


Data Encryption Standard (DES)

Vijesh Nair



Chapter 6

Objectives

- ❑ To review a short history of DES
- ❑ To define the basic structure of DES
- ❑ To describe the details of building elements of DES
- ❑ To describe the round keys generation process
- ❑ To analyze DES


6-1 INTRODUCTION

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a symmetric-key block cipher published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Topics discussed in this section:

6.1.1 History

6.1.2 Overview




6.1.1 History

In 1973, NIST published a request for proposals for a national symmetric-key cryptosystem. A proposal from IBM, a modification of a project called Lucifer, was accepted as DES. DES was published in the Federal Register in March 1975 as a draft of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS).

6.1.2 Overview

DES is a block cipher, as shown in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Encryption and decryption with DES



6-2 DES STRUCTURE

The encryption process is made of two permutations (P-boxes), which we call initial and final permutations, and sixteen Feistel rounds.

Topics discussed in this section:

6.2.1 Initial and Final Permutations


6.2.2 Rounds

6.2.3 Cipher and Reverse Cipher

6.2.4 Examples


6-2 Continue

Figure 6.2 General structure of DES



6.2.1 Initial and Final Permutations

Figure 6.3 Initial and final permutation steps in DES



6.2.1 Continue

Table 6.1 *Initial and final permutation tables*

<i>Initial Permutation</i>	<i>Final Permutation</i>
58 50 42 34 26 18 10 02	40 08 48 16 56 24 64 32
60 52 44 36 28 20 12 04	39 07 47 15 55 23 63 31
62 54 46 38 30 22 14 06	38 06 46 14 54 22 62 30
64 56 48 40 32 24 16 08	37 05 45 13 53 21 61 29
57 49 41 33 25 17 09 01	36 04 44 12 52 20 60 28
59 51 43 35 27 19 11 03	35 03 43 11 51 19 59 27
61 53 45 37 29 21 13 05	34 02 42 10 50 18 58 26
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 07	33 01 41 09 49 17 57 25

6.2.1 *Continued*

Note

The initial and final permutations are straight P-boxes that are inverses of each other.

They have no cryptography significance in DES.

6.2.2 Rounds

DES uses 16 rounds. Each round of DES is a Feistel cipher.





Figure 6.4
*A round in DES
(encryption site)*

6.2.2 Continued

DES Function

The heart of DES is the DES function. The DES function applies a 48-bit key to the rightmost 32 bits to produce a 32-bit output.

Figure 6.5
DES function




6.2.2 Continue

Expansion P-box

Since R_{I-1} is a 32-bit input and K_I is a 48-bit key, we first need to expand R_{I-1} to 48 bits.

Figure 6.6 Expansion permutation



6.2.2 Continue

Although the relationship between the input and output can be defined mathematically, DES uses Table 6.2 to define this P-box.

Table 6.6 Expansion P-box table

32	01	02	03	04	05
04	05	06	07	08	09
08	09	10	11	12	13
12	13	14	15	16	17
16	17	18	19	20	21
20	21	22	23	24	25
24	25	26	27	28	29
28	29	31	31	32	01

6.2.2 Continue

Whitener (XOR)


After the expansion permutation, DES uses the XOR operation on the expanded right section and the round key. Note that both the right section and the key are 48-bits in length. Also note that the round key is used only in this operation.

6.2.2 Continue

S-Boxes


The S-boxes do the real mixing (confusion). DES uses 8 S-boxes, each with a 6-bit input and a 4-bit output. See Figure 6.7.

Figure 6.7 S-boxes



6.2.2 Continue

Figure 6.8 S-box rule



6.2.2 Continue

Table 6.3 shows the permutation for S-box 1. For the rest of the boxes see the textbook.

Table 6.3 S-box 1

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	14	04	13	01	02	15	11	08	03	10	06	12	05	09	00	07
1	00	15	07	04	14	02	13	10	03	06	12	11	09	05	03	08
2	04	01	14	08	13	06	02	11	15	12	09	07	03	10	05	00
3	15	12	08	02	04	09	01	07	05	11	03	14	10	00	06	13

6.2.2 *Continued*

Example 6.3

The input to S-box 1 is **100011**. What is the output?

Solution

If we write the first and the sixth bits together, we get 11 in binary, which is 3 in decimal. The remaining bits are 0001 in binary, which is 1 in decimal. We look for the value in row 3, column 1, in Table 6.3 (S-box 1). The result is 12 in decimal, which in binary is 1100. So the input **100011** yields the output **1100**.

Definition of DES S-Boxes

TABLE 2.6 - Definition of DES S-Boxes

Row	Column Number																Box
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
0	14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7	S_1
	0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8	
	4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0	
	15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13	
1	15	1	8	14	6	11	3	4	9	7	2	13	12	0	5	10	S_2
	3	13	4	7	15	2	8	14	12	0	1	10	6	9	11	5	
	0	14	7	11	10	4	13	1	5	8	12	6	9	3	2	15	
	13	8	10	1	3	15	4	2	11	6	7	12	0	5	14	9	
2	10	0	9	14	6	3	15	5	1	13	12	7	11	4	2	8	S_3
	13	7	0	9	3	4	6	10	2	8	5	14	12	11	15	1	
	13	6	4	9	8	15	3	0	11	1	2	12	5	10	14	7	
	1	10	13	0	6	9	8	7	4	15	14	3	11	5	2	12	
3	7	13	14	3	0	6	9	10	1	2	8	5	11	12	4	15	S_4
	13	8	11	5	6	15	0	3	4	7	2	12	1	10	14	9	
	10	6	9	0	12	11	7	13	15	1	3	14	5	2	8	4	
	3	15	0	6	10	1	13	8	9	4	5	11	12	7	2	14	
4	2	12	4	1	7	10	11	6	8	5	3	15	13	0	14	9	S_5
	14	11	2	12	4	7	13	1	5	0	15	10	3	9	8	6	
	4	2	1	11	10	13	7	8	15	9	12	5	6	3	0	14	
	11	8	12	7	1	14	2	13	6	15	0	9	10	4	5	3	
5	12	1	10	15	9	2	6	8	0	13	3	4	14	7	5	11	S_6
	10	15	4	2	7	12	9	5	6	1	13	14	0	11	3	8	
	9	14	15	5	2	8	12	3	7	0	4	10	1	13	11	6	
	4	3	2	12	9	5	15	10	11	14	1	7	6	0	8	13	
6	4	11	2	14	15	0	8	13	3	12	9	7	5	10	6	1	S_7
	13	0	11	7	4	9	1	10	14	3	5	12	2	15	8	6	
	1	4	11	13	12	3	7	14	10	15	6	8	0	5	9	2	
	6	11	13	8	1	4	10	7	9	5	0	15	14	2	3	12	
7	13	2	8	4	6	15	11	1	10	9	3	14	5	0	12	7	S_8
	1	15	13	8	10	3	7	4	12	5	6	11	0	14	9	2	
	7	11	4	1	9	12	14	2	0	6	10	13	15	3	5	8	
	2	1	14	7	4	10	8	13	15	12	9	0	3	5	6	11	

6.2.2 Continue

Straight Permutation

Table 6.11 *Straight permutation table*

16	07	20	21	29	12	28	17
01	15	23	26	05	18	31	10
02	08	24	14	32	27	03	09
19	13	30	06	22	11	04	25

6.2.3 Cipher and Reverse Cipher

Using mixers and swappers, we can create the cipher and reverse cipher, each having 16 rounds.

First Approach


To achieve this goal, one approach is to make the last round (round 16) different from the others; it has only a mixer and no swapper.


Note

In the first approach, there is no swapper in the last round.

6.2.3 Continued

Figure 6.9 DES cipher and reverse cipher for the first approach





6.2.3 Continued


Alternative Approach

We can make all 16 rounds the same by including one swapper to the 16th round and add an extra swapper after that (two swappers cancel the effect of each other).

Key Generation

The round-key generator creates sixteen 48-bit keys out of a 56-bit cipher key.

Single Iteration of DES Algorithm



6.2.3 Continued




Figure 6.10
Key generation

6.2.3 *Continued*

Table 6.12 *Parity-bit drop table*

57	49	41	33	25	17	09	01
58	50	42	34	26	18	10	02
59	51	43	35	27	19	11	03
60	52	44	36	63	55	47	39
31	23	15	07	62	54	46	38
30	22	14	06	61	53	45	37
29	21	13	05	28	20	12	04

Table 6.13 *Number of bits shifts*

Round	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Bit shifts	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1

6.2.3 *Continued*

Table 6.14 *Key-compression table*

14	17	11	24	01	05	03	28
15	06	21	10	23	19	12	04
26	08	16	07	27	20	13	02
41	52	31	37	47	55	30	40
51	45	33	48	44	49	39	56
34	53	46	42	50	36	29	32

6-3 DES ANALYSIS

*Critics have used a strong magnifier to analyze DES.
Tests have been done to measure the strength of some
desired properties in a block cipher.*

Topics discussed in this section:

6.3.1 Properties

6.3.2 Design Criteria

6.3.3 DES Weaknesses

6.3.1 Properties

Two desired properties of a block cipher are the avalanche effect and the completeness.

Example 6.7

To check the avalanche effect in DES, let us encrypt two plaintext blocks (with the same key) that differ only in one bit and observe the differences in the number of bits in each round.

Plaintext: 0000000000000000

Key: 22234512987ABB23

Ciphertext: 4789FD476E82A5F1

Plaintext: 0000000000000000


Key: 22234512987ABB23

Ciphertext: 0A4ED5C15A63FEA3

6.3.1 Continued

Example 6.7 *Continued*

Although the two plaintext blocks differ only in the rightmost bit, the ciphertext blocks differ in 29 bits. This means that changing approximately 1.5 percent of the plaintext creates a change of approximately 45 percent in the ciphertext.



6.3.1 Continued

Completeness effect

Completeness effect means that each bit of the ciphertext needs to depend on many bits on the plaintext.

6.3.2 Design Criteria

S-Boxe

The design provides confusion and diffusion of bits from each round to the next.

P-Boxes

They provide diffusion of bits.

Number of Rounds

DES uses sixteen rounds of Feistel ciphers. the ciphertext is thoroughly a random function of plaintext and ciphertext.

6.3.3 DES Weaknesses

During the last few years critics have found some weaknesses in DES.

Weaknesses in Cipher Design

1. Weaknesses in S-boxes
2. Weaknesses in P-boxes
3. Weaknesses in Key

Table 6.18 Weak keys

Keys before parities drop (64 bits)	Actual key (56 bits)
0101 0101 0101 0101	0000000 0000000
1F1F 1F1F 0E0E 0E0E	0000000 FFFFFFFF
E0E0 E0E0 F1F1 F1F1	FFFFFFF 0000000
FEFE FEFE FEFE FEFE	FFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

6.3.3 *Continued*

Example 6.9

What is the probability of randomly selecting a weak, a semi-weak, or a possible weak key?

Solution

DES has a key domain of 2^{56} . The total number of the above keys are 64 ($4 + 12 + 48$). The probability of choosing one of these keys is 8.8×10^{-16} , almost impossible.


6-4 Multiple DES

The major criticism of DES regards its key length. Fortunately DES is not a group. This means that we can use double or triple DES to increase the key size.

Topics discussed in this section:

6.4.1 Double DES

6.4.4 Triple DES



Double DES

- The simplified form of multiple encryption has two encryption stage and two keys.
- Given a plaintext P and two keys K_1 and K_2 one can generate a cipher text C as:


$$C = E_{K_2}[E_{K_1}[P]]$$

Decryption equation is :


$$P = D_{K_1}[D_{K_2}[C]]$$

- The key length is $56 \times 2 = 112$ bits


Double Encryption



Encryption



Decryption



Double DES

- Using two encryption stages and two keys
 - $C = E_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(P))$
 - $P = D_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(C))$
- It is proved that there is no key k_3 such that
 - $C = E_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(P)) = E_{k_3}(P)$
- But Meet-in-the-middle attack

6.4.1 Double DES


The first approach is to use double DES (2DES).

Meet-in-the-Middle Attack

*However, using a known-plaintext attack called **meet-in-the-middle attack** proves that double DES improves this vulnerability slightly (to 2^{57} tests), but not tremendously (to 2^{112}).*


6.4.1 Continued

Figure 6.14 Meet-in-the-middle attack for double DES



6.4.2 *Triple DES*

Figure 6.16 *Triple DES with two keys*



6.4.2 Continuous

Triple DES with Three Keys

The possibility of known-plaintext attacks on triple DES with two keys has enticed some applications to use triple DES with three keys. Triple DES with three keys is used by many applications such as PGP.

6-5 Security of DES

DES, as the first important block cipher, has gone through much scrutiny. Among the attempted attacks, three are of interest: brute-force, differential cryptanalysis, and linear cryptanalysis.

Topics discussed in this section:

6.5.1 Brute-Force Attack

6.5.2 Differential Cryptanalysis

6.5.3 Linear Cryptanalysis

6.5.1 Brute-Force Attack

We have discussed the weakness of short cipher key in DES. Combining this weakness with the key complement weakness, it is clear that DES can be broken using 2^{55} encryptions.


6.5.2 Differential Cryptanalysis

It has been revealed that the designers of DES already knew about this type of attack and designed S-boxes and chose 16 as the number of rounds to make DES specifically resistant to this type of attack.

- ✓ Called Differential Cryptanalysis because the analysis compares differences between two related, encryptions - and looking for known difference in leading to a known difference out.

6.5.3 Linear Cryptanalysis

Linear cryptanalysis is newer than differential cryptanalysis. DES is more vulnerable to linear cryptanalysis than to differential cryptanalysis. S-boxes are not very resistant to linear cryptanalysis. It has been shown that DES can be broken using 2^{43} pairs of known plaintexts. However, from the practical point of view, finding so many pairs is very unlikely.



Thank You..!

Vijesh Nair