


QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR ON A MOBILE PHONE

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UNIVERSITÉ
DE GENÈVE

FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES



“THE SECURITY OF A CYpher MUST RESIDE
ENTIRELY IN THE KEY”

AUGUSTE KERCKHOFFS [1]




[1] A. Kerckhoffs. *Journal des sciences militaires*, vol. IX:38, 1883.

COMPROMISING THE SECURITY OF THE KEY COMPROMISES THE SYSTEM



- [1] L. Bello. openssl – predictable random number generator. *Debian security advisory 1571-1*, 2008.
- [2] Bushing, Marcan, Segher, and Sven. PS3 epic fail. 27th Chaos Communication Congress, 2010.
- [3] R. Chirgwin. Android bug batters bitcoin wallets. The Register, 2013.
- [4] L. Dorrendorf, Z. Guterman, and B. Pinkas. Cryptanalysis of the random number generator of the windows operating system. *ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.*, 13(1):1–32, 2009.
- [5] A. K. Lenstra, H. J. P., M. Augier, J. W. Bos, T. Kleinjung, and C. Wachter. Ron was wrong, Whit is right. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2012.

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CURRENT COMMERCIAL RNG IMPLEMENTATIONS

- Software (not random)
- Microphone (can be controlled)
- PLL (no one knows...)
- Shot noise in diode (slow)
- Quantis (“large” and “expensive”)



ars technica

MAIN MENU • MY STORIES: 25 • FORUMS SUBSCRIBE JOBS


RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

“We cannot trust” Intel and Via’s chip-based crypto, FreeBSD developers say


Following NSA leaks from Snowden, engineers lose faith in hardware randomness.

by Dan Goodin - Dec 10 2013, 2:00pm CET

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


SIMPLIFIED PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION




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
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
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

CONCEPT




CONCEPT



CONCEPT





FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH → COOL APPLICATIONS



MOBILE PHONE SENSORS ARE EXCELLENT!

- Low noise (< 1e-), linear, *small pixels*, low capacitance before amp
- Fast (1Gpixel/s ~10 GBits/s) for video
- Cheap (~1\$); market for *billions* of sensors (I have 30 at home)
- CMOS technology: source, detector and processing on a single chip.



TESTED WITH TWO CAMERAS

Astronomy CCD
(ATIK 383L+)







Noise: 10 e⁻


Phone CMOS
(Nokia N9)



Noise: 3 e⁻









	ATIK 383L	Nokia N9
Noise, σ_t (e^-)	10	3.3
Saturation (e^-)	2×10^4	500
Illumination (e^-)	1.5×10^4	410
Quantum uncertainty, σ_q (e^-)	122	20
Offset (e^-)	144	-6
Output bits per pixel	16	10
Quantum entropy per pixel	8.3 bits	5.7 bits
Quantum entropy per raw bit	0.52	0.57

NON-IDEAL CAMERA: STILL OK




Even if Eve has full knowledge of the technical noise, the best she can do is recover the quantum noise.

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
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
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UP TO 10 RANDOM BITS PER PIXEL



$$\begin{aligned} H_{\min}(X_q) &= -\log_2 [\max (P_q(n))] \\ &= -\log_2 \left[\max \left(\frac{e^{-\bar{n}} \bar{n}^n}{n!} \right) \right] \\ &= -\log_2 \left[\frac{e^{-\bar{n}} \bar{n}^{\lfloor \bar{n} \rfloor}}{\lfloor \bar{n} \rfloor!} \right] \end{aligned}$$



DETECTOR LINEARITY IS IMPORTANT



RANDOMNESS EXTRACTOR





[1] D. Frauchiger, R. Renner, and M. Troyer. True randomness from realistic quantum devices. arXiv preprint arXiv:1311.4547, 2013.


[2] M. Troyer and R. Renner. A randomness extractor for the quantis device. Id Quantique technical report, 2012.

$\sim 2 \times 10^{96}$
trials before a
deviation is found

TESTS, “DIEHARDER”





SPEED



Sensor: 8 Megapixels \times 30 frames/s \times 3 bits = 720 Mbit/s
Extractor: software \sim 10 Mbps; FPGA \sim 1.25 Gbps
Mobile phone: limited memory


MOST “CALIBRATED” SOURCES ARE USABLE, WITH CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS.



Test of LED photon number distribution with single photon detector



CAN BE COMPLETELY INTEGRATED ON CHIP



CONCLUSION

- Cheap image sensors really work at the quantum level
 - QRNG can be made cheaply and integrated, using existing technology
 - Still some work on the theory required
-

THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION



Hugo
Zbinden



Anthony
Martin



Nicolas
Gisin

7TH ID QUANTIQUE WINTER SCHOOL

18 JAN - 22 JAN 2015

Tutorial by:

- Whitfried Diffie
- Colin Williams (D-Wave)
- Nicolas Gisin
- Eleni Diamanti
- Tracy Northup
- Sandu Popescu
- Mikael Afzelius
- Renner Renato

