

z/OS 3.2 IBM Education Assistant

Solution Name: RACF Support for Tape Data Set Encryption and Granularity

Solution Element: RACF

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Agenda

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Trademarks

- See url <http://www.ibm.com/legal/copytrade.shtml> for a list of trademarks.
- Additional Trademarks:
 - None

Objectives

- As DFSMS provides tape data set encryption, provide a way for customers to request or bypass encryption for tape data sets covered by a RACF profile
- Extend this policy control to PDSE and sequential (basic and large format) data sets, for which DFSMS already provides encryption support
- The overall goal is to avoid application outage when the application uses EXCP to access data, thus bypassing the access methods, and breaking when accessing encrypted data
- The ability to include and exclude various data set types is accomplished with a new ENCRYPTTYPES keyword in the DFP segment of the RACF DATASET profile

Overview

- Who (Audience)
 - Security Administrators
- What (Solution)
 - The ability to specify policy for encryption of various data set types covered by a single RACF DATASET profile
- Wow (Benefit / Value, Need Addressed)
 - Accommodation of applications that do not support encryption/decryption of data in data sets

Usage & Invocation

- A new field in the DFP segment of the DATASET profile specifies encryption policy for tape, PDSE, and sequential basic and large format data sets covered by the profile
 - No change to current support of extended format data sets
- This policy is not bound to the encryption key label in the DFP DATAKEY field
 - That is, the key can be sourced elsewhere, like today
- For each type, you can choose to
 - **IN**clude the type for encryption
 - **EX**clude the type from encryption
 - Defer to SMS for the decision (the default). SMS checks a FACILITY profile for system-wide default policy.

Usage & Invocation ... ADDSD and ALTDSD

```
[ DFP (
    [RESOWNER(userid or group-name) | NORESOWNER]
    [DATAKEY(CKDS key label) | NODATAKEY]
    [ENCRYPTTYPES (
        [ALL |
        [INTAPE | EXTAPE | NOTAPE]
        [INPDSE | EXPDSE | NOPDSE]    ← NOxxxx values undocumented for ADDSD, but 'work'
        [INSEQ | EXSEQ | NOSEQ ]
    ) | NOENCRYPTTYPES]
) | NODFP ]
```

- ALL is mutually exclusive with EXxxxx and NOxxxx
- NOxxxx, INxxxx, and EXxxxx are mutually exclusive for the same type
- Authorized by system SPECIAL, or UPDATE access to FIELD class resource DATASET.DFP.ENCTYPES

Usage & Invocation ... LISTDSD

- Requires SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or READ access to FIELD class resource DATASET.DFP.ENCTYPES

```
INFORMATION FOR DATASET BRUCE.* (G)
```

```
DFP INFORMATION
```

```
-----
```

```
RESOWNER= NONE
```

```
DATAKEY= MYKEY
```

```
DATA SET TYPES ENCRYPTED= INTAPE EXSEQ
```

```
INFORMATION FOR DATASET BRUCE.* (G)
```

```
DFP INFORMATION
```

```
-----
```

```
RESOWNER= NONE
```

```
DATAKEY= MYKEY
```

```
DATA SET TYPES ENCRYPTED= ALL INTAPE INPDSE INSEQ
```


Usage & Invocation ... R_admin (IRRSEQ00)

- R_admin (IRRSEQ00) callable service
 - On DATASET-extract, the field is treated as a repeat group of character values
 - Possible values are INTAPE|EXTAPE, INPDSE|EXPDSE, INSEQ|EXSEQ
 - No NOxxxx values are emitted. NOxxxx is implied when neither INxxxx nor EXxxxx is emitted
 - “ALL” is never emitted

Field name	Flag byte values	ADDSD/ALTDSD keyword reference	Allowed on add requests	Allowed on alter requests	Returned on extract requests
ENCTYPES (list ENCTYPEN)	'Y'	ENCRYPTTYPES(xx)	Yes	Yes	Yes
	'N'	NOENCRYPTTYPES	No	Yes	

Usage & Invocation ... IRRDBU00

- DFP record type 0410 is extended
- Values are treated as a series of YES/NO fields for each type
- Blanks for a given type implies NOxxxx
- Space is reserved for 13 more possible types
 - The database field is 4 bytes, requiring two bits (IN and EX) per type

Usage & Invocation ... messages

- Existing, unchanged message indicates mutually exclusive operands entered

```
IRR52128I Mutually exclusive operands are specified for  
keyword ENCRYPTTYPES. Processing terminated.
```

Usage & Invocation ... RACF database templates

- The version string is updated to
 - **OA66305** 00000285.00000050 on 2.5 and 3.1
 - **HRF77F0** 00000285.00000050 on 3.2
- All 3.2 template updates are rolled back
- When extracting the 4-byte field using RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT or ICHEINTY LOCATE, the field is formatted as follows.

```
DFP      001 00 00 00000000 00 DFP - START OF SEGMENT FIELDS
RESOWNER 002 00 00 00000008 FF DFP - RESOURCE OWNER
DATAKEY  003 00 00 00000000 00 DFP - CKDS label of default key
ENCTYPES 004 00 00 00000004 00 DFP - Types of data set encrypted

$*                               Byte 1:
$*                               X'80' - INTAPE
$*                               X'40' - INPDSE
$*                               X'20' - INSEQ
$*                               X'08' - EXTAPE
$*                               X'04' - EXPDSE
$*                               X'02' - EXSEQ
```

Interactions & Dependencies

- Software Dependencies
 - None
- Hardware Dependencies
 - None
- Exploiters
 - DFSMS

Upgrade & Coexistence Considerations

- To exploit this solution, all systems in the Plex must be at the new z/OS level: No
- List any toleration/coexistence APARs/PTFs:
 - zSecure support for new DFP field
 - HRF77D0
 - ++IF FMID(HCKR250) THEN REQ(UJ96644). zSecure Admin and Audit
 - ++IF FMID(HC4R250) THEN REQ(UJ96650). zSecure Admin and Audit
 - ++IF FMID(JC4R250) THEN REQ(UJ96649). zSecure Command Verifier
 - ++IF FMID(HCKR310) THEN REQ(UJ96643).
 - ++IF FMID(HC4R310) THEN REQ(UJ96646).
 - ++IF FMID(JC4R310) THEN REQ(UJ96645)
 - HRF77E0
 - ++IF FMID(HCKR310) THEN REQ(UJ96643).
 - ++IF FMID(HC4R310) THEN REQ(UJ96646).
 - ++IF FMID(JC4R310) THEN REQ(UJ96645).
 - ++IF FMID(HCKR250) THEN REQ(UJ96644).
 - ++IF FMID(HC4R250) THEN REQ(UJ96650).
 - ++IF FMID(JC4R250) THEN REQ(UJ96649)
- List anything that doesn't work the same anymore: Nothing

Installation & Configuration

- List anything that a client needs to be aware of during installation and include **examples** where appropriate - clients appreciate these:
 - Are any APARs or PTFs needed for enablement?
 - When sharing the RACF database with a 2.5/3.1 system, have OA66305 applied on 2.5/3.1
 - What jobs need to be run?
 - RACF templates should be updated by running IRRMIN00 with PARM=UPDATE after IPL
 - RACF Dynamic Parse initialization (IRRDPI00 UPDATE) is executed as part of your IPL automation
 - What hardware configuration is required? None
 - What PARMLIB statements or members are needed? None
 - Are any other system programmer procedures required? None
 - Are there any planning considerations? None
 - Are any special web deliverables needed? None
 - Does installation change any system defaults? None

Summary

- DFSMS is providing tape data set encryption
- Some applications may not support encrypted data sets
- Granularity is required at the data set level to specify the data set types that should be encrypted, for data sets covered by the RACF profile
- In the absence of RACF policy, DFSMS checks a FACILITY profile to determine if tape encryption is to be done at a system-wide level
- The same level of granularity is also desired for previously supported (for encryption) types PDSE and Sequential
 - So, we added it as well
- Policy can be established using ADDSD/ALTDSD and R_admin (IRRSEQ00)
- Policy can be retrieved by LISTDSD, RACROUTE REQUEST=EXTRACT, R_admin (IRRSEQ00), and the Database Unload utility (IRRDBU00)

Appendix

- Publications
 - z/OS Security Server RACF Callable Services
 - R_Admin
 - z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference
 - ADDSD, ALTDSD, LISTDSD
 - z/OS Security Server RACF Macros and Interfaces
 - RACF database templates, DB Unload table
 - z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide
 - FIELD level access table