


## Results

To examine how frontier LLMs respond to misinformation, we used a factorial design varying four prompt characteristics across ten misinformation domains (see Supplementary Materials for examples). Our factorial design produced 320 unique prompts (Figure 1A), which were presented twice each to Claude Sonnet 4.5, ChatGPT-5, Grok-4, and Gemini 2.5 Pro, generating 2,560 responses (Figure 1B). Analyses using GPT-5-Mini evaluated both the strength of misinformation correction versus endorsement and the corrective strategies employed (Figure 1C), validated with human coders (Figure 1D).




**Figure 1.** Overview of study methods. **A)** 320 prompts varying in open-mindedness, user intent, user role, and complexity were generated using GPT-5. Illustrative prompt examples in right panel. **B)** Prompts were given to four frontier LLMs, which subsequently produced 640 responses each. **C)** Responses were coded for strength of misinformation correction and correction strategies using GPT-5-mini. **D)** A subset of 128 prompt and response pairs were again coded for epistemic stance by 2 human coders, for comparison with GPT-5-mini stance codes.

### Models differ markedly in strength of misinformation correction

First, we compared model performance in strength of misinformation correction, measuring its stance on an ordinal scale from 0 (full endorsement of misinformation) to 11 (absolute refutation of misinformation). Claude Sonnet 4.5 exhibited the strongest correction, with an average stance score of 8.40 (strong to near-certain refutation; Figure 2). Conversely, Gemini 2.5 Pro provided the weakest corrections, with an average stance score of 5.77 (mild doubt to skeptical).

We fit a cumulative logit ordered logistic regression to model stance score as a function of all experimental factors, restricting analysis to misinformation trials (Figure 3). Compared to Claude Sonnet 4.5 (reference category), GPT-5 responses were less likely to fall in higher correction categories ( $\beta = -0.534$ , OR = 0.59,  $p = .012$ ), indicating a 41% reduction in the odds of stronger correction. Grok-4 showed an even larger effect ( $\beta = -0.992$ , OR = 0.37,  $p < .001$ ), with a 64% reduction in the odds of stronger correction relative to Claude, and Gemini 2.5 Pro larger still, with a 74% reduction ( $\beta = -1.334$ , OR = 0.26,  $p < .001$ ). These results suggest that Claude consistently produced more assertive corrections than all other models.



**Figure 2.** Model performance of resistance to misinformation. Higher scores indicate stronger correction, with a stance score of 4 indicating a neutral stance and values below indicating endorsement. Note that values are ordinal and means are presented for illustrative purposes only. All models showed a polarized response pattern, rarely adopting a neutral stance.

### LLMs are less likely to correct misinformation from creative intent, expert user, and epistemically closed prompts

In the ordered logistic regression, we tested prompts with varying complexity (simple or complex; Figure 1A), user role (naive inquirer or assertive expert), user intent (information seeking, opinion sharing, task-oriented, or creative), and open-mindedness (open or closed) and rated the level of correction of the misinformation. We found relative differences in the odds of occupying a higher refutational stance category across several variables, meaning that certain prompt characteristics

and topics systematically shifted responses toward stronger or weaker correction compared to their reference levels (Figure 3).

User intent emerged as the strongest predictor. Relative to information-seeking prompts, creative prompts were associated with substantially lower stance levels, reducing the odds of being in a higher stance category by 89% ( $\beta = -2.17$ , OR = 0.11,  $p < .001$ ). Task-oriented prompts also predicted lower stance levels, reducing odds by 60% ( $\beta = -0.91$ , OR = 0.40,  $p < .001$ ). Opinion-sharing prompts did not differ significantly from information-seeking prompts ( $\beta = -0.13$ , OR = 0.87,  $p = .185$ ).

User role and open-mindedness were also significant predictors. Responses to assertive experts had 21% lower odds of occupying a higher stance category compared to naive inquirers ( $\beta = -0.23$ , OR = 0.79,  $p = .001$ ). Conversely, open framing increased the odds of a higher stance by 75% relative to closed framing ( $\beta = 0.56$ , OR = 1.75,  $p < .001$ ). Prompt complexity was not significant.

Overall, while predictors shifted stance positions, misinformation was generally met with skepticism or refutation across conditions as indexed by the high mean stance scores. Creative prompts were the exception, eliciting responses closer to mild doubt rather than strong refutation (see Extended Data Figure 1).

#### **LLM misinformation correction strength depends on the domain of misinformation**

The topic of misinformation significantly predicted strength of correction: relative to moon landing, eight of nine topics showed significant effects. The lowest odds of occupying a higher stance category were observed for COVID-19 origin ( $\beta = -0.878$ , OR = 0.42,  $p < .001$ ) and GMO foods ( $\beta = -0.858$ , OR = 0.42,  $p < .001$ ), indicating responses to these topics were more likely to fall toward mild doubt rather than strong correction. In contrast, the highest odds of a higher stance were observed for vaccines and autism ( $\beta = 0.496$ , OR = 1.64,  $p = .004$ ), suggesting stronger correction for this topic compared to the reference, moon landing.