Offensive Security Certified Professional Exam Report

OSCP Exam Report

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1 Offensive Security OSCP Exam Report

1.1 Introduction:

The Offensive Security Exam penetration test report contains all efforts that were conducted in order to pass the Offensive Security exam. This report will be graded from a standpoint of correctness and fullness to all aspects of the exam. The purpose of this report is to ensure that the student has a full understanding of penetration testing methodologies as well as the technical knowledge to pass the qualifications for the Offensive Security Certified Professional.

1.2 Objective:

The objective of this assessment is to perform an internal penetration test against the Hack the box practice network. The student is tasked with following a methodical approach in obtaining access to the objective goals. This test should simulate an actual penetration test and how you would start from beginning to end, including the overall report. An example page has already been created for you at the latter portions of this document that should give you ample information on what is expected to pass this course. Use the sample report as a guideline to get you through the reporting.

1.3 Requirement:

The student will be required to fill out this penetration testing report fully and to include the following sections:

- Overall High-Level Summary and Recommendations (non-technical)
- Methodology walkthrough and detailed outline of steps taken
- Each finding with included screenshots, walkthrough, sample code, and proof.txt if applicable.
- Any additional items that were not included # High-Level Summary

I was tasked with performing an internal penetration test towards Hack the box. An internal penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally connected systems. The focus of this test is to perform

attacks, similar to those of a hacker and attempt to infiltrate Offensive Security's internal exam systems – The Beep. My overall objective was to evaluate the network, identify systems, and exploit flaws while reporting the findings back to Offensive Security. When performing the internal penetration test, there were several alarming vulnerabilities that were identified on the assigned machine. When performing the attacks, I was able to gain access to the system, primarily due to outdated patches and poor security configurations. During the testing, I had administrative level access to multiple systems. Beep was successfully exploited and access granted. This system as well as a brief description on how access was obtained are listed below:

Beep(10.10.10.7) - Arbitrary Remote code execution and privileged access to user to run the script.

1.4 Recommendations:

We recommend patching the vulnerabilities identified during the testing to ensure that an attacker cannot exploit these systems in the future. One thing to remember is that these systems require frequent patching and once patched, should remain on a regular patch program to protect additional vulnerabilities that are discovered at a later date.

2 Methodologies

I utilized a widely adopted approach to performing penetration testing that is effective in testing how well the Offensive Security Exam environments is secured. Below is a breakout of how I was able to identify and exploit the variety of systems and includes all individual vulnerabilities found.

2.1 Information Gathering:

The information gathering portion of a penetration test focuses on identifying the scope of the penetration test. During this penetration test, I was tasked with exploiting the exam network. The specific IP addresses were:

Beep - 10.10.10.7## Penetration:

The penetration testing portions of the assessment focus heavily on gaining access to a variety of systems. During this penetration test, I was able to successfully gain access to Lame.

2.1.1 System IP: 10.10.10.75

2.1.1.1 Service Enumeration:

The service enumeration portion of a penetration test focuses on gathering information about what services are alive on a system or systems. This is valuable for an attacker as it provides detailed information on potential attack vectors into a system. Understanding what applications are running on the system gives an attacker needed information before performing the actual penetration test. In some cases, some ports may not be listed.

Server IP Address	Ports Open
10.10.10.7	TCP : 22,25,80,110,111,143,443,993,995,3306,4559,4445,5038,10000

2.1.1.2 Scanning

Nmap-Initial

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Mon Jul 5 12:18:36 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -vv -oA nmap/initial

→ 10.10.10.7

Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.7
Host is up, received echo-reply ttl 63 (0.21s latency).
Scanned at 2021-07-05 12:18:37 PDT for 361s
Not shown: 988 closed ports
Reason: 988 resets
        STATE SERVICE REASON
PORT
                                         VFRSTON
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0)
ssh-hostkey:
  1024 ad:ee:5a:bb:69:37:fb:27:af:b8:30:72:a0:f9:6f:53 (DSA)
AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAI04jN+Sn7/9f2k+5UteAWn8KKj3FRGuF4LyeDmo/xxuHgSsdCjYuWtNS8m7stqgNH5edUu8vZ0pzF/quX5kph
  2048 bc:c6:73:59:13:a1:8a:4b:55:07:50:f6:65:1d:6d:0d (RSA)
_ssh-rsa
→ AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA4SXumrUtyO/pcRLwmvnF25NG/ozHsxSVNRmTwEf7AYubgpAo4aUuvhZXg5iymwTcZd6vm46Y+TX39N
        open smtp
                     syn-ack ttl 63 Postfix smtpd
25/tcp
|_smtp-commands: beep.localdomain, PIPELINING, SIZE 10240000, VRFY, ETRN, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES,
→ 8BITMIME, DSN,
                        syn-ack ttl 63 Apache httpd 2.2.3
80/tcp
       open http
http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://10.10.10.7/
|_https-redirect: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
110/tcp open pop3 syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus pop3d 2.3.7-Invoca-RPM-2.3.7-7.el5_6.4
|_pop3-capabilities: AUTH-RESP-CODE LOGIN-DELAY(0) PIPELINING IMPLEMENTATION(Cyrus POP3 server
\hookrightarrow v2) UIDL USER RESP-CODES TOP APOP EXPIRE(NEVER) STLS
111/tcp open rpcbind syn-ack ttl 63 2 (RPC #100000)
143/tcp open imap syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus imapd 2.3.7-Invoca-RPM-2.3.7-7.el5_6.4
|_imap-capabilities: NAMESPACE SORT BINARY LISTEXT ATOMIC Completed QUOTA UIDPLUS SORT=MODSEQ
→ RIGHTS=kxte THREAD=REFERENCES CHILDREN CATENATE LITERAL+ IDLE MAILBOX-REFERRALS
→ URLAUTHA0001 X-NETSCAPE LIST-SUBSCRIBED ID CONDSTORE UNSELECT STARTTLS ANNOTATEMORE NO
→ THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT IMAP4 IMAP4rev1 OK ACL RENAME MULTIAPPEND
443/tcp open ssl/https? syn-ack ttl 63
_ssl-date: 2021-07-05T19:33:33+00:00; +11m31s from scanner time.
993/tcp open ssl/imap syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus imapd
|_imap-capabilities: CAPABILITY
995/tcp open pop3 syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus pop3d 3306/tcp open mysql syn-ack ttl 63 MySQL (unauthorized)
4445/tcp open upnotifyp? syn-ack ttl 63
10000/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 63 MiniServ 1.570 (Webmin httpd)
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 74F7F6F633A027FA3EA36F05004C9341
http-methods:
_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; Charset=iso-8859-1).
Service Info: Hosts: beep.localdomain, 127.0.0.1, example.com
Host script results:
```

```
|_clock-skew: 11m30s

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.

# Nmap done at Mon Jul 5 12:24:38 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 361.49 seconds
```

Nmap-Full

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Tue Jul 6 12:57:00 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -vv -p- -oA nmap/full
\rightarrow 10.10.10.7
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.7
Host is up, received syn-ack ttl 63 (0.21s latency).
Scanned at 2021-07-06 12:57:01 PDT for 538s
Not shown: 65519 closed ports
Reason: 65519 resets
      STATE SERVICE REASON
                                       VERSION
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0)
ssh-hostkey:
1024 ad:ee:5a:bb:69:37:fb:27:af:b8:30:72:a0:f9:6f:53 (DSA)
AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAI04jN+Sn7/9f2k+5UteAWn8KKj3FRGuF4LyeDmo/xxuHgSsdCjYuWtNS8m7stqgNH5edUu8vZ0pzF/quX5kph
  2048 bc:c6:73:59:13:a1:8a:4b:55:07:50:f6:65:1d:6d:0d (RSA)
_ssh-rsa
→ AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA4SXumrUtyO/pcRLwmvnF25NG/ozHsxSVNRmTwEf7AYubgpAo4aUuvhZXg5iymwTcZd6vm46Y+TX39N
25/tcp open smtp syn-ack ttl 63 Postfix smtpd
|_smtp-commands: beep.localdomain, PIPELINING, SIZE 10240000, VRFY, ETRN, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES,
\hookrightarrow 8BITMIME, DSN,
        open http
                        syn-ack ttl 63 Apache httpd 2.2.3
80/tcp
http-methods:
_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://10.10.10.7/
|_https-redirect: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
110/tcp open pop3
                          syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus pop3d 2.3.7-Invoca-RPM-2.3.7-7.el5_6.4
|_pop3-capabilities: RESP-CODES PIPELINING STLS LOGIN-DELAY(0) UIDL EXPIRE(NEVER)
→ AUTH-RESP-CODE APOP TOP IMPLEMENTATION(Cyrus POP3 server v2) USER
111/tcp open rpcbind syn-ack ttl 63 2 (RPC #100000)
                          syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus imapd 2.3.7-Invoca-RPM-2.3.7-7.el5_6.4
         open imap
|_imap-capabilities: MULTIAPPEND QUOTA IDLE OK ATOMIC CATENATE MAILBOX-REFERRALS URLAUTHA0001
→ RIGHTS=kxte X-NETSCAPE IMAP4 ACL LIST-SUBSCRIBED SORT=MODSEQ THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT SORT
→ LITERAL+ Completed ANNOTATEMORE LISTEXT ID STARTTLS THREAD=REFERENCES BINARY CHILDREN
→ IMAP4rev1 UNSELECT NAMESPACE RENAME NO UIDPLUS CONDSTORE
443/tcp open ssl/https? syn-ack ttl 63
|_ssl-date: 2021-07-06T20:14:56+00:00; +11m34s from scanner time.
878/tcp open status syn-ack ttl 63 1 (RPC #100024)
993/tcp open ssl/imap syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus imapd
|_imap-capabilities: CAPABILITY
995/tcp open pop3 syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus pop3d
3306/tcp open mysql syn-ack ttl 63 MySQL (unauthorized)
4190/tcp open sieve syn-ack ttl 63 Cyrus timsieved 2.3.7-Invoca-RPM-2.3.7-7.el5_6.4
4445/tcp open upnotifyp? syn-ack ttl 63
```

```
4559/tcp open hylafax syn-ack ttl 63 HylaFAX 4.3.10
5038/tcp open asterisk syn-ack ttl 63 Asterisk Call Manager 1.1
10000/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 63 MiniServ 1.570 (Webmin httpd)
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 74F7F6F633A027FA3EA36F05004C9341
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; Charset=iso-8859-1).
Service Info: Hosts: beep.localdomain, 127.0.0.1, example.com, localhost; OS: Unix

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 11m33s

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
# Nmap done at Tue Jul 6 13:05:59 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 538.60 seconds
```

2.1.1.3 Gaining Shell

System IP: 10.10.10.7

Vulnerability Exploited: Weak admin password/Arbitrary remote code execution

System Vulnerable: 10.10.10.75

Vulnerability Explanation: Local file inclusion vulnerability

Privilege Escalation Vulnerability: Exposing the password of root to the public web

Vulnerability fix: The version of the elastix has to be upgraded to the latest version and avoid exposing the sensitive passwords to the public

Severity Level: Critical

While checking the ports we can see that there are so many ports open but i am going to concentrate on port 80 which seems like elastix running on it.

[[beep/images/205-website.png]]

I am not sure about the version but however we can try for the searchsploit against elastix and check for the luck.

[[305-searchsploit.png]]

Since xss,csrf and other vulnerabilities requires user interaction i will go through the local file inclusion vulnerability this time.

[[310-graph.png]]

This seems like local file inclusion vulnerability in graph.php under vtigercrm. Lets see if this folders exist in the box.

[[315-vtiger.png]]

It seems like vtigercrm folder exist in this box. lets try to execute the command mentioned in the script manually and see what we get.

[[320-graph_content.png]]

It seems like the contents are messed up. We can view this with the page source.

[[325-passwords.png]]

2.1.1.4 Privilege Escalation

From the list i can see that few of the username and passwords are commented out. So we have options like asterisk:jEhdlekWmdjE or root:jEhdlekWmdjE.

Lets try to root with check with both the username and passwords.

[[330-ssh_error.png]]

Since this is a very old box we are having the algorithm not supported error. A simple googling shows that we need to include -oKexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 before the user and ip address.

[[335-root_password.png]]

By ssh with the password root: jEhdlekWmdjE we got the root access directly to the machine.

2.1.1.5 Privilege Escalation

From the script i can see the privilege escalation as well which belongs to the nmap.

[[260-script_priv.png]]

By checking the same i can see that we can run nmap as sudo. Lets see if we have access to the nmap as sudo.

[[265-sudo_l.png]]

Lets follow the script and get the root.

[[270-priv_escalation.png]]

2.1.1.6 Proof File

User

[[275-user.txt.png]]

Root

[[280-root.txt.png]]

3 Maintaining Access

Maintaining access to a system is important to us as attackers, ensuring that we can get back into a system after it has been exploited is invaluable. The maintaining access phase of the penetration test focuses on ensuring that once the focused attack has occurred, we have administrative access over the system again. Many exploits may only be exploitable once and we may never be able to get back into a system after we have already performed the exploit. Maintaining access to a system is important to us as attackers, ensuring that we can get back into a system after it has been exploited is invaluable. The maintaining access phase of the penetration test focuses on ensuring that once the focused attack has occurred, we have administrative access over the system again. Many exploits may only be exploitable once and we may never be able to get back into a system after we have already performed the exploit.

4 House Cleaning:

The house cleaning portions of the assessment ensures that remnants of the penetration test are removed. Often fragments of tools or user accounts are left on an organization's computer which can cause security issues down the road. Ensuring that we are meticulous and no remnants of our penetration test are left over is important.

After collecting trophies from the system was completed, We removed all user accounts and passwords as well as the exploit code written on the system. Hack the box should not have to remove any user accounts or services from the system.