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One-Sided Device Independence of BB84 Via Monogamy-of-Entanglement Game

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Waterloo, August 7, 2013

Status of Device-Independent QKD

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(have they already been successfully attacked, e.g. fair sampling?)

2. Formalize Security ✓

(there is almost universal agreement on how to do this for QKD)

3. Prove security using the laws of quantum mechanics applied to the formalized protocol/assumptions (✓)

(many techniques are known, we add one more in this talk)

4. Is the protocol feasible?

(using current technology, does the protocol ever output something non-trivial?)

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There does not currently exist a protocol/proof for
which both 1. and 4. have a satisfactory answer.

Example: Errors vs. Fair Sampling

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Solution	Assumption	Feasibility
Ignore them!	fair sampling	key is produced
Randomize!	none	too many errors

Problem is not solved yet!

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Interesting approaches:

- Restrict adversary, e.g. no long-term memory (Pironio et al.)
- Allow some device assumptions: measurement device independent QKD (Lo/Curty/Qi, Braunstein/Pirandola), **one-sided device independent QKD**

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
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We show that BB84 is one-sided device independent


The Uncertainty Principle



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
The Uncertainty Principle



Heisenberg

It is **impossible** that both the position **x** and the momentum **p** are fully determined.


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
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Many different formalizations of this statement have been proposed.


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Example: Polarization in **X** and **Z** direction



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
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
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More formally: $p_{\text{guess}}(X) + p_{\text{guess}}(Z) \leq 1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$

Monogamy of Entanglement




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- The more A is entangled with B, the less it can be with C .
- And vice versa.

Monogamy of Entanglement



- The more A is entangled with B, the less it can be with C .
- And vice versa.
- As given above: is a qualitative statement.
- Exist different quantitative statements.
- Part of our contribution:
 - new way to get a quantitative statement
 - with applications to quantum crypto

A Monogamy (of Entanglement) Game

ALICE

(Game Master)



BOB



CHARLIE


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


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
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Set up:

- $A = A_1 \dots A_n$: n qubits
- $B & C$: arbitrary many qubits
- joint state of ABC : arbitrary

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
BOB and CHARLIE jointly win if:

both $x' = x$ and $x'' = x$.


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Intuition




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
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
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Thus, we expect:

$$p_{\text{win}}(n) := \max_{\substack{\text{initial states} \\ \& \text{measurements}}} P[X' = X \wedge X'' = X] \approx 0$$

Our Main Technical Result

Formally: $p_{\text{win}}(n) := \max_{\{P_x^\theta\}, \{Q_x^\theta\}} \frac{1}{2^n} \left\| \sum_{\theta, x} H^\theta |x\rangle\langle x| H^\theta \otimes P_x^\theta \otimes Q_x^\theta \right\|$

Theorem:

$$p_{\text{win}}(n) \leq \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \right)^n \approx 0.85^n$$

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Remarks:

- Bound is **tight** (i.e., $p_{\text{win}}(n) = \dots$)
- Strong parallel repetition: $p_{\text{win}}(n) = p_{\text{win}}(1)^n$
- Is attained **without any entanglement**
=> monogamy completely kills power of entanglement

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Proof:

- very simple
- New **operator-norm inequality**: bounds $\|\sum_i O_i\|$ for positive operators O_1, \dots, O_n in terms of $\|\sqrt{O_i} \sqrt{O_j}\|$.

Generalizations

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- Relaxed winning condition for Bob and/or Charlie,
i.e., $x' \approx x$ and $x'' \approx x$, or $x' \approx x$ and $x'' = x$.

Main Application Result

Theorem (informal): Standard BB84 QKD remains **secure** even if Bob's measurement device is **malicious**.

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In the proof:

- We analyze EPR-pair bases version of BB84
- Well known to **imply** security for standard BB84 QKD

EPR-Pair Based BB84 QKD

ALICE



BOB



CHARLIE



EPR-Pair Based BB84 QKD



ALICE



BOB



EVE

EPR-Pair Based BB84 QKD



ALICE


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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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plus post-processing:

- comparing x & x' on random subset
- error correction
- privacy amplification

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
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To prove:

$$H_\infty(X|QE, \text{not abort}) \geq t$$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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$$H_\infty(X|QE, \text{not abort}) \geq t$$

- For sake of argument: say that Eve measures E
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 $\Rightarrow P[X' \approx X] \leq e^{n/2}$ (and thus $P[\text{abort}] \approx 1$) ✓
or $P[X'' = X | X' \approx X] \leq e^{n/2} \quad \forall \text{ measurement of } E$

EPR-Pair Based BB84 QKD



plus post-processing:


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Comparison with other protocols

	Reichhardt et al. (E91)	Vazirani/ Viddick (E91)	this work (BB84/BBM92)
device assumptions	none	none	trusted Alice (source)
noise tolerance	0%	1.2%	1.5% (11%)
key rate	0%	2.5%	22.8% (100%)
finite key analysis	✗	✗	✓

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 - first **1-round position-verification scheme**

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THANK YOU