법 (1/4)

사용 명령어 변경




Figure 2-1. IA-32 Instruction Format

E : ModR/M follows the opcode and specifies the operand.

G : The reg field of ModR/M select a general register.

01C1 → **ADD ECX, EAX** **1100 0001**

11C1 → **ADC ECX, EAX** **1100 0001**

21C1 → **AND ECX, EAX** **1100 0001**

31C1 → **XOR ECX, EAX** **1100 0001**

31C2 → **XOR EDX, EAX** **1100 0010**

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0	Eb, Gb	Ev, Gv	Gb, Eb	Gv, Ev	AL, Ib ^{1D}	eAX, Iv ^{1D}	PUSH ES ^{1D}	POP ES ^{1D}
1	Eb, Gb	Ev, Gv	Gb, Eb	Gv, Ev	AL, Ib ^{1D}	eAX, Iv ^{1D}	PUSH SS ^{1D}	POP SS ^{1D}
2	Eb, Gb	Ev, Gv	Gb, Eb	Gv, Ev	AL, Ib ^{1D}	eAX, Iv ^{1D}	SEG=ES Prefix	DAA ^{1D}
3	Eb, Gb	Ev, Gv	Gb, Eb	Gv, Ev	AL, Ib ^{1D}	eAX, Iv ^{1D}	SEG=SS Prefix	AAA ^{1D}
4	eAX ^{1D}	eCX ^{1D}	eDX ^{1D}	eBX ^{1D}	eSP ^{1D}	eBP ^{1D}	eSI ^{1D}	eDI ^{1D}
5	eAX	eCX	eDX	eBX	eSP	eBP	eSI	eDI
6	PUSHA/ PUSHAD ^{1D}	POPA/ POPAD ^{1D}	BOUND Gv, Ma	ARPL Ew, Gw	SEG=FS Prefix	SEG=GS Prefix	Opd Size Prefix	Addr Size Prefix
7	Jcc, Jb - Short-displacement jump on condition							
	O ^{1D}	NO ^{1D}	B/NAE/C ^{1D}	NB/AE/NC ^{1D}	Z/E ^{1D}	NZ/NE ^{1D}	BE/NA ^{1D}	NBE/A ^{1D}
8	Eb, Ib	Ev, Iv	Eb, Ib	Ev, Ib	Eb, Gb	Ev, Gv	Eb, Gb	Ev, Gv
9	NOP ^{1D}	eCX	eDX	eBX	eSP	eBP	eSI	eDI
	XCHG word or double-word register with eAX ^{1D}							
A	AL, Ob	eAX, Ov	Ob, AL	Ov, eAX	MOVS/ MOVSB Yb, Xb ^{1D}	MOVS/ MOVSW/ MOVSD Yv, Xv ^{1D}	CMPS/ CMPSB Yb, Xb ^{1D}	CMPS/ CMPSW/ CMPSD Xv, Yv ^{1D}
	MOV immediate byte into byte register ^{1D}							
B	AL	CL	DL	BL	AH	CH	DH	BH
C	Shift Grp 2 ^{1A}		RET Iw ^{1D}	RET ^{1D}	LES Gv, Mp	LDS Gv, Mp	Grp 11 ^{1A} - MOV	
	Eb, Ib	Ev, Ib					Eb, Ib	Ev, Iv
D	Shift Grp 2 ^{1A}				AAM Ib ^{1D}	AAD Ib ^{1D}		XLAT/ XLATB ^{1D}
	Eb, 1	Ev, 1	Eb, CL	Ev, CL				
E	LOOPNE/ LOOPNZ Jb ^{1D}	LOOPE/ LOOPZ Jb ^{1D}	LOOP Jb ^{1D}	JCXZ/ JECXZ Jb ^{1D}	IN		OUT	
					AL, Ib ^{1D}	eAX, Ib ^{1D}	Ib, AL ^{1D}	Ib, eAX ^{1D}
F	LOCK Prefix		REPNE Prefix	REP/ REPE Prefix	HLT ^{1D}	CMC ^{1D}	Unary Grp 3 ^{1A}	
							Eb	Ev

2.변형 기법 (2/4)

Garbage 명령 삽입

```
LEA    BX,[SI+4D] ; BX = 104D
CLC
MOV    CX,03B4    ; Loop Count
CLC
MOV    DX,[BX]    ; DX = EC2E
CLC
PUSH   BP         ; PUSH BP
CLC
MOV    BP,SI      ; BP = 1000
NOP
MOV    AX,000D    ; AX = D
CLD
ADD    BP,AX      ; BP = 100D
STC
PUSH   [BP+00]    ; PUSH 10E0
CLD
POP    AX         ; AX = 10E0
STC
POP    BP         ; BP = 0
STI
ADD    DX,AX      ; DX = 3FCC
NOT    DX         ; DX = C033
STI
MOV    [BX],DX    ; [104D] = C033
CLD
INC    BX         ; BX = 104E
STC
INC    BX         ; BX = 104F
LOOP   1822
```

```
LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[F0FCE513]
SHL EAX,44
INC EAX
MOV EAX,NOTEPAD.0040F424 ; EAX = 40F424
ADC EBX,12317708
MOV EBX,EDX
TEST EDX,EBX
MOV EBX,EAX ; EBX = 40F424
MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX],EDX ; DS:[40F424] = 9DE5CFBF
IMUL EAX,EDX
DEC EAX
MOV EDX,NOTEPAD.00403BC8 ; EDX = 403BC8
ADC EAX,EDX
MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX] ; EBX = E14C383C
INC EAX
BSF EAX,EDX
LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[40F428] ; EAX = 40F428
AND DL,DH
IMUL EDX,EDX
PUSH EBX ; PUSH E14C383C
ADD DH,DH
OR EDX,EDX
IMUL EDX,EDX
SAL EDX,68
MOV DL,DL
POP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] ; DS:[40F428] = E14C383C
XOR EDX,C48729A2
CMP EDX,EDX
```

2. 변형 기법 (3/4)

사용 Register 변경

1. Same code pattern

G1)


5A	pop	edx
BF04000000	mov	edi,0004h
8BF5	mov	esi,ebp
B80C000000	mov	eax,000Ch
81C288000000	add	edx,0088h
8B1A	mov	ebx,[edx]
899C8618110000	mov	[esi+eax*4+00001118],ebx

G2)

58	pop	eax
BB04000000	mov	ebx,0004h
8BD5	mov	edx,ebp
BF0C000000	mov	edi,000Ch
81C088000000	add	eax,0088h
8B30	mov	esi,[eax]
89B4BA18110000	mov	[edx+edi*4+00001118],esi

2. 변형 기법 (4/4)

Permutation



3.다형성 바이러스 진단 (1/3)

다형성 바이러스 진단

1. Signature 기반 진단

- 다형성 엔진에 대한 시그니처 진단
- 오진 / 비정상 치료

2. 전용진단 함수

- 선행 조건
- 사용된 명령어 패턴 기반 진단

3. Emulation

- Emulation 시작 위치 (EPO)
- Emulation 종료
- 진단 속도 / 예외 처리
- Anti-Emulation 기법에 대한 대비

3.다형성 바이러스 진단 (2/3)

전용 진단 함수 (명령어 패턴)

[Win32/Zmist]

```
BOOL ScanFunc(X86INST *px86Inst, DWORD dwEip, int* pZmistPatternArray, DWORD *pdwPattern)
{
    const DISASMINFO *pDisasmInfo = px86Inst->pEntry->pDisasmInfo;

    if (0x70 <= px86Inst->byOpcode[0] && px86Inst->byOpcode[0] <= 0x7F) // Jcc, jb xx
        goto Start;

    if (px86Inst->byOpcode[0] == 0xE9 && px86Inst->dwDisp32 != 1) // JMP xxxxxxxx
        goto Start;

    if (px86Inst->byOpcode[0] == 0xC2 || px86Inst->byOpcode[0] == 0xC3) // RETN or RETN xx
        goto Clear;

    if (0xC8 <= px86Inst->byOpcode[0] && px86Inst->byOpcode[0] <= 0xCF) // ENTER ~ IRET
        goto Clear;

    if (0xE0 <= px86Inst->byOpcode[0] && px86Inst->byOpcode[0] <= 0xE3) // LOOPNE ~ JCXZ
        goto Clear;

    if (0xA4 <= px86Inst->byOpcode[0] && px86Inst->byOpcode[0] <= 0xA7) // MOVS ~ JCXZ
        goto Clear;

    if (0xAA <= px86Inst->byOpcode[0] && px86Inst->byOpcode[0] <= 0xAF) // STOS ~ SCAS
        goto Clear;

    if (px86Inst->byOpcode[0] == 0xE8) // CALL xxxxxxxx
        goto Clear;

    if (0x50 <= px86Inst->byOpcode[0] && px86Inst->byOpcode[0] <= 0x57) // PUSH ERX
    {
        if (px86Inst->byOpcode[0] == 0x54 || px86Inst->byOpcode[0] == 0x55) // PUSH ESP, EBP
            goto Clear;
    }

    ....
    ....
}
```

3.다형성 바이러스 진단 (3/3)

Anti-Emulation Technique

1. Co-Processor / MMX instruction usage
2. Structured Exception Handling Usage
3. Random Virus Code Execution
4. Use Of Brute Force Decryption of Virus Code (RDA)
5. Use of API

IV. Case Study

1. Win32/Polip 분석


2. 진단

3. 치료

3. Win32/Polip 분석 (1/9)

Win32/Polip Virus

1. EPO 기법 사용
2. 다형성 엔진 + XTEA 변형
3. 섹션 빈 공간에 코드 추가
4. NULL 섹션 추가
5. 파일 크기 증가 (60 ~ 70 KB)
6. Win32.Polipos 1.2 by Joseph



3.Win32/Polip 분석 (2/9)

Polymorphic Engine – EPO (Entry Point Obscuring)

[Pinball.exe 감염]

```
////////////////////////////////////
// 원본 코드
////////////////////////////////////
010063A1  CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],3BD
010063A8  JE SHORT Pinball.010063B1
010063AA  POP EBP
010063AB  JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.DefWindowProcA>]
010063B1  MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[10261E8]
010063B7  PUSH EBX

////////////////////////////////////
// 바이러스에 의해 수정된 코드
////////////////////////////////////
010063A1  CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],3BD
010063A8  JE SHORT PINBALL.010063B1
010063AA  POP EBP
010063AB  JMP PINBALL.01050BE1          ; EP of Virus
010063B0  DB 01
010063B1  MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[10261E8]
010063B7  PUSH EBX
```

[Msn6.exe 감염]

```
////////////////////////////////////
// 원본 코드
////////////////////////////////////
0040681A  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.CreateWindow>]
00406820  JMP msn6.00403B6A
00406825  JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.DefWindowProc>]
0040682B  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0040682E  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.DeleteFile>]

////////////////////////////////////
// 바이러스에 의해 수정된 코드
////////////////////////////////////
0040681A  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.CreateWindow>]
00406820  JMP msn6.00403B6A
00406825  JMP msn6.0042030A          ; EP of Virus
0040682A  DB 00
0040682B  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0040682E  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.DeleteFile>]
```

3.Win32/Polip 분석 (3/9)

Polymorphic Engine – Random Memory Access

```
////////////////////////////////////
// EP of Virus
//
// 1. .text 섹션 : 1001000 ~ 1020400
// 2. .data 섹션 : 1021000 ~ 1022A00
// 3. .rsrc 섹션 : 1027000 ~ 1048800
// 1. 추가된 섹션 : 1049000 ~ 1056E00
////////////////////////////////////
01050BE1 55          PUSH EBP                      ; EP of Virus
01050BE2 8BEC        MOV EBP,ESP
01050BE4 83EC 34      SUB ESP,34
01050BE7 60          PUSHAD
01050BE8 8105 CB690201 FD ADD DWORD PTR DS:[10269CB],156A9CFD ; .data 섹션과 .rsrc 섹션 사이
01050BF2 69F2 1DBDFA18 INSL ESI,EDX,18FABD1D

01050BF8 B9 28000000    MOV ECX,28
01050BFD BF 4D630201    MOV EDI,PINBALL.0102634D ; EDI = 0102634D
01050C02 F3:AA         REP STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
01050C04 4A          DEC EDX
01050C05 0FB63D 0E290201 MOVZX EDI,BYTE PTR DS:[102290E] ; EDI = 0
01050C0C 3305 23270201 XOR EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[1022723] ; EAX = C0004900
01050C12 88D7        MOV BH,DL
01050C14 8335 F2650201 73 XOR DWORD PTR DS:[10265F2],73 ; [10265F2] = 00000073
01050C1B B9 10000000    MOV ECX,10 ; ECX = 10
01050C20 BF 61640201    MOV EDI,PINBALL.01026461 ; EDI = 01026461
01050C25 F2:AF        REPNE SCAS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI] ; EDI 에서 EAX를 찾음
01050C27 75 26        JNZ SHORT PINBALL.01050C4F

....
```


3.Win32/Polip 분석 (4/9)

Polymorphic Engine – Garbage 명령 삽입

[Pinball.exe 감염]

```
01050BE1  PUSH EBP                ; EP of Virus
01050BE2  MOV EBP,ESP
01050BE4  SUB ESP,34
01050BE7  PUSHAD
01050BE8  ADD DWORD PTR DS:[10269CB],156A9CFD
01050BF2  IMUL ESI,EDX,18FABD1D
01050BF8  MOV ECX,28
01050BFD  MOV EDI,PINBALL.0102634D
01050C02  REP STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
01050C04  DEC EDX
01050C05  MOVZX EDI,BYTE PTR DS:[102290E]
01050C0C  XOR EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[1022723]
01050C12  MOV BH,DL
01050C14  XOR DWORD PTR DS:[10265F2],73
01050C1B  MOV ECX,10
01050C20  MOV EDI,PINBALL.01026461
01050C25  REPNE SCAS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
01050C27  JNZ SHORT PINBALL.01050C4F
01050C29  ROL EDX,18
01050C2C  AND EAX,57
01050C2F  AND EBX,EAX
01050C31  XOR DWORD PTR DS:[102642C],EDX
01050C37  AND EBX,EDX
01050C39  ADC EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[1022816]
01050C3F  MOV DWORD PTR DS:[1026ACF],48B6DF44
01050C49  RCL DWORD PTR DS:[10264F5],1
```

[Msn6.exe 감염]

```
0042030A  PUSH EBP                ; EP of Virus
0042030B  MOV EBP,ESP
0042030D  SUB ESP,34
00420310  PUSHAD
00420311  IMUL EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[40BC27],53543809
0042031B  XOR BYTE PTR DS:[40BD63],89
00420322  SHLD DWORD PTR DS:[40BF53],EDX,16
0042032A  MOV DWORD PTR DS:[40BD11],18AB316F
00420334  DEC DWORD PTR DS:[40BD40]
0042033A  SHR DWORD PTR DS:[40BDF3],1
00420340  MOV EAX,EDX
00420342  CALL msn6.0041DF3A
00420347  MOVSX ECX,AX
0042034A  OR EDX,EAX
0042034C  MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[40BBE4]
00420352  SHL BL,0
00420355  RCL BL,7
00420358  SHRD DWORD PTR DS:[40BD62],EAX,1F
00420360  ADD ECX,40DA011F
00420366  OR DWORD PTR DS:[40BD6D],FFFFFFD4
0042036D  MOV ECX,EAX
0042036F  SBB DWORD PTR DS:[40BEBF],-5
00420376  MOV DWORD PTR DS:[40BEA6],794BFF2D
00420380  PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[40BF6E]
00420386  INC EDI
```

3.Win32/Polip 분석 (5/9)

Polymorphic Engine – Random Code Execution

```
...  
01054EAC 2315 DF2D0201 AND EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[1022DDF]  
01054EB2 75 36 JNZ SHORT PINBALL.01054EEA  
01054EB4 41 INC ECX  
01054EB5 0F9E05 1E650201 SETLE BYTE PTR DS:[102651E]  
01054EBC 66:8B0D 06280201 MOV CX,WORD PTR DS:[1022806]  
  
...  
01054EEA 037D 0C ADD EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]  
01054EED 66:850D C02A0201 TEST WORD PTR DS:[1022A0D],CX  
01054EF4 75 5A JNZ SHORT PINBALL.01054F50  
01054EF6 C0D8 01 RCR AL,1  
  
...  
010550B9 81C1 6791653F ADD ECX,3F659167  
010550BF 3905 DD660201 CMP DWORD PTR DS:[10266DD],EAX  
010550C5 76 32 JBE SHORT PINBALL.010550F9  
010550C7 41 INC ECX  
010550C8 42 INC EDX  
010550C9 830D 17680201 CE OR DWORD PTR DS:[1026817],FFFFFFCE  
010550D0 0FAF05 242B0201 IMUL EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[1022B24]  
010550D7 FE0D 4D630201 DEC BYTE PTR DS:[102634D]  
010550DD 1B15 DC290201 SBB EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[10229DC]  
010550E3 C705 28640201 EC MOV DWORD PTR DS:[1026428],5102E7EC  
010550ED 8A35 D4260201 MOV DH,BYTE PTR DS:[10226D4]  
010550F3 0B05 132B0201 OR EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[1022B13]  
010550F9 66:29DE SUB SI,BX  
010550FC 1205 BA250201 ADC AL,BYTE PTR DS:[10225BA]
```

3.Win32/Polip 분석 (6/9)

XTEA (eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm) 원형

```
/* XTEA is a version of slightly improved tea.
The plain or cypher text is in v[0], v[1].
The key is in k[n], where n = 0 - 3,
The number of coding cycles is given by N and
the number of decoding cycles given by -N */
```

```
tean(long *v, long *k, long N)
{ unsigned long y = v[0],
  z = v[1],
  DELTA = 0x9e3779b9,
  limit,
  sum;

  if (N > 0) /* coding */
  {
    limit = DELTA * N;
    sum = 0;
    while (sum != limit)
    { y += (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z ^ sum + k[sum & 3];
      sum += DELTA;
      z += (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y ^ sum + k[sum >> 11 & 3];
    }
  }
  else /* decoding */
  {
    sum = DELTA * (-N);
    while (sum)
    { z -= (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y ^ sum + k[sum >> 11 & 3];
      sum -= DELTA;
      y -= (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z ^ sum + k[sum & 3];
    }
  }

  v[0] = y;
  v[1] = z;
  return;
}
```

```
XTEA_Decipher proc
  PUSHAD ; Save registers
  MOV EAX, v[0 * 4] ; EAX -> y
  MOV EBX, v[1 * 4] ; EBX -> z
  MOV ECX, N ; ECX -> n
  MOV EDX, DIS ; EDX -> sum

DeStart:
  ...
  MOV ESI, EDX
  SHR ESI, 11 ; sum >> 11
  AND ESI, 3 ; sum >> 11 & 3
  MOV ESI, k[ESI * 4] ; k[sum >> 11 & 3]
  ADD ESI, EDX ; sum + k[sum >> 11 & 3]
  XOR ESI, EDI ; (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y ^ sum + k[sum >> 11 & 3]
  SUB EBX, ESI ; z -= (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y ^ sum + k[sum >> 11 & 3]

  SUB EDX, Delta ; sum -= delta

  ...
  MOV ESI, EDX
  AND ESI, 3 ; sum & 3
  MOV ESI, k[ESI * 4] ; k[sum & 3]
  ADD ESI, EDX ; sum + k[sum & 3]
  XOR ESI, EDI ; (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z ^ sum + k[sum & 3]
  SUB EAX, ESI ; y -= (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z ^ sum + k[sum & 3]

  LOOP DeStart

  MOV v[0 * 4], EAX
  MOV v[1 * 4], EBX

  POPAD ; Restore registers
  RET
XTEA_Decipher endp
```

3.Win32/Polip 분석 (7/9)

XTEA (eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm) 변형

```
void DecodeBuf(DWORD dwData, DWORD *pdwDecodeData, DWORD dwKey, DWORD dwSum, DWORD dwDelta)
{
    DWORD y = LOWORD(dwData);
    DWORD z = HIWORD(dwData);

    for (int i=0; i<5; i++)
    {
        DWORD dwTemp1 = (y << 4 ^ y >> 5); // (y << 4 ^ y >> 5)
        WORD t1 = LOWORD(dwTemp1) + LOWORD(y);
        memcpy(&dwTemp1, &t1, 2);

        DWORD dwTemp2 = dwTemp1 ^ (dwSum + dwKey); // (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y ^ dwSum + dwKey
        WORD t2 = LOWORD(z) - LOWORD(dwTemp2);
        memcpy(&z, &t2, 2); // z -= (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y ^ dwSum + dwKey

        dwSum -= dwDelta;

        dwTemp1 = (z << 4 ^ z >> 5); // (z << 4 ^ z >> 5)
        t1 = LOWORD(dwTemp1) + LOWORD(z);
        memcpy(&dwTemp1, &t1, 2);

        dwTemp2 = dwTemp1 ^ ((dwSum + dwKey) >> 16); // (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z ^ ( (dwSum + dwKey) >> 16 )
        t2 = LOWORD(y) - LOWORD(dwTemp2);
        memcpy(&y, &t2, 2); // y -= (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z ^ dwSum + dwKey;
    }

    DWORD dwResult = y | (z << 16);
    *pdwDecodeData = dwResult;
}
```

3.Win32/Polip 분석 (8/9)

XTEA (eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm) 변형

0105261D 8B45 08	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]	; EAX = [00127654] = 010487A8 ==> arg1
01052623 8B00	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]	; EAX = 4FD5D982
0105262B 89C6	MOV ESI,EAX	; ESI = 4FD5D982 ==> 디코딩할 데이터
01052637 C745 FC D54FD7F9	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],F9D74FD5	; [00127648] = F9D74FD5
0105264C C1EE 10	SHR ESI,10	; ESI = 4FD5
01052662 25 FFFF0000	AND EAX,0FFFF	; EAX = 0982
0105267B C745 F8 DFA5FC05	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],5FCA5DF	; [00127644] = 5FCA5DF ==> SUM 값
01052685 BA 05000000	MOV EDX,5	; EDX = 5 ==> 반복할 회수
010526C1 8175 F8 4245EB12	XOR DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],12EB4542	; [00127644] = 1717E09D ==> SUM 값
010526D4 8175 FC 6CB6E067	XOR DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],67E0B66C	; [00127648] = 9E37F9B9 ==> Delta 값
@Loop:		
01052700 56	PUSH ESI	; PUSH ESI = 00004FD5
01052750 89C2	MOV EDX,EAX	; EDX = EAX = 0000D982
01052768 C1E2 04	SHL EDX,4	; EDX = 0000D982 ==> 00009820
01052772 C1EE 05	SHR ESI,5	; ESI = 0000D982 ==> 000006CC
01052783 31F2	XOR EDX,ESI	; EDX = 00009EEC
01052792 66:01C2	ADD DX,AX	; EDX = 0000786E
01052795 8B75 F8	MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]	; ESI = [00127644] = 1717E09D ==> SUM 값
0105279F 0375 0C	ADD ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]	; ESI = 1717E09D + 1092A940 = 27AA89DD
010527B1 31F2	XOR EDX,ESI	; EDX = 0000786E ^ 27AA89DD = 27A7F1B3
010527BC 5E	POP ESI	; ESI = 00004FD5
010527C0 66:29D6	SUB SI,DX	; ESI = 4FD5 - F1B3 = 5E22
010527C3 8B55 FC	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]	; EDX = SS:[00127648]=9E37F9B9 ==> Delta 값
010527C6 2955 F8	SUB DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],EDX	; [00127644] = 78DFE6E4 ==> sum -= delta
010527E1 50	PUSH EAX	; PUSH EAX = 0000D982
010527EC 89F2	MOV EDX,ESI	; EDX = ESI = 00005E22
010527F0 89D0	MOV EAX,EDX	; EAX = 00005E22
010527F9 C1E8 05	SHR EAX,5	; EAX = 00005E22 ==> 000002F1
01052803 C1E2 04	SHL EDX,4	; EDX = 00005E22 ==> 0005E220
0105281E 31C2	XOR EDX,EAX	; EDX = 0005E220 ^ 000002F1 = 0005E0D1
01052821 8B45 F8	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]	; EAX = [00127644]=78DFE6E4
0105282E 0345 0C	ADD EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]	; EAX = 78DFE6E4 + 1092A940 ==> 89729024
01052837 66:01F2	ADD DX,SI	; EDX = E0D1 + 5E22 = 00053EF3
01052846 C1E8 10	SHR EAX,10	; 유효 명령임
01052856 31C2	XOR EDX,EAX	; EDX = 00053EF3 ^ 00008972 = 0005B781
01052858 58	POP EAX	; EAX = 0000D982
01052861 66:29D0	SUB AX,DX	; EAX = D982 - B781 = 00002201
01052865 5A	POP EDX	; EDX = 5
0105287B 4A	DEC EDX	; EDX = 4
0105287C ^0F85 63FEFFFF	JNZ @Loop(010526E5)	
0105288E 8B55 10	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]	; EDX = 00127680
01052892 C1E6 10	SHL ESI,10	; ESI = 00000D10 ==> 0D100000
01052897 09F0	OR EAX,ESI	; EAX = 0000F074 0D100000 = 0D10F074
0105289F 8902	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],EAX	; [00127680] = 0D10F074

3.Win32/Polip 분석 (9/9)

Win32/Polip XTEA – Decoding 루틴 구조

Subroutine1:

```
...  
call    Subroutine2  
...  
ret
```

Subroutine2:

```
...  
call    Subroutine1  
...  
ret
```

```
Function10519A6  
{  
    ...  
    Function10525F8 (XTEA 디코딩 함수)  
    ...  
    Function1052275  
    {  
        ...  
        Function105359F (XTEA 디코딩 함수)  
        ...  
        Function1055CCB  
        {  
            ...  
            Function1054DA9 (XTEA 디코딩 함수)  
            ...  
            Function10519A6 (Recursive call)  
        }  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

2.Win32/Polip 진단 (1/2)

Emulation (Pre-Condition 체크)

```
BOOL Scan()
{
    Initialize();

    if (FindEmulationLoc() == FALSE)
        return FALSE;

    while(true)
    {
        if (FetchInstruction() == FALSE)
            return FALSE;

        DisasmInstruction();

        call pEntry->pfnOpcode()

        if (CheckException() == TRUE)
            return FALSE;

        if (CheckEndOfEmulation() == TRUE)
            break;
    }

    if (IsInfectedByPolip() == TRUE)
        return TRUE;

AtExit:
    Uninitialize();
}
```

```
static const OPTABLE g_Opcode32Table[256*2] =
{
    ...
    /* 24 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_andb_AL_Ib, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 25 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_andl_EAX_Id, AND32_EAX_Id },
    /* 26 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_prefix_es, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 27 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_daa, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 28 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_subb_Eb_Gb, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 29 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_subl_Ed_Gd, SUB32_EdGd },
    /* 2A */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_subb_Gb_Eb, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 2B */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_subl_Gd_Ed, SUB32_GdEd },
    /* 2C */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_subb_AL_Ib, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 2D */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_subl_EAX_Id, SUB32_EAXId },
    /* 2E */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_prefix_cs, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 2F */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_das, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 30 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_xorb_Eb_Gb, XOR32_EbGb },
    /* 31 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_xorl_Ed_Gd, XOR32_EdGd },
    /* 32 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_xorb_Gb_Eb, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 33 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_xorl_Gd_Ed, XOR32_GdEd },
    /* 34 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_xorb_AL_Ib, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 35 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_xorl_EAX_Id, XOR32_EAXId },
    /* 36 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_prefix_ss, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 37 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_aaa, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 38 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_cmpb_Eb_Gb, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 39 */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_cmpl_Ed_Gd, CMP32_EdGd },
    /* 3A */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_cmpb_Gb_Eb, NULL_FN_OPCODE },
    /* 3B */ { 0, NULL_TABLE, &Ia_cmpl_Gd_Ed, CMP32_GdEd },
    ...
}
```


2.Win32/Polip 진단 (2/2)

진단문자열 (Virus Body)

```
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 암호화 해제 10505DD 부터 1050AC8 까지 10F07688 키값을 사용해서 XOR 디코딩
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
010505C4  60                PUSHAD
010505C5  E8 00000000        CALL PINBALL.010505CA
010505CA  5A                POP EDX                ; EDX = 010505CA
010505CB  B9 3B010000        MOV ECX,13B           ; ECX = 13B (0x4EC 바이트)
010505D0  81B48A 0F000000    >XOR DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+ECX*4+F],10F07688 ; [01050AC5] = 09F0B57A ^ 10F07688 = 1900C3F2
010505D8  ^E2 F3            LOOPD SHORT PINBALL.010505D0 ; 10505DD 부터 1050AC8 까지 XOR 디코딩

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// 스택에 있는 00127BB3 부터 7145 만큼 XOR 연산 수행 함 (key 값 증가 시키면서 01050551)
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
010505F3  64:FF35 00000000    PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0]
010505FA  64:8925 00000000    MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0],ESP ; FS:[0] = ESP = 0012766C
01050601  8B7424 2C          MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2C] ; ESI = SS:[00127698]=0012769C
01050605  8BFA              MOV EDI,EDX                ; EDI = 105050CA
01050607  8D86 17050000      LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+517] ; EAX = 00127BB3
0105060D  B9 45710000        MOV ECX,7145              ; ECX = 7145
01050612  B2 51              MOV DL,51                 ; DL = 51 ==> EDX = 01050551

                                @L1:
01050614  3010              XOR BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],DL   ; [00127BB3] = C5 ^ 51 = 94
01050616  42                INC EDX                    ; EDX = 01050552
01050617  40                INC EAX                    ; EAX = 00127BB4
01050618  ^E2 FA            LOOPD @L1(01050614)        ; 루프 반복

0105061A  E8 AD010000        CALL PINBALL.010507CC      ; ==> kernel32 주소를 구하고 'MZ' 시그니처를 확인
0105061F  8BEB              MOV EBP,EBX                ; EBP = 77E20000
01050621  68 1EDADF1A        PUSH 1ADFAD1E
01050626  E8 E8020000        CALL @GetProcAddress(01050913) ; ==> GetModuleHandleA 주소 구함
0105062B  85C0              TEST EAX,EAX               ; EAX = 77E3AD86 (kernel32.GetModuleHandleA)
0105062D  0F84 D6000000      JE PINBALL.01050709
01050633  8987 D9030000      MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+3D9],EAX
```


3.Win32/Polip 치료 (1/2)

치료 정보

[복호화 후 Stack]



0x7554 치료 데이터

06	FF	25	84	11	00	01
----	----	----	----	----	----	----

0x759E 치료 위치

02	AB	63	00	00
	BC	C1	01	00


[Pinball.exe 감염]

```
////////////////////////////////////
// 원본 코드
////////////////////////////////////
010063A1 817D 0C BD0300    CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],3BD
010063A8 74 07            JE SHORT Pinball.010063B1
010063AA 5D              POP EBP
010063AB FF25 84110001    JMP PTR DS:[<&USER32.DefWindowProcA>]
010063B1 8B15 E8610201    MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[10261E8]
010063B7 53              PUSH EBX

////////////////////////////////////
// 바이러스에 의해 수정된 코드
////////////////////////////////////
010063A1 817D 0C BD0300    CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],3BD
010063A8 74 07            JE SHORT PINBALL.010063B1
010063AA 5D              POP EBP
010063AB E9 31A80400    JMP PINBALL.01050BE1 ; EP of Virus
010063B0 01              DB 01
010063B1 8B15 E8610201    MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[10261E8]
010063B7 53              PUSH EBX
```

3.Win32/Polip 치료 (2/2)

치료 [Entry Point 치료 Vs 원본 파일에 가깝게]



V. 결 론

1. Evolution of Polymorphic Virus

2. Analysis Technique of Polymorphic Virus

3. Scanning Speed

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