

PasswordStore Audit Report

Version 1.0

IDorando

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Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

Disclaimer

The IDorando team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

| | | Impact | | |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|-----|
| | | High | Medium | Low |
| Likelihood | High | H | H/M | M |
| | Medium | H/M | M | M/L |
| | Low | M | M/L | L |

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in the document correspond the following commit hash:

```
1 2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990
```

Scope

```
1 ./src/  
2 #-- PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read password.

Executive Summary

Add some notes about how the audit went, types of things you found, etc.

We spent X hours with Z auditors using Y tools. etc

Issues found

| Severity | Number of issues found |
|----------|------------------------|
| High | 2 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
| Info | 1 |
| Total | 3 |

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone and no longer private

Description: All data stored on chain is public and visible to anyone. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be hidden and only accessible by the owner through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function. I show one such method of reading any data off chain below.

Impact: Anyone is able to read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

Proof of Concept: The below test case shows how anyone could read the password directly from the blockchain. We use foundry's cast tool to read directly from the storage of the contract, without being the owner.

Create a locally running chain

```
1 make anvil
```

Deploy the contract to the chain

```
1 make deploy
```

Run the storage tool

```
1 cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

We use 1 because that's the storage slot of `PasswordStore::s_password`.

You'll get an output that looks like this:

[illegible]

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
1 cast parse-bytes32-string 0  
x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
```

And get an output of:

```
1 myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the stored password. However, you're also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with this decryption key.

[H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password

Description: The `PasswordStore : : setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however the purpose of the smart contract and function's natspec indicate that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password.`

```
1 function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2     // @Audit - There are no Access Controls.
3     s_password = newPassword;
4     emit SetNewPassword();
5 }
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the stored password, severely breaking the contract's intended functionality.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to the PasswordStore.t.sol test file:

Code

```
1 function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {
2     vm.assume(randomAddress != owner);
3     vm.startPrank(randomAddress);
4     string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
5     passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);
6     vm.startPrank(owner);
7     string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
8     assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
9 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to `PasswordStore::setPassword`.

```
1 if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
2     revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
3 }
```

Informational

[I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect.

Description:

```
1     /*
2     * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3     @> * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4     */
5     function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {}
```

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` while the natspec says it should be `getPassword(string)`.

Impact: The natspec is incorrect.

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
1 - * @param newPassword the new password to set.
```