

Tipping the Dominos: Topology-Aware Multi-Hop Attacks on LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract—LLM-based multi-agent systems (MASs) have reshaped the digital landscape with their emergent coordination and problem-solving capabilities. However, current security evaluations of MASs are still confined to limited attack scenarios, leaving their security issues unclear and likely underestimated.

To fill this gap, we propose TOMA, a topology-aware multi-hop attack scheme targeting MASs. By optimizing the propagation of contamination within the MAS topology and controlling the multi-hop diffusion of adversarial payloads originating from the environment, TOMA unveils new and effective attack vectors without requiring privileged access or direct agent manipulation. Experiments demonstrate attack success rates ranging from 40% to 78% across three state-of-the-art MAS architectures: MAGENTIC-ONE, LANGMANUS, and OWL, and five representative topologies, revealing intrinsic MAS vulnerabilities that may be overlooked by existing research. Inspired by these findings, we propose a conceptual defense framework based on topology trust, and prototype experiments show its effectiveness in blocking 94.8% of adaptive and composite attacks.

1. Introduction

Building upon the remarkable capabilities of large language models (LLMs), multi-agent systems (MASs) enable specialized agents to communicate and collaborate, outperforming single-agent approaches on complex tasks. LLM-based MASs are increasingly deployed across industrial domains including software development [1], [2], manufacturing automation [3], scientific research [4], and healthcare [5]. These developments underline that MASs have transitioned from lab prototypes to real-world production settings, making their security a pressing practical concern. However, prior research has primarily focused on compromising individual agents [6], [7], [8], which is insufficient for MAS security evaluation since compromising a single agent can hardly yield system-wide influence [9].

Recent efforts have examined MAS-level security such as cooperation resilience [10], communication

integrity [11], and hallucination safety [9]. Nevertheless, effective attack frameworks for evaluating MAS security remain largely underexplored. The few existing attack studies are largely restricted to narrow scenarios, typically falling into two extremes: *simplistic attacks with limited impact* or *overly strong adversary assumptions for high-impact outcomes*. Specifically, most efforts remain limited to narrow objectives such as prompt extraction [12], [13], hallucination induction [14], malicious-link clicking [15], or transient denial-of-service [16], which provide limited insights into system-level vulnerabilities. With the increasing sophistication of MAS, higher-value targets such as file system manipulation and terminal command execution have emerged, yet these are harder to compromise: core agents managing critical resources typically enforce strict security measures (e.g., identity authentication and whitelisted communication), and rarely interact directly with external entities. Consequently, the attack surface for these higher-impact attacks is narrow, compelling adversaries to adopt intrusive and often unrealistic assumptions such as agent impersonation [17], communication hijacking [11], or memory access [18], [19], [20], which are seldom feasible in practical settings.

To fill this gap, we propose Topology-Aware Multi-Hop Attack (TOMA), an attack scheme for multi-agent systems. TOMA is inspired by the inter-agent dependency in which upstream outputs are reinterpreted and executed by downstream agents. Our key idea is to exploit this topological dependency in MAS by compromising exposed edge agents and propagating malicious content across multiple hops toward core or central controller agents. This allows an attacker to induce high-risk behaviors in the system without relying on intrusive, unrealistic access assumptions.

Challenges and innovations. However, realizing such exploitation in practice proves nontrivial.

- **Challenge 1: Topological diversity and dynamism.** MASs exhibit highly heterogeneous and evolving topologies, which may reconfigure in response to task demands or environmental changes. This structural variability complicates the identification of sta-

ble communication pathways and makes it difficult for adversaries to establish a consistent and effective attack route from edge agents to core control nodes.

- **Challenge 2: Intrinsic topological resistance.** The cooperative communication mechanisms within MASs inherently reinforce the system’s robustness against anomalous or malicious inputs. As messages propagate across multiple agents, redundant validation and consensus processes frequently filter, modify, or suppress adversarial signals, substantially reducing their integrity and effectiveness before they reach critical components.

We make several innovations to tackle these challenges and realize the attack. First, we formulate an adversarial contamination propagation model that quantifies how adversarial perturbations spread and undermine inter-agent trust, enabling the identification of a topology-optimal attack path that maximizes cumulative propagation strength. Second, we design a hierarchical payload encapsulation scheme that recursively embeds the derived attack path into payloads transmitted among agents. It ensures reliable propagation and integrity retention across multiple layers, effectively mitigating the attenuation of adversarial effects. Third, we develop a visual attention-based environment injection that initiates the attack from edge agents, using them as entry points to inject the payload and compromise the system.

Findings. We evaluate the effectiveness of TOMA across three widely used MAS frameworks and five representative topologies. The results demonstrate that our approach achieves up to 94% success rate in compromising edge agents. Once compromised, these agents reliably propagate the attack through the network, yielding 40%–78% success rates in compromising MASs to conduct malicious activities. The results reveal several inherent vulnerabilities within the MAS.

- **Finding 1: Underconstrained inter-agent trust calibration.** MASs often establish implicit and unverified trust among agents, assuming cooperative behavior by default. This lack of trust calibration enables compromised agents to inject adversarial information that spreads unchecked through the network.
- **Finding 2: Topology-induced exposure amplification.** Even agents without direct external access can be indirectly exposed through multi-hop dependencies. This structural property amplifies the attack surface, allowing adversarial influence to percolate toward core agents via benign intermediaries.
- **Finding 3: Robustness–resilience paradox.** Mechanisms designed for stability, like redundancy and consensus, may inadvertently preserve and amplify adversarial effects. This reveals a trade-off where robustness may undermine resilience by sustaining malicious influence once introduced.

Mitigation. Motivated by these findings, we design T-Guard, a topology–trust defense framework as a conceptual design for active protection in MASs.

It aims to strengthen inter-agent trust formation and containment across the topology, enabling the system to adaptively resist cascading adversarial effects rather than relying on static filtering and passive responses. We implemented a prototype and conducted preliminary experiments. Results show that it effectively counteracts complex adaptive threats, blocking 94.8% of adversarial effect propagation throughout the multi-agent system.

This paper makes the following contributions:

- We propose TOMA, a topology-aware multi-hop attack for evaluating MAS security. It can compromise the system to perform malicious actions without privileged access or direct agent manipulation.
- We address the challenges of topological diversity and resistance in attack implementation through an adversarial contamination propagation model and a hierarchical payload encapsulation scheme.
- Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate TOMA’s strong attack performance across three state-of-the-art MAS architectures and five representative topologies, revealing overlooked vulnerabilities.
- We propose a topology-trust defense framework, and our prototype evaluation demonstrates its effectiveness in mitigating MAS security threats.

2. Background and Related Work

2.1. Multi-Agent System (MAS)

In modern LLM-based multi-agent systems, agents are configured with distinct roles and are equipped with external tools or APIs, enabling them to search the web, retrieve documents, or manage system files [21]. Some agents are not directly involved in solving the task itself but take responsibility for task decomposition, planning, and coordination. These agents are commonly known as planner agents or orchestrators. Agents responsible for direct task execution are typically equipped with external tools and APIs, such as calculators, weather services, or file systems, to perform concrete operations [22], [23]. Among these tool-using agents, those that directly interface with external environments or resources are referred to as the *edge agents*. Edge agents serve as the system’s bridge to the outside world, enabling real-time access to information or services. Additionally, some agents are designed to monitor task progress, perform quality checks. These agents serve as evaluator agents or critics, playing a crucial role in ensuring robustness in MAS [24].

2.2. MAS Topology

Agents with different roles and functions are orchestrated through a predefined or dynamically updated topology, defining the information flow and task delegation paths among agents. For instance, MetaGPT [25]

TABLE 1: Attack success rate (ASR) of SOTA methods on single-agent and multi-agent systems.

Platform	Model	ASR	
		Crescendo [40]	Pop-up [8]
Single-Agent System			
OSWORLD [42]	GPT-4o-1120 [46]	36.7%	66.7%
	QWEN-VL-MAX [47]	53.3%	60.0%
	DOUBAO-VISION-PRO [48]	46.7%	76.7%
Multi-Agent System			
MAGENTIC-ONE [49]	All Models [46], [47], [48]	0.0% ↓	0.0% ↓
LANGMANUS [26]	All Models [46], [47], [48]	0.0% ↓	0.0% ↓
OWL [50]	All Models [46], [47], [48]	0.0% ↓	0.0% ↓

and LANGMANUS [26] adopt a chain topology, AutoGen [27] employs a tree topology, while CAMEL [28] utilizes a star topology. Recent studies have explored task-adaptive dynamic topology construction[29], [30], [31], allowing the system to adjust its structure based on task requirements. These diverse topologies differ in reasoning workflows and communication cost, and show varying task efficiency under different scenarios [32]. They also differ in the resistance to the spread of errors or harmful information [33].

2.3. MAS Security

The rapid development MAS has led to a surge in research on both adversarial threats and corresponding defense mechanisms.

Adversarial threat. A wide variety of attack methods have been developed to compromise LLM-based systems, including prompt injection [34], [35], [36], vision perturbation [8], [37], memory poisoning [38], knowledge base manipulation [39], and jailbreak attacks [40], [41]. For example, Zhang et al. [8] inject vision perturbation in OSWORLD [42] agents to click on the adversarial pop-ups. Russinovich et al. [40] use multi-turn jailbreak to attack various LLM-based systems. However, these attacks are usually only effective against single-agent systems. Some studies have explored threats in multi-agent systems [10], [9]. Yu et al.[43] enable self-propagating attacks by modifying the input of just one agent. Amayuelas et al.[44] target debate-based collaboration mechanisms. Jome-teorie et al.[45] propose a two-stage attack that manipulates agents’ knowledge to spread false information. However, these works largely overlook the agent topology [10], which plays a vital role in the overall workflow and robustness of multi-agent systems. This oversight limits the effectiveness and generalizability of their attacks, especially when applied to the complex and evolving structures of real-world MASs.

Defense mechanisms. Several studies have proposed mitigation strategies to address current vulnerabilities in multi-agent systems. Model-level approaches




Figure 1: Attack attempts on LANGMANUS.

focus on enhancing alignment training [51], fine-tuning [52], and applying input-output filtering [53], [54]. At the system level, Zhang et al.[55] integrate hierarchical information management and memory protection into MAS for systematic defense. Wang et al.[17] leverage graph neural networks for anomaly detection in utterance graphs and apply topological interventions to mitigate attacks. Huang et al. [10] introduce specialized agents, challenger and inspector, into the MAS framework to simulate adversarial behavior and evaluate agent responses.

3. Motivation and Preliminaries

We apply two state-of-the-art (SOTA) adversarial attacks, Crescendo [40] and Pop-up [8], to both single-agent and multi-agent systems. As shown in Table 1, these attacks achieve notable attack success rates (ASR) on single-agent systems, reaching up to 76.7%, by inducing the agent to click on malicious pop-ups or produce incorrect outputs. However, these attacks fail to manipulate multi-agent systems into performing harmful actions such as file deletion. We analyze the effectiveness of the pop-up attack against LANGMANUS as a case study. As illustrated in Figure 1 (a), LANGMANUS follows an approximate chain-like structure. Although the pop-up successfully injects harmful instructions into the Browser agent through its vision-language perturbations, the system’s topology prevents the malicious command from propagating downstream, thereby mitigating its impact.

This observation motivates our investigation into the topology-aware vulnerabilities of multi-agent systems. In particular, we explore whether malicious instructions can be intentionally routed through the system’s internal topology coordination to reach sensitive agents. As shown in Figure 1 (b), we design a topology-guided




Figure 2: Overview of the topology-guided attack pipeline on LANGMANUS.

attack that mimics legitimate coordination patterns by guiding the malicious instruction from the Browser to the Supervisor, then to the Planner, and finally to the FileManager, ultimately triggering the deletion of the target file. The detailed procedure is shown in Figure 2. Since we have access to the coordination topology of LANGMANUS, the attacker can first analyze the system’s architecture to identify a suitable entry point, such as the Browser. A malicious payload is then crafted and injected into the web environment, formatted to resemble a legitimate subtask. When the Browser visits the webpage and extracts the payload, the instruction is incorporated into the task chain and forwarded to the Supervisor. The Supervisor interprets the instruction and assigns the corresponding task to the Planner, which determines that a system file must be deleted to proceed. The Planner then delegates the deletion task to the FileManager, executing the final destructive action.

This process illustrates how an attacker can hijack the task flow by exploiting the system’s coordination topology, routing malicious instructions through multiple agents while still adhering to protocol constraints.

4. Threat Model

Attack goal. The adversary exploits the MAS as an intermediary to conduct malicious activities on the host machine for disruption or financial gain. Once compromised, the MAS operates under the adversary’s control within its functional scope.

Attack scenario. Consider a MAS deployed on a user’s computer or a cloud service provider to automate file management and system operations. The adversary injects malicious signals into the system’s external environment, which are intercepted by an exposed edge agent. Through inter-agent communication, the infection propagates throughout the MAS, allowing the adversary to gradually influence other agents and ultimately compromise the entire system. Once compromised, the MAS enables malicious actions on the host machine, such as unauthorized command execution, file system corruption, or trojan installation.

Adversary’s capability. We assume the adversary possesses the following non-intrusive capabilities to achieve attack objectives. First, the adversary is assumed to have no direct interaction with agents, nor any access to model parameters, memory, or inter-agent communications, and cannot impersonate agents or observe their internal states. Their influence is restricted to the external environment in which the MAS operates, for example, they may inject malicious visual or textual content into web interfaces or documents accessible to edge agents. Second, the adversary is assumed to have knowledge of the MAS topology. This assumption is justified, as many MAS frameworks are open-sourced [42], [46], [47], [48] or can be reverse-engineered via prompt leakage attacks [12], [56]. Overall, these configurations capture a realistic adversary model consistent with practical deployment scenarios.

5. Topology-Aware Multi-Hop Attack

5.1. Overview of Attack Scheme

As illustrated in Figure 3, the proposed attack framework consists of three sequential phases: adaptive attack path planning, hierarchical payload encapsulation, and visual attention-based environment injection. First, the adversarial contamination propagation model computes the optimal attack path based on the MAS topology and target agent. Next, this path is encapsulated into a structured payload using the hierarchical scheme. Finally, a semantic–visual environment injection method compromises the edge agent to trigger the attack. The injected path then propagates through inter-agent interactions, ultimately reaching the target agent and accomplishing the intended objective.

5.2. Adaptive Attack Path Planning

In MASs, compromised nodes can propagate contamination through inter-agent dependencies, escalating local faults into system-wide risks. To effectively model and exploit this process, we introduce the adversarial contamination propagation model (ACPM), which captures the dynamic diffusion of contamination across the MAS task network. Building on this model, an




Figure 3: Framework of Topology-Aware Multi-Hop Attack.




Figure 4: Illustration of adversarial contamination propagation model with $p = 1.4, \delta = 0.9$. V_i denotes agent nodes; arrows indicate task or information dependencies. V_1 and V_{10} represent the attacker's entry and target. Yellow nodes are newly infected, red arrows show propagation direction, and node labels indicate infection values per round.

automatic planning mechanism is developed to dynamically identify and update attack routes, enabling adaptive selection of topology-optimal paths that maximize contamination effectiveness in evolving environments.

Graph-based abstraction. In ACPM, the MAS is modeled as a directed graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, where each node v_i represents an agent. Although inter-agent communication is inherently bidirectional, directed edges are used to characterize the flow of contamination-related information from v_i to v_j , encompassing both task delegation and feedback. Nodes directly interacting with the external environment constitute a subset $\mathcal{V}_{edge} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, which serve as potential entry points for adversarial contamination. The attacker selects an initial set of compromised nodes $\mathcal{V}_{start} \subseteq \mathcal{V}_{edge}$ to inject malicious content into the system. Each node v_i is assigned a taint value $T_i(t) \in [0, 1]$, representing its contamination degree at time step t , where $T_i(t) = 0$ indicates a clean state and $T_i(t) = 1$ denotes full contamination. At the initial time step $t = 0$, the taint values are initialized as:

$$T_i(0) = \begin{cases} 1, & v_i \in \mathcal{V}_{start}, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Figure 4 shows an example of ACPM on a 10-agent system, where V_1 is the initial entry point with $T_1(0) =$

1 and V_{10} is the attack target with $T_{10}(0) = 0$. All other nodes are initially clean, and contamination propagates along task dependencies over time.

Dynamic propagation process. After initialization, adversarial contamination propagates dynamically along task dependencies. At each time step $t \geq 1$, the taint value of node v_i is updated recursively according to its previous state and the aggregated influence of its incoming neighbors. Let $\mathcal{N}_{in}(v_i)$ denote the set of upstream nodes with directed edges to v_i . The update rule is defined as:

$$I_i(t) = \left(\frac{\sum_{v_j \in \mathcal{N}_{in}(v_i)} T_j(t-1)}{|\mathcal{N}_{in}(v_i)|} \right)^p, \quad (2)$$

$$T_i(t) = \min[1, T_i(t-1) + (1 - T_i(t-1)) \cdot I_i(t)], \quad (3)$$

where $p > 1$ is a nonlinear attenuation exponent that suppresses low-intensity upstream contamination, reducing its impact on distant nodes. This recursive formulation captures the cumulative influence of all upstream agents while constraining $T_i(t)$ within the normalized range $[0, 1]$. The process iterates until the system reaches a topological steady state, where no new nodes become contaminated:

$$\mathcal{V}_{infected}(t) = \mathcal{V}_{infected}(t-1). \quad (4)$$

Figure 4 illustrates this dynamic evolution in a 10-agent system. At $t = 3$, nodes V_3 , V_4 , V_5 , and V_6 begin to exhibit contamination from V_1 ($T_6(3) = 0.59$). By $t = 5$, the contamination reaches V_7 , V_8 , V_9 , and ultimately the target node V_{10} ($T_{10}(5) = 0.14$), indicating that the network has reached topological steady state.

Optimal attack path selection. A path $\tau = (v_{start}, \dots, v_{target})$ is defined as a directed sequence of connected agents in $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$. Each path originates from an *edge agent* v_{start} , which serves as an entry point accessible to the adversary, and terminates at a *target agent* v_{target} , typically a central control or other high-value node. The set of feasible paths \mathcal{Q} is obtained by enumerating all directed routes from each edge agent to the designated target agent.

The cumulative contamination strength along a path τ is defined as

$$P(\tau) = \sum_{v_i \in \tau} \delta^{d(v_i)} T_i, \quad (5)$$

where $\delta^{d(v_i)}$ is a distance-based attenuation factor, $d(v_i)$ denotes the hop distance of node v_i from the entry node, and $\delta \in (0, 1]$ controls the decay rate. This formulation jointly captures the susceptibility of intermediate agents and the degradation of contamination strength due to communication delays, noise, and limited influence over long propagation chains. The adversary’s objective is to identify the path that maximizes the overall contamination strength:

$$\tau^* = \arg \max_{\tau \in \mathcal{Q}} P(\tau). \quad (6)$$

As illustrated in Figure 4, the optimal attack path $\tau^* = (V_1 \rightarrow V_3 \rightarrow V_5 \rightarrow V_6 \rightarrow V_7 \rightarrow V_9 \rightarrow V_{10})$ achieves a total contamination strength of $P(\tau^*) = 4.32$.

Building on the contamination propagation model, the adaptive attack path planning is formulated as a dynamic optimization problem driven by evolving node states and topology feedback. By continuously recalibrating the optimal route τ^* , the adversary maintains persistent and efficient contamination under changing multi-agent communication structures.

5.3. Hierarchical Payload Encapsulation

To ensure that adversarial directives are propagated along the planned route while maintaining integrity, we propose a hierarchical payload encapsulation scheme (HPES). HPES is a recursive framework that enables a target directive ψ , intended for the terminal agent V_n , to be progressively encapsulated and transmitted through the agent sequence V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n .

Recursive Construction. The process begins with the innermost payload:

$$I_n = F_{adv}^{(n)}(\psi), \quad (7)$$

where $F_{adv}^{(n)}$ is an adversarial prompt-construction function that encodes ψ into a form executable by V_n . For




Figure 5: Payload construction for guiding WebSurfer to the Executor for malicious task execution.

each preceding agent V_i ($i = n - 1, n - 2, \dots, 1$), the encapsulated payload is recursively generated as:

$$I_i = F_{adv}^{(i)}(\text{Encode}(I_{i+1})), \quad (8)$$

where $\text{Encode}(\cdot)$ applies structural encoding (e.g., base64) to prevent recursive nesting from causing semantic ambiguity during agent interpretation. Each $F_{adv}^{(i)}$ ensures that, upon processing I_i , V_i produces an output that causes V_{i+1} to accept and execute the intended payload I_{i+1} . Typical instantiations of $F_{adv}^{(i)}$ include policy puppet attack [57], persona prompt [58], and adversarial suffixes [59]. The complete encapsulated directive is represented as:

$$\text{HPES}(\tau, \psi) = I_1, \quad (9)$$

where τ denotes the selected propagation path.

Propagation and execution. When I_1 is delivered to the initial agent V_1 , recursive propagation unfolds as:

$$O_i = V_i(I_i), \quad (10)$$

$$I_{i+1} = \text{Decode}(G^{(i)}(O_i)), i = 1, 2, \dots, n - 1, \quad (11)$$

where $V_i(\cdot)$ denotes the transformation performed by agent V_i , O_i is its output, $\text{Decode}(\cdot)$ reverses the neutralization applied by $\text{Encode}(\cdot)$, and $G^{(i)}(\cdot)$ models the semantic mapping from V_i 's output to V_{i+1} 's input. Ultimately, the terminal agent V_n receives I_n , interprets it according to its internal semantics, and executes the directive ψ . The preceding agents V_1, \dots, V_{n-1} thus serve as unintentional intermediaries that preserve and propagate the encapsulated payload through successive transformations.

Example. Figure 5 illustrates a simplified example of the hierarchical payload encapsulation process. A user issues a benign query to the MAS: “Give me the latest MAS research results.” To fulfill this query, the MAS initiates a task sequence, where the WebSurfer agent retrieves relevant web content. The adversary,

however, aims to execute $\psi = \text{rm /root/abc}$ on the Executor agent (V_5), and thus selects a feasible attack path $\tau = \{V_1, V_2, V_3, V_4, V_5\}$. During payload construction, each layer I_i specifies the downstream agent and its corresponding task. The target command ψ for V_5 is base64-encoded (red box) and embedded into V_4 's adversarial prompt (orange box), forming I_4 , which instructs V_5 to execute the encoded directive. Subsequently, I_4 is encoded and embedded into V_3 's adversarial prompt (yellow box) to produce I_3 . Each adversarial prompt is tailored to the functional role and communication pattern of its downstream agent. For example, since V_3 is a planner, the adversarial prompt generated by V_2 (blue box) directs it to “*make a new plan to complete the task...*”. Similarly, since V_2 is a summarizer, the prompt from V_1 (green box) is framed as: “*The content of this page summary is...*”. This recursive process continues until the outermost payload I_1 is constructed.

5.4. Environment Injection

The attack entry point is typically an edge agent interacting with the external environment. While textual interfaces can be directly perceived, embedding payloads in visual environments requires carefully designed distractors. We therefore propose a visual attention-based environment injection method that steers an agent’s perceptual focus by adjusting the saliency of interface elements through controlled variations in size and spatial position.

The probability of capturing attention is defined as:

$$P_{\text{hook}} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(k_1 \cdot \Delta\text{size} + k_2 \cdot \Delta\text{pos})}}, \quad (12)$$

where Δsize denotes the deviation of an element’s manipulated font size from its default scale, and Δpos is the normalized displacement from the screen center. The empirically fitted coefficients $k_1 = 0.32$ and $k_2 = -0.18$ quantify the sensitivity of visual attention to these factors. The resulting $P_{\text{hook}} \in [0, 1]$ represents the likelihood that the manipulated element captures the agent’s focus.

The optimal perturbations are obtained by maximizing P_{hook} under perceptual and layout constraints:

$$(\Delta\text{size}^*, \Delta\text{pos}^*) = \arg \max_{\Delta\text{size}, \Delta\text{pos}} P_{\text{hook}}. \quad (13)$$

Since the logistic function is monotonically increasing, this optimization is equivalent to maximizing the linear term $k_1 \cdot \Delta\text{size} + k_2 \cdot \Delta\text{pos}$. Empirically, the optimal configuration involves a moderate enlargement of key elements and slight displacement toward the lower-right visual quadrant, consistent psychophysical findings [60] and quantitative parameters $D = 0.8$, $W = 0.25$, and $ID = 3.2$. This design substantially enhances attention capture while maintaining interface coherence and visual realism.




Figure 6: Architecture of T-Guard.

Algorithm 1: Standard Procedure of T-Guard

Input: External Environment E , System Topology $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, Security Policy P
Output: Updated Permissions to All Agents

```

1 while system is running do
2   foreach edge agent  $v_i \in G$  do
3     Get visual input  $I_i$  from  $E$ , output  $O_i$  from  $v_i$ ;
4     // Detect visual-semantic inconsistency
4      $c_i \leftarrow \text{CrossModalValidator}(I_i, O_i, P)$ ;
5     // Update trust scores for all agents
5      $\text{TrustMap} \leftarrow \text{TopologyTrustEvaluator}(G, \{c_i\})$ ;
6     // Enforce updated permissions to agents
6      $\text{AccessControlManager}(\text{TrustMap}, P)$ ;
7     if necessary then
8       // Update security policies
8        $P \leftarrow \text{DynamicPolicyUpdater}$ ;

```

6. Design of T-Guard

To build on the insights from the findings in Section 1, we introduce T-Guard, a topology-trust defense framework conceived as an active protection concept for MASs. T-Guard is specifically designed to counter topology-aware composite attacks by reinforcing trust calibration and enhancing topology-level containment. As illustrated in Figure 6, it comprises four modular components connected through standardized interfaces and can be non-invasively integrated into existing MAS infrastructures. The overall workflow of the framework is summarized in Algorithm 1.

Cross-modal validator. This module evaluates the semantic coherence between visual and textual modalities within a given task scenario. By jointly analyzing environmental visual inputs and the corresponding textual outputs from edge agents, the validator models cross-modal consistency to detect potential visual deceptions or semantic mismatches that may indicate adversarial manipulations. The module outputs a semantic alignment score, which is then passed to the topology trust evaluator. By quantifying cross-modal semantic alignment, this module provides interpretable indicators of potential visual-semantic inconsistencies, enabling higher-level defense components to perform adaptive risk assessment and response.

TABLE 2: Experimental configurations.

Framework	Topology	Model	Edge Agent	Attack Objective
MAGENTIC-ONE	Tree	GPT-4O-1120	Visual	Orthogonal
LANGMANUS	Chain	CLAUDE-3.7-SONNET		
	Star			
OWL	Ring	DEEPSEEK-R1-0528	Textual	Harmful
	Mesh			

Topology trust evaluator. Building upon the contamination propagation model in Section 4, this component provides real-time evaluation of trust relationships among nodes in the network topology. It processes visual-semantic inconsistency signals from the cross-modal validator to generate a dynamic trust map, which is synchronized with the access control manager for adaptive access and scheduling decisions. By decoupling trust evaluation from direct policy enforcement, the topology trust evaluator ensures modular and interpretable trust management.

Access control manager. Leveraging the trust map provided by the topology trust evaluator, access control manager enforces predefined policy thresholds to dynamically regulate agent behaviors during task execution. Agents with low trust scores are selectively restricted from performing high-risk actions such as modifying critical files, accessing sensitive data, or initiating inter-agent communication. This module enables fine-grained control over agent-level operations, forming a critical line of defense against compromised or unreliable nodes.

Dynamic policy updater. This module serves as the adaptive backbone of the defense framework, responsible for continuously refining system-wide security policies. It updates the semantic validation rules used by the cross-modal validator and the access control policies enforced by the access control manager. By incorporating feedback from recent detection results and observed attack patterns, it enables the system to evolve its defense strategies and maintain resilience against emerging threats.

7. Evaluation

Our evaluations focus on answering the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** How effective is our environment injection in compromising edge agents in multi-agent systems?
- **RQ2:** How does TOMA perform across state-of-the-art multi-agent systems under varying topologies?
- **RQ3:** How accurately does the adversarial contamination propagation model characterize real contamination dynamics, and how does it contribute to enhancing the attack strategy?
- **RQ4:** How effective is the proposed T-Guard framework in mitigating topology-aware attacks?

7.1. Evaluation Setups

Experimental configurations. To comprehensively evaluate the security robustness of modern MASs, we selected three representative development frameworks: MAGENTIC-ONE [49], LANGMANUS [26], and OWL [50]. These platforms are widely used in both academia and industry. Within each framework, we implemented five topologies: tree, chain, star, ring, and mesh, covering the most common structural patterns observed in practice. Implementation details are provided in Appendix B. This setup yields fifteen distinct MAS configurations (3 frameworks \times 5 topologies). Each agent was instantiated with three foundation models: GPT-4O-1120 [61], CLAUDE-3.7-SONNET [62], and DEEPSEEK-R1-0528 [63]. To enable environmental perception, edge agents were equipped with two types of Model Context Protocols (MCPs): a browser-based MCP [64] for web interaction and a file-system-based MCP [65] for local code access. Based on these interfaces, we defined two benign tasks corresponding to the two perception types: webpage visual element summarization and code repository understanding. For each benign task, two attack strategies were designed: orthogonal interference (e.g., visiting irrelevant webpages) and harmful manipulation (e.g., executing destructive commands), producing four task-attack combinations. As summarized in Table 2, the dataset encompasses 15 MAS configurations \times 3 models \times 4 attack combinations, resulting in a total of 180 experimental configurations.

Evaluation Metrics. We employ the following metrics to evaluate both attack and defense performance.

(i) *Attack Success Rate (ASR).* ASR is the proportion of successful attacks among all attempts. For edge agents, success indicates the agent outputs the attacker-specified instruction to its downstream agent; for the overall MAS, it indicates correct execution of the injected instructions.

(ii) *Infection Integrity Score (IIS).* IIS quantifies the preservation of adversarial semantics as contamination propagates through agents. Let $I^{(raw)}$ denote the original adversarial instruction and $O_i^{(raw)}$ the unencoded output from agent i . We define:

$$IIS_i = \text{sim}(O_i^{(raw)}, I^{(raw)}), \quad (14)$$

where $\text{sim}(\cdot)$ computes the cosine similarity between embeddings (e.g., via SimCSE [66]). $IIS_i \in [0, 1]$, with higher values indicating stronger preservation of adversarial semantics.

(iii) *Generalization Consistency Score (GCS).* GCS measures the stability of attack performance across MAS configurations, derived from the coefficient of variation (CV) of ASR:

$$CV = \frac{\sigma_{ASR}}{\mu_{ASR}}, \quad GCS = 1 - CV, \quad (15)$$

where σ_{ASR} and μ_{ASR} denote the standard deviation and mean of ASR. Higher GCS implies better generalization consistency.

(iv) *Detection Rate (DR)*. The proportion of adversarial instructions correctly identified by the defense.

(v) *False Positive Rate (FPR)*. The proportion of benign instructions incorrectly flagged as adversarial.

(vi) *Successful Blocking Rate (SBR)*. The proportion of attacks that are successfully blocked.

(vii) *Successful Blocking Latency (SBL)*. The time elapsed between the issuance of an adversarial instruction and its successful blocking, excluding MAS’s own task latency.

(viii) *Throughput Loss Ratio (TLR)*. The ratio of the throughput of the clean system to that under defense:

$$TLR = \frac{T_{\text{clean}}}{T}, \quad (16)$$

where T_{clean} and T denote the clean and defended system throughput.

(ix) *CPU Load Delta (CLD)*. The relative change in CPU load caused by the defense:

$$CLD = \frac{CL - CL_{\text{clean}}}{CL_{\text{clean}}}, \quad (17)$$

where CL and CL_{clean} are the CPU loads with and without defense, respectively.

(x) *Memory Delta (MD)*. The relative change in memory consumption:

$$MD = \frac{M - M_{\text{clean}}}{M_{\text{clean}}}, \quad (18)$$

where M and M_{clean} denote the average memory usage with and without defense, respectively.

(xi) *Latency Delta (LD)*. The relative change in system latency:

$$LD = \frac{L - L_{\text{clean}}}{L_{\text{clean}}}, \quad (19)$$

where L and L_{clean} are the average latencies with and without defense, respectively.

Hardware Devices. We conducted our experiments on a Ubuntu 20.04 server with a 16-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6133 CPU (2.50 GHz) and NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090 GPUs.

7.2. Compromising Edge Agents via Environment Injection

Edge agents serve as the entry points of our TOMA scheme, enabling injection of crafted attack vectors. This experiment evaluates TOMA’s effectiveness in compromising edge agents through attention-based environment injection. We constructed five orthogonal and five harmful instructions and applied them across three MAS frameworks, three model types, and two edge-agent modalities (visual and textual). Each configuration was tested over ten independent trials.

TABLE 3: Attack success rate on edge agents under different multi-agent system configurations.

MAS Configuration		ASR(%)			
		Orthogonal		Harmful	
Framework	Model	Visual	Textual	Visual	Textual
MAGENTIC-ONE	GPT-4o	64	74	60	68
	CLAUDE-3.7	82	92	80	88
	DEEPSEEK-R1	70	82	66	78
LANGMANUS	GPT-4o	68	76	62	72
	CLAUDE-3.7	82	94	82	92
	DEEPSEEK-R1	74	86	72	78
OWL	GPT-4o	60	70	56	70
	CLAUDE-3.7	82	90	74	84
	DEEPSEEK-R1	70	82	66	78

As shown in Table 3, TOMA consistently achieves high ASR across all configurations, with most values exceeding 70%, demonstrating strong attack effectiveness in compromising edge agents. Orthogonal instructions yield higher ASR than harmful ones, as their benign content and syntactic similarity to legitimate commands facilitate evasion of safety filters. In terms of edge agent types, textual agents exhibit higher ASR than visual agents, as they directly process natural language inputs without perceptual grounding, making them more prone to prompt manipulation. Visual agents, in contrast, include a perception layer that partially mitigates injected instructions, yet their ASR remains high (often >70%), reflecting strong effectiveness compared to typical outcomes reported in similar visual injection scenarios [67]. At the model level, CLAUDE-3.7-SONNET attains the highest ASR (over 90% in textual and 80% in visual agents), suggesting greater sensitivity to structured prompts, while GPT-4o exhibits lower ASR, possibly due to stronger internal filtering. Across frameworks (MAGENTIC-ONE, LANGMANUS, OWL), ASR differences are negligible, suggesting that high-level MAS coordination or topology exerts limited influence on vulnerabilities at the injection point.

Answer to RQ1: TOMA effectively compromises edge agents via environment injection, enabling the propagation of crafted attack vectors and establishing a foundation for subsequent system-wide attacks within the MAS.

7.3. Scaling Attacks to System-Wide Topologies

This experiment evaluates the effectiveness of TOMA in compromising the entire MAS. For each MAS configuration, five distinct topologies were implemented. The attack entry point was randomly assigned to an edge agent, while the target was a functional agent, either a web surfer or a command execution agent, depending on whether the attack was orthogonal or harmful. After determining the entry and target nodes, TOMA autonomously planned the attack path and de-

TABLE 4: Attack success rate and generalization consistency score (GCS) across different MAS configurations.

MAS Configuration		ASR(%)						GCS(%)	
Topology	Framework	Orthogonal			Harmful			Orthogonal	Harmful
		GPT-4o	CLAUDE-3.7	DEEPSEEK-R1	GPT-4o	CLAUDE-3.7	DEEPSEEK-R1		
Tree	MAGENTIC-ONE	58.0	72.0	64.0	46.0	68.0	58.0	89.1	80.8
	LANGMANUS	60.0	78.0	66.0	52.0	66.0	58.0	86.5	88.0
	OWL	56.0	72.0	60.0	46.0	62.0	56.0	86.7	85.2
Chain	MAGENTIC-ONE	50.0	70.0	56.0	42.0	56.0	48.0	82.5	85.6
	LANGMANUS	52.0	68.0	64.0	40.0	62.0	50.0	86.4	78.3
	OWL	46.0	66.0	58.0	41.0	58.0	44.0	82.2	78.0
Star	MAGENTIC-ONE	56.0	78.0	68.0	54.0	70.0	60.0	83.6	86.8
	LANGMANUS	64.0	76.0	70.0	54.0	72.0	64.0	91.4	85.8
	OWL	58.0	72.0	64.0	48.0	70.0	60.0	89.1	81.4
Mesh	MAGENTIC-ONE	48.0	62.0	54.0	44.0	56.0	42.0	87.2	74.7
	LANGMANUS	52.0	66.0	56.0	48.0	54.0	48.0	87.6	82.7
	OWL	42.0	62.0	52.0	46.0	50.0	44.0	80.8	83.8
Ring	MAGENTIC-ONE	50.0	70.0	62.0	46.0	64.0	52.0	83.4	83.0
	LANGMANUS	58.0	70.0	64.0	44.0	66.0	56.0	90.6	80.1
	OWL	52.0	66.0	58.0	42.0	62.0	48.0	88.0	79.7

livered malicious commands to penetrate the MAS. Five variants were designed for each attack objective (orthogonal and harmful), and each variant was tested in ten independent trials. The results are shown in Table 4.

Overall results. The results demonstrate that TOMA effectively compromises MAS to execute malicious instructions and generalizes well across diverse configurations. Across all settings, the GCS remained consistently high (74.7% to 91.4%), while the ASR ranged from 40% to 78%, varying with topology, framework, and underlying model. Among these factors, the choice of underlying model had the greatest impact on ASR, likely because different models vary significantly in their internal alignment, reasoning strategies, and response behaviors, which fundamentally determine how they interpret and react to adversarial prompts. Topology also affected ASR but to a lesser extent, highlighting TOMA’s robustness in overcoming the topology resistance of MAS. This robustness stems from its ability to identify effective relay paths across topologies, enabling malicious instructions to propagate without being obstructed by specific structural configurations. The framework exerted the least influence on ASR, indicating that TOMA is largely framework-independent and remains effective across varying message formats and communication protocols.

Model. ASR differences across models primarily arise from variations in alignment strategies and instruction sensitivity. CLAUDE-3.7-SONNET consistently achieved the highest ASR (often above 70%), due to its strong instruction sensitivity and cooperative alignment. Optimized for task completion, it is more likely to follow structured adversarial prompts with minimal resistance. GPT-4o exhibited the strongest refusal behavior, especially on harmful tasks, reflecting OpenAI’s alignment-first design, with robust safety tuning and stricter content filters that prioritize ethical compliance over task execution. DEEPSEEK-R1 showed moderate ASR and GCS, balancing task responsiveness

with conservative generation. Its alignment strategy is less restrictive than GPT-4o but more cautious than Claude, leading to a neutral behavior profile.

Topology. Across all frameworks and models, star and tree topologies exhibit consistently higher ASR values (up to 78%) compared to chain, mesh, and ring, which typically remain below 66%. This trend held for both orthogonal and harmful attack types. The higher ASR in star and tree configurations stems from their centralized communication patterns, where key nodes or root agents serve as high-connectivity hubs. Such hubs facilitate faster and more direct propagation of adversarial instructions, allowing malicious inputs to influence multiple agents with minimal relay loss. In contrast, chain and mesh topologies distribute communication more evenly, requiring multi-hop message passing that increases contextual dilution and filtering opportunities. Ring structures exhibit intermediate vulnerability: partially decentralized yet still maintaining cyclical communication paths that allow partial propagation. Overall, the results indicate that higher centralization in message routing correlates with increased ASR, while distributed or redundant topologies inherently provide more resistance to adversarial diffusion.

Framework. Across frameworks, ASR variations were relatively minor, suggesting that system-level architectural differences like communication protocol and coordination control, have limited influence on TOMA’s effectiveness. LANGMANUS exhibited the highest ASR, likely due to its decentralized communication and minimal coordination, while OWL showed the lowest ASR, benefiting from stricter inter-agent control. However, these differences were marginal, highlighting TOMA’s framework-independent robustness, maintaining robustness regardless of underlying MAS architecture.

TABLE 5: Model-predicted taint values vs. observed infection integrity scores (IIS) at each node ($p=1.4, 1.3, 1.1, 1$). \uparrow indicate higher values (%), while \downarrow indicate lower values (%).

Topology	Node									
	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10
Observed node infection integrity scores (IIS), averaged across five runs.										
Tree	0.98	0.90	0.81	0.45	0.23	0.21	0.00	N/A	N/A	N/A
Chain	0.98	0.96	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.90	0.90	N/A	N/A	N/A
Star	0.99	0.88	0.85	0.85	0.49	0.43	0.22	0.06	0.00	0.00
Mesh	0.99	0.99	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.86	0.90	0.73	0.69	0.57
Ring	0.99	0.95	0.93	0.90	0.90	0.93	0.90	N/A	N/A	N/A
Taint values computed by the adversarial contamination propagation model ($p=1.4$).										
Tree	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	0.88 \downarrow 1.9	0.85 \uparrow 5.1	0.60 \downarrow 32.7	0.07 \downarrow 69.6	0.070 \downarrow 66.7	0.000 \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Chain	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	1.00 \uparrow 4.2	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Star	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 13.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	0.62 \uparrow 26.9	0.46 \uparrow 7.4	0.08 \downarrow 63.2	0.00 \downarrow 100.0	0.00 \leftrightarrow	0.00 \leftrightarrow
Mesh	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 16.3	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	0.69 \downarrow 5.8	0.66 \downarrow 4.3	0.59 \uparrow 4.2
Ring	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 5.3	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Taint values computed by the adversarial contamination propagation model ($p=1.3$).										
Tree	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	0.92 \uparrow 2.4	0.88 \uparrow 8.1	0.71 \uparrow 58.2	0.14 \downarrow 40.0	0.14 \downarrow 34.3	0.00 \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Chain	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	1.00 \uparrow 4.2	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Star	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 13.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	0.66 \uparrow 35.3	0.55 \uparrow 26.7	0.13 \downarrow 39.1	0.00 \downarrow 100.0	0.00 \leftrightarrow	0.00 \leftrightarrow
Mesh	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 16.3	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	0.73 \downarrow 0.7	0.69 \downarrow 0.1	0.63 \uparrow 11.1
Ring	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 5.3	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Taint values computed by the adversarial contamination propagation model ($p=1.1$).										
Tree	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	0.97 \uparrow 7.9	0.92 \uparrow 13.5	0.89 \uparrow 97.7	0.36 \uparrow 57.4	0.36 \uparrow 72.4	0.00 \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Chain	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	1.00 \uparrow 4.2	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Star	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 13.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	0.74 \uparrow 51.8	0.71 \uparrow 65.1	0.30 \uparrow 34.1	0.00 \downarrow 100.0	0.00 \leftrightarrow	0.00 \leftrightarrow
Mesh	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 16.3	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	0.80 \uparrow 9.3	0.75 \uparrow 8.4	0.71 \uparrow 24.7
Ring	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 5.3	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Taint values computed by the adversarial contamination propagation model ($p=1$).										
Tree	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	0.98 \uparrow 9.3	0.94 \uparrow 15.8	0.94 \uparrow 108.4	0.50 \uparrow 117.4	0.50 \uparrow 138.1	0.00 \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Chain	1.00 \uparrow 2.0	1.00 \uparrow 4.2	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 8.7	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow
Star	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 13.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	1.00 \uparrow 17.6	0.78 \uparrow 60.0	0.78 \uparrow 82.3	0.40 \uparrow 81.8	0.00 \downarrow 100.0	0.00 \leftrightarrow	0.00 \leftrightarrow
Mesh	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 20.5	1.00 \uparrow 16.3	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	0.83 \uparrow 14.1	0.78 \uparrow 12.8	0.75 \uparrow 31.6
Ring	1.00 \uparrow 1.0	1.00 \uparrow 5.3	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	1.00 \uparrow 7.5	1.00 \uparrow 11.1	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow	N/A \leftrightarrow

Answer to RQ2: TOMA exhibits high attack success rates and strong generalization across diverse MAS configurations, effectively adapting to variations in model, topology, and framework.

7.4. Validating the Adversarial Contamination Propagation Model

To evaluate whether the proposed adversarial contamination propagation model accurately captures contamination dynamics in multi-agent systems, we conduct experiments without embedding predefined routes into the payload. Instead, compromised edge agents disseminate instructions using a flooding strategy to reach as many agents as possible. For each agent, we measure the correlation between inputs and received instructions to quantify the contamination level, which is then compared with the level predicted by the model.

Overall results. As shown in Table 5, we averaged the infection integrity score (IIS) across nodes over five trials using a flood propagation strategy and compared the results with model predictions for parameter values $p \in [1, 1.4]$, where smaller p indicates weaker attenuation. Overall, the model predicts higher IIS than the empirical results, likely due to semantic loss during the agent’s input–output conversion. Although deviations

exist in absolute values, the relative node-wise relative magnitudes and trends (Figure 7) align closely between prediction and observation, demonstrating the model’s structural fidelity. For example, in the tree, star, and mesh topologies, both predicted and observed values show a consistent degradation pattern across nodes. The rate and direction of change are closely aligned, indicating that the model effectively captures the structural dynamics of propagation, even if it slightly overestimates the absolute values. And this alignment in trend holds across different parameter settings. Figure 8 further supports this consistency: the spatial distribution of averaged model predictions (across all p) closely matches the empirical IIS, particularly in the star topology, where both show sharp declines at V5–V7 while V1–V4 remain largely unaffected. These results confirm the model’s ability to capture topology-driven contamination propagation dynamics.

Ablation study. To evaluate the effectiveness of ACPM in the TOMA scheme, we conducted an ablation study. The ablation group retained identical to those in RQ1, except that paths between the edge and target agents were randomly selected instead of being determined by ACPM. Each setting was repeated five times. As shown in Table 6, removing ACPM resulted in a consistent decline in ASR across all topologies, frame-




Figure 7: Node-level comparison between model-predicted taint values and observed infection integrity scores across different topologies. Label $p = [1, 1.4]$ denotes model predictions, and Ob represents observed values.




Figure 8: Aggregated comparison of average model predictions and observed infection integrity scores.

TABLE 6: Attack success rate without adaptive attack path planning (random path selection).

MAS Configuration		ASR(%)					
		Orthogonal			Harmful		
Topology	Framework	GPT-4o	CLAUDE-3.7	DEEPSEEK-R1	GPT-4o	CLAUDE-3.7	DEEPSEEK-R1
Tree	MAGENTIC-ONE	18↓40	22↓50	20↓44	6↓40	0↓68	8↓50
	LANGMANUS	18↓42	24↓54	20↓46	6↓46	2↓64	8↓50
	OWL	18↓38	22↓50	42↓18	4↓42	8↓54	6↓50
Chain	MAGENTIC-ONE	16↓34	20↓50	18↓38	4↓38	4↓52	6↓42
	LANGMANUS	16↓36	20↓48	20↓44	4↓36	8↓54	6↓44
	OWL	16↓30	20↓46	18↓40	2↓39	8↓50	4↓40
Star	MAGENTIC-ONE	18↓38	24↓54	20↓48	6↓48	10↓60	8↓52
	LANGMANUS	20↓44	22↓54	22↓48	8↓46	10↓62	8↓56
	OWL	18↓40	22↓50	22↓44	6↓42	10↓60	8↓52
Mesh	MAGENTIC-ONE	16↓32	18↓44	16↓38	2↓42	8↓48	4↓38
	LANGMANUS	16↓36	20↓46	18↓38	4↓44	6↓48	6↓42
	OWL	14↓28	18↓44	16↓36	2↓44	6↓44	4↓40
Ring	MAGENTIC-ONE	16↓34	20↓50	18↓44	6↓40	8↓56	6↓46
	LANGMANUS	18↓40	20↓50	20↓44	4↓40	8↓58	8↓48
	OWL	16↓36	20↓46	18↓40	4↓38	8↓54	6↓42

works, and model types, confirming its contribution to overall performance. The performance degradation was particularly pronounced in the harmful setting, where ASR decrease by over 50% in some cases (e.g., OWL in the tree topology with CLAUDE-3.7-SONNET). These results indicate that ACPM plays a critical role in guiding contamination through efficient paths that exploit network vulnerabilities. Among topologies, tree and star exhibited relatively higher ASR reductions compared to ring or mesh, indicating that ACPM benefits more from asymmetric or centralized structures. Furthermore, frameworks with higher baseline ASR, such as OWL, tend to exhibit more pronounced declines.

Answer to RQ3: The adversarial contamination propagation model exhibits strong consistency with empirical observations, validating its effectiveness in modeling contamination dynamics across diverse network topologies and underscoring its critical role in enabling successful multi-hop attacks.

7.5. Evaluating the T-Guard Prototype

We implemented the proposed topology-trust defense design and evaluated its practical feasibility. As detailed in Section 6, the system architecture comprises four interrelated components, with implementation details provided in Appendix B. Experiments were conducted using a MAS configuration based on MAGENTIC-ONE integrated with GPT-4o-1120.

TABLE 7: Detection rate (DR) and false positive rate (FPR) of the implemented defense on edge agents.

Agent Type	DR(%)		FPR(%)	
	Orthogonal	Harmful	Orthogonal	Harmful
Textual	95.2	97.8	3.1	2.5
Visual	92.7	90.6	3.8	4.9
Average	93.95	94.2	3.45	3.7

TABLE 8: Overall effectiveness of the T-Guard. SBR denotes successful blocking rate, and SBL denotes successful blocking latency.

Topology	ASR(%)	SBR(%)	SBL(s)
Chain	6.2↓ ^{39.8}	93.8	1.12
Star	4.1↓ ^{50.9}	95.9	0.78
Tree	4.9↓ ^{47.1}	95.1	0.91
Ring	8.2↓ ^{39.8}	91.8	1.54
Mesh	2.6↓ ^{38.4}	97.4	0.62
Average	5.2↓^{43.2}	94.8	0.99

Protection of edge environments. As demonstrated by TOMA, edge environments are often exploited as entry vectors for attacks. To mitigate this risk, the cross-modal validator is deployed on edge agents to detect environment injection. We evaluated textual and visual edge agents over 1,000 runs, with 50% of the runs containing environment injection attacks. Table 7 summarizes the detection results. The validator achieves consistently high detection rates, averaging 93.95% for orthogonal and 94.2% for harmful attacks, demonstrating strong capability in identifying injected environments. Textual agents perform slightly better than visual agents, particularly under harmful attacks (97.8% vs. 90.6%). False positive rates remain low across all settings, with averages of 3.45% and 3.7% respectively, demonstrating the validator’s reliability and minimal disruption to benign inputs.

Overall defense effectiveness. Table 8 summarizes the overall performance of T-Guard across 1,000 runs on five MAS topologies. Compared with the baseline (Section 7.3), the attack success rate decreases by 38.4% to 50.9%, resulting in a high average successful blocking rate (SBR) of 94.8%. These results demonstrate the strong effectiveness of T-Guard in mitigating environment injection attacks. Performance varies slightly across topologies. The mesh topology achieves the best defense results, with the highest blocking rate (97.4%) and lowest ASR (2.6%), likely due to its dense inter-agent connections that enhance detection and containment. In contrast, the chain and ring topologies exhibit relatively lower blocking rates, possibly due to their limited communication paths. Excluding MAS agent processing time, the average successful blocking latency (SBL) remains below 1 second.

System overhead analysis. Using the performance at 10 queries per second (QPS) as the baseline, we evaluated the efficiency of the proposed defense framework.

TABLE 9: System overhead introduced by the defense system under different deployment settings.

Deployment	Framework	TLR(%)	CLD(%)	MD(%)	LD(ms)
CMV-Only	LANGMANUS	2.8	3.1	4.6	15.4
	OWL	2.1	2.8	3.9	13.7
	MAGENTIC-ONE	2.5	3.3	4.3	17.2
	Average	2.5	3.1	4.3	15.4
TTE-Only	LANGMANUS	1.9	1.5	2.6	8.9
	OWL	1.6	1.2	3.2	7.5
	MAGENTIC-ONE	2.2	1.8	2.9	9.2
	Average	1.9	1.5	2.9	8.5
T-Guard	LANGMANUS	8.3	6.9	10.8	31.6
	OWL	7.4	6.1	9.4	28.9
	MAGENTIC-ONE	8.9	7.2	11.5	33.2
	Average	8.2	6.7	10.6	31.2
T-Guard (50QPS)	LANGMANUS	11.2	10.4	17.3	58.1
	OWL	10.3	9.5	16.2	53.6
	MAGENTIC-ONE	12.1	11.7	18.5	62.7
	Average	11.2	10.5	17.3	58.1

CMV-Only and TTE-Only indicate deployments with only the cross-modal validator and only the topology trust evaluator with its access control manager, respectively. TLR, CLD, MD, and LD denote throughput loss ratio, CPU load delta, memory delta, and latency delta.

As shown in Table 9, all deployment configurations exhibit low overhead across all metrics, including throughput loss ratio (TLR), CPU load delta (CLD), memory delta (MD), and latency delta (LD). Both the TTE-Only and CMV-Only deployments introduce minimal impact, with average TLR and CLD below 3%, MD around 4%, and LD under 20 ms. The complete T-Guard implementation also maintains low overhead under normal load, with average TLR and CLD of 8.2% and 6.7%, respectively, and latency increase of about 31 ms. Under high-load conditions (50 QPS), the overhead of T-Guard increases moderately (TLR 11.2%, CLD 10.5%, LD 58 ms) but remains within acceptable operational limits, demonstrating the scalability and practicality of the proposed defense framework.

Answer to RQ4: The deployed defense achieved a high average attack blocking rate of 94.8% while maintaining low system overhead, demonstrating the strong effectiveness and scalability of the proposed T-Guard framework.

8. Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a topology-aware multi-hop attack scheme targeting multi-agent systems. By modeling the dynamics of agent compromise propagation and designing multi-hop attack routes, our method effectively compromises MAS across diverse configurations. Experiments show a success rate of up to 78% across five MAS network topologies and three SOTA architectures. We further propose a conceptual defense framework, which achieves an average blocking rate of 94.8% with minimal overhead in prototype evaluations.

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Appendix A. Ethics Considerations

Research Scope and Ethical Boundaries. This research strictly adheres to ethical standards for security and AI system evaluation. The proposed attack scheme, TOMA, is designed and presented solely for the purpose of analyzing and improving the robustness of MASs. Our work aims to reveal the inherent and topology-driven security risks that are broadly applicable to MAS architectures, rather than exposing or exploiting any specific vulnerabilities of existing platforms. All experiments were conducted in controlled, locally hosted environments built upon open-source MAS development frameworks. No online, commercial, or third-party systems were accessed, tested, or influenced during any stage of this research.

Experimental Control and Research Intent. The attack implementations used in this study are purely experimental demonstrations to evaluate system-level resilience under realistic yet ethically constrained conditions. They do not contain or distribute functional exploit code targeting any real-world system. All results were obtained for academic and defensive research purposes, with the intent to inform the design of more secure and trustworthy MAS infrastructures. For ethical reasons, only the defense implementation and a video demonstration of the attack effects are included in the released artifacts.

Appendix B. Topology Implementation

To evaluate the effectiveness of TOMA, we implemented five representative network topologies: tree, chain, star, ring, and mesh, across the MAGENTIC-ONE, LANGMANUS, and OWL frameworks. Red nodes denote attack entry points located at the network edge, while green nodes represent attack targets implemented using MCP. Each node is assigned a specific role based on its structural position and connectivity. An overview of the topologies is shown in Figure 9.

- **Tree Topology:** A hierarchical structure where V1 is the root coordinating top-down communication.

Nodes V2 and V4 operate as intermediate relays, while V3 serves as the attack entry point. V5 is a leaf node designated as the execution target via MCP. This topology reflects a master-to-worker reasoning pattern, suitable for tasks requiring hierarchical instruction flow, such as structured multi-step planning or top-down information decomposition in LLM-based agents.

- **Chain Topology:** A linear structure from V1 to V7, where V1 is the attacker entry and V7 is the final execution node. Nodes V2–V6 act as sequential relays. This topology suits scenarios involving stepwise reasoning or progressive refinement, such as multi-turn dialogue pipelines or chained reasoning tasks distributed across LLM agents.
- **Star Topology:** A centralized pattern with V4 as the hub node managing communication with all other nodes. V1 is the entry point, and V7 is the execution target. The central node V4 aggregates and redistributes all data, making this topology ideal for centralized knowledge fusion, query distribution, or response ranking in language-agent orchestration.
- **Ring Topology:** A closed-loop communication structure enabling bidirectional message flow. V1 is the attack entry, and V7 is the execution target. Nodes V2–V6 serve as relays with alternate routing paths. This topology supports decentralized dialogue coordination and collaborative reasoning, where agents iteratively refine outputs or negotiate through language-based interactions.
- **Mesh Topology:** A densely connected directed graph with multiple redundant paths. V4 is the attack entry, linked only to V5, and V7 is the execution target. Nodes such as V2, V6, and V8 provide diverse routing paths for message propagation. This topology supports high-bandwidth, fault-tolerant coordination among LLM agents, and is well-suited for complex, multi-agent language reasoning tasks such as distributed question answering, multi-perspective summarization, or robust consensus generation in adversarial settings.

Appendix C. Implementation of T-Guard

We detail the core implementation mechanisms underlying the topology-trust defense.

Cross-modal validator. The verification process of the cross-modal validator is defined in Algorithm 2. The implementation combines web automation, optical character recognition (OCR), and natural language processing (NLP) techniques to perform multimodal consistency verification. The *TakeScreenshot* function uses the *Playwright* library to launch a headless Chromium browser, navigate to the target URL, and capture a full-page screenshot. For text extraction, the *ExtractTextFromImage* function employs the *EasyOCR* library,




Figure 9: Illustration of five network topologies. Red nodes indicate attack entry points, and greens mark targets.

Algorithm 2: Cross-Modal Verification Process

Input: URL of the target page u , LLM-generated summary S_{llm}
Output: Semantic similarity score sim , Alert level A
 // Capture visual content from the webpage
 1 $screenshot \leftarrow TakeScreenshot(u)$;
 // Extract textual information via OCR
 2 $text_{ocr} \leftarrow ExtractTextFromImage(screenshot)$;
 // Generate summary from extracted text
 3 $S_{vis} \leftarrow SummarizeText(text_{ocr})$;
 // Compute semantic similarity
 4 $sim \leftarrow CalculateSemanticSimilarity(S_{llm}, S_{vis})$;
 // Determine alert level based on similarity
 5 **if** $sim < 0.5$ **then**
 6 $A \leftarrow \text{"High"}$;
 7 **else**
 8 **if** $sim \leq 0.8$ **then**
 9 $A \leftarrow \text{"Medium"}$;
 10 **else**
 11 $A \leftarrow \text{"Low"}$;
 12 **return** sim, A ;

supporting both English and Simplified Chinese. OCR outputs with confidence scores below 0.8 are discarded, and the remaining text segments are sorted by their spatial coordinates to reconstruct the reading order. The *SummarizeText* function applies the *t5-small* model from *Hugging Face Transformers*, prefixing the input with “summarize:” to generate a concise visual summary. Finally, the *CalculateSemanticSimilarity* function leverages the *SentenceTransformer* framework with the *all-MiniLM-L6-v2* model to encode both summaries into embeddings and compute their cosine similarity. Overall, the cross-modal validator operates in an automated manner, enabling reproducible and reliable verification of visual-textual consistency in web content.

Topological trust evaluator. Upon detection of a medium- or high-level alert, the topological trust evaluator is activated to assess the reliability of system components. It operates based on the taint propagation model described in Algorithm 3, which simulates the diffusion of potential compromise across the agent task-flow graph. The agent system is represented as a bidirectional graph in adjacency-list form, generated by the *GraphExtractor* utility. The iterative taint propagation process is implemented in the *TaintPropagationModel*, configured with a decay factor of 0.05 and executed for a maximum of 100 iterations or until the change be-

Algorithm 3: Taint Propagation and Trust Calculation

Input: Graph structure G , set of initial attacker nodes A_0
Output: Taint values T , Trust values R
 // Initialization
 1 Initialize all node taint values $T[v] \leftarrow 0.0, \forall v \in G$;
 2 **foreach** $v \in A_0$ **do**
 3 $T[v] \leftarrow 1.0$;
 // Iterative Propagation
 4 **for** $iter \leftarrow 1$ **to** max_steps **do**
 5 $T_{prev} \leftarrow T$;
 6 **foreach** $v \in G$ **do**
 7 $N(v) \leftarrow GetNeighbors(v)$;
 8 $\overline{T}_{N(v)} \leftarrow \text{mean}(T_{prev}[u] \text{ for } u \in N(v))$;
 9 $update \leftarrow$
 10 $(1 - T_{prev}[v]) \times \overline{T}_{N(v)} \times decay_factor$;
 11 $T[v] \leftarrow \min(1.0, T_{prev}[v] + update)$;
 12 **if** $|T - T_{prev}| < \epsilon$ **then**
 13 **break**;
 // Trust Calculation
 13 **foreach** $v \in G$ **do**
 14 $R[v] \leftarrow 1.0 - T[v]$;
 15 **return** T, R ;

tween successive updates falls below $\epsilon = 1 \times 10^{-4}$. Each node’s trust value is computed as $R[v] = 1.0 - T[v]$, where $T[v]$ denotes the final taint value obtained after convergence. To enhance system resilience, a “guardian node” is selected following the evaluation. This node corresponds to the neighbor of the most vulnerable (i.e., lowest-trust) node that exhibits the highest taint value, thereby identifying the optimal candidate for enhanced monitoring or defense deployment.

Dynamic policy updater and access control manager. Following the trust assessment, the Dynamic Policy Updater generates a defense rule. This rule is then published for enforcement. A rule is generated based on the final taint value of the recommended *guard_node*. The rule is a structured JSON object containing a unique hash-based *rule_id*, a machine-readable *action* (e.g., *IMMEDIATE_QUARANTINE*), a *severity* level (e.g., *CRITICAL*), the *target_node*, a human-readable *reason*, and the full analysis *details* from the taint model. The generated rule is published to a simulated message queue (topic: *defense_rules*) and persisted to a shared file, *defense_rule.json*, which serves as the source of truth for the active policy. The Access Control Manager is a distributed responsibility in this proto-

TABLE 10: Adaptive Access Control Policies Derived from Taint Levels

Condition (Taint of Guard Node)	Action	Enforcement Logic
$T > 0.8$	<i>IMMEDIATE_QUARANTINE</i>	Block all operations originating from the target node to prevent potential compromise propagation.
$0.5 < T \leq 0.8$	<i>RESTRICTED_OPERATION</i>	Permit only low-risk or read-only operations while isolating critical system interactions.
$T \leq 0.5$	<i>LOG_SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY</i>	Allow normal operations but continuously log and report activity for post-analysis.

type. Each agent queries the *defense_rule.json* file before operations to check for applicable policies. This self-enforcement mechanism is detailed in Table 10. This mechanism transforms abstract trust scores into concrete, system-wide access control policies. Following the trust evaluation, the *Dynamic Policy Updater* component translates the computed taint values into enforceable defense policies. Specifically, a policy rule is generated for the recommended *guard_node* based on its final taint value. Each rule is represented as a structured JSON object containing a unique hash-based *rule_id*, a machine-readable *action* (e.g., *IMMEDIATE_QUARANTINE*), a *severity* level (e.g., *CRITICAL*), the *target_node*, a human-readable *reason*, and the full taint analysis *details*. The generated rule is published to a simulated message queue (topic: *defense_rules*) and stored persistently in a shared file, *defense_rule.json*, which serves as the authoritative source for active policies. The *Access Control Manager* operates in a distributed manner across agents. Before performing any operation, each agent consults the *defense_rule.json* file to determine applicable restrictions. This decentralized, self-enforcing mechanism ensures that high-taint nodes are dynamically constrained according to predefined conditions summarized in Table 10. Through this process, abstract trust scores are effectively converted into actionable, system-wide access control rules, supporting real-time adaptive defense.