

UNDERWAY TO IDENTIFYING COMMONALITIES OF CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS IN THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM



Agenda

- Introduction
- Related Work
- Methodology and Research Design
- Results and Discussion
- Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work
- Questions



Introduction




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
Related Work

- Previously published initial work in *Identifying Commonalities of Cyberattacks Against the Maritime Transportation System (MTS)* in March 2023.
- Lack of research informing the MTS about trends in cybersecurity incidents:
 - What are the commonalities?
 - How are MTS systems affected?
 - Where should MTS resources be focused?
 - What tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are used?



Methodology and Research Design - 1

- Combine models and concepts to develop a more comprehensive threat picture
 - Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis:
 - Adversary
 - Victim
 - Social-Political Needs
 - Parkerian Hexad:
 - Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) Triad plus:
 - Possession
 - Authenticity
 - Utility
 - MITRE ATT&CK Framework:
 - Tactics
 - Techniques



Methodology and Research Design - 2

- Limited, exploratory document analysis expanding upon prior research using:
 - Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS') *Significant Cyber Incidents*
 - 2006-Present: Cyberattacks against defense sector, government agencies, technology companies, and economic crimes (\$1M+)
 - Council on Foreign Relations' (CFR') Cyber Operations Tracker
 - 2005-Present: Publicly known, state-sponsored cyber incidents
- Combined entries from CFR and CSIS
- Removed duplicates or entries lacking specific keywords—*maritime, port(s), logistics, ship, shipping, shipbuilder, terminal, vessel*
- Discarded entries related to military operations--*submarines, navy,*




Results and Discussion


- MTS Aspect:
 - Administrative: maritime entity providing software or other support
 - Ports: ports/terminals where cargo is loaded/unloaded
 - Shipbuilding: companies building ships or equipment used by MTS
 - Shipping Company: company handling business or physical aspects of moving cargo
 - Vessel: a ship or merchant vessel transporting cargo
- Adversary:
 - Country
 - Social-Political Need
- Parkerian Hexad Element
- MITRE ATT&CK Tactic/Technique




Cyber Incidents per MTS Aspect




Adversary Customer per MTS Aspect




Parkerian Hexad Element per MTS Aspect



+ Social-Political



MITRE ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques



Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work

- Conclusion: Commonalities do exist in cyberattacks against the MTS
- Limitations:
 - Lack of publicly available data
 - Available MTS cybersecurity incident information is disjointed across a myriad of sources
 - Did not include military operations
- Future Work:
 - Establish guidelines for categorizing MTS Aspect, Parkerian Hexad, Social-Political Need, and MITRE ATT&CK Tactics/Techniques
 - Expand work to include military
 - Incorporate additionally publicly available data, such as the Maritime Cyber Attack Database maintained by NHL Stenden University of Applied Sciences





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Questions?
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