

# DNS / DNSSEC / DANE / DPRIVE @ IETF 93 Hackathon

July 18-19  
Prague, Czech  
Republic




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
# Answering 3 Questions

- How can you be sure the information you get *out* of DNS is the same info the domain operator put *in* to DNS? (DNSSEC)
- How do you know you are using the correct TLS certificate? (DANE/DNSSEC)
- How can you protect the *confidentiality* of your DNS queries from surveillance? (DPRIVE)


# Attacking DNS



# The Global Chain of Trust



# The Two Parts of DNSSEC




# DANE

- RFC 6698
- Adds TLS certificate (fingerprint or entire cert) as a DNS record – and signs that with DNSSEC
- Apps can then verify via DNSSEC that this is correct cert (or CA) to use
- Being used now between email servers, XMPP servers, plugins for browsers
- Concept expanded to S/MIME certs, OpenPGP

# DNS PRIVate Exchange (DPRIVE)

- Protecting the **confidentiality** of DNS queries
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter/>
- Focused on communication between DNS clients (i.e. stub resolvers) and DNS iterative resolvers
- Solutions include sending DNS queries over TLS or DTLS

# Summary – What We Are Working On



**TRUST IN TLS - DANE**

**CONFIDENTIALITY - DPRIVE**

**INTEGRITY – DNSSEC**



# IETF 93 Hackathon Ideas

- DNSSEC
  - Stats and reliability testing – improving tools to help gather data about roadblock avoidance.
  - Tools to help ease / automate deployment
  - Support for new algorithm types (ex. ECDSA) in tools/interfaces
- DANE
  - Portable tool for creating and adding DANE RR's to zones
  - Measurement of DANE deployment
  - Adding DANE support to different tools and interfaces
- DPRIVE
  - Explore mechanisms to authenticate server certificates used in DNS-over-TLS (Unbound, getdns)
  - Enhancements to the implementation of DNS-over-TLS in Unbound e.g.
    - TCP connection re-use/TLS session resumption
    - Configuration options for TLS versions and supported cipher suites
    - Transport fallback if TLS/STARTTLS not available

# Join Us!

- **Help us make DNS (and the Internet) more secure and private!**
- **Champions:**
  - Dan York, Internet Society [york@isoc.org](mailto:york@isoc.org)
  - Allison Mankin, Verisign Labs [amankin@verisign.com](mailto:amankin@verisign.com)
  - Benno Overeinder, NLnet Labs [benno@nlnetlabs.nl](mailto:benno@nlnetlabs.nl)
  - Sara Dickinson, Sinodun [sara@sinodun.com](mailto:sara@sinodun.com)
  - Daniel Kahn Gillmor, ACLU [dkg@fifthhorseman.net](mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net)