



Impact Data and Evidence Aggregation Library

Session: Topics


Jennie Barker

June 12, 2025



INTRODUCTION

This session discusses the fields of topic and keywords.



This is important for potential users of the library in identifying topics they would like to conduct meta-analyses on or learn from as they plan interventions.



I. Topic

- **Definition:** Broad substantive topic(s) that the paper covers.
 - Select at least one and up to three from 3 sets of controlled vocabularies
 - Some CVs have **specific subtopics**, which we want over general categories
 - “Nothing fits” is an option across CVs but is a **last resort**
 - Three CVs
 - CESSDA CV
 - World Bank Theme Taxonomy
 - JEL classification

Example paper

Gaikwad and Nellis
(2021)

*M*igrants are politically marginalized in cities of the developing world, participating in destination-area elections less than do local-born residents. We theorize three reasons for this shortfall: migrants' socioeconomic links to origin regions, bureaucratic obstacles to enrollment that disproportionately burden newcomers, and ostracism by antimigrant politicians. We randomized a door-to-door drive to facilitate voter registration among internal migrants to two Indian cities. Ties to origin regions do not predict willingness to become registered locally. Meanwhile, assistance in navigating the electoral bureaucracy increased migrant registration rates by 24 percentage points and substantially boosted next-election turnout. An additional treatment arm informed politicians about the drive in a subset of localities; rather than ignoring new migrant voters, elites amplified campaign efforts in response. We conclude that onerous registration requirements impede the political incorporation, and thus the well-being, of migrant communities in fast-urbanizing settings. The findings also matter for assimilating naturalized yet politically excluded cross-border immigrants.



Example: CESSDA CV

- [Link](#)
- Possible Set of Entries:
 - Politics.Elections **(67)**
 - Politics.Political BehaviorAndAttitudes **(70)**
 - Demography.Migration **(13)**
- Politics (65) or Demography (11) would be less appropriate here.



Example: World Bank Theme Taxonomy

- [Link](#)
- Possible Set of Entries:
 - Civil registration and identification (**434**)
 - Migration, Remittances, and Diaspora Engagement (**136**)
 - Transparency, Accountability, and Good Governance (**432**)
- Public administration (43) would be less appropriate here.



Example: JEL Classification

- [Link](#)
- Possible Set of Entries:
 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (**D72**)
- Analysis of Collective Decision-making (D7) would be less appropriate here

II. Open Text Topic

- **Definition:** Open text topics suggested by coder
 - Three 1-3 word topics
 - These should reflect, using your best judgment, what the paper is about
 - They do not need to be the same as the standard topic codes or the key words.



II. Open Text Topic

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Example: Gaikwad and Nellis (2021)

- Possible set of entries
 - **Internal migration**
 - **Voter registration**
 - **Migrant political incorporation**



II. Keywords

- **Definition:** A list of keywords displayed in the paper
 - Only select keywords that are in the paper or its supplementary materials
 - If there are no keywords, enter 'None'
 - Depends on:
 - Subfield
 - Journal
 - Keywords are usually (but not always) on the title page of the PDF of the paper

Article Contents

Abstract

Supplementary data

November 25 2024

Improving Workers' Performance in Small Firms: A Randomized Experiment on Goal Setting in Ghana

Elena Cettolin, Kym Cole, Patricio S. Dalton

Author and Article Information

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1–45.https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01537

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Abstract

We report the results of a cost-effective intervention to improve workers' performance in small cassava processing firms in Ghana. We train workers to track their daily output and then randomly assign a sub-sample to set daily production goals. Achieving or missing a goal does not carry monetary consequences. Goal setting increases workers' output by 16%, their productivity by 8% and the average product of labor in firms by 13%. Goal setting is particularly effective for piece-rate workers, increasing their output by 32% and productivity by 24%. While not conclusive, evidence suggests that goals serve as a self-regulation device.



Keywords: Behavioral Constraints, Goals Setting, Management Practices, Small Firms, Informal Businesses

Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies

JOSEPH ASUNKA, SARAH BRIERLEY, MIRIAM GOLDEN, ERIC KRAMON AND GEORGE OFOSU*

This article reports on the effects of domestic election observers on electoral fraud and violence. Using an experimental research design and polling station data on fraud and violence during Ghana's 2012 elections, it shows that observers reduced fraud and violence at the polling stations which they monitored. It is argued that local electoral competition shapes party activists' response to observers. As expected, in single-party dominant areas, parties used their local political networks to relocate fraud to polling stations without an election observer, and, in contrast, party activists relocated violence to stations without observers in competitive areas – a response that requires less local organizational capacity. This highlights how local party organization and electoral incentives can shape the manipulative electoral strategies employed by parties in democratic elections.

→ **Keywords:** Election observers; fraud; violence; political parties; Ghana; Africa

Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines☆



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ABSTRACT

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict-affected areas. Despite their growing popularity, there is limited evidence on how CCT programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous. We estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the Philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a CCT program at the village level. We find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict-related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages in the first 9 months of the program. Using unique data on local insurgent influence, we also find that the program reduced insurgent influence in treated villages. An analysis of possible spillovers yields inconclusive results. While we find no statistical evidence of spillovers, we also cannot rule out that the village-level effect was due to displacement of insurgent activity from treatment to control villages.

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Thank you
for listening

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