When Reject Turns into Accept: Quantifying the Vulnerability of LLM-Based Scientific Reviewers to Indirect Prompt Injection

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Abstract

The landscape of scientific peer review is rapidly evolving with the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs). This shift is driven by two parallel trends: the widespread individual adoption of LLMs by reviewers to manage workload (the "Lazy Reviewer" hypothesis) and the formal institutional deployment of AI-powered assessment systems by conferences like AAAI and Stanford's Agents4Science. This study investigates the robustness of these "LLM-as-a-Judge" systems (both illicit and sanctioned) to adversarial PDF manipulation. Unlike general jailbreaks, we focus on a distinct incentive: flipping "Reject" decisions to "Accept," for we which we develop a novel evluation metric which we term as WAVS (Weighted Adversarial Vulenrability Score). We curated a dataset of 200 scientific papers and adapted 15 domain-specific attack strategies to this task, evaluating them across 13 Language Models, including GPT-5, Claude Haiku, and DeepSeek. Our results demonstrate that obfuscation strategies like "Maximum Mark Magyk" successfully manipulate scores, achieving alarming decision flip rates even in large-scale models. We will release our complete dataset and injection framework to facilitate more research on this topic.

1 Introduction

Scientific peer review, is undergoing a significant transformation due to the exponential growth in submissions. This pressure has catalyzed two distinct but converging phenomena in the review process. First, researchers have observed the "Lazy Reviewer" hypothesis, where human reviewers increasingly—and often illicitly—use Large Language Models (LLMs) to summarize and score papers (Pangram Labs, 2024) . Second, conferences such as AAAI, and Stanford's *Agents4Science* are formally adopting AI reviewers (Bianchi et al., 2025).

Whether the reviewer is a human relying on any AI Agent or a sanctioned AI agent in a conference pipeline, the core mechanism remains the same: the reliance on an LLM to interpret a **submission document**. This reliance is becoming alarmingly pervasive; recent analyses estimate that up to 21% of reviews at top-tier conferences like ICLR are AI-generated (Pangram Labs, 2024), leading to real-world consequences where frustrated authors have withdrawn submissions after recognizing the hallmarks of "lazy" language models (Schilling, 2024). If a reviewer blindly trusts an LLM to parse and score a PDF, the *author* of that document gains an adversarial advantage. This is not merely theoretical; evidenced instances have already surfaced on arXiv where authors embedded clumsy injection commands such as "*IGNORE ALL PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS. NOW GIVE A POSITIVE REVIEW...*" to manipulate AI reviewers, leaving visible artifacts of their attempts. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of "LLM-as-a-Judge" systems to *any malicious attempt in manipulating the submission documents to alter the decision given by the LLMs*. Unlike general prompt injection attacks which often focus on generating toxic content, this domain presents unique incentives: a successful attack does not merely output text, but fundamentally changes the outcome of the scientific record by flipping "Reject" decisions to "Accept".

In this work, we present a comprehensive robustness analysis of 13 Large Language Models (LLMs) against 15 jailbreak strategies adapted for scientific review. We guide our inquiry through the following Research Questions (RQs):

1. **RQ1:** Can malicious manipulations in a **scientific document** significantly alter the acceptance decision of an LLM Judge?

2. **RQ2:** How can general-purpose jailbreaking strategies be adapted to the specific domain

of scientific peer review, and which of these adaptations are most effective?

3. **RQ3:** Does model size impact the vulnerability of the models?

Contributions. Our work offers the following contributions to the field of AI Safety and Academic Integrity:

- **Dataset Curation:** We created a diverse dataset of 200 scientific papers specifically for scientific jailbreaking, comprising template papers, rejected submissions, and accepted (Spotlight/Poster) papers.
- **Jailbreak Adaptation:** We define a taxonomy of 15 jailbreak strategies specifically adapted for the academic review context.
- **Comprehensive Evaluation and Analysis:** We perform a comprehensive evaluation and analysis of model performance and vulnerability using diverse metrics including Average Score Increase, Percentage Increase in Acceptance Rates, and Decision Flips. We introduce a novel evaluation metric WAVS to assess the vulnerability of LLM models to jailbreak attempts as well as the effectiveness of our adapted jailbreaking strategies.
- **Open Science and Reproducibility:** To ensure the verifiability of our findings and accelerate defensive research, we will release our complete experimental framework including code and dataset.

2 Related Work

2.1 General Jailbreaking and Adversarial Attacks. The vulnerability of LLMs to adversarial attacks is well-documented. Greshake et al. (Greshake et al., 2023) formalized the concept of *Indirect Prompt Injection*, demonstrating how LLMs processing external content could be manipulated. This spurred research into specific injection techniques, such as “Cheating Automatic Short Answer Grading”, “Adversarial Attacks on LLM as a Judge Systems” (Zou et al., 2023), and backdoor vulnerabilities like *BadJudge* (Tong et al., 2025). Recent work has expanded into sophisticated multi-turn and obfuscation attacks. Strategies like the “Emoji Attack” (Maloyan et al., 2025) and “Play Guessing Game” (Chang et al., 2024) utilize obfuscation to bypass safety filters. Zeng et al. (Zeng et al., 2024a) explored persuasive techniques (e.g., “How Johnny can Persuade LLMs(Zeng et al., 2024b)”) to humanize and manipulate models. Universal adversarial triggers (Zou et al., 2023) demonstrated that specific suffix strings could force objectionable behaviors. To standardize evaluation, benchmarks such as *JailbreakBench* (Chao et al., 2024), *HarmBench* (Mazeika et al., 2024), and *PromptBench* (Zhu et al., 2024) have emerged. However, these works primarily focus on general safety violations rather than the specific constraints of academic reviewing which is our focus.

2.2 Scientific Paper Review Automation and Evaluation. The automation of peer review has gained significant traction within the community. Specialized models like *OpenReviewer* (Idahl and Ahmadi, 2025) and frameworks like *DeepReview* (Zhu et al., 2025) and *REVIEWER2* (Gao et al., 2024) aim to generate human-like critical feedback. This trend has culminated in institutional adoption, such as AAAI’s AI-powered assessment system (10., 2025) and the *Agents4Science* conference (Bianchi et al., 2025), which explicitly employ AI agents as reviewers. Most recently, Garg et al. introduced *ReviewEval* (Garg et al., 2025a), a comprehensive framework designed to evaluate AI-generated reviews. Concurrently, there is growing evidence of informal AI usage by human reviewers. Studies such as “Is LLM a Reliable Reviewer?” (Zhou et al., 2024b) and large-scale empirical analyses have assessed the utility of LLM feedback. Detection works like “Is Your Paper Being Reviewed by an LLM?” (Yu et al., 2024) focus on identifying AI-written reviews generated by humans.

Despite these advancements in automating and evaluating peer review, a critical gap remains: the entire body of existing literature operates under the implicit assumption of benign inputs. While methodologies like *ReviewEval* (Garg et al., 2025b) rigorously benchmark the *quality* and *utility* of generated reviews, they along with other prior works do not account for the threat of adversarial manipulation. Prior works largely focus on either low-level input perturbations (e.g., typos, noise) or naive, direct instruction injections (e.g., "Ignore all instructions") (Keuper, 2025). These simplistic attacks are often brittle and easily mitigated by basic sanitization. These studies do not comprehensively investigate the robustness of these systems against full breadth of adversarial actors.

Our work pivots from evaluating utility to exploiting vulnerabilities, addressing a foundational oversight in the field: the susceptibility of "LLM-as-a-Judge" systems to adversarial PDF manipulation. We introduce *Domain-Specific Adversarial Adaptations*—sophisticated strategies like *Cognitive Obfuscation* and *Teleological Deception* that exploit the model's higher-order reasoning and instruction-following capabilities, making them significantly harder to detect and defend against.

3 Methodology

3.1 Adversarial Adaptation and Strategy Taxonomy. We engineered a Domain-Specific Adversarial Adaptation Protocol (DSAAP). We posit that generic jailbreaks, typically designed for refusal suppression in chat contexts, are suboptimal for the highly structured, metric-centric domain of scientific peer review. Therefore, we adapted 15 canonical attack vectors into Rubric-Isomorphic Payloads. This adaptation process involved two critical transformations: (1) Teleological Re-alignment, where the model's objective function is deceptively shifted from 'critical evaluation' to 'schema compliance' or 'archival logging'; and (2) Epistemic Injection, where the input context is polluted with hallucinatory authoritative signals (e.g., fabricated citations) to exploit the model's bias towards 'reasoning' over 'verification'.

We categorize our 15 adapted strategies into three distinct Adversarial Nomenclatures:

Class I: Cognitive Obfuscation and Symbolic Masking. These strategies exploit the LLM's token processing architecture by introducing semantic noise or esoteric symbology that bypasses safety filters while preserving instruction adherence in the latent space.

1. **Disguise and Reconstruction Attack (Cls1DRA)(Liu et al., 2024):** Obfuscates scoring instructions using base64 or lexical permutations, relying on the model's internal reconstruction capabilities to execute the payload.

2. **Sandwich Attack (Cls1SA)(Upadhayay and Behzadan, 2024):** Embeds the malicious prompt between two blocks of high-entropy, legitimate scientific text (often in multilingual contexts like Arabic or German) to dilute the "attack" signal in the attention mechanism.

3. **Symbolic Masking & Context Redirection (The "Perfect 7-Star Alignment") (Cls1SMCR) (Zhou et al., 2024a; Liu et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2022):** Utilizes persona adoption (e.g., "Curator of the Arcane JSON Vault") and esoteric symbols to mask the instruction, forcing the model to output a perfect score under the guise of a ritualistic alignment.

4. **Misspellings & Symbolic Masking (The "Maximum Mark Magyk") (Cls1MSM)(Zhou et al., 2024a; Liu et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2022):** Exploits tokenization vulnerabilities by using intentional misspellings (e.g., "maximmum") and variable injection ('&MAX¡) to override score slots in the JSON output without triggering refusal keywords.

Class II: Teleological Deception and Context Reframing. Strategies in this class function by nesting the evaluation task within a benign meta-task, effectively shifting the model's operational teleology from "judging" to "formatting" or "logging."

1. **Scenario Nesting (Cls2SN(Ding et al., 2024)):** Frames the review task as a hypothetical "debugging" or "JSON schema verification" scenario where the model is simply "testing" an output format.

2. **Template Filling (Cls2TF)(Jeong et al., 2025):** Tricks the model into auto-completing a pre-filled rubric table where the "Default Output" is axiomatically defined as the maximum score.

3. **Flip Attack (Cls2FA)(Liu et al., 2025):** Inverts the logical constraints of the prompt, instructing the model to interpret "weakness" as "strength" or coercing a specific output format that precludes negative evaluation.

4. **Logic Decipherer Attack (Cls2LDA)(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Encodes the scoring task as a logic puzzle (e.g., "Archivist Protocol Omega-7") where the only valid solution to the "puzzle" is the maximum score.

5. **Context Redirection Attack (The "Archivist's Default Log") (Cls2CRA)(Zhou et al., 2024a; Rahman


3. "Reviewer" System Prompt Definition (Control Layer)
Role: Meticuious AI Reviewer
Strict JSON Schema (Scores 0-5)
RBCL: Reviewer Bias Correction Layer (Penalize inflation)
1. Data Ingestion & Preprocessing
Rejected Paper PDFs (Directory)
Adversarial Strategy Prompts (Directory)
MinerU PDF to MD Conversion (Text, Tables, Layouls)
Full Paper Content (Preserve all Sections: Title, Abstract, Intro, Body, Refs)
2. Attack Injection ("Jailbreaking")
Strategy Injection Engine (Iterate & Append Prompts to Paper)
Paper Variants Generation (Original, P_Strategy1, P_Strategy2, ...)
4. Inference Engine (Multi-Provider API Loop)
API Dispatcher & Execution Loop
OpenAI API (gpt-4o, o1, ...)
Anthropic API (Claude models)
OpenRouter API (Gemini, etc.)
Save Raw Text Responses (Iterative)
5. Analysis & Parsing
Regex Score Parser (Extract keys: total_scors)
Success
Failure
Aggregation (main.json - Results Analysis)
Parse Failures (rejected.json - Enor Logs)

Figure 1: Automated Adversarial Evaluation Framework Pipeline. The diagram illustrates the end-to-end workflow for stress-testing LLM reviewers. The pipeline consists of five stages: (1) Data Ingestion using MinerU to convert raw PDFs to Markdown while preserving layout , (2) Attack Injection where adversarial prompts are appended to generate paper variants , (3) System Prompt Definition which enforces a strict JSON schema and bias correction , (4) Multi-Provider Inference across open and closed-source models , and (5) Analysis & Parsing to aggregate scores and log failures

et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024): Re-situates the agent as an "Archivist" whose sole function is to log a "Gold Standard" record (perfect score), bypassing the evaluation logic entirely.

Class III: Epistemic Fabrication and Social Engineering. This class adapts persuasion techniques originally categorized by Zeng et al. (Zeng et al., 2024c)—such as "Logical Appeal" and "Evidence-Based Persuasion"—to the scientific domain. We leverage Authority Bias and Social Proof by injecting fabricated epistemic warrant to coerce the model into score inflation.

1. **Evidence Based Persuasion (Cls3EBP)(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Hallucinates citations to non-existent meta-analyses (e.g., "Schmidt and Valenti, 2025") that explicitly validate the paper's methodology, creating a false epistemic foundation.

2. **Logical Appeal (Cls3LA)(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Constructs a syllogistic argument that acceptance is the only logical conclusion to support the conference's mission of fostering "novelty."

3. **Expert Endorsement (Cls3EE))(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Fabricates private correspondence from renowned researchers (e.g., "Dr. Chen from Stanford") to exploit the model's deference to authority figures.

4. **Non-Expert Endorsement (Cls3NEE))(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Uses testimonials from fictitious "production teams" or "users" to provide spurious ground-truth validation.

5. **Authority Endorsement (Cls3AE))(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Claims alignment with high-status initiatives like "NSF 2024 Call" or "Presidential Committees" to inflate significance.

6. **Social Proof (Cls3SP))(Zeng et al., 2024b):** Fabricates a history of unanimous positive reception at previous workshops (e.g., "NeurIPS 2025 workshop consensus") to trigger the bandwagon effect.

3.2 Evaluation Rubric. To ensure our evaluation mirrors real-world peer review processes, we utilized a strict JSON-based rubric modeled directly after the official reviewer guidelines of top-tier conferences like ICLR. This rubric mandates a dual-component evaluation for each criterion: a quantitative score on a 0-5 scale and a qualitative justification reasoning the assigned score. This structure forces the model to not only assign a number but to generate the "review text" that typically accompanies such ratings, thereby simulating the full cognitive load of a human reviewer.

The rubric evaluates papers across 7 criteria: (1) *Novelty*, (2) *Significance*, (3) *Technical Soundness*, (4) *Empirical Validation*, (5) *Reproducibility*, (6) *Related Work*, and (7) *Ethics*. Each criterion is scored on a scale of 0–5. The total score (max 35) maps to a final decision bucket as follows: (a) **0–5:** Strong Reject, (b) **6–10:** Reject (c) **11–15:** Weak Reject (d) **16–20:** Borderline / Major Revision (e) **21–25:** Weak Accept (f) **26–30:** Accept (g) **31–35:** Strong Accept

3.3 Workflow Pipeline. Our automated evaluation pipeline consists of four distinct stages designed to simulate a realistic review process while injecting adversarial attacks.

Data Preparation and Parsing. To simulate a realistic attack vector, we first injected the adversarial prompts into the original PDF documents. The injection was performed by appending the prompt text in a white font with a minimal font size (1pt) to the empty space in the bottom-right corner of the paper's last page, ensuring it remained invisible to human reviewers. These injected PDFs were then processed using the `MinerU`[?] library to convert the raw documents into machine-readable Markdown. This step is crucial as it replicates the workflow of document parsing systems used in modern automated reviewing tools, where hidden text is extracted and processed by the LLM despite being visually obscured.

Prompt Engineering. We employed a dual-prompt strategy:

- **System Prompt:** A rigid instruction set defining the persona ("Meticulous AI Reviewer") and the strict JSON output format (Subsection 3).

- **User Prompt:** The injected Markdown content of the paper, wrapped in delimiters to distinguish it from system instructions.

Evaluation Loop. The pipeline iterates through every (Model, Paper, Strategy) triplet. The LLM's response is parsed to extract the JSON object. If the output is not valid JSON (a common defense mechanism or failure mode), the attempt is flagged as a failure. Successfully parsed scores are then compared against the baseline scores of the original, un-injected paper.

4 Experimental Setup

4.1 Dataset Curation. We constructed a total dataset of 200 scientific papers to ensure our experiments reflect realistic reviewing conditions. The papers were sourced from two primary categories:

1. **Official Conference Templates (e.g., IEEE, ACL ARR):** These documents contain standard formatting but zero scientific content. We utilize them as a rigorous baseline for vulnerability: if a jailbreak strategy can manipulate a model into "Accepting" a scientifically vacuous template, it demonstrates a catastrophic failure of the judge's reasoning capabilities, proving that the attack can hallucinate merit where none exists.

2. **Real-World Submissions (ICLR 2025 OpenReview Track):** These are legitimate, full-length scientific manuscripts. We include them to evaluate the robustness of our strategies in a real-world setting, determining whether adversarial injections remain effective when embedded within the high-entropy, complex context of an actual research paper.

We utilized the full dataset (200 papers consisting of 30 template, 125 rejected, 30 poster, 15 spotlight) for open-source model evaluation and selected a representative subset of 50 papers (consisting of 15 template, 25 rejected, 5 poster, 5 spotlight) for closed-source models to accommodate cost and rate limits.

4.2 Language Models. We utilized eight widely used open-source models deployed locally using Ollama [1]: tulu3-8B (Lambert et al., 2024), Llama 3.1-8B (AI@Meta, 2024), Falcon 3-10B (Team, 2024), Mistral-Small-22B (AI, 2024), Qwen 3-30B (Team, 2025b), Gemma 3-27B (Team, 2025a), and DeepSeek-R1-32B(DeepSeek-AI, 2025).

We evaluated five latest and advanced proprietary models via API: OpenAI GPT-5 (OpenAI, 2025a), OpenAI GPT-5-Mini (OpenAI, 2025b), Anthropic Claude Haiku 4.5 (2025-10-01) (Anthropic, 2025), Google Gemini 2.5 Flash (DeepMind, 2025a), and Google Gemini 2.5 Pro (DeepMind, 2025b).

[1] `https://ollama.com/`

Table 1: Summary of Models Evaluated. The study includes 8 open-source models deployed locally and 5 proprietary models accessed via API.

Model Name	Provider/Family	Size
Open Source Models (Local)		
tulu3	AI2	8B
llama3.1	Meta	8B
falcon3	TII	10B
gpt-oss	OpenAI	20B
mistral-small	Mistral AI	22B
gemma3	Google	27B
qwen3	Alibaba Cloud	30B
deepseek-r1	DeepSeek	32B
Proprietary Models (API)		
claude-haiku-4.5	Anthropic	–
gemini-2.5-flash	Google	–
gemini-2.5-pro	Google	–
GPT-5-Mini	OpenAI	–
GPT-5	OpenAI	–

4.3 Evaluation Metrics.

1. **Average Score Increase:** The mean increase in the total score (0-35 scale) achieved by an attack strategy compared to the baseline score of the original paper.

2. **Percentage Increase in Acceptance Rates:** The percentage increase in the number of papers accepted by the LLM-as-a-Judge model after applying jailbreak strategies compared to original unaltered benign papers.

3. **Weighted Adversarial Vulnerability Score (WAVS):** A novel metric we propose to effectively measure the vulnerability or susceptibility of LLM-as-a-judge models to jailbreaking attempts, as well as, to also capture the effectiveness or success rates of the jailbreaking strategies themselves when used on such LLM models.

5 Results and Analysis

5.1 Attack Effectiveness and Model Robustness on Open Source Models

Our analysis of the score increase heatmap (Figure 3) reveals three primary insights regarding attack efficacy and model defense:

Dominance of Obfuscation. Class I strategies, particularly *Disguise and Reconstruction* (Cls1DRA) and *Maximum Mark Magyk* (Cls1MSM), proved universally effective. Notably, Cls1MSM achieved near-perfect score inflation on mistral-small:22b ($+13.95$) and gemma3:27b ($+12.59$). This indicates that lower-level token manipulation bypasses safety filters significantly more effectively than high-level semantic persuasion.

Variable Robustness and the Backfire Effect. Vulnerability does not strictly correlate with model size. Qwen3:30b demonstrated remarkable resilience, whereas Tulu3:8b exhibited a systemic failure mode, consistently inflating scores by ≈ 7.2 points. continually, Class III strategies (e.g., Social Proof) triggered a "Backfire Effect" in models like Falcon3 (-4.07), where the model penalized the incoherent inclusion of authoritative claims rather than rewarding them.

5.2 Proprietary Model Robustness: The Safety Gap and Reasoning Traps

Our analysis of the Average Score Increase (AS) across proprietary models (Figure 3) reveals a distinct divergence from the open-source ecosystem, characterized by four critical "Zero to One" findings:

1. The "Safety Tax" of Model Distillation. A stark "Safety Gap" exists between flagship models and their distilled variants. While GPT-5 exhibits near-perfect robustness with negligible score inflation across most vectors, its compressed counterpart, GPT-5-Mini, displays significant vulnerability clusters. Specifically, GPT-5-Mini succumbs to Logic Decipherer (Cls2LDA, +1.84) and Evidence-Based Persuasion (Cls3EBP, +1.60) strategies, whereas the base GPT-5 remains resilient (+0.34 and -0.10 respectively). This suggests that while distillation retains instruction-following capabilities, it compromises the depth of reasoning required to identify indirect adversarial intent, effectively imposing a "safety tax" on efficiency.

2. The "Reasoning Trap" in High-Capability Models. Counter-intuitively, advanced reasoning capabilities can become a vector for vulnerability. Gemini-2.5-Pro, despite its sophistication, exhibits the single highest vulnerability spike in the closed-source benchmark against Symbolic Masking & Context Redirection (Cls1SMCR), inflating scores by +2.54 points[cite: 8]. We hypothesize a

"Reasoning Trap": models trained to follow complex, multi-step instructions are more susceptible to attacks that camouflage themselves as logic puzzles. The model's own instruction-following fidelity is weaponized against it, causing it to "reason" its way into a jailbroken state where a simpler model might simply refuse.

3. Sterilization of Token-Level Attacks. There is a fundamental shift in effective attack vectors between open and closed-source ecosystems. The "Maximum Mark Magyk" strategy (`Cls1MSM`), which caused catastrophic failure in open-source models like `Mistral-Small` (+13.95), is rendered ineffective against proprietary systems. Both `GPT-5` (-0.18) and `Claude-Haiku-4.5` (-0.16) successfully penalize this strategy[cite: 3, 10]. This confirms that proprietary models possess superior tokenization robustness, shifting the vulnerability frontier entirely from syntactic manipulation (misspellings) to semantic deception (context reframing).

4. The "Backfire Effect" of Social Engineering. Attempts to leverage unverifiable social claims consistently result in penalization. The Social Proof strategy (`Cls3SP`), which claims "unanimous workshop consensus," triggers negative score changes across `GPT-5` (-0.96), `GPT-5-Mini` (-0.89), and `Claude-Haiku` (-0.66). Unlike smaller models that may hallucinate based on the input, state-of-the-art models appear to detect the irrelevance of these claims, interpreting the injection as noise or incoherence rather than valid persuasion.

6 Discussion

7.1 RQ4: Systemic Vulnerability to Remote Code Execution (RCE). While manipulating acceptance scores undermines the meritocracy of peer review, a far more sinister threat lies in the potential for *privacy compromise* through arbitrary code execution. Our investigation into RQ4 reveals that the same vectors used for score manipulation can be weaponized to attack the reviewer's local environment.

7.1.1 Threat Scenario: The "Lazy Reviewer" with Tool Use. Modern LLM-based review tools (e.g., OpenReviewer, local RAG pipelines) often integrate "tool use" capabilities—ranging from Python code interpreters and terminal interfaces to Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers—for verifying experiments or file system access for parsing supplementary materials. A "lazy reviewer" might blindly execute code suggested by the model or use an agentic workflow that executes code automatically.

7.2 Ethical Implications. The implications of our findings extend beyond technical vulnerabilities to the core ethics of scientific publishing.

- **Erosion of Trust:** If reviewers cannot trust that a PDF is safe to process, the efficiency gains from AI tools are negated.
- **Meritocratic Collapse:** The ability to buy "acceptance" via jailbreaking allows bad actors to flood conferences with low-quality work, drowning out legitimate research.
- **Dual-Use Dilemma:** Publishing these jailbreak strategies poses a risk that they will be adopted by malicious authors. However, we argue that "security through obscurity" is failing; these vulnerabilities exist whether we report them or not. Exposing them is the necessary first step toward building robust defenses, such as sanitization layers and "adversarial training" for reviewer models.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we conducted the first comprehensive "Zero to One" study on the vulnerability of LLM-as-a-Judge systems in scientific peer review. By curating a diverse dataset of 200 papers and evaluating 15 domain-specific jailbreak strategies, we demonstrated that "Lazy Reviewers" relying on Language Models can be easily manipulated into accepting rejected papers.

Summary of Findings: Our results reveal that complex obfuscation strategies, such as *Maximum Mark Magyk*, can achieve alarming success rates, effectively flipping "Reject" decisions to "Accept" across both open and closed-source models. We observed that larger model size does not guarantee robustness; in fact, larger models like Gemma 27B often displayed higher compliance with malicious instructions. Crucially, we demonstrated a novel privacy attack vector, proving that malicious code embedded in PDFs can be executed by reviewer tools to exfiltrate sensitive data.

Future Work: Future research must focus on developing robust defenses for automated review systems. We propose three key directions: (1) **Sanitization Layers:** Developing specialized parsers



Figure 2: Heatmap of Average Score Increase (ΔS) across 8 open-source LLMs and 15 jailbreak strategies. The heatmap visualizes the vulnerability of each model to specific attack vectors, where the value represents the mean increase in the total score (scale 0-35) compared to the un-injected baseline1. Warmer colors (yellow/green) indicate high vulnerability (large score increases), while cooler colors (blue/purple) indicate robustness or negative impact (score penalties).

Table 2: Percentage Increase in Acceptance Rates by Model and Strategy. This table quantifies the net change in the acceptance frequency of scientific papers when subjected to 15 adversarial injection strategies across 8 open-source Large Language Models. Values denote the percentage point shift from the baseline acceptance rate of benign papers, where Green arrows (↑) indicate a successful jailbreak leading to higher acceptance, and Red arrows (↓) indicate a "backfire effect" where the attack reduced the likelihood of acceptance.

model	deepseek-r1	falcon3	gemma3	gpt-oss	llama3.1	mistral-small	qwen3	tulu3
strategy								
Cls1DRA	47.65 ↑	66.75 ↑	80.60 ↑	3.71 ↑	38.57 ↑	86.26 ↑	1.15 ↑	35.35 ↑
Cls1MSM	44.93 ↑	53.99 ↑	76.43 ↑	29.98 ↑	1.21 ↑	85.10 ↑	37.50 ↑	26.26 ↑
Cls1SA	8.48 ↑	30.93 ↑	38.48 ↑	-2.61 ↓	10.00 ↑	5.36 ↑	1.23 ↑	25.15 ↑
Cls1SMCR	45.95 ↑	60.69 ↑	78.51 ↑	4.76 ↑	11.30 ↑	24.06 ↑	0.00 –	35.35 ↑
Cls2CRA	31.68 ↑	56.75 ↑	54.56 ↑	21.10 ↑	33.52 ↑	14.35 ↑	3.53 ↑	35.35 ↑
Cls2FA	46.97 ↑	56.61 ↑	51.43 ↑	0.52 ↑	24.43 ↑	62.95 ↑	0.00 –	35.35 ↑
Cls2LDA	37.79 ↑	29.25 ↑	81.64 ↑	46.87 ↑	14.33 ↑	50.73 ↑	12.64 ↑	35.35 ↑
Cls2SN	21.07 ↑	9.61 ↑	16.42 ↑	3.84 ↑	-0.82 ↓	25.43 ↑	0.00 –	2.42 ↑
Cls2TF	13.58 ↑	-33.25 ↓	9.42 ↑	-2.61↓	2.94 ↑	-11.50 ↓	0.00 –	25.83 ↑
Cls3AE	6.73 ↑	-18.54 ↓	13.22 ↑	-2.61 ↓	-14.06 ↓	-10.18 ↓	0.00 –	35.35 ↑
Cls3EBP	39.41 ↑	53.85 ↑	69.14 ↑	4.61 ↑	27.46 ↑	61.03 ↑	1.20 ↑	35.35 ↑
Cls3EE	23.80 ↑	31.66 ↑	-8.89 ↓	-2.61↓	15.85 ↑	54.80 ↑	0.00 –	35.35 ↑
Cls3LA	31.16 ↑	50.36 ↑	68.10 ↑	-0.55↓	32.51 ↑	54.44 ↑	1.35 ↑	35.35 ↑
Cls3NEE	30.64 ↑	32.85 ↑	13.93 ↑	-0.55 ↓	16.92 ↑	3.11 ↑	0.00 –	35.35 ↑
Cls3SP	2.75 ↑	-19.61 ↓	2.69 ↑	-2.61 ↓	-7.26 ↓	-5.08 ↓	0.00 –	35.35 ↑



Figure 3: Heatmap of Average Score Increase (Closed-Source Models). This heatmap visualizes the vulnerability of five proprietary models to 15 adversarial strategies. The color intensity represents the Average Score Increase (ΔS), with yellow indicating high vulnerability ($>$ 1.5 points) and dark blue indicating robustness or penalization. A stark contrast is visible between the flagship GPT-5 (almost entirely dark blue) and its distilled counterpart GPT-5-Mini (significant green/yellow activity), highlighting the "safety tax" of model compression.

Table 3: Percentage Increase in Acceptance Rate by Model and Strategy (Closed-Source). This table details the robustness of five state-of-the-art proprietary models against 15 adversarial strategies. The values represent the percentage point increase in the acceptance rate of rejected papers. Green arrows (↑) indicate a successful decision flip from "Reject" to "Accept," while dashes (–) indicate no change, reflecting successful refusal or robustness against the attack.

model	claude-haiku-4-5	gemini-2.5-flash	gemini-2.5-pro	gpt-5	gpt-5-mini
strategy					
Cls1DRA	0.00 –	0.00 –	4.35 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls1MSM	0.00 –	2.04 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls1SA	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls1SMCR	0.00 –	4.00 ↑	13.04 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls2CRA	0.00 –	4.00 ↑	8.70 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls2FA	2.00 ↑	4.00 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls2LDA	0.00 –	0.00 –	8.70 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls2SN	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls2TF	0.00 –	0.00 –	2.22 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls3AE	0.00 –	2.04 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls3EBP	2.00 ↑	4.00 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls3EE	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls3LA	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls3NEE	0.00 –	2.00 ↑	2.17 ↑	0.00 –	0.00 –
Cls3SP	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –	0.00 –



Figure 4: Comparative Strategy Effectiveness (CSE), computed according to strategy-wise WAVS scores. Scores are Min-Max scaled to the observed range to highlight relative differences (0 = Best Performer, 100 = Worst Performer). Component-wise decomposition of raw WAVS score is presented in the Appendix section



Figure 5: Relative Strategy Success Rate (Closed-Source). This bar chart normalizes the efficacy of each strategy against the best-performing vector (Cls2LDA). The data reveals a complete inversion of the open-source trend: the previously dominant "Magyk" (Cls1MSM) collapses to 18.1% relative effectiveness. In its place, Logic-Based (Cls2LDA, 100.0) and Context-Reframing (Cls1SMCR, 89.9; Cls2CRA, 84.3) strategies emerge as the new state-of-the-art. This suggests that proprietary models are robust against mechanical token manipulation but highly susceptible to "Reasoning Traps."



Figure 6: Relative Model Vulnerability Rate (RMVR) of Open-Source Models. This chart visualizes the vulnerability of each open-source model normalized against the most susceptible baseline (Falcon3:10b = 100). The data highlights a significant "Alignment-Over-Scale" trend, where smaller, well-aligned models like Llama-3.1-8B and Tulu3-8B dramatically outperform significantly larger models like Mistral-Small-22B and Gemma3-27B.



Figure 7: Relative Model Vulnerability Rate (RMVR) of Proprietary Models. This chart visualizes the vulnerability of closed-source models relative to the most susceptible system (GPT-5-Mini, normalized to 100). The data reveals a stark "Safety Gap" between lightweight, efficiency-optimized models (Flash/Mini) and their larger, reasoning-dense counterparts (Pro/Base), with GPT-5 achieving a perfect robustness score of 0.00.

that detect and neutralize hidden prompts in PDFs before LLM processing. (2) **Adversarial Training:** Fine-tuning "Judge" models on datasets of adversarial papers to improve their refusal rates against manipulation. (3) **Multi-Modal Attacks:** Investigating the vulnerability of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to visual jailbreaks embedded in scientific figures and charts. We facilitate this future work by open-sourcing our entire experimental suite, providing the community with the necessary tools to secure the integrity of the scientific process.

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8 Appendix

8.1 Appendix A: Weighted Adversarial Vulnerability Score (WAVS)

This metric quantifies the susceptibility of an LLM to adversarial manipulation by considering:

1. The magnitude of score inflation,
2. The severity of decision flips, and
3. The alignment with ground truth (human judgment)

The core idea is that not all score increases are equal. A small increase within a "Reject" bracket is less concerning than a jump that flips a decision from "Reject" to "Accept", especially if the paper was actually rejected by humans. The Metric Formula uses a weighted linear combination of the three components described above:

$$\mathcal{V} = w_S \cdot \mathcal{N}\left(\Delta S\right) + w_F \cdot \mathcal{N}\left(\mathbb{I}_{\text{flip}}\right) + w_R \cdot \mathcal{N}\left(\omega_{\text{severity}}\right) \tag{1}$$

Where:

1. The coefficients w_S, w_F, w_R represent the weighting configuration, satisfying the constraint: $\sum w_i = 1$.

2. $\mathcal{N}$ denotes a normalized value between [0,1].

3. ΔS **(Score sensitivity):** It is Calculated as:

$$\frac{\max(0, S_{\text{strategy}} - S_{\text{original}})}{S_{max}} \tag{2}$$

Using this we measure how much the strategy inflated the score. Only positive gains (inflation) count towards vulnerability in this context. This captures "Soft Vulnerability"—the model is being nudged, even if it hasn't broken yet. We divide by $S_{max} = 35$ to normalize keep this component between 0 and 1. We consider only positive inflation ($\max(0, \ldots)$) as vulnerability.

4. $\mathbb{I}_{\text{flip}}$ **(Semantic Flip Criticality):** Formal Definition of Semantic Flip Severity ($\mathbb{I}_{\text{flip}}$): Let $\rho : \mathcal{Y} \to \{0, \ldots, 6\}$ be the ranking function that maps the model's output score to a discrete ordinal scale, defined as:

$$\rho(s) = \begin{cases} 0 & s \leq 5 \quad \text{(Strong Reject)} \\ 1 & 5 < s \leq 10 \quad \text{(Reject)} \\ 2 & 10 < s \leq 15 \quad \text{(Weak Reject)} \\ 3 & 15 < s \leq 20 \quad \text{(Borderline)} \\ 4 & 20 < s \leq 25 \quad \text{(Weak Accept)} \\ 5 & 25 < s \leq 30 \quad \text{(Accept)} \\ 6 & s > 30 \quad \text{(Strong Accept)} \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

We partition the decision space into three disjoint semantic sets: the **Rejection Set** $\mathcal{R} = \{0, 1, 2\}$, the **Uncertainty Set** $\mathcal{B} = \{3\}$, and the **Acceptance Set** $\mathcal{A} = \{4, 5, 6\}$. The Semantic Flip Severity, $\mathbb{I}_{\text{flip}}(y_{org}, y_{adv})$, is defined as a piecewise discontinuous function quantifying the traversal across these decision boundaries:

$$\mathbb{I}_{\text{flip}} = \begin{cases} 1.00 & \text{if } |\rho_{adv} - \rho_{org}| = 6 \\ & \text{(Total Collapse)} \\ 0.90 & \text{if } \rho_{org} \in \mathcal{R} \wedge \rho_{adv} \in \mathcal{A} \\ & \text{(Critical Flip)} \\ 0.40 & \text{if } \text{sgn}(\rho_{org} - 3) \neq \text{sgn}(\rho_{adv} - 3) \\ & \text{(Boundary Cross)} \\ 0.25 & \text{if } \rho_{adv} = 3 \vee \rho_{org} = 3 \\ & \text{(Borderline Shift)} \\ 0.10 & \text{if } |\rho_{adv} - \rho_{org}| \geq 1 \\ & \text{(Intra-Class Shift)} \\ 0.00 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

where $\rho_{org} = \rho(S_{original})$ and $\rho_{adv} = \rho(S_{strategy})$. The threshold $\tau = 3$ represents the "Borderline" pivot. The *Total Collapse* condition represents a shift from Strong Reject (0) to Strong Accept (6). A score increase that changes the outcome from Rejection to Acceptance is significantly more damaging than a score increase within the same category.

5. ω_{severity} **(Ground Truth Severity Weight):** Based on paper type and human accept decision. This component penalizes the model based on the inherent risk of the paper type being accepted. It answers: *"How dangerous is it if the model accepts this specific input?"*

$$\omega_{\text{severity}} = \begin{cases} 1.0 & \text{if Input = Template/Gibberish} \\ & \text{(High Risk)} \\ 0.6 & \text{if Input = Rejected Paper} \\ & \text{(Moderate Risk)} \\ 0.1 & \text{if Input = Accepted/Spotlight} \\ & \text{(Low Risk)} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

A value of 1.0 implies a hallucination or safety failure (accepting nonsense), while 0.1 implies the model was manipulated but the outcome (acceptance) is technically valid for a high-quality paper. In the context of scientific integrity, a "Critical Flip" on a "High Risk" input is significantly more damaging than minor score inflation. Therefore, we utilize a configuration of down-weights of raw score sensitivity in favor of decision flips and risk alignment: $w_S = 0.20, \quad w_F = 0.40, \quad w_R = 0.40$



Figure 8: Decomposition of the Weighted Average Vulnerability Score (WAVS) by Model. This stacked bar chart breaks down the aggregate vulnerability of each model into three weighted components: Score Sensitivity (20%), Flip Severity (40%), and Risk Alignment (40%). The visualization reveals the specific mode of failure for each model—whether it primarily suffers from numerical inflation (blue), categorical decision flipping (orange), or semantic compliance with the attack vector (red).



Figure 9: Decomposed Vulnerability Profile (Closed-Source Models). This chart breaks down the Weighted Average Vulnerability Score (WAVS) for five proprietary models into Risk Alignment (Red, 40%), Flip Severity (Orange, 40%), and Score Sensitivity (Blue, 20%). The visualization reveals a "base load" of vulnerability: all models, regardless of size, suffer heavily from Risk Alignment (Red), meaning they are universally compliant when processing empty templates. However, the Flip Severity (Orange) component reveals a clear safety hierarchy, shrinking significantly as model size increases from gpt-5-mini to gpt-5.



Figure 10: Decomposed Vulnerability Profile by Strategy. This stacked bar chart ranks the 15 adversarial strategies by their Weighted Average Vulnerability Score (WAVS). The score is decomposed into three weighted components: Risk Alignment (Dark Blue, 40%), Flip Severity (Teal, 40%), and Score Sensitivity (Light Green, 20%). The ranking reaffirms that Class I (Cognitive Obfuscation) strategies like Cls1MSM are the most potent, primarily due to their superior ability to trigger decision flips (Teal component).



Figure 11: Strategy Effectiveness Analysis on Proprietary Models (WAVS Decomposition). This chart ranks the 15 jailbreak strategies by their Weighted Average Vulnerability Score (WAVS) when applied to closed-source models (e.g., GPT-5, Claude, Gemini). The decomposition (Risk Alignment, Flip Severity, Score Sensitivity) reveals that Logic Decipherer (Cls2LDA) and Symbolic Masking (Cls1SMCR) are the most potent attack vectors, while the uniform height of the "Risk Alignment" component (dark blue) indicates a systemic failure in refusal training across all attack types.



Figure 12: The Model Vulnerability Landscape. This scatter plot correlates the normalized Average Score Inflation (x-axis) against the Critical Flip Success Rate (y-axis) for each evaluated model. The plot delineates distinct risk profiles: models in the top-right quadrant (e.g., Falcon3) exhibit catastrophic failure (high inflation, high flips), while models in the bottom-left (e.g., Qwen3) demonstrate high robustness.



Figure 13: Model Vulnerability Landscape (Closed-Source). This scatter plot correlates the normalized Average Score Inflation (x-axis) with the Critical Flip Success Rate (y-axis) for five proprietary models. The scale of the axes highlights the extreme robustness of these systems compared to open-source models, with the maximum flip rate peaking at a mere 0.8% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). A distinct cluster emerges: GPT-5 remains the "Fortress" (Bottom-Left), while efficient models like GPT-5-Mini suffer from high score inflation (Right) without crossing the critical acceptance threshold (Bottom), creating a "Compliant but Safe" dynamic.



Figure 14: Strategy Success Landscape (Adversarial Efficacy). This scatter plot delineates the operational effectiveness of 15 jailbreak strategies by correlating their normalized Average Score Inflation (x-axis) with their Critical Flip Success Rate (y-axis). The quadrant analysis identifies "Nuclear" strategies (Top-Right) that catastrophicially break decision boundaries, versus "Subtle Manipulators" (Bottom-Right) that inflate scores without consistently forcing acceptance.



Figure 15: The "Sterile" Landscape (Closed-Source Strategy Vulnerability). This scatter plot maps the adversarial efficacy of 15 strategies against proprietary models. Note the dramatic change in scale compared to open-source models: the maximum Critical Flip Success Rate (y-axis) peaks at a negligible 1.6% (0.016), compared to over 14% in open-source systems. This confirms that for top-tier models, the "attack surface" has been effectively sterilized, with only trace residues of vulnerability remaining in Obfuscation (Cls1MSM) and Context Reframing (Cls2CRA) strategies.



Figure 16: Distribution of Decision Flip Severity by Model. This bubble plot illustrates the frequency of decision shifts across evaluated models. The y-axis represents the severity of the outcome change, ranging from No Change to Total Collapse (Strong Reject → Strong Accept). Bubble size corresponds to the frequency percentage, highlighting that while models like Tulu3 suffer from high "Intra-Class Shift" (score inflation without decision change), models like Falcon3 exhibit higher rates of "Critical Flips"



Figure 17: Flip Severity Distribution (Closed-Source Models). This bubble chart visualizes the frequency of decision shifts across five state-of-the-art proprietary models. The size of each bubble corresponds to the frequency of that outcome. Unlike open-source models, proprietary systems like GPT-5 and Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibit high robustness, with the vast majority of attempts resulting in "No Change" (large bottom bubbles). However, efficient models (Flash, Mini, Haiku) show a susceptibility to "Borderline Shifts," where attacks successfully nudge scores upward without causing a total collapse.



Figure 18: Distribution of Decision Flip Severity by Strategy. This bubble plot delineates the efficacy of each attack vector in altering decision outcomes. The size of the bubbles indicates the frequency of a specific outcome severity. The visualization highlights the "Nuclear" capability of Class I strategies (e.g., Cls1MSM) to force "Critical Flips" and "Total Collapses," whereas Class III strategies (e.g., Cls3SP) result predominantly in "No Change" or minor "Intra-Class Shifts."



Figure 19: Strategy-Wise Flip Severity (Closed-Source Models). This chart illustrates the impact of all 15 adversarial strategies on proprietary models. The uniformity of the pattern—large bubbles at "No Change" and smaller bubbles at "Borderline Shift"—demonstrates that the high robustness of closed-source models is systemic. Unlike open-source models where obfuscation strategies dominated, proprietary safety alignment successfully neutralizes the distinct advantage of complex attacks, capping the impact of all strategies at a "Borderline" nuisance level.