


From Bell's theorem to secure key distribution

Nicolas Gisin, Valerio Scarani, Geneva
Antonio Acin, Barcelona
Lluis Masanes, Bristol

- Key distribution: abstract setting
- Assumptions in security proofs of "unconditional" QKD
- Security against individual attacks from no-signaling
- Heisenberg uncertainty for non-signaling correlations



Key distribution: abstract setting



key distillation P secret key



Assumptions in security proofs of "unconditional" QKD

measurements outcomes

bases choices

Example of BB84: $P(a=b|x=y) \approx 1$

Eve's power limited only by quantum laws and Alice and Bob's Q systems are 2-dimensional

⇒ secure secret key

$$\frac{1}{4} \left(\left| 0,0 \right\rangle_{ab} \left\langle 0,0 \right| + \left| 1,1 \right\rangle_{ab} \left\langle 1,1 \right| \right)_{z} \otimes \left(\left| 0,0 \right\rangle_{ab} \left\langle 0,0 \right| + \left| 1,1 \right\rangle_{ab} \left\langle 1,1 \right| \right)_{x}$$

This is a real thread to actual implementations of QKD, known as « side channels ».

Security against individual attacks from

no-signaling

J.Barrett et al, PRL'05 A.Acin, L.Masanes, NG quant-ph/0510094

intrinsic

info > 0

Eve distributes the correlation. For each realization she produces one of the vertices with fixed prob.

to the no-signaling ≤:

The protocol (pseudo-sifting):
Alice announces her x
Bob always accepts
Bob replaces his b with b+xy

⇒secure QKD against individual attacks by any post-quantum non-signaling Eve!

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{isotropic} \\ \text{correlations} \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \text{facet corresponding} \\ \text{to the CHSH-Bell} \leq : \\ \sum P \leq 3 \end{array}$

polytope of local correlations


1-way

distillation

boand info ???

2-way

Security against individual attacks from no-signaling





Heisenberg uncertainty for non-signaling correlations

QBER for a given input x on Alice side: $Q_x = P(a \neq b | x)$

Eve's information gain: I(E,B|x)

Information gain versus disturbance trade-off:

$$I(E,B|x=0) = \frac{1}{2}Qx=1$$
 $I(E,B|x=1) = \frac{1}{2}Qx=0$



Conclusions

- Correlations that do not violate any Bell inequality can not be distilled to a secret key without assumptions on the Hilbert space dimensions.
- Any correlation that violates some Bell inequality has a positive intrinsic information.
- In the binary case, security is proven against individual attacks for most nonlocal correlations, including some Q correlations.
- In the binary case, the Heisenberg trade-off bw information gain and disturbance holds for all non-signaling correlations.