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The Incident Detection Message Exchange Format version 2 (IDMEFv2) draft-lehmann-idmefv2-06

Abstract

The Incident Detection Message Exchange Format version 2 (IDMEFv2) defines a date representation for security incidents detected on cyber and/or physical infrastructures.

This draft is maintained the IDMEFv2 Task Force. Please consult our website for more information. <https://www.idmefv2.org>

The format is agnostic so it can be used in standalone or combined cyber (SIEM), physical (PSIM) and availability (NMS) monitoring systems. IDMEFv2 can also be used to represent man made or natural hazards threats.

IDMEFv2 improves situational awareness by facilitating correlation of multiple types of events using the same base format thus enabling efficient detection of complex and combined cyber and physical attacks and incidents.

If approved this draft will obsolete RFC4765.

Status of this Memo

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1. Introduction

The Incident Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is intended to solve the problem of security monitoring compartmentalization by proposing a single format to represent any type of incident, whether cyber or physical, intentional or accidental, natural or man-made.

Indeed security is often associated to the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability triad, performance and availability management systems are still run independently from security management systems.

Additionally, with the adoption and integration of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices, and the exponential emergence of smart systems (transport, cities, buildings, etc), an increasingly interconnected mesh of cyber-physical systems (CPS) has emerged. This expansion of the attack and incident surfaces blurs the once-clear functions of cybersecurity and physical security.

Finally, as IT infrastructure moves out of data centers it becomes more exposed to external threats, including natural and man-made hazards,

Incident detection systems have traditionally focused on detecting cyber incidents or physical incident or availability incidents. There is an increasing need nowadays to have a unified view and management of all those incidents and their interconnection.

To achieve this goal the Incident Detection Message Exchange Format offers a unique data representation for multiple types of events:

Cyber-security events (e.g. authentication failure/success, virus/malware detection, bruteforce/scan detection, etc.)

Physical security events (e.g. intrusion detection, object detection, face or activity recognition, fire/smoke/noise/rain detection, etc.)

Availability/observability/performance events (e.g. system failure, service malfunction, performance decrease, etc.)

Natural and man made hazards events (e.g. wildfires, avalanches, droughts, earthquakes, pollution, fire, explosion, etc.)

1.1. IDMEFv2 deployment architecture

IDMEFv2 can be used to exchange incident detection information between specialized managers (SIEM, PSIM, NMS) and a universal "Cyber & Physical SIEM" (CPSIEM) or directly from specialized analyzers and a CPSIEM.




Figure 1: IDMEF Use Architecture

Thanks to its universality IDMEFv2 improves situational awareness by enabling correlation of multiple types of events using the same base format.

This document defines a model serialization method for the purpose of describing and sharing these events.

1.2. IDMEFv1 (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) - RFC 4765 - Legacy

IDMEFv2 (Incident Detection Message Exchange Format) is based on IDMEFv1 (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) concepts. But IDMEFv1 was cyber intrusion focused as IDMEFv2 perimeter is much larger. Thus retro-compatibility although partly possible has not been a priority.

1.3. Relationship between IDMEFv2 and other event/incident formats

IDMEFv2 focuses essentially on high level event/incident correlation and detection. There are many standard and proprietary formats on the incident detection market and in particular on the cybersecurity market. IDMEFv2 is complementary to most of these formats.

IDMEFv1 (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format - RFC 4765) : IDMEFv2 (Incident Detection) replaces and obsoletes IDMEFv1 (Intrusion Detection) by covering a wider spectrum.

IODEFv2 (Incident Object Definition Exchange Format - RFC 5070) : IDMEFv2 helps detect incident. When an incident is detected it will be analysed and eventually fully described and shared with other security teams through IODEFv2. IODEFv2. IDMEF is used upstream IODEFv2. IDMEFv2 Alerts can be “attached” to IODEFv2 object to provide technical details about incidents.

Syslog (System Logging) : Syslog is a loose format with no formal structuration. Syslog can be used by sensors to send information to analyzers. Out of those multi-format syslogs the analyzer might detect an incident or an event of interest. The analyzer will then use IDMEFv2 to notify the manager which might correlate this information with other data to confirm the incident.

SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) : SNMP polls information from devices which is then compared to thresholds to detect incident. IDMEFv2 can be used when incident is detected downstream of SNMP to communicate the incident to the manager. IDMEFv2 can have a similar role as SNMP Traps.

STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) : is a language and serialization format used to exchange cyber threat intelligence (CTI). IDMEFv2 can help detect incidents which might lead to the creation and sharing of STIX information. Cyber analyzer can also rely on STIX information to detect incidents that will be notified in IDMEFv2 format.

SIEM proprietary formats (CEF, LEEF, ECS, CIM, ...) : By covering cyber, physical and monitoring incidents type, IDMEFv2 offers a wider spectrum than those formats. Gateways between IDMEFv2 and those formats can be developed to connect legacy cyber detection systems to an IDMEFv2 architecture.

2. Terminology

2.1. Keywords

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

2.2. Normative sections

Implementations of IDMEFv2 are REQUIRED to fully implement:

The data types defined in [Section 3](#)

The data model defined in [Section 5](#)

The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) serialization method [Section 5.9](#).

2.3. Concepts related to event processing

2.3.1. Event

An event is something that triggered a notice. Any incident starts off as an event or a combination of events, but not all events result in an incident. An event need not be an indication of wrongdoing. E.g. someone successfully logging in or entering a building is an event.

2.3.2. Incident

An incident is an event that compromises or has a significant probability of compromising at least one of the organization's security criteria such as Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability. An incident may affect a production tool, personnel, etc. It may be logical, physical or organizational in nature. Last but not least, an incident may be caused on purpose or by accident.

2.3.3. Alert

An alert is a notification/message that a particular event/incident (or series of events/incidents) has occurred.

2.3.4. Manager

The manager is the central console toward which all analyzers send their alerts. The manager collects, correlates, stores and display the alerts to the operators.

Example : - A SIEM (Security Information & Event Management) or a Log Manager) - A PSIM (Physical Security Information Management) - A NMS (Network Management System) - A CPSIEM (Cyber & Physical Security Information Management System)

2.3.5. Operator

The level 1 operator is in charge of receiving manager notifications and identify or confirm when an event should be considered as an incident. The operator must also decide if there is a know resolution for this incident or if it needs a deeper analysys.

2.3.6. Analyst

The analyst will be contacted by the operator to analyze complex incidents that can't be easily resolved. The investigation starts with the IDMEFv2 information but the analyst might need more information like raw logs for a deeper forensics.

2.3.7. Attack

An attack is an attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of a cyber or physical asset. An attack is one or many kinds of incidents.

2.3.8. Correlation

Correlation is the identification of relationships between two or more events.

2.3.9. Aggregation

Aggregation is the consolidation of similar events into a single event.

3. The IDMEF Data Types

Each object inside the IDMEF data model has an associated data type. This type may be used to validate the content of incoming IDMEF messages.

3.1. Classes

The classes are meant to group related attributes together. Some of the classes may be instantiated multiple times (e.g. Source, Target, etc.) while others may only appear once in an IDMEF message (e.g. Analyzer).

3.2. Numbers

3.2.1. Integers

Integers inside the IDMEF data model are expressed using the following ABNF [\[RFC5234\]](#) grammar:

```
integer      = *1minus int
int          = zero / ( digit1-9 *DIGIT )
minus        = %x2D                                ; -
zero         = %0x30                                ; 0
digit1-9     = %x31-39                                ; 1-9
```

E.g. 123.

Such values are indicated with the "INT" type annotation in the model.

3.2.2. Floating-point values

Floating-point values inside the IDMEF data model are expressed using the following ABNF grammar:

```
float        = integer *1frac
frac         = decimal-point 1*DIGIT
decimal-point = %x2E                                ; .
```

This grammar reuses some of the production rules listed in [Section 3.2.1](#).

E.g. 12.34.

Such values are indicated with the "FLOAT" type annotation in the model.

3.3. Strings

Strings are series of characters from the [\[UNICODE\]](#) standard and are used to represent a text.

For readability, this document uses quotes (") to delimit strings, but please note that these quotes are not syntactically part of the actual strings.

E.g. "Hello world".

Some of the strings used in the IDMEFv2 data model follow a stricter syntax. These are included below for completeness.

Such values are indicated with the "STRING" type annotation in the model.

3.3.1. Enumerations

Enumerations are special strings used when valid values for an IDMEF attribute are restricted to those present in a predefined list.

Such values are indicated with the "ENUM" type annotation in the model.

3.3.2. Timestamps

Timestamps are used to indicate a specific moment in time. The timestamps used in the IDMEF data model follow the syntax defined by the "date-time" production rule of the grammar in [\[RFC3339\]](#) ch 5.6.

E.g. "1985-04-12T23:59:59.52Z" represents a moment just before April 5th, 1985 in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

Such values are indicated with the "TIMESTAMP" type annotation in the model.

3.3.3. Geographical Locations

Some attributes inside the IDMEF data model may refer to geographical locations using a set of coordinates. The reference system for all geographical coordinates is a geographic coordinate reference system, using the World Geodetic System 1984 [\[WGS84\]](#). The reference system used is the same as for the Global Positioning System (GPS).

The format for such values can be either "latitude,longitude" or "latitude,longitude,altitude". Each of these coordinates is represented as a floating-point value. The latitude and longitude are expressed in degrees while the altitude is expressed in meters.

E.g. "48.8584,2.2945,276.13" matches the (3-dimensional) geographical location for the top floor of the Eiffel Tower located in Paris, France, while "48.8584,2.2945" matches the same location in two dimensions (with the altitude removed).

Such values are indicated with the "GEOLOC" type annotation in the model.

3.3.4. UNECE Location Codes (UN/LOCODE)

Some attributes inside the IDMEF data model may refer to geographical locations using Locations Codes. These codes can be assimilated to an enumeration, where the list of possible values is defined in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Codes for Trade [\[UN-LOCODE\]](#).

E.g. "FR PAR" is the Location Code for the city of Paris, France.

Such values are indicated with the "UNLOCODE" type annotation in the model.

3.3.5. Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)

The IDMEF data model uses Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), as defined in [\[RFC3986\]](#), when referring to external resources. Unless otherwise specified, either a Uniform Resource Location (URL) or a Uniform Resource Name (URN) may be used where a URI is expected.

E.g. both "https://example.com/resource" and "urn:myapp:resource" are valid Uniform Resource Identifiers.

Such values are indicated with the "URI" type annotation in the model.

3.3.6. IP Addresses

IP addresses inside the IDMEF data model are expressed as strings using the traditional dotted-decimal notation for IPv4 addresses (defined by the "dotnum" production rule in the grammar in [\[RFC5321\]](#)), while IPv6 addresses are expressed using the text representation defined in [\[RFC4291\]](#) ch 2.2.

E.g. "192.0.2.1" represents a valid IPv4 address, while "::1/128" represents a valid IPv6 address.

It is RECOMMENDED that implementations follow the recommendations for IPv6 text representation stated in [\[RFC5952\]](#).

Such values are indicated with the "IP" type annotation in the model.

3.3.7. E-mail addresses

E-mail addresses inside the IDMEF data model are expressed as strings using the address specification syntax defined in [\[RFC5322\]](#) ch 3.4.1.

E.g. "root@example.com".

Such values are indicated with the "EMAIL" type annotation in the model.

3.3.8. Attachment names

Attachments inside the IDMEF data model are identified using a unique name, composed of a string whose character set is limited to the ASCII letters (A-Z a-z) and digits (0-9).

E.g. "state" is a valid name for an attachment.

The constraint on name unicity is enforced per class. That is, but it is not possible for two attachments to share the same name inside the same alert.

Such values are indicated with the "ID" type annotation in the model.

3.3.9. Media types

Media types are used in the IDMEF data model to describe an attachment's content. The syntax for such values is defined in [\[RFC2046\]](#).

IANA keeps a list of all currently registered media types in the Media Types registry .

E.g. "application/xml" or "text/plain; charset=utf-8".

Such values are indicated with the "MEDIATYPE" type annotation in the model.

3.3.10. Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs)

Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) are used to uniquely identify IDMEF messages. It is also possible for an IDMEF message to reference other IDMEF messages using their UUIDs. The syntax for UUIDs is defined in [\[RFC4122\]](#).

To limit the risk of UUID collisions, implementors SHOULD NOT generate version 4 UUIDs (randomly or pseudo-randomly generated UUIDs).

E.g. "ba2e4ef4-8719-42bb-a712-d6e8871c5c5a".

UUIDs are case-insensitive when used in comparisons.

Such values are indicated with the "UUID" type annotation in the model.

3.3.11. Protocol Names

Such values are indicated with the "PROTOCOL" type annotation in the model.

3.3.12. IDMEF Paths

This document defines a way to represent the path to every possible attribute inside an IDMEF message. For conciseness, the top-level "Alert" class is omitted from the path.

This representation can be used in contexts where the path to an IDMEF attribute is expected. An example of such usage can be seen in the definition of the "AggrCondition" attribute inside the Alert class ([Section 5.2](#)).

The syntax for these IDMEF paths is expressed in the following ABNF grammar:

```
class-name      = "Analyzer" / "Sensor" / "Source" / "Target" /
                  "Vector" / "Attachment"
attribute-name  = 1*ALPHA
class-reference = class-name "."
num            = *1 "-" 1*DIGIT
list-index     = "(" num ")"
path           = *1class-reference attribute-name *1list-index
```

Valid attribute names are limited to those defined for the specified class-reference (or in the top-level "Alert" class if class-reference is omitted).

For example, the following path refers to the "CeaseTime" attribute of the top-level "Alert" class: "CeaseTime".

Likewise, the following path refers to the "Name" attribute of the "Analyzer" class: "Analyzer.Name".

For attributes defined as lists (see [Section 3.4](#)), the path may include the (0-based) index for an entry inside the list. The index defaults to 0 if omitted. This means that several (valid) representations may be used to reference the same IDMEF attribute when list attributes are involved.

For example, both of the following paths refer to the IP address of the first source associated with an IDMEF message:

```
Source.IP  
Source(0).IP
```

Compatible implementations **MUST** reject paths that reference an unknown class, an unknown attribute, or use a list-index for an IDMEF field which is not defined as a list.

A compatible implementation **MUST** also normalize paths before comparing them (e.g. by stripping the text "(0)" from paths referring to list attributes).

3.3.13. Hashes

Hashes are sometimes used inside the data model to protect the integrity (and optionally, authenticity) of attachments.

The syntax for these values is "function:hash_result", where "function" refers to one of the hashing function names listed in and "hash_result" contains the hexadecimal notation for the hash result obtained by calling the specified hash function on the input value.

In the context of IDMEF, either a keyless or keyed hash function may be used to process the raw input value.

E.g. "sha256:a02735ed8b10ad432d557bd4849c0dac3b23d64706e0618716d6df2def338374"

Hashes are case-insensitive when used in comparisons.

Such values are indicated with the "HASH" type annotation in the model.

3.4. Lists

Some attributes of the IDMEF data model accept ordered lists of values.

Such ordered lists are indicated with the "X[]" type annotation in the model, where "X" refers to one of the data types defined in [Section 3](#). For example, "ENUM[]" refers to an ordered list of enumeration values.

4. The IDMEF extension

In order to support the dynamic nature of security operations and to adapt to specific needs, the IDMEFv2 data model will need to continue to evolve. This section discusses how new data elements can be incorporated into the IDMEFv2. There is support to add additional enumerated values and new attributes.

These extension mechanisms are designed so that adding new data elements is possible without requiring modifications to this document. Extensions can be implemented publicly or privately. With proven value, well-documented extensions can be incorporated into future versions of the specification.

4.1. Extending the Enumerated Values of Attributes

Additional enumerated values can be added to select attributes either through the use of specially marked attributes with the "ext-" prefix or through a set of corresponding IANA registries. The former approach allows for the extension to remain private. The latter approach is public.

4.1.1. Private Extension of Enumerated Values

The data model supports adding new enumerated values to an attribute without public registration. For each attribute that supports this extension technique, there is a corresponding attribute in the same element whose name is identical but with a prefix of "ext-". This special attribute is referred to as the extension attribute. The attribute being extended is referred to as an extensible attribute. For example, an extensible attribute named "foo" will have a corresponding extension attribute named "ext-foo". An element may have many extensible attributes.

In addition to a corresponding extension attribute, each extensible attribute has "ext-value" as one its possible enumerated values. Selection of this particular value in an extensible attribute signals that the extension attribute contains data. Otherwise, this "ext-value" value has no meaning.

In order to add a new enumerated value to an extensible attribute, the value of this attribute **MUST** be set to "ext-value", and the new desired value **MUST** be set in the corresponding extension attribute. For example, extending the Category attribute of the Analyzer class would look as follows:

```
Analyzer: {  
    ...  
    "Category": [ "ext-value" ],  
    "ext-Category": "my-new-analyzer-category",  
    ....  
}
```

A given extension attribute **MUST NOT** be set unless the corresponding extensible attribute has been set to "ext-value".

4.1.2. Public Extension of Enumerated Values

The data model also supports publicly extending select enumerated attributes. A new entry can be added by registering a new entry in the appropriate IANA registry. Section (Table 10) provides a mapping between the extensible attributes and their corresponding registry.

4.2. Private Extension of Attributes

Use of new attributes is possible through the use of the attachment class. New attributes and their corresponding values should be stored in the Content attribute of an Attachment and the ContentEncoding must be set to JSON. For example creating a new attribute to store the email of the operator (in charge of solving the incident) will look as follows:

```
"Attachment" : [  
  {  
    "Name": "Operator",  
    "ContentEncoding": "JSON",  
    "Content": "{ \"OperatorMail\": \"John.Does@acme.com\" }",  
  }  
]
```

5. The IDMEF Data Model

In this section, the individual components of the IDMEF data model will be discussed in detail. For each class, the semantics will be described.

5.1. Overview




Figure 2: IDMEFv2 Overview Classes

An IDMEF message is composed of an instance of the Alert class ([Section 5.2](#)) representing the overall properties of the message. It also contains exactly one instance of the Analyzer class ([Section 5.3](#)) and zero or more instances of the Sensor class ([Section 5.4](#)).

The message may also describe various aspects of an event using the Source ([Section 5.5](#)), Target ([Section 5.6](#)) and Vector ([Section 5.7](#)) classes.

Last but not least, it may also include zero or more instances of the Attachment class ([Section 5.8](#)), e.g. captured files or network packets related to the event for example.

The relationship between the main Alert class and other classes of the data model is shown in [Figure 3](#) (attributes are omitted for clarity).




Figure 3: IDMEFv2 Classes

It is important to note that the data model does not specify how an incident should be categorized or identified. For example, an attacker scanning a network for machines listening on a specific port may be identified by one

analyzer as a single attack against multiple targets, while another analyzer may identify it as multiple attacks from a single source. However, once an analyzer has determined the type of alert it plans on sending, the data model dictates how that alert should be formatted.

5.2. The Alert Class

The Alert class contains high level information about the event that triggered the alert.

Alert	
STRING	Version
UUID	ID
STRING	OrganisationName
STRING	OrganisationId
STRING	EntityName
STRING	EntityId
ENUM[]	Category
STRING	ext-Category
ENUM	Cause
STRING	Description
ENUM	Status
ENUM	Priority
FLOAT	Confidence
STRING	Note
TIMESTAMP	CreateTime
TIMESTAMP	StartTime
TIMESTAMP	EndTime
STRING[]	AltNames
STRING[]	AltCategory
URI[]	Ref
UUID[]	CorrelID
CONDITION[]	AggrCondition
UUID[]	PredID
UUID[]	RelID

Figure 4: The Alert class

The aggregate classes that make up Alert are:

Analyzer	Exactly one. An instance of the Analyzer class (Section 5.3) that describes the tool/device responsible for the analysis that resulted in the alert being created and sent.
Sensor	Zero or more. Instances of the Sensor class (Section 5.4) used to describe the sensor(s) that captured the information used during the analysis. Depending on the tools/devices used to detect incidents, an Analyzer may rely on the output from a single sensor or from multiple sensors to generate alerts. In addition, the Analyzer and Sensor may actually be part of the same physical device and may share some of their attributes (e.g. IP, Hostname, Model, etc.).
Source	Zero or more. Instances of the Source class (Section 5.5) used to describe the source(s) of the incident (e.g. attackers, faulty device, etc.).
Target	Zero or more. Instances of the Target class (Section 5.6) used to describe the target(s) of the incident, i.e. the impacted devices/users/services/locations.

Vector	Zero or more. Instances of the Vector class (Section 5.7) used to describe the means which were employed by the sources to disrupt the targets. E.g. to describe a drone crashing into a building and resulting in service loss or a malware email delivered opened in a mailbox and resulting in service loss.
Attachment	Zero or more. Instances of the Attachment class (Section 5.8) used to describe the electronic artifacts captured in relation with the event. The intent of the Attachment class is to keep track of the electronic files left as a trail during the event. This may include things like on-disk files (e.g. malware samples), network packet captures, videos or still images from a camera feed, voice recording, etc.

The Alert class has the following attributes:

Version	Mandatory. The version of the IDMEF format in use by this alert. During the drafts tuning period the version is equal to the draft version. Therefore it is "2.D.V0X" for Draft V0X.
ID	Mandatory. Unique identifier for the alert.
OrganisationName	Optional. Corporate/Main Office Organisation Name Useful if alerts are sent to a multi-organisation incident detection system. Example: ACME Corporation
OrganisationId	Optional. Corporate/Main Office Organisation ID. Where possible official organisation ID manage by national authority. Useful if alerts are sent to a multi-organisation incident detection system. This ID has to be chosen depending on the overall detection perimeter and the nature of the monitored organisation (Private/Public, Commercial, International, etc.) Examples: OrganisationId in France could be SIREN, in England could be CR, Germany could be Handelsregisternummer, Spain could be CIF, Italia could be Partita IVA, USA could be EIN, etc. Commercial OrganisationId in Europe could be V.A.T ID
EntityName	Optional. Entity Name, monitored by the organisation, where the incident occurred. Could be a town, region or country name or an internal name. Could also be the name of a client for a MSSP centralizing it's client incidents in a single system. Do not repeat the organisation name in the EntityName Example: - ACME HeadQuaters is located in Paris France and has a local office in India - If the incident occurred in the local office: "OrganisationName": "ACME" , "EntityName": "India" - If the incident occurred in the headquarters: "OrganisationName": "ACME", "EntityName": "Headquarters" (or "Paris")
EntityId	Optional. Entity ID, monitored by the organisation, where the incident occurred. Useful if organisation and entity are not directly linked, like a client and a MSSP.
Category	Optional. The incident's category & subcategory as listed in [ENISA-RIST] using the format "category.subcategory" (e.g. "Attempt.Exploit"). The category attribute is being totally reworked and will be updated on next release (V07). Please visit IDMEFv2 Task Force for more information.

Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Abusive.Spam	Or 'Unsolicited Bulk Email', this means that the recipient

Rank	Keyword	Description
		has not granted verifiable permission for the message to be sent and that the message is sent as part of a larger collection of messages, all having a functionally comparable content. This IOC refers to resources, which make up a SPAM infrastructure, be it a harvesters like address verification, URLs in spam e-mails etc.
1	Abusive.Harassment	Discretization or discrimination of somebody, e.g. cyber stalking, racism or threats against one or more individuals.
2	Abusive.Illicit	Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE), Sexual content, glorification of violence, etc.
3	Malicious.System	System infected with malware, e.g. PC, smartphone or server infected with a rootkit. Most often this refers to a connection to a sinkholed C2 server
4	Malicious.Botnet	Command-and-control server contacted by malware on infected systems.
5	Malicious.Distribution	URI used for malware distribution, e.g. a download URL included in fake invoice malware spam or exploit-kits (on websites).
6	Malicious.Configuration	URI hosting a malware configuration file, e.g. web-injects for a banking trojan.
7	Recon.Scanning	Attacks that send requests to a system to discover weaknesses. This also includes testing processes to gather information on hosts, services and accounts. Examples: fingerd, DNS querying, ICMP, SMTP (EXPN, RCPT, ...), port scanning.
8	Recon.Sniffing	Observing and recording of network traffic (wiretapping).
9	Recon.SocialEngineering	Gathering information from a human being in a non-technical way (e.g. lies, tricks, bribes, or threats).
10	Attempt.Exploit	An attempt to compromise a system or to disrupt any service by exploiting vulnerabilities

Rank	Keyword	Description
		with a standardised identifier such as CVE name (e.g. buffer overflow, backdoor, cross site scripting, etc.)
11	Attempt.Login	Multiple login attempts (Guessing / cracking of passwords, brute force). This IOC refers to a resource, which has been observed to perform brute-force attacks over a given application protocol.
12	Attempt.NewSignature	An attack using an unknown exploit.
13	Intrusion.AdminCompromise	Compromise of a system where the attacker gained administrative privileges.
14	Intrusion.UserCompromise	Compromise of a system using an unprivileged (user/service) account.
15	Intrusion.AppCompromise	Compromise of an application by exploiting (un-)known software vulnerabilities, e.g. SQL injection.
16	Intrusion.SysCompromise	Compromise of a system, e.g. unauthorised logins or commands. This includes compromising attempts on honeypot systems.
17	Intrusion.Burglary	Physical intrusion, e.g. into corporate building or data-centre.
18	Availability.DoS	Denial of Service attack, e.g. sending specially crafted requests to a web application which causes the application to crash or slow down.
19	Availability.DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service attack, e.g. SYN-Flood or UDP-based reflection/amplification attacks.
20	Availability.Misconf	Software misconfiguration resulting in service availability issues, e.g. DNS server with outdated DNSSEC Root Zone KSK.
21	Availability.Theft	Physical theft, e.g. stolen laptop computer, stolen USB key, stolen paper document, etc.
22	Availability.Sabotage	Physical sabotage, e.g cutting wires or malicious arson.
23	Availability.Outage	Outage caused e.g. by air condition failure or natural disaster.

Rank	Keyword	Description
24	Availability.Failure	Failure, malfunction (e.g. : bug, wear, faults, etc.)
25	Information. UnauthorizedAccess	Unauthorised access to information, e.g. by abusing stolen login credentials for a system or application, intercepting traffic or gaining access to physical documents.
26	Information. UnauthorizedModification	Unauthorised modification of information, e.g. by an attacker abusing stolen login credentials for a system or application or a ransomware encrypting data. Also includes defacements.
27	Information.DataLoss	Loss of data, e.g. caused by harddisk failure or physical theft.
28	Information.DataLeak	Leaked confidential information like credentials or personal data.
29	Fraud.UnauthorizedUsage	Using resources for unauthorised purposes including profit-making ventures, e.g. the use of e-mail to participate in illegal profit chain letters or pyramid schemes.
30	Fraud.Copyright	Offering or Installing copies of unlicensed commercial software or other copyright protected materials (Warez).
31	Fraud.Masquerade	Type of attack in which one entity illegitimately impersonates the identity of another in order to benefit from it.
32	Fraud.Phishing	Masquerading as another entity in order to persuade the user to reveal private credentials. This IOC most often refers to a URL, which is used to phish user credentials.
33	Vulnerable.Crypto	Publicly accessible services offering weak crypto, e.g. web servers susceptible to POODLE/FREAK attacks.
34	Vulnerable.DDoS	Publicly accessible services that can be abused for conducting DDoS reflection/amplification attacks, e.g. DNS open-resolvers or NTP servers with monlist enabled.

Rank	Keyword	Description
35	Vulnerable.Surface	Potentially unwanted publicly accessible services, e.g. Telnet, RDP or VNC.
36	Vulnerable.Disclosure	Publicly accessible services potentially disclosing sensitive information, e.g. SNMP or Redis.
37	Vulnerable.System	A system which is vulnerable to certain attacks. Example: misconfigured client proxy settings (example: WPAD), outdated operating system version, XSS vulnerabilities, etc.
38	Geophysical.Earthquake	A hazard originating from solid earth. This term is used interchangeably with the term geological hazard.
39	Geophysical.MassMovement	A hazard originating from solid earth. This term is used interchangeably with the term geological hazard.
40	Geophysical.Volcanic	A hazard originating from solid earth. This term is used interchangeably with the term geological hazard.
41	Meteorological. Temperature	A hazard caused by short-lived, micro- to meso-scale extreme weather and atmospheric conditions that last from minutes to days.
42	Meteorological.Fog	A hazard caused by short-lived, micro- to meso-scale extreme weather and atmospheric conditions that last from minutes to days.
43	Meteorological.Storm	A hazard caused by short-lived, micro- to meso-scale extreme weather and atmospheric conditions that last from minutes to days.
44	Hydrological.Flood	A hazard caused by the occurrence, movement, and distribution of surface and subsurface freshwater and saltwater.
45	Hydrological.Landslide	A hazard caused by the occurrence, movement, and distribution of surface and subsurface freshwater and saltwater.
46	Hydrological.Wave	A hazard caused by the occurrence, movement, and

Rank	Keyword	Description
47	Climatological.Drought	distribution of surface and subsurface freshwater and saltwater. A hazard caused by long-lived, meso- to macro-scale atmospheric processes ranging from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability.
48	Climatological. LakeOutburst	A hazard caused by long-lived, meso- to macro-scale atmospheric processes ranging from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability.
49	Climatological.Wildfire	A hazard caused by long-lived, meso- to macro-scale atmospheric processes ranging from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability.
50	Biological.Epidemic	A hazard caused by the exposure to living organisms and their toxic substances (e.g. venom, mold) or vector-borne diseases that they may carry. Examples are venomous wildlife and insects, poisonous plants, and mosquitoes carrying disease-causing agents such as parasites, bacteria, or viruses (e.g. malaria).
51	Biological.Insect	A hazard caused by the exposure to living organisms and their toxic substances (e.g. venom, mold) or vector-borne diseases that they may carry. Examples are venomous wildlife and insects, poisonous plants, and mosquitoes carrying disease-causing agents such as parasites, bacteria, or viruses (e.g. malaria).
52	Biological.Animal	A hazard caused by the exposure to living organisms and their toxic substances (e.g. venom, mold) or vector-borne diseases that they may carry. Examples are venomous wildlife and insects, poisonous plants, and mosquitoes carrying disease-causing agents such as parasites, bacteria, or viruses (e.g. malaria).
53	Extraterrestrial.Impact	A hazard caused by asteroids, meteoroids, and comets as

Rank	Keyword	Description
54	Extraterrestrial. SpaceWeather	they pass near-earth, enter the Earth's atmosphere, and/or strike the Earth, and by changes in interplanetary conditions that effect the Earth's magnetosphere, ionosphere, and thermosphere. A hazard caused by asteroids, meteoroids, and comets as they pass near-earth, enter the Earth's atmosphere, and/or strike the Earth, and by changes in interplanetary conditions that effect the Earth's magnetosphere, ionosphere, and thermosphere.
55	Other.Uncategorised	All incidents which don't fit in one of the given categories should be put into this class or the incident is not categorised.
56	Other.Undetermined	The categorisation of the incident is unknown/undetermined.
57	Test.Test	Meant for testing.
58	ext-value	A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)

Table 1: Incident taxonomy

ext-Category	Optional. A means by which to extend the Category attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)
Cause	Optional. Incident cause. The cause can be modified by any analyser on the way of the alert and later by the operator and/or the analyst if new investigation reveals and confirms a different cause of the event.

Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Normal	The event is related to an expected phenomenon or to a phenomenon that does not qualify as out of the ordinary.
1	Error	The event is related to a human error.
2	Malicious	The event is related to malicious code or malicious actions.
3	Malfunction	The event is related to a device or service malfunction.
4	Hazard	The event is related to a hazard phenomenon.

Rank	Keyword	Description
5	Unknown	The cause of the event is unknown.

Table 2: Incident causes

Description	Optional. Short free text human-readable description of the event. The description can add detail to the event classification for easiest/faster comprehension by the operator. Example : * Cryptoware WannaCry blocked on pegasus server * Unknown person entering through east doorway
Status	Optional. Event state in the overall event lifecycle.

Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Event	The event is still considered as an harmless event and should not be treated.
1	Incident	The event is considered as an incident and should be taken care of.

Table 3: Incident statuses

Priority	Optional. Priority of the alert. Priority is defined by combining impact and urgency. It indicates how fast the incident should be taken care of. Impact defines the enormity of the situation and mostly deals with “How Many” or “how much” question. It can be in terms of people, finances, systems, etc. How many people and/or systems impacted, how badly are they impacted (is there potential physical impact ?) , how much financial loss, severity of legal liabilities,... Impact could be considered equivalent to "Severity". Urgency is associated with time. The time it takes to have the perceived Impact. For example, a high impact incident may have low urgency if the impact will not affect the business until the end of the financial year.
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Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Unknown	Priority unknown
1	Info	No priority, the alert is informational
2	Low	Low priority
3	Medium	Medium priority
4	High	High priority

Table 4: Incident severities

Confidence	Optional. A floating-point value between 0 and 1 indicating the analyzer's confidence in its own reliability of this particular detection, where 0 means that the detection is surely incorrect while 1 means there is no doubt about the detection made.
Note	Optional. Free text human-readable additional note, possibly a longer description of the incident if is not already obvious. The Note attribute can be used to store any additional information. It can be additional information about the event and/or about the incident resolution, although the incident resolution information should in principle be stored elsewhere (with a link with the external tool in AltNames)
CreateTime	Mandatory. Timestamp indicating when the message was created.

StartTime	Optional. Timestamp indicating the deduced start of the event. StartTime can be later than CreateTime in case of Alerts created from forecast information (e.g. Snow Storm in two days starting at 10h00)
EndTime	Optional. Timestamp indicating the deduced end of the event.
AltNames	Optional. Alternative identifiers; strings which help pair the event to internal systems' information (for example ticket IDs inside a request tracking systems).
AltCategory	Optional. Alternate categories from a reference other than [ENISA-RIST] (e.g. MISP, MITRE ATT@CK or another proprietary/internal reference).
Ref	Optional. References to sources of information related to the incident and/or vulnerability, and specific to this incident. This MAY be a URL to additional info, or a URN in a registered or unregistered ad-hoc namespace bearing reasonable information value and uniqueness, such as "urn:cve:CVE-2013-2266".
CorrelID	Optional. Identifiers for the messages which were used as information sources to create this message, in case the message has been created based on correlation/analysis/deduction from other messages.
AggrCondition	Optional. A list of IDMEF fields used to aggregate events. The values for these fields will be the same in all aggregated events. This attribute should mostly be set by intermediary nodes, which detect duplicates, or aggregate events, spanning multiple detection windows, into a longer one. The "StartTime" and "EndTime" attributes are used in conjunction with this attribute to describe the aggregation window.
PredID	Optional. A list containing the identifiers of previous messages which are obsoleted by this message. The obsoleted alerts SHOULD NOT be used anymore. This field can be used to "update" an alert.
RelID	Optional. A list containing the identifiers of other messages related to this message.

5.3. The Analyzer Class

The Analyzer class describes the module that has analyzed the data captured by the sensors, identified an event of interest and decided to create an alert.

Analyzer	
UUID	ID
IP	IP
STRING	Name
STRING	Hostname
STRING	Model
ENUM[]	Type
ENUM[]	Category
STRING	ext-Category
ENUM[]	Data
STRING	ext-Data
ENUM[]	Method
STRING	ext-Method
GEOLOC	GeoLocation
UNLOCODE	UnLocation
STRING	Location

Figure 5: The Analyzer class

The Analyzer class has the following attributes:

ID	Mandatory. Unique identifier for the analyzer.
IP	Optional. Analyzer IP address.
Name	Mandatory. Name of the analyzer, which must be reasonably unique, however still bear some meaningful sense. This attribute usually denotes the hierarchy of organizational units the detector belongs to and its own name. It MAY also be used to distinguish multiple analyzers running with the same IP address.
Hostname	Optional. Hostname of this analyzer. SHOULD be a fully-qualified domain name.
Model	Optional. Analyzer model description (usually its generic name, brand and version).
Type	Optional. Analyzer type.

Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Cyber	The analyzer specializes in the detection of cyber incidents
1	Physical	The analyzer specializes in the detection of physical incidents
2	Availability	The analyzer specializes in the detection of availability incidents
3	Combined	The analyzer specilizes in detections that combine data from multiple domains (e.g. a combination of Cyber and Availability data)

Table 5: Analyzer types

Category	Optional. Analyzer categories.		
Rank	Keyword	Description	
0	1DLiS	1D LIDAR Sensor	

Rank	Keyword	Description
1	2DLiS	2D LIDAR Sensor
2	3DLiS	3D LIDAR Sensor
3	1DLaS	1D Laser Sensor
4	2DLaS	2D Laser Sensor
5	3DLaS	3D Laser Sensor
6	VAD	Voice Activity Detection
7	HAR	Human Activity Detection
8	FRC	Face Recognition Camera
9	VNIR	Visible and Near-InfraRed
10	SWIR	Short Wavelength InfraRed
11	MWIR	Middle Wavelength InfraRed
12	LWIR	Long Wavelength InfraRed
13	ADS	Anti-Drone System
14	ODC	Object Detection Camera
15	DDoS	Anti-DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) protection
16	SPAM	Spam detection, phishing detection, etc.
17	AV	Signature-based virus/malware detection
18	EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
19	FW	Firewall
20	NIDS	Network Intrusion Detection System
21	HIDS	Host Intrusion Detection System
22	WIDS	Wi-Fi Intrusion Detection System
23	PROX	Proxy, e.g. detection of violations to the company's security policy
24	WAF	Web Application Firewall
25	HPT	Honeypot
26	LOG	Log analyzer
27	IAM	Identity and Access Management tool
28	VPN	Devices/tools related to Virtual Private Network
29	ETL	Extract-Transform-Load tools
30	RASP	Runtime Application Self-Protection
31	BAST	Clientless Remote Desktop Gateway / administration bastions
32	NAC	Devices/tools related to Network Access Control
33	SIEM	Security Information and Event Management systems
34	NMS	Network Management Systems
35	ext-value	A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided

Rank	Keyword	Description
using the corresponding ext-* attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)		
Table 6: Analyzer categories		
ext-Category	Optional. A means by which to extend the Category attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)	
Data	Optional. Type of data analyzed during the detection.	
Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Light	
1	Noise	
2	Touch	
3	Images	
4	Vibrations	
5	Lidar	
6	Thermic	
7	Seismic	
8	Temperature	
9	Rain	
10	Water	
11	Humidity	
12	Particles	
13	Contact	
14	MagneticField	
15	Acoustics	
16	Fog	
17	External	
18	Reporting	
19	Connection	
20	Datagram	
21	Content	
22	Data	
23	File	
24	Flow	
25	Log	
26	Protocol	
27	Host	
28	Network	
29	Alert	
30	Relay	
31	Auth	
32	SNMP	
33	ext-value	A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)

Table 7: Analyzer data	
ext-Data	Optional. A means by which to extend the Data attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)

Method	Optional. Detection method.		
Rank	Keyword	Description	
0	Biometric		
1	Policy		
2	Heat		
3	Movement		
4	Blackhole		
5	Signature		
6	Statistical		
7	Heuristic		
8	Integrity		
9	Honeypot		
10	Tarpit		
11	Recon		
12	Correlation		
13	Monitor		
14	AI		
15	Threshold		
16	ext-value	A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)	

Table 8: Analyzer methods

ext-Method	Optional. A means by which to extend the Method attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)
GeoLocation	Optional. GPS coordinates for the analyzer.
UnLocation	Optional. Standard UN/Locode for the analyzer.
Location	Optional. Internal name for the location of the analyzer.

5.4. The Sensor Class

The Sensor class describes the module that captured the data before sending it to an analyzer. The Sensor may be a subpart of the Analyzer.

Sensor	
UUID	ID
IP	IP
STRING	Name
STRING	Hostname
STRING	Model
GEOLOC	GeoLocation
UNLOCODE	UnLocation
STRING	Location
STRING	CaptureZone

Figure 6: The Sensor class

The Sensor class has the following attributes:

ID Mandatory. Unique identifier for the sensor.

IP	Optional. The sensor's IP address.
Name	Mandatory. Name of the sensor, which must be reasonably unique, however still bear some meaningful sense. This attribute usually denotes the hierarchy of organizational units the sensor belongs to and its own name. It MAY also be used to distinguish multiple sensors running with the same IP address.
Hostname	Optional. The sensor's hostname. This SHOULD be a fully qualified domain name, but may not conform exactly because values extracted from logs, messages, DNS, etc. may themselves be malformed. An empty string MAY be used to explicitly state that this value was inquired but not found (missing DNS entry).
Model	Optional. The sensor model's description (usually its generic name, brand and version).
GeoLocation	Optional. GPS coordinates for the analyzerr.
UnLocation	Optional. Standard UN/Locode for the sensor.
Location	Optional. Internal name for the location of the sensor.
CaptureZone	Optional. A string that describes the "capture zone" of the sensor, as a JSON-serialized string. Depending on the type of sensor, the capture zone may for instance refer to: A JSON object describing a camera's settings (elevation, horizontal and vertical field of view, azimuth, etc.) A description of the IP network where packet capture is taking place.

5.5. The Source Class

The Source class describes the origin(s) of the event(s) leading up to the creation of this alert.

Source	
UUID	ID
IP	IP
STRING	Hostname
STRING	Note
STRING[]	TI
STRING	User
EMAIL	Email
PROTOCOL[]	Protocol
INT[]	Port
GEOLOC	GeoLocation
UNLOCODE	UnLocation
STRING	Location
ID[]	Attachment

Figure 7: The Source class

The Source class has the following attributes:

ID	Mandatory. Unique identifier for the source.
IP	Optional. Source IP address.

Hostname	Optional. Hostname of this source. This SHOULD be a fully qualified domain name, but may not conform exactly because values extracted from logs, messages, DNS, etc. may themselves be malformed. An empty string MAY be used to explicitly state that this value was inquired but not found (missing DNS entry).
Note	Optional. Free text human-readable additional note for this source.
TI	Optional. Threat Intelligence data about the source. Values in this list MUST use the format "attribute:origin", where "attribute" refers to the attribute inside this source found inside a Threat Intelligence database, and "origin" contains a short identifier for the Threat Intelligence database. E.g. "IP:Dshield". Please note that the same attribute may appear multiple times inside the list (because a match was found in multiple Threat Intelligence databases).
User	Optional. User ID or login responsible for the incident.
Email	Optional. Email address responsible for the incident. E.g. the value of the "Reply-To" or "From" header inside a phishing e-mail.
Protocol	Optional. Protocols related to connections from/to this source. If several protocols are stacked, they MUST be ordered from the lowest (the closest to the medium) to the highest (the closest to the application) according to the ISO/OSI model.
Port	Optional. Source ports involved in the incident. Values in this list MUST be integers and MUST be in the range 1-65535.
GeoLocation	Optional. GPS coordinates for the source.
UnLocation	Optional. Standard UN/Locode for the source.
Location	Optional. Internal name for the location of the source.
Attachment	Optional. Identifiers for attachments related to this source. Each identifier listed here MUST match the "Name" attribute for one of the attachments described using the Attachment class (Section 5.8).

5.6. The Target Class

The Target class describes the target(s) impacted by the event(s) leading up to the creation of this alert.

Target	
UUID	ID
IP	IP
STRING	Hostname
STRING	Note
STRING	Service
STRING	User
EMAIL	Email
INT[]	Port
GEOLOC	GeoLocation
UNLOCODE	UnLocation
STRING	Location
ID[]	Attachment

Figure 8: The Target class

The Target class has the following attributes:

ID	Mandatory. Unique identifier for the target.
IP	Optional. Target IP address.
Hostname	Optional. Hostname of this target. This SHOULD be a fully qualified domain name, but may not conform exactly because values extracted from logs, messages, DNS, etc. may themselves be malformed. An empty string MAY be used to explicitly state that this value was inquired but not found (missing DNS entry).
Note	Optional. Free text human-readable additional note for this target.
Service	Optional. Service or process impacted by the incident.
User	Optional. User ID or login impacted by the incident.
Email	Optional. Email address impacted by the incident. E.g. the value of the "To" header inside a phishing e-mail.
Port	Optional. Target ports involved in the incident. Values in this list MUST be integers and MUST be in the range 1-65535.
GeoLocation	Optional. GPS coordinates for the target.
UnLocation	Optional. Standard UN/Locode for the target.
Location	Optional. Internal name for the location of the target.
Attachment	Optional. Identifiers for attachments related to this target. Each identifier listed here MUST match the "Name" attribute for one of the attachments described using the Attachment class (Section 5.8).

5.7. The Vector Class

The Vector class describes the vector(s) of the event(s) leading up to the creation of this alert.

Vector	
UUID	ID
ENUM[]	Category
STRING	ext-Category
STRING	Name
STRING	Note
STRING[]	TI
GEOLOC	GeoLocation
FLOAT	GeoRadius
UNLOCODE	UnLocation
STRING	Location
ID[]	Attachment

Figure 9: The Vector class

The Vector class has the following attributes:

ID	Mandatory. Unique identifier for the vector.
Category	Optional. Category for the detected "vector".

Rank	Keyword	Description
0	Unknown	
1	Face	
2	RunningMan	

Rank	Keyword	Description
3	Human	
4	Man	
5	Woman	
6	Children	
7	Animal	
8	Object	
9	Blast	
10	Fire	
11	Wind	
12	Snow	
13	Rain	
14	Chemical	
15	Smoke	
16	Vapors	
17	Drug	
18	Device	
19	Drone	
20	Car	
21	Truck	
22	Vehicle	
23	Bird	
24	Storm	
25	HighTemperature	
26	Artifact	
27	Autonomous System	
28	Directory	
29	Domain Name	
30	Email Address	
31	Email Message	
32	File	
33	IPv4 Address	
34	IPv6 Address	
35	Mutex	
36	Network Traffic	
37	Process	
38	URL	
39	User Account	
40	Windows Registry Key	
41	X509 Certificate	
42	ext-value	A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)

Table 9: Vector categories

ext-Category	Optional. A means by which to extend the Category attribute. (see Section 4.1.1)
Name	Optional. Name of the detected vector or "Unknown". Please note that this name does not need to be unique across vectors.
Note	Optional. Free text human-readable additional note for this vector.

TI	Optional. Threat Intelligence data about the vector. Values in this list MUST use the format "attribute:origin", where "attribute" refers to the attribute inside this vector found inside a Threat Intelligence database, and "origin" contains a short identifier for the Threat Intelligence database. E.g. "Name:FBI-Wanted". Please note that the same attribute may appear multiple times inside the list (because a match was found in multiple Threat Intelligence databases).
GeoLocation	Optional. GPS coordinates for the vector.
GeoRadius	Optional. Estimated radius around the provided geolocation in meters. This attribute can be interpreted as an error margin related to the detection of this vector.
UnLocation	Optional. Standard UN/Locode for the vector.
Location	Optional. Internal name for the location of the vector.
Attachment	Optional. Identifiers for attachments related to this vector. Each identifier listed here MUST match the "Name" attribute for one of the attachments described using the Attachment class (Section 5.8).

5.8. The Attachment Class

The Attachment class contains additional data which was captured in relation with the event.

Attachment	
ID	Name
STRING	FileName
HASH[]	Hash
INT	Size
URI[]	Ref
URI[]	ExternalURI
STRING	Note
MEDIATYPE	ContentType
STRING	ContentEncoding
STRING	Content

Figure 10: The Attachment class

The Attachment class has the following attributes:

Name	Mandatory. A unique identifier among attachments that can be used to reference this attachment from other classes using the "Attachment" attribute.
FileName	Optional. Attachment filename. This will usually be the original name of the captured file or the name of the file containing the captured content (e.g. a packet capture file).
Hash	Optional. A list of hash results for the attachment's Content. The values in this list are computed by taking the raw value of the attachment's "Content" attribute. The hash result is computed before any other transformation (e.g. Base64 encoding) is applied to the content, so that a receiving IDMEF system may reverse the transformation, apply the same hashing function and

	<p>obtain the same hash result. See also the definition for the "ContentEncoding" attribute below.</p> <p>It is RECOMMENDED that compatible implementations use one of the hashing functions from the SHA-2 [RFC6234] or SHA-3 [NIST.FIPS.202] families to compute the hash results in this list.</p>
Size	<p>Optional. Length of the content (in bytes).</p> <p>This value MUST be a non-negative integer.</p>
Ref	<p>Optional. References to sources of information related to the incident and/or vulnerability, and specific to this attachment.</p>
ExternalURI	<p>Optional. If the attachment's content is available and/or recognizable from an external resource, this is the URI (usually a URL) to that resource.</p> <p>This MAY also be a URN in a registered or unregistered ad-hoc namespace bearing reasonable information value and uniqueness, such as "urn:mhr:55eaf7effadc07f866d1eacd9c64e7ee49fe081a" or "magnet:?xt=urn:sha1:YNCKHTQCWBTRNJIV4WNAE52SJUQCZO5C".</p>
Note	<p>Optional. Free text human-readable additional note for this attachment.</p>
ContentType	<p>Optional. Internet Media Type of the attachment.</p> <p>For compatibility reasons, implementations SHOULD prefer one of the well-known media types registered in IANA .</p>
ContentEncoding	<p>Optional. Content encoding.</p> <p>The following encodings are defined in this version of the specification:</p> <p>"json": The content refers to a JSON object which has been serialized to a string using the serialization procedure defined in [RFC8259].</p> <p>"base64": The content has been serialized using the Base64 encoding defined in [RFC4648].</p> <p>The "base64" encoding SHOULD be used when the content contains binary data. If omitted, the "json" encoding MUST be assumed.</p>
Content	<p>Optional. The attachment's content, in case it is directly embedded inside the message.</p> <p>For large attachments, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations make use of the "ExternalURI" attribute to reference a copy of the content saved in an external storage mechanism.</p>

5.9. The JavaScript Object Notation Serialization Method

This serialization method aims to convert IDMEFv2 messages to a format that is easy to parse and process, both by software/hardware processors, as well as humans. It relies on the the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format defined in [RFC8259].

Conforming implementations MUST implement all the requirements specified in [RFC8259].

In addition, the following rules MUST be observed when serializing an IDMEFv2 message:

The top-level Alert class (Section 4.2) is represented as a JSON object ([RFC8259]). This JSON object is returned to the calling process at the end of the serialization process.

Aggregate classes are represented as JSON objects and stored as members of the top-level JSON object, using the same name as in the IDMEF data model. E.g. the appears under the name "Analyzer" inside the top-level JSON object.

Attributes are stored as members of the JSON object representing the class they belong to, using the same name as in the IDMEF data model. E.g. the "Version" attribute from the is stored under the name "Version" inside the top-level JSON object.

Lists from the IDMEF data model are represented as JSON arrays ([RFC8259]). This also applies to aggregate classes where a list is expected. E.g. the "Sensor" member inside the top-level JSON object contains a list of objects, where each object represents an instance of the .

The various string-based data types listed in Section 3 are represented as JSON strings ([RFC8259]). Please note that the issues outlined in [RFC8259] regarding strings processing also apply here.

IDMEF attributes with the "NUMBER" data type are represented as JSON numbers ([RFC8259]).

6. Security Considerations

This document describes a data representation for exchanging security-related information between incident detection system implementations. Although there are no security concerns directly applicable to the format of this data, the data itself may contain security-sensitive information whose confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability may need to be protected.

This suggests that the systems used to collect, transmit, process, and store this data should be protected against unauthorized use and that the data itself should be protected against unauthorized access.

The underlying messaging format and protocol used to exchange instances of the IDMEF MUST provide appropriate guarantees of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The use of a standardized security protocol is encouraged.

The draft-lehmann-idmefv2-https-transport-01.txt document defines the transportation of IDMEF over HTTPS that provides such security.

7. IANA Considerations

This document creates 10 identically structured registries to be managed by IANA:

Name of the registry group: "Incident Detection Message Exchange Format v2 (IDMEF)"

URL of the registry: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/idmefv2>

Namespace format: A registry entry consists of:

Rank. A uniq integer for this namespace. Range starts at 0 and ends at the length of this list. The maximum length of this list is 255.

Keyword. A keyword for a given IDMEF attribute. It MUST conform to the formatting specified by the IDMEF "ENUM" data type (Section 3.3.1).

Description. A short description of the enumerated keyword.

Reference. An optional list of URIs to further describe the value.

Allocation policy: Expert Review per [RFC8126]. This reviewer will ensure that the requested registry entry conforms to the prescribed formatting. The reviewer will also ensure that the entry is an appropriate value for the attribute per the information model (Section 5).

The registries to be created are named in the "Registry Name" column of Table 10. Each registry is initially populated with ranks, keywords and descriptions that come from an attribute specified in the IDMEF model (Section 5). The initial Ranks, Keywords and Description fields of a given registry are listed in "Initial Values". The "Initial Values" column points to a table in this document that lists and describes each enumerated keyword. Each enumerated keyword in the table gets a corresponding entry in a given registry. The initial value of the Reference field of every registry entry described below should be this document.

Registry Name	Initial Values
Alert-Category	Table 1 (Alert class (Section 5.2))
Alert-Cause	Table 2 (Alert class (Section 5.2))
Alert-Priority	Table 4 (Alert class (Section 5.2))
Alert-Status	Table 3 (Alert class (Section 5.2))
Analyzer-Category	Table 6 (Alert class (Section 5.2))
Analyzer-Data	Table 7 (Analyzer class (Section 5.3))
Analyzer-Method	Table 8 (Analyzer class (Section 5.3))
Analyzer-Type	Table 5 (Analyzer class (Section 5.3))
Vector-Category	Table 9 (Vector (Section 5.7))

Table 10: IANA Enumerated Value Registries

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¶The CESNET team for their work on the [IDEA0] format (based on IDMEFv1) which inspired multiples concepts to IDMEFv2.

¶The [ENISA-RIST] Reference Security Incident Taxonomy Working Group

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Appendix A. Examples

This section contains several examples of events/incidents which may be described using the IDMEF Data Model defined in.

For each example, the serialization method listed in Section 5 was used on the original IDMEF message to produce a JSON representation.

A.1. Physical intrusion

Listing 1 describes an incident where an unidentified man was detected on company premises near the building where server room A is located.


```
{
  "Version": "2.D.V0X",
  "ID": "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b1",
  "Description": "Potential intruder detected",
  "Priority": "Low",
  "Status": "Incident",
  "Cause": "Malicious",
  "CreateTime": "2021-05-10T16:52:13.075994+00:00",
  "StartTime": "2021-05-10T16:52:13+00:00",
  "Category": [
    "Intrusion.Burglary"
  ],
  "Analyzer": {
    "Name": "BigBrother",
    "Hostname": "bb.acme.com",
    "Type": "Physical",
    "Model": "Big Brother v42",
    "Category": [
      "HAR",
      "FRC"
    ],
    "Data": [
      "Images"
    ],
    "Method": [
      "Movement",
      "Biometric",
      "AI"
    ],
    "IP": "192.0.2.1"
  },
  "Sensor": [
    {
      "IP": "192.0.2.2",
      "Name": "Camera #23",
      "Model": "SuperDuper Camera v1",
      "Location": "Hallway to server room A1"
    }
  ],
  "Source": [
    {
      "Note": "Black Organization, aka. APT 4869"
    }
  ],
  "Vector": [
    {
      "Category": ["Man"],
      "TI": ["Name:FBI-Wanted"],
      "Name": "John Doe",
      "Note": "Codename Vodka, known henchman for APT 4869",
      "Location": "Hallway to server room A1",
      "Attachment": ["pic01", "wanted"]
    }
  ],
  "Attachment": [
    {
      "Name": "wanted",
      "FileName": "fbi-wanted-exposed-1992026",
      "Size": 1234567,
      "Ref": ["https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/tenten"]
    }
  ]
}
```

A.2. Cyberattack

Listing 2 describes an incident related to a potential bruteforce attack against the "root" user account of the server at 192.0.2.2 and 2001:db8::/32.

```
{
  "Version": "2.D.V0X",
  "ID": "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b2",
  "Description": "Potential bruteforce attack on root user account",
  "Priority": "Medium",
  "CreateTime": "2021-05-10T16:55:29.196408+00:00",
  "StartTime": "2021-05-10T16:55:29+00:00",
  "Category": [
    "Attempt.Login"
  ],
  "Analyzer": {
    "Name": "SIEM",
    "Hostname": "siem.acme.com",
    "Type": "Cyber",
    "Model": "Concerto SIEM 5.2",
    "Category": [
      "SIEM",
      "LOG"
    ],
    "Data": [
      "Log"
    ],
    "Method": [
      "Monitor",
      "Signature"
    ],
    "IP": "192.0.2.1"
  },
  "Sensor": [
    {
      "IP": "192.0.2.5",
      "Name": "syslog",
      "Hostname": "www.acme.com",
      "Model": "rsyslog 8.2110",
      "Location": "Server room A1, rack 10"
    }
  ],
  "Target": [
    {
      "IP": "192.0.2.2",
      "Hostname": "www.acme.com",
      "Location": "Server room A1, rack 10",
      "User": "root"
    },
    {
      "IP": "2001:db8::/32",
      "Hostname": "www.acme.com",
      "Location": "Server room A1, rack 10",
      "User": "root"
    }
  ]
}
```

A.3. Server outage

Listing 3 describes an incident where the webserver at "www.example.com" encountered some kind of failure condition resulting in an outage.

```
{
  "Version": "2.D.V0X",
  "ID": "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b3",
  "Description": "A server did not reply to an ICMP ping request",
  "Priority": "Medium",
  "Status": "Incident",
  "Cause": "Unknown",
  "CreateTime": "2021-05-10T16:59:11.875209+00:00",
  "StartTime": "2021-05-10T16:59:11.875209+00:00",
  "Category": [
    "Availability.Outage"
  ],
  "Analyzer": {
    "Name": "NMS",
    "Hostname": "nms.example.com",
    "Type": "Availability",
    "Model": "Concerto NMS 5.2",
    "Category": [
      "NMS"
    ],
    "Data": [
      "Network"
    ],
    "Method": [
      "Monitor"
    ],
    "IP": "192.0.2.1"
  },
  "Target": [
    {
      "IP": "192.168.1.2",
      "Hostname": "www.acme.com",
      "Service": "website",
      "Location": "Server room A1, rack 10"
    }
  ]
}
```

A.4. Combined incident

Listing 4 describes a combined incident resulting from the correlation of the previous physical, cyber and availability incidents.

```
{
  "Version": "2.D.V0X",
  "ID": "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b4",
  "Description": "Intrusion and Sabotage detected",
  "Priority": "High",
  "Status": "Incident",
  "Cause": "Malicious",
  "CreateTime": "2021-05-10T16:59:15.075994+00:00",
  "StartTime": "2021-05-10T16:52:11+00:00",
  "Category": [
    "Intrusion.Burglary",
    "Attempt.Login",
    "Intrusion.SysCompromise",
    "Availability.Outage",
    "Availability.Sabotage",
    "Availability.Failure"
  ],
  "CorrelID": [
    "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b1",
    "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b2",
    "819df7bc-35ef-40d8-bbee-1901117370b3"
  ],
  "Analyzer": {
    "Name": "Correlator",
    "Hostname": "correlator.acme.com",
    "Type": "Combined",
    "Model": "Concerto Hybrid Correlator v5.2",
    "Category": [
    ],
    "Data": [
      "Alert"
    ],
    "Method": [
      "Correlation"
    ],
    "IP": "192.0.2.1"
  },
  "Source": [
    {
      "Note": "Black Organization, aka. APT 4869"
    }
  ],
  "Vector": [
    {
      "Category": ["Man"],
      "TI": ["Name:FBI-Wanted"],
      "Name": "John Doe",
      "Note": "Codename Vodka, known henchman for APT 4869",
      "Size": "Medium"
    }
  ],
  "Target": [
    {
      "Location": "Server room A1"
    },
    {
      "IP": "192.0.2.2",
      "Hostname": "www.acme.com",
      "User": "root"
    }
  ]
}
```

Appendix B. JSON Validation Schema (Non-normative)

Listing 5 contains a JSON Schema that can be used to validate incoming IDMEF messages prior to processing. Please note that extraneous linebreaks have been included due to formatting constraints.

```

{
  "description": "JSON schema for the Intrusion Detection Message
Exchange Format (IDMEF) version 2 (revision 2.D.V0X)",
  "properties": {
    "Version": {
      "description": "The version of the IDMEF format in use by this
alert. During the drafts tuning period the version is equal to the draft
version. Therefore it is \"2.D.V0X\" for Draft V0X.",
      "enum": [
        "2.D.V0X"
      ]
    },
    "ID": {
      "description": "Unique identifier for the alert.",
      "$ref": "#/definitions/uuidType"
    },
    "OrganisationName": {
      "description": "Corporate/Main Office Organisation Name Useful
if alerts are sent to a multi-organisation incident detection system.
Example: ACME Corporation",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "OrganisationId": {
      "description": "Corporate/Main Office Organisation ID. Where
possible official organisation ID manage by national authority. Useful
if alerts are sent to a multi-organisation incident detection system.
This ID has to be chosen depending on the overall detection perimeter and
the nature of the monitored organisation (Private/Public, Commercial,
International, etc.) Examples: OrganisationId in France could be SIREN,
in England could be CR, Germany could be Handelsregisternummer, Spain
could be CIF, Italia could be Partita IVA, USA could be EIN, etc.
Commercial OrganisationId in Europe could be V.A.T ID",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "EntityName": {
      "description": "Entity Name, monitored by the organisation,
where the incident occurred. Could be a town, region or country name
or an internal name. Could also be the name of a client for a MSSP
centralizing it's client incidents in a single system. Do not repeat
the organisation name in the EntityName Example : \n- ACME HeadQuaters
is located in Paris France and has a local office in India\n- If the
incident occurred in the local office : \"OrganisationName\" : \"
ACME\" , \"EntityName\" : \"India\" \n- If the incident occurred in
the headquaters : \"OrganisationName\" : \"ACME\", \"EntityName\" :
\"Headquaters\" (or \"Paris\"),
      "type": "string"
    },
    "EntityId": {
      "description": "Entity ID, monitored by the organisation,
where the incident occurred. Useful if organisation and entity are not
directly linked, like a client and a MSSP.",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "Category": {
      "description": "The incident's category & subcategory
as listed in using the format \"category.subcategory\" (e.g.
\"Attempt.Exploit\").",
      "type": "array", Expires June 29, 2026
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/definitions/categoryEnum"
      }
    }
  }
}

```

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